Following the fall of the Assad regime after offensives by opposition groups in early December 2024, there were clashes between Assad loyalists and forces of the new Syrian caretaker government in the Alawite-majority Tartus and Latakia Governorates as well as in the western parts of the Hama and Homs Governorates.
The government took action through pursuing Assadist officers and officials in villages within Western Syria. The clashes were triggered by the proliferation of videos on social media showing footage of an attack on the Abu Abdullah al-Hussein al-Khusseibi shrine in Aleppo, which occurred in November. The incitement of violence and civil unrest among Alawite communities by Assadist elements has led to the formation of Alawite insurgent groups in Western Syria.
Following the collapse of Ba'athist Syria, there were frequent demands of vengeance against individuals involved with the deposed regime across parts of Western Syria. Sources such as the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights group also reported numerous extrajudicial executions of mainly Alawite civilians and former security personnel in the region, carried out by unidentified gunmen and fighters aligned with the Syrian caretaker government and nominally a part of the new Syrian Army as well as by Assad loyalists, resulting in the deaths of more than 2,388 civilians, at least 2,127 of whom were confirmed to have been killed in sectarian violence.
In early March, Assadist insurgents launched a coordinated attack on government forces in the coastal region, and government forces launched a counter-offensive. This was accompanied by sectarian violence, mainly against Alawites. The Syrian caretaker government announced it had completed its military operation against Assad loyalists on 10 March 2025, though attacks continued. By late May 2025, the Institute for the Study of War reported that Assadist insurgent attacks had largely stopped since March until later on in August when insurgent attacks continued.
Background
In December 2024, a surprise offensive by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other rebel forces, some backed by Turkey, overthrew the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, ending over five decades of Assad family rule in Syria. The surprise offensive, originating in the country's northwestern region, resulted in al-Assad and his family seeking asylum in Russia. HTS emir and military commander Ahmed al-Sharaa emerged as Syria's de facto leader following the fall of Damascus, with the majority of Syrian Armed Forces troops surrendering, fleeing the country, or defecting.
Civil unrest
After the fall of the Assad regime, escalating tensions were reported in Western Syria, particularly in regions with significant Alawite populations, with riots and civil unrest emerging in multiple locations including Tartus, Latakia, and Bashar's birthplace of Qardaha.
On 15 December 2024, the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that pro-Assad insurgents were meeting with village elders in Latakia Governorate, instructing them to resist actions from the newly implemented Military Operations Administration in order to defend "the Alawite sect".
On 22 December 2024, SOHR reported that civilian demonstrations erupted in the Al-Bahluliyah district east of Latakia, following allegations of misconduct by the caretaker government's security forces, demanding the complete withdrawal of security forces from the village. SOHR said that the incident involved armed individuals claiming affiliation with the new government forcibly entering the residence of Al-Bahluliyah's Mukhtar. The intruders reportedly brandished weapons at young residents in the neighborhood and committed various acts of misconduct, including verbal and physical abuse against family members and a girl. SOHR reported that protesters chanted "Death rather than humiliation" in response.
On 23 December 2024, hundreds of Christians and their supporters marched through Damascus after foreign fighters from Ansar al-Tawhid set fire to a Christmas tree in Suqaylabiyah, a Christian town near Hama. Protestors urged the HTS authorities to protect minorities and for foreign fighters to leave Syria. HTS later said they had detained the arsonists.
Catholic News Agency reported on 31 December 2024 that some Muslim residents who were displaced from the town of Maaloula by the Assad regime, were threatening and harassing some Christian residents who were accused of collaborating with pro-Assad militant groups.
Attack on Alawite shrine
On 25 December, tensions inflamed amongst segments of the Syrian Alawite population in response to online circulation of videos showing footage of an attack on the Alawite shrine of Abu Abdullah al-Hussein al-Khusseibi in Aleppo. Though the incident had occurred weeks earlier, disinformation campaigns spread the footage as recent, aiming to incite discord and violent riots. The footage depicted attackers killing five shrine attendants, mutilating their bodies, damaging the site, and setting fire to the structure. The video provoked outrage among sections of Syria's Alawite population.
The demonstrations erupted across multiple Alawite neighborhoods in Homs, including Al-Khudari, Wadi Al-Dhahab, Al-Zahraa, Al-Sabil, Al-Abbasiya, and Al-Muhajireen. Protesters expressed outrage over the shrine attack through sectarian chants and public demonstrations, with religious and community leaders denouncing it as an attack on Alawite religious heritage and identity while calling for the perpetrators to be brought to justice. Protesters also demanded greater security be granted to the community by the government, and for it to remove all of the extremist and foreign elements from its military. Several protesters were arrested in Homs, Tartus, and Jableh. The Syrian General Security Service, operating under the new government's Military Operations Department, opened fire to disperse the crowd in Homs, resulting in one protester's death and five others sustaining injuries from gunfire.
It was soon discovered that the attack had occurred weeks earlier during clashes between Syrian opposition and Assad regime forces in Aleppo, and that the Alawite religious site had only been partially damaged, contrary to numerous social media posts that claimed it had been demolished. Verify Syria, a fact-checking organization, reported that a co-ordinated disinformation campaign was launched to circulate misleading posts related to the shrine attack through social media networks of Assad loyalists, who aimed to exacerbate sectarian tensions and provide cover for Assad regime officials fleeing Syria. In response to rising tensions, the new government enhanced its security presence in Alawite-dominated regions. Public Security Forces implemented a curfew across Homs, Jableh, and Banias, while military reinforcements established security perimeters around the Akrama and Al-Nahda neighborhoods to stop further unrest. They also established military checkpoints for civilians to hand over their weapons, and set up loudspeakers in mosques instructing them to do so within 24 hours. Many, especially commanders and officers associated with the Assad regime, refused to do so.
Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Syria has experienced a surge in disinformation on social media, targeting both Syrian and international audiences. DW News reported that the flood of online disinformation and inflammatory social media posts has had destabilizing consequences on the ground, such as triggering Alawite riots after the widespread online circulation of misleading posts of a shrine attack that occurred in November.
Fact-checking organizations such as Verify-Sy and Misbar have attributed these campaigns to social media accounts associated with Assad loyalists, as well as state propaganda outlets of Russia and Iran. Ba'athist Syria had maintained an extensive state propaganda apparatus, and its collapse created an information vacuum. Researchers have noted that Russian and Iranian disinformation networks remain active in social media, deploying fake accounts to stoke tensions amongst minorities, particularly the Alawite community, and incite sectarian clashes. Accounts linked to far-right groups in the West have also been amplifying Islamophobic posts targeting Syrian revolutionary activists.
Clashes
December
On 14 December, pro-Assad gunmen ambushed Sham Legion fighters in al-Muzayri'a in the Latakia countryside, killing four and wounding 11 others.
On 14 December, a raid on Al-Mazra'a in Homs Governorate, regarded as a significant Hezbollah stronghold, was launched by the Syrian Military Operations Administration, resulting in the arrests of "dozens of young men accused of committing previous violations against the people of the area". In an act of sectarian violence, on 1 February, Sunni gunmen killed 10 Alawites including a child and an elderly woman in the village of Arzah.
On 18 December, the Military Operations Administration conducted several raids in Hama and Homs Governorates and in several coastal areas to seek out Assad-associated figures and war criminals.
On 25 December, unidentified armed groups conducted synchronized assaults on multiple security checkpoints in the western Hama countryside with RPG launchers and heavy machine guns, killing one Syrian government troop and injuring another. On the same day, a contingent of the General Security Service – a police unit loyal to the new government – made their way to the Khirbet al-Ma'zah village in the southern Tartus Governorate. They intended to arrest Major General Mohammad Kanjo Hassan, who had headed the Military Justice Administration and Field Court during the rule of the Assad regime. He was regarded as one of those responsible for the mass murders in Saydnaya Prison. Upon entering the village, the General Security Service were ambushed by militants, with 14 policemen and three attackers being killed. According to SOHR, loyalists of Hassan and another former Ba'athist officer, Suhayl al-Hasan, were responsible for the ambush. The militants were led by Mohammad Kanjo Hassan's brother and expelled the security forces from the village. The caretaker government described the ambush as an attack by Assad loyalists. A curfew was declared at several cities.
The government's Military Operations Command subsequently ordered the arrest of the attackers and sent reinforcements to secure Khirbet al-Ma'zah. By 26 December, the Military Operations Command was conducting a large-scale campaign across Tartus Governorate, searching homes and securing the countryside. Hassan was reportedly captured in Khirbet al-Ma'zah. Three gunmen associated with Hassan were also killed in the gunfight. Hassan was former head of the military judiciary under the Assad regime and a Ba'athist prison officer at the Sednaya prison.
Other villages in the Tartus Governorate saw an "mass escape of former regime members". Two armed individuals from the village of Al-Zarqat, identified as regime loyalists or "shabiha," were killed after engaging in armed conflict with General Security Service. The security campaign prompted many former regime officials implicated in crimes against Syrian civilians to flee from several villages, including Al-Zuraiqat, Khirbet al-Ma'zah, and surrounding areas. In addition, four Syrian government troops were killed during a raid on a pro-Assad holdout containing trafficking ringleader Shujaa al-Ali in Balqsa, western Homs Governorate.
On 29 December 2024, a pro-Assadist group named the Syrian Popular Resistance announced their opposition to the HTS-led government and threatened to attack HTS forces in response to the civil unrest since the toppling of the Assad regime.
January
On 14 January, soldiers of the Military Operations Command were kidnapped and taken as hostages by the Assadist commander Bassam Hussam al-Din in Latakia Governorate. Bassam demanded Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces in a video to withdraw from the area within 24 hours or else the soldiers taken hostage would be "slaughtered". Later that day, HTS found Bassam's location using a drone and sent reinforcements to the area to rescue the units taken hostage, and surrounded him in his hideout, ultimately leading to him ending his life by suicide bombing himself. Seven Assadist militants (such as Jaafar Mahmoud al-Said) were killed in clashes following the incident, and all kidnapped units were rescued safely and unharmed without any casualties.
On 16 January 2025, General Security Administration (GSA) ended an effort by pro-Iranian trafficking networks to smuggle weapons from the Tartus region to Lebanon.
On 18 January 2025, a commander in the Military Operations Command was killed during clashes with pro-Assad gunmen in the Talkalakh area in the western Homs countryside.
On 19 January, Syrian security forces captured and destroyed a massive Captagon shipment belonging to drug trafficking networks linked to Maher al-Assad. The Syrian Ministry of Interior announced that roughly 100 million Captagon pills were seized in warehouses near the port of Latakia.
On 22 January, pro-Assad gunmen targeted a checkpoint of the Military Operations Command with machine guns and grenades in the industrial area at the entrance of Jableh in the Latakia countryside. The attack left two members of the Military Operations Command dead and two other members injured.
On 24 January, a group of pro-Assad militants attacked a security checkpoint in al-Muzayri'a in the Latakia countryside. The General Security Service repelled the attack and confiscated a vehicle and several firearms from the gunmen who attacked the security checkpoint.
February
Calls for resistance by Assad loyalists in Western Syria have resulted in the formation of Alawite insurgent groups in the region. Iran has also been accused of sponsoring the insurgency against the Syrian caretaker government.