The Battle of Majar al-Kabir was the result of growing distrust between the British military and local inhabitants of south-eastern Iraq over house searches and confiscation of personal weapons that locals felt were crucial for their self-protection. Despite a signed agreement between local people and British forces stating that the British would not enter the town, the 1st Battalion, Parachute Regiment started patrolling in the town of Majar al-Kabir on 24 June 2003, the day after the agreement was signed. The British thought the agreement was to stop the weapons searches that involved going into the houses of local inhabitants.
At first, angry locals stoned the Paras, encouraged by anti-British rhetoric broadcast from the town's minarets. The Paras used rubber bullets to try to control the situation; this led to street battles, rifle fire and the cornering of six Royal Military Policemen (RMP) in the police station at Majar al-Kabir. There were conflicting reports about who had fired the first live shots. The six RMP were killed by an angry mob of up to 600 people while maintaining a defensive position within the police station. Four Iraqi civilians were killed and at least eleven more were injured during the riot. Eight British troops were injured, although only one casualty was the result of a firefight in the town.
A Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was deployed from Camp Abu Naji and air support came in the form of one Gazelle and one Chinook helicopter. The Chinook incurred enough airframe damage from Iraqi gunfire that it could not land its QRF element in the town and had to return to Abu Naji where it offloaded seriously injured troops.
The death of the six RMP was one of the most controversial occurrences of the Iraq Campaign involving British forces and remains a topic of debate in political and military circles.
Background
On 20 March 2003, coalition forces started the invasion of Iraq that would become the Iraq War, lasting until 18 December 2011. Combat operations were announced by the then-President of the United States, George W. Bush, as being over on 1 May 2003. The south-eastern region of Iraq became part of the United Kingdom's Multi-National Division (South East) (MND (SE)) under the framework of Operation Telic. As part of their remit, the British forces were keen to remove all heavy weaponry from the region (anti-tank weapons, RPGs etc) and did so purposely. Whilst most of the weapons and ammunition were removed from private houses in the region, smaller weapons, such as AK-47s and handguns, were left with the families for their own protection. The local Iraqis had argued this point and demanded that they be left with some protection in what was a dangerous area post-invasion. One local man was quoted as saying "If Saddam Hussein could not take away our weapons, why should we allow the British to do so?"
The town of Majar al-Kabir lies 250 miles (400 km) south east of Baghdad and 120 miles (190 km) north of Basra in the Maysan Province of Iraq, and at the time, had a population of 85,000. In 2003, the main British base covering the region was Camp Abu Naji, which was 4 miles (6.4 km) south of Amarah and 15 miles (24 km) north of Majar al-Kabir. Majar al-Kabir was known to be awash with weapons as the area was predominantly Shia Muslim, whose people had been brutally treated by the government of Saddam Hussein. When the British arrived, they found an area devoid of government officials as all the Ba'athists had been chased away by the resentful local populace. The region was also prone to other influences such as the CIA operating in the area. This annoyed Lieutenant-Colonel Tom Beckett (commanding officer of 1 Para) who demanded that all CIA operatives clear their routines in the 1 Para area of operations through the Ops Room at Camp Abu Naji.
Because of the flat area in and around Majar al-Kabir, VHF and HF communications were extremely limited. Even when soldiers were in close proximity, communication was hampered by blackspots. 1 Para had Iridium phones, sat-phones and Personal Role Radios (PRRs).
A memorandum of understanding (MOU) was reached between the British Forces and local people that no more house searches would take place. The British believed that this understanding also meant that they would still patrol through the streets (showing and maintaining a presence), but the locals maintain that this was not in the agreement. It was later remarked that the British were not in the habit of creating "no-go zones" for themselves. On the 21 June, three days before the Battle of Majar al-Kabir, Major Kemp went into the town to meet the elders and inform them that there would be a British military presence at the police station where they would collect, but not search for, weapons. At the inquest into the men's deaths in March 2006, it was noted that there had been a mis-translation in the text of the MOU which the Iraqi population read as there being "no necessity that the coalition [troops] be there [the following day]."
Two days before the killings, Two-Zero Alpha, an element of 8 Platoon, C Company (1 Parachute Regiment) were at the police station in Majar al-Kabir to collect weapons that were to be handed in under the amnesty agreement. With some men on guard duty, the rest were sunbathing and relaxing when a crowd of angry Iraqis arrived at the police station throwing rocks and chanting "no, no, America". In the unrest that followed, a DAF truck and the Land Rover belonging to Two-Zero Alpha were destroyed. After some warning shots were fired by the British, including one plastic bullet which deflected off the ground and hit a protester in the face, a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was activated and they arrived in Scimitars and armed Land Rovers to push back the crowd.
Battle
On the morning of the battle, a support company platoon had driven through the town and when they reached Camp Abu Naji, they described the area as being "eerily quiet" and those locals that were out on the streets giving them "death stares".
Alpha and Bravo Company
Alpha and Bravo Company, both of 8 Platoon, 1 Para, arrived in Majar al-Kabir at 9:25 am on 24 June with the intention of carrying out foot patrols through the town. Before leaving, Lieutenant Ross Kennedy (the Officer in Command (OIC) of the two companies) asked for more baton rounds (plastic bullets) for his baton gun. The request was denied as all the spare rounds were packed away before the Parachute Regiment left the area to return to the UK in seven days' time. This left his two patrols (Alpha and Bravo) with only 13 baton rounds. At just after 10:00 am local time, the local Iraqi militia commander (Talal Abid Ahmed Zubaida) drove up to the patrol and stopped them from going further. Zubaida told them that the town was dangerous and that they would be shot at. Lieutenant Kennedy offered to change the route of the patrol, but Zubaida warned him that the route was an issue too and that if he went into the town, it would have to be without Zubaida's militia. The British managed to negotiate a vehicle-mounted patrol through the town as a compromise with Zubaida. Alpha Company would remain at the Militia headquarters with other vehicles whilst the Iraqi Militia would accompany Bravo, mounted on Pinzgauers, on a patrol through the town; the British felt that not to have patrolled would be a sign of weakness. At 10:10 am, Bravo company entered the town and almost immediately were showered with rocks thrown by "smiling locals."
At 10:25 am, Bravo Company de-bussed as the Iraqis were swarming around them and the ringleaders in the crowd were encouraging the locals to attack Bravo Company. As they de-bussed to throw back the crowd, the rear vehicle noticed that the Iraqi Militia contingent were no longer in the convoy. Such was the intensity of the rock throwing and the sheer numbers of locals in the crowd, Bravo took the decision to fire rubber bullets at the ringleaders. Although the soldiers were well aware that using rubber bullets could either calm or inflame a situation, they felt that they had no choice given the intensity of the crowd, who were being told via the loudspeakers on the minarets that the British were here to "rape the women [and] attack them!" One of the ringleaders was identified, and a corporal using the baton gun fired and felled the ringleader from 20 feet (6.1 m) away. After two more baton rounds were fired, the crowd surged forward and the Non-commissioned officer (NCO) of Bravo Company (Sgt Gordon Robertson) fired warning shots into the air from his rifle and other troops followed suit. At this the crowd moved back and allowed them space to move, but it was later realized that the local Iraqis had gone to get their weapons. In their minds, the British had fired first, so it was a matter of pride that they returned fire. At 10:30 am, Iraqi gunmen would return fire and Bravo would defend themselves with the result of the first Iraqis dying. One witness in the crowd claimed that children were throwing stones at the Paratroopers and when one of the paratroopers went into a firing position, a local man called Tassir thought a child would be shot, so he levelled his weapon at the paratroopers. The British troops fired on him first as they thought he was going to shoot, and after that, the crowd became completely hostile. At this point, the RMP patrol was only 200 metres (660 ft) away from the Paratroopers. Ahmed Younis, a member of the crowd on the morning, said
The market was very crowded. I threw myself on the ground and shouted to everyone to run away or get down. The shooting lasted about five minutes but there were bullets going everywhere. They were firing on automatic. I couldn't believe it when they started shooting.
Sheikh Shejar said
The Iraqi side fired first. Later they went to the police station and attacked there. The mob wanted to shelter at the police station and use it as a base to attack the British.
Back at the Militia Headquarters, Alpha Company were crouched down behind their vehicles dodging the rocks being thrown at them by an angry crowd. They were able to distinguish between the sound of rounds being fired from an AK-47 and an SA-80 rifle by their relative pitches. They realized that Bravo were under fire and returning fire themselves. Without communications, Alpha mounted up and drove into the town having to guess where Bravo would be by the sound of the gunfire. Alpha came under sustained and heavy fire at a crossroads 100 metres (330 ft) from the police station. Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) under these conditions is to de-bus. The troops from Alpha spread out, with some taking cover under their DAF truck. Despite the short distance and the availability of line of sight, no members of Alpha had seen or recognized the Land Rovers of the RMP patrol at the police station, though at that point, the Land Rovers may have been moved inside the police station compound. Alpha suppressed the enemy fire, but the DAF truck needed to be jump-started due to mechanical problems. With some troops providing cover, the rest of Alpha pushed the truck until it started. They then mounted up and sped north, targeted by gunmen all the way but managed to reach a point of safety north of the town. They de-bussed and took up defensive positions; the sitrep was phoned in to the Ops Room back at Abu Naji.
Meanwhile, Bravo were looking for an exit. As they were attacked from the front and had to stop, Sgt Gordon Robertson managed to reach the Ops Room at Camp Abu Naji and relay their situation. At this point Bravo had no casualties, but did need an ammunition re-supply. They were eager to know Alpha Company's location and situation. During heavy fighting, Bravo lost one of their Pinzgauers to an RPG round which detonated the fuel tank. A few minutes later, the second Pinzgauer was on fire and Bravo were having to fight through the streets to get to cover.
Alpha mounted back up at 10:50 am to drive back into town and try to assist Bravo Company. This request had come from the Ops Room and had been worded carefully so as not to sound like an order; only the commander on the ground could assess whether or not Alpha could be of any use. As they expected, they came under contact with heavy fire almost immediately and they had to de-bus from the DAF truck. An RPG was fired at the truck, but was deflected just in front of the vehicle by an electricity cable.
At this time (between 11:00 and 11:15 am), Alpha, Bravo and the six RMP personnel were within 400 metres (1,300 ft) of each other, but unable to communicate or group together; Alpha and Bravo Companies were completely unaware that the RMPs were even in the town and vice versa, even though they had all gone through the same Ops Room that morning. An Army Air Corps (AAC) Gazelle helicopter was dispatched to act as a re-broadcast unit between Alpha, Bravo and the Ops Room. Critically, it had also been given orders for a fly-over of the police station to determine if the six RMP NCOs were still there. At 11:05 am, a Chinook with a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was deployed from Abu Naji to go into Majar al-Kabir and support Bravo Company.