During the Russo-Ukrainian war, aerial warfare took place as early as the dawn of 24 February 2022, with Russian infantry and armored divisions entering into Eastern Ukraine with air support. Dozens of missile attacks were reported across Ukraine. The main infantry and tank attacks were launched in four spearhead incursions, creating a northern front launched towards Kyiv, a southern front originating in Crimea, a south-eastern front launched at the cities of Luhansk and Donbas, and an eastern front. Dozens of missile strikes across Ukraine also reached as far west as Lviv. Drones have also been a critical part of the invasion, particularly in regards to combined arms warfare. Drones have additionally been employed by Russia in striking Ukrainian critical infrastructure, and have been used by Ukraine to strike military infrastructure in Russian territory.
Air forces
Ukrainian Air Force
After the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War on Donbas in 2014, the development of air defense capabilities was a goal of the Ukrainian government. This consisted of ensuring that the radio engineering troops, responsible for providing warning from air attacks, could detect targets in a 300–400 kilometres (190–250 mi) range. In addition, Ukraine tried to modernize and increase the lifespans of its man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), which played a significant role in Ukraine's short range air defense capabilities.
The Ukrainian Air Force, led by Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk, is the aerial branch of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Prior to the invasion the Ukrainian Air Force had around 50 MiG-29 fighters in the 40th, 204th and 114th Tactical Aviation Brigade, 32 Su-27 fighters from the 831st and 39th Tactical Aviation Brigade as well as a few of Su-24 and Su-25 aircraft. However, the Ukrainian Air Force was still at a technical disadvantage to the Russian Air Force at the beginning of the invasion. The Army Aviation was reported to field 15 Mi-2, 60 Mi-8 cargo helicopters and 60 Mi-24 attack helicopters, some of these were non-operational at the time.
In April 2022, an unspecified country handed spare parts to help Ukraine restore 20 jet aircraft to operational usage, a United States defence official claimed. In June 2022, 20 Mi-17 cargo helicopters were supplied by the United States to the Ukrainian Army.
In May 2023, the United States indicated support for training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 fighters and for allies to transfer the aircraft to Ukraine. After this, multiple countries, including the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, pledged F-16s to Ukraine. On 6 June 2024, according to Le Figaro, French president Emmanuel Macron announced the future transfer of an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets to Ukraine.
Russian Aerospace Forces
The Russian Aerospace Forces, which consists of the Russian Air Force, the Air and Missile Defense Forces, and the Russian Space Forces, is currently led by Viktor Afzalov. The Russian Aerospace Forces, formed in August 2015, were previously headed by Sergey Surovikin, who was sacked from his position in August 2023 in the aftermath of the Wagner Group Rebellion. As of 2021, Russia had 4,173 active aircraft, comprising 8% of the world share, according to data from Flight Global. Close to 1,200 fixed wing aircraft are reported to be employed in the war.
Timeline
Initial invasion (24 February – 7 April 2022)
According to Mikhail Khodaryonok, Russians expecting a quick Russian victory in Ukraine falsely believed that: Russia could overwhelm Ukrainian defense with a powerful "first strike", which overlooked Russia's limited number of Kalibr cruise missiles, Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, Iskander missiles, and Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles; and that Russia achieving air dominance would be the decisive factor in obtaining a fast victory, which disregarded previous conflicts (such as the Soviet–Afghan War and the Chechen Wars) in which achieving air dominance did not obtain a fast victory.
Russian forces were unable to achieve air dominance over Ukraine in the early days of the war, which contributed to the Russian army failing to achieve its initial strategic objectives. Justin Bronk, a senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, attributed the failure to establish air superiority to a lack of early warning, coordination capacity and sufficient planning time. In addition, the Russian use of small jet formations and the U.S's fast delivery of anti-aircraft FIM-92 Stingers to Ukraine were also factors in Russia not achieving air superiority. In addition, Ukraine successfully used anti-air systems against Russia, which meant that Russian aircraft could not freely operate over most of Ukrainian-controlled territory. Due to the Russians having limited numbers of air resources for bombing, as well as Russian aircraft losses, Russian forces began to rely on missiles, which were often less accurate, instead of planes and helicopters.
At the opening stages of the war, Russia aimed to pin down Ukrainian air defenses by conducting ballistic and cruise missile strikes, and strike Ukrainian military infrastructure, arms, shipments from the West, fuel facilities, and bridges. During the first 21 days of the war, Russia launched over 1,100 missiles, and 2,125 over the first 68 days. On the first day of the invasion alone, Russia launched 100 short-range ballistic missiles. Russia faced problems in this campaign due to a lack of air supremacy, as well as logistics problems (such as running low on long range, precision guided missiles). In addition, Ukraine was able to move most of their planes before Russian missile attacks on Ukrainian airfields began on 24 February.
The first major battle of the invasion, the Battle of Antonov Airport, began on 24 February. The Russians aimed to use the airport to land a paratrooper force near Kyiv. The attack began with Russian Ka-52 attack helicopters and Mi-8 transport helicopters, with paratroopers on board. While Russian forces managed to take Antonov Airport, the Ukrainians contested the area for multiple more days. The Russians' failure to achieve air superiority also significantly hampered their efforts to take the airport. The resistance of Ukraine at Antonov Airport, and the failure of Russian paratroopers to take another airport in Vasylkiv a few days later, were significant reasons why the Battle of Kyiv failed. Russian forces took heavy paratrooper losses during the Battle of Kyiv. Later during the Battle of Kyiv, on 28 February, Russian forces sent a 15,000 strong convoy from Belarus into Ukraine, in order to help encirclement efforts of Kyiv. Ukraine employed Bayraktar TB2 drones to breach Russian anti-air systems included in the convoy. During the Odesa offensive in late march, Russia used cruise missiles to strike port infrastructure and the military airport in Odesa.
In the first month of the war, multiple countries provided air components to Ukraine: the U.S. provided 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft missile systems, 5,500 Javelin anti-tank missile systems, and 16 Mi-17 helicopters; Britain gave 10,000 short-range missiles and 10,000 anti-tank missiles; France gave MILAN anti-tank guided missile systems; and Germany gave 500 Stingers.
Southeastern front (8 April – 28 August 2022)
In April, after Russia abandoned the Kyiv Offensive, Russia refocused its missile attacks from Ukraine's military air fields and air defenses to economic and logistical targets. To that end, Russia targeted Ukraine's petroleum industry and oil refineries, which likely contributed to a temporary shortage of gasoline for Ukraine in the spring and summer of 2022. In addition, Russia struck Ukraine's bridge and rail infrastructure in an effort to slow the transfer of Western supplied weapons to Ukraine. However, neither of these efforts had a lasting impact on the war.
During this period in the Battle of Donbas, fighting became increasingly dominated by the use of artillery. As this increased, the importance of target acquisition also increased. To help with target acquisition, both sides used a wide range of drones. In a study by the Royal United Services Institute covering the period of the war up to July 2022, it was assessed that around 90% of drones used by Ukraine during this time period were destroyed.
From the last week of March to the end of April, Ukraine initiated helicopter raids to rescue members of the Azov Regiment during the Siege of Mariupol. These raids consisted of sixteen Mi-8 helicopters and resulted in the loss of three helicopters.
On 14 April, Ukraine sunk the cruiser Moskva with the use of Neptune missiles and a drone. The loss of the Moskva, which was the only Black Sea Fleet ship to have the S-300 missile system, left the other Black Sea Fleet ships with insufficient anti-air capabilities. This led the other Black Sea Fleet ships to relocate to the Sevastopol harbor, where there were ground based anti-air defences.
By the summer of 2022, Russian attacks against civilians and the Ukrainian agricultural sector using long-range missiles had increased. The increase in civilian attacks happened at the same time that there were reports that Russia was running low on higher-end precision-guided missiles, such as the Kh-101, and was instead using missiles not suited for land attacks, such as anti-ship missiles like the Kh-22 and S-300 anti-air missiles. It is likely that this increase in civilian attacks came in part intentionally, and in part due to inaccurate Russian missiles and bad targeting information.
On 28 June, Oleksii Reznikov, the defence minister of Ukraine, said that Ukraine had been given fifty Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones since the start of the invasion.
On 9 August, Ukraine struck Saky airbase in Novofedorivka, Crimea, leading to the destruction of four Su-30M jets and seven Su-24 jets.
2022 Ukrainian counteroffensives (29 August – 11 November 2022)
After Ukraine attacked the Kerch Straight Bridge on 8 October, Russia began a campaign to degrade Ukraine's electrical infrastructure through the use of missile and drone strikes. In the first week after having started these attacks, Russia struck about 30% of the power stations in Ukraine. While this campaign led to significant damage of Ukraine's energy infrastructure, Ukraine was able to avoid a complete collapse of its electrical grid.
2023–2024 winter campaigns
On 19 October 2023, Ukrainian forces carried out Operation Dragonfly, striking the Luhansk International Airport in the east and Berdiansk Airport in the south. During the operation, the Special Operations Forces used six MGM-140 ATACMS for the attack, which led to the heavy losses in the Russian Air Force. According to satellite imagery, these included two Mi-8s and six Ka-52s destroyed, two Mi-8s and three Ka-52s damaged beyond repair, and four Mi-8s and one Ka-52 damaged. In addition, the attack also destroyed the airport runways, numerous supply depots, and some air defense systems. The Ukrainians also claimed to have caused manpower losses, but it cannot be confirmed.
The fires created due to the burning of equipment at the Berdiansk Airport was visible from NASA's FIRMS. According to Russia, there were shrapnel of M74 Bomblets found at the scene, which likely originated from the ATACMS Block IA (M39A1) that the Ukrainians used for the attack. More shrapnel found later proved that the Ukrainians used ATACMS for the operation. which is likely the first time that it has been used in Ukraine. Prior to this incident, there had been fears from American leaders that the supply of ATACMS would lead to an "escalation of tensions", which American Ben Hodges criticized has "created sanctuary for the Russians".
During the Battle of Avdiivka, according to the ISW, Russian forces gained temporary and localized air superiority, likely for the first time during the war. During the battle, Russian forces increased their use of glide bombs.