The twin battles of Vyazma and Bryansk were a military confrontation during World War II on the German-Soviet front. They began under the code name Operation Typhoon on September 30, 1941, with the attack of the German Army Group Centre against the Soviet Western, Reserve and Bryansk Front. The goal of the German offensive was the destruction of the formations of the Red Army before Moscow and subsequently the capture of the city itself. Despite initial successes of the Wehrmacht, which was able to encircle and destroy large parts of the Soviet defenders at Vyazma and Bryansk, the advance stalled by October 30, 1941, in the autumn mud and the strengthening Soviet resistance. Only after more than two weeks could it resume the offensive with the onset of frost weather and thus open the Battle of Moscow.
Background
Since the beginning of the attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the three German army groups had broken through the defense of the Red Army and destroyed numerous Soviet formations in several encirclements. The Army Group Centre was directed towards Moscow. It had won the battles of Minsk and Smolensk, but on July 30, 1941, received the order to temporarily halt the advance.
In the days before, the so-called August crisis had arisen in the German leadership regarding the question of how the further operations should be shaped. Hitler was of the opinion that the capture of Moscow was not a priority. In his view, the economically important areas of Ukraine should first be occupied and Leningrad conquered. Therefore, the Army Group Centre should hand over its armored forces to the neighboring army groups North and South, in whose operational areas these goals lay. For the advance on Moscow, however, only the weakened infantry armies would remain, which were not up to this task in view of ongoing Soviet counterattacks. The military leadership in the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) considered this decision wrong and tried to dissuade Hitler from it. The Chief of the Army General Staff Colonel General Franz Halder pointed out the danger that by renouncing the advance on Moscow, the enemy would gain time and could bring a later German offensive to a halt with the onset of winter, whereby the military goal of Operation Barbarossa would not be achieved. Nevertheless, Hitler enforced his ideas on July 28 by turning the 2nd Army and the 2nd Panzer Group south into Ukraine, where they participated in the Battle of Kiev. The 3rd Panzer Group was relocated to the north to participate in the conquest of Leningrad.
Only after some "persuasive work" could the OKH and the Wehrmachtführungsstab prevail in mid-August. Hitler stipulated in Führer Directive No. 34 on August 12 that the "state, armaments, and transportation center" Moscow should be occupied before the onset of winter. However, the goals of Leningrad and Ukraine still had priority, so the fighting there should first be concluded before an offensive on Moscow could be prepared. The fighting in Ukraine and before Leningrad dragged on until September. Already before their final conclusion, however, Hitler issued on September 6, 1941, Führer Directive No. 35, which formed the basis of the future offensive:
The initial successes against the enemy forces located between the inner flanks of Army Groups South and Centre have [...] created the basis for a decisive operation against the Army Group Timoshenko fixed in attack battles before the Army Centre. It must be decisively defeated in the limited time available before the onset of winter weather. For this purpose, all forces of the Army and the Air Force that become dispensable on the flanks and can be brought up in time must be concentrated.
— Adolf Hitler
As the goal of the operation, the directive stipulated "to destroy the enemy located in the area eastward of Smolensk in a double envelopment set in the general direction of Vyazma [...]. [...] Only then [...] will Army Group Centre have to advance to the pursuit direction Moscow – leaning right on the Oka, left on the upper Volga." With this, Hitler had swung back to the rough line of the OKH and the High Commands of the Army Group Centre after the "August crisis".
German attack preparations
The German General Staff had already presented an operational plan on August 18, 1941, before the decision to turn the armored formations against Kiev, which provided for a double envelopment of the Soviet formations before the Army Group Centre. In this planning, it was initially left open whether after a successful advance, the envelopment of Moscow should be directly transitioned to or whether first the Soviet formations before the capital should be encircled and destroyed. Already in a discussion between Hitler and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch on August 30, 1941, they had agreed on a new advance towards Moscow. Already before Hitler's official directive, the commanders of the affected armies were informed. A few days later, Directive No. 35 followed from Hitler's headquarters.
The Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) issued a Directive for the Continuation of Operations on September 10, 1941, in which Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder specified Hitler's directive and partially reinterpreted it. In Hitler's plan, the capture of Moscow was only envisaged after the destruction of the Soviet forces, while Halder ordered to let formations advance on the capital simultaneously. Furthermore, he included the 2nd Army and the 2nd Panzer Group, which were still bound before Kiev at that time, in the plans. These should advance from the area of Romny against Oryol. With this, Halder had additionally created a third assault group for the attack to the east. The directive also provided for the handover of troops from the other army groups. The Army Group South had to hand over two general commands, four infantry divisions, two armored divisions and two motorized infantry divisions, while from the Army Group North with the 4th Panzer Group three general commands, five armored divisions and two motorized infantry divisions.
While Hitler wanted to set the pincer arms of the armored troops directly on Vyazma, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group Centre, wanted to carry out the envelopment of the enemy only far behind Vyazma at Gzhatsk. Colonel General Halder agreed and assured von Bock of his support. On September 17, 1941, both discussed the concrete operational plans worked out by von Bock. On September 24, the Commanders-in-Chief of the armies, panzer groups and the 2nd Air Fleet (Luftflotte 2) met with von Bock and Halder in Smolensk for a final discussion of the undertaking, which had received the designation Operation Typhoon on September 19. In it, it was determined that the 2nd Panzer Group should already advance to the attack on September 30, two days before the other formations. This had been enforced by Colonel General Heinz Guderian; since there were hardly any paved roads in his attack area, he was of the opinion that he had to gain paved roads at Oryol as quickly as possible and from there lateral connections to Bryansk.
The final orders to the individual armies were issued on September 26. To ensure close cooperation between panzer groups and infantry armies, the 4th Panzer Group was operationally subordinated to the 4th Army. It should attack along the road Roslavl–Moscow and after the successful breakthrough swing in on both sides of Vyazma against the Smolensk–Moscow highway. North of that, the 3rd Panzer Group, which was subordinated to the 9th Army, was to break through the Soviet lines south of Bely and gain the road Vyazma–Rzhev, before turning in west of Vyazma. Meanwhile, the inner flanks of both groupings should bind the enemy before them. The 2nd Army was ordered to advance against Sukhinichi and Meshchovsk to protect the flank of the 9th Army. Finally, the 2nd Panzer Group, which was directly under the High Command of the Army Group Centre, was to roll up the Soviet positions from the south. In cooperation with the 2nd Army, the enemy in the area of Bryansk was to be destroyed. The start of the attack should be (except for the 2nd Panzer Group) October 2, 1941, at 5:30 a.m.
Hitler had demanded from Halder on September 6 that the operation should begin within eight to ten days, which the latter described as impossible given the condition of the troops. The 2nd Panzer Group and the 2nd Army first had to be detached from the encirclement ring of the Kiev pocket, moreover, the formations had lost their offensive power in the long defensive battles before Smolensk. The relocation of formations from the other army groups over more than 600 km distance as well as the bringing up of the 2nd and 5th Panzer Division from Germany took a lot of time. Moreover, it was no longer possible to compensate for the personnel losses of the previous months. Nevertheless, the Army Group Centre could field a total of 1,929,406 soldiers in 78 divisions (46 inf div, 1 cav div, 14 pz div, 8 mot inf div, 6 sec div, 1 SS cav bde) on October 2, 1941, but not all participated in the planned offensive. However, these formations had suffered considerable loss of combat power, as both the soldiers and the material had been in continuous use for months.
In addition, Hitler held back large quantities of tanks that he had intended for use after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since the constant failures were therefore not replaced, the tank inventory of the 2nd Panzer Group at the beginning of the operations was only 50 percent, that of the 3rd Panzer Group 70 to 80 percent and only that of the 4th Panzer Group slightly below 100 percent. However, hardly all vehicles were operational from these inventories. In addition, there was a deficit of 22 percent in motor vehicles and 30 percent in tractors. Only 125 tanks were promised as replacements, although Colonel General Halder unsuccessfully requested the release of another 181 tanks. But even with their delivery, the operational readiness of the particularly weakened armored divisions would have increased by only 10 percent. The claim of Soviet historiography that the German assault formations were fully replenished and equipped, with 1700 tanks available to them, does not correspond to the facts. The historian Klaus Reinhardt determined the figure of 1220 tanks for the actual inventory.
In Gomel, Roslavl, Smolensk and Vitebsk, supply depots were also established for the supply of the troops during the planned offensive. However, to replenish the depots in September, 27 supply trains would have been necessary daily, in October even 29. The actual performance, however, amounted to these numbers only in the first 13 days. At the end of September and in October, only 22 trains arrived daily, before the number fell further to 20 in November. The supply was therefore only considered "satisfactory".
Soviet situation
Already shortly after the battles for Smolensk, the Soviet State Defense Committee (GKO) ordered the expansion of defensive positions before Moscow. Since July 16, 1941, the construction of a fortified defense line was carried out in the area of Mozhaysk with the involvement of civilians. About 85,000–100,000 Muscovites, mainly women, are said to have participated in the work. Until the beginning of the German offensive, the various defensive structures (bunkers, anti-tank obstacles, trenches) were only completed to 40 to 80 percent each.
On September 12, 1941, Colonel General I. S. Konev took command of the Western Front. This included at that time the 22nd, 29th, 30th, 19th, 16th and 20th Armies, which stood side by side from Lake Seliger in the north to Yelnya in the south. In addition, there was the Reserve Front of Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny, whose 24th and 43rd Armies stood along the Desna and thus connected left to the Western Front, but with its main mass (31st, 49th, 32nd and 33rd Armies) in the area of Vyazma 35 km behind the front also formed a second defense line. Further south stood the 50th, 3rd and 13th Armies of the Bryansk Front under Colonel General A. I. Yeryomenko in the area between Zhukovka and Vorozhba. These fronts comprised about 40 percent of the personnel and artillery as well as 35 percent of the tanks and aircraft of all Soviet forces.