The Stalemate in Southern Palestine was a six-month standoff between the British Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) and the Ottoman Army in World War I. The two hostile forces faced each other along the Gaza to Beersheba line during the Sinai and Palestine campaign, with neither side able to force its opponent to withdraw. The stalemate began in April 1917 with the defeat of the EEF by the Ottoman Army at the Second Battle of Gaza and lasted until the EEF offensive began with the Battle of Beersheba on 31 October 1917.
Previous to the stalemate, units of the Ottoman Fourth Army had been forced out of the Sinai Peninsula by a series of EEF victories: the Battle of Romani in August 1916, the Battle of Magdhaba in December and the Battle of Rafa in January 1917. The EEF followed up those victories by making two unsuccessful attempts to capture Gaza: the First Battle of Gaza in March, and the Second Battle of Gaza in April. These two Ottoman victories halted the attempted EEF invasion of southern Palestine, leading to the stalemate.
During the six-month-long stalemate, the EEF held positions on the edge of the Negev Desert, while both sides engaged in continuous trench warfare and contested mounted patrolling of the open eastern flank. Both sides took the opportunity to reorganise their forces, change commanders, conduct training and prepare for future major battles, which resulted in the EEF capture of Jerusalem in December 1917.
British defeats at Gaza
After the first British defeat at Gaza in March 1917, the commander of Eastern Force, Lieutenant-General Charles Dobell, sacked the commander of the 53rd (Welsh) Division, Major-General Alister Dallas, while the division was transferred from the Desert Column to Eastern Force. However, after a second defeat on 21 April, General Archibald Murray in turn sacked Dobell, promoting the commander of the Desert Column, Lieutenant-General Philip Chetwode, in his place. Chetwode was replaced by Harry Chauvel, promoted from command of the Anzac Mounted Division, while Edward Chaytor, commanding the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, was promoted to replace Chauvel. Yet General Murray would also be relieved of command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) in June and was sent back to England.
With its back to the Negev Desert following their defeat at the Second Battle of Gaza, the EEF had been fortunate that the Ottoman forces did not launch a large-scale counter-attack, as such an attack would likely have succeeded in pushing the EEF back a considerable distance. Regardless, the EEF faced the urgent problems of securing the positions it held at the end of the battle, and reorganising and reinforcing its severely depleted infantry divisions.
The British suffered nearly 4,000 casualties during the first battle for Gaza, and more than 6,000 casualties during the second. These casualties had to be managed, with the dead buried and their personal effects stored or sent home, and the wounded cared for. Meanwhile, the EEF's railway, which had reached Deir el Belah before the second battle of Gaza, was extended by a branch line to Shellal.
As the EEF withdrew following the Second Battle of Gaza, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade took up a position at Tel el Fara on the Wadi Ghazza, five miles (8.0 km) south of Gaza, where they dug trenches in case of a counter-attack.
Both sides constructed extensive entrenchments (which were particularly strong where they almost converged) to defend the Gaza–Beersheba line. These trenches resembled those on the Western Front, except they were not so extensive and had an open flank.
Between 400–2,500 yards (370–2,290 m) apart, the defensive lines stretched 30 miles (48 km) from Sheikh Ailin on the Mediterranean Sea to Sheikh Abbas and on to Tel el Jemmi and Beersheba. However, from a point just beyond Sheikh Abbas, the continuous trench lines became a series of fortified strong points, as the Ottoman line extended south-east along the Gaza to Beersheba road, while the EEF line following the Wadi Ghazza turned more sharply south to be as much as nine miles (14 km) south of the Ottoman line.
Situation after battles for Gaza
German and Ottoman forces
The Ottoman Fourth Army after the Second Battle of Gaza consisted of 174,908 men, 36,225 animals, 5,351 camels, armed with 145,840 rifles, 187 machine guns, and 282 artillery pieces. At this time the Fourth Army's five corps were responsible for garrisoning Palestine, the northern coast of Syria, and the Hejaz railway.
The strategic priorities of Enver Pasha and the Ottoman General Staff were to use this force to push the EEF back to the Suez Canal and to retake Baghdad and Mesopotamia along with Persia, while relying on "nonexistent interior lines of communication" and "chronic shortfalls in strategic transportation." In 1917 the Turkish 54th and 59th Infantry Divisions in Palestine and Syria became inoperative. The loss of these two divisions was blamed on problems of supply caused by the single–track, incomplete railway line from Turkey, which was not completed through the Taurus and Amanus mountains until 1918. Despite these deficiencies, following the two victories at Gaza, the Ottoman Army was "greatly strengthened in both force and morale."
Within a few weeks of the April battle for Gaza, General von Kressenstein, German field commander under Djemal Pasha, added, to his 3rd, 16th and 53rd Divisions of the Fourth Army, the 7th and 54th Divisions as reinforcements. This force was reorganised into two corps to hold the Gaza to Beersheba line: the XX Corps (16th and 54th Infantry Divisions, 178th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Cavalry Division), and the XXII Corps (3rd, 7th, 53rd Infantry Divisions).
The 30-mile (48 km)-long Ottoman front line stretched southeastwards from Gaza and dominated the country to the southwest, where the EEF was spread out in open, low-lying, rugged country interrupted by many deep wadis. From Gaza to Beersheba, this front line "stretch[ed] continuously for almost fifty kilometres." Major defensive outposts along the line, such as Rijm el Atawineh and Aba Hareira, could support each other; and, as they overlooked an almost flat plain, making a frontal attack against them virtually impossible. Between Gaza and Aba Hareira, at the Wadi el Sheria and halfway to Beersheba, the Ottoman defences were especially strong. Although those strengthened defences did not extend to Beersheba, strong fortifications, some being blasted from solid rock, made the isolated town a fortress.
Closest to Gaza, the 3rd Division of von Kressenstein's Fourth Army was deployed to defend Gaza and the defences stretching from Samson's Ridge, 2 miles (3.2 km) southwest of Gaza, along the Beersheba Road to Khashm el Bir and Khashm Sihan. From that point the Ottoman defences along the road were held by the 53rd Division, while the 79th Regiment defended fortified works which linked with two battalions of the 16th Division holding Tel esh Sheria, 15 miles (24 km) from Gaza and halfway along the defensive line, while the Ottoman cavalry division was deployed near Huj, 10 miles (16 km) east of Gaza.
New troop reinforcements for the buildup were incorporated into the organisational restructuring that saw formation of the Yildirim Army Group and the Seventh and Eighth Armies. New units were schooled in new combat methods developed on the Western Front and conducted multi-echelon combined-arms training. Among these new arrivals, the experience of the 7th Infantry Division (later part of the Eighth Army) was typical. This division left Constantinople on 14 January 1917, and by mid-April was being reorganised in Aleppo before travelling via Jerusalem, to arrive at Beersheba, between 7 May and 14 June 1917. While at Jerusalem in early May the division's 20th Infantry Regiment began company-level training, and after arriving at Beersheba remained in reserve, conducting theatre-specific training until late June, when it went into the front line, training in hand-grenade and trench-mortar use, fortification, reconnaissance, and counter-reconnaissance continuing. The division's 21st Infantry Regiment received similar training.
From 28 June to 10 August, the 7th Division, and eventually every Ottoman infantry division in Palestine, reorganised so that a quarter of their rifle strength, one company of every four, was outfitted with light machine guns, considerably increasing fire power and strengthening offensive and defensive capabilities. In addition, von Kressenstein, who commanded the Gaza to Beersheba defences, ordered assault detachments equivalent to the German Stosstruppen (known as Stormtroopers) to be formed. The 7th Division activated an assault detachment of 50 men on 17 July 1917.
The central training facility was located at the main Ottoman base of Tel esh Sheria, midway between Gaza and Beersheba, having moved north from Hafir el Auja, in early 1917, as the EEF approached Gaza. The school was staffed by German and Austrian instructors, as well as experienced Ottoman officers, from the European fronts of Galicia, Romania, and Macedonia. Courses were conducted in tactics and weapons then being employed on the Western Front. Commanders received a 15-day course and divisional officers a six–week course focused on the use of machine guns, "which was vital to the newly reorganised Ottoman infantry battalions." Artillery training also included up-to-date methods and tactics.
Egyptian Expeditionary Force
The EEF's strength, once enough for an advance into Palestine, had been decimated by the two battles for Gaza. The 52nd (Lowland), the 53rd (Welsh), and the 54th (East Anglian) Divisions, which had been reported to be about 1,500 below establishment before the first battle, lost a further 10,000 casualties during the two battles. Three months later, they would still be 5,150 infantry and 400 yeomanry below strength. A much larger force would be needed to defeat the strongly entrenched and newly reinforced Ottoman positions.
Permanent defences were constructed from the sea at Gaza to Shellal on the Wadi Ghazza. From Shellal a lightly entrenched line extended to El Gamli, before continuing south 7 miles (11 km) to Tel el Fara. The western sector stretched almost to Tel el Jemmi, and was strongly entrenched and wired, and defended by infantry. The Desert Column was responsible for outposts and patrols in the open plain stretching east and south of the eastern flank, and for harassing Ottoman forces at every opportunity, while wells and cisterns were mapped.
The open eastern flank was dominated by the Wadi Ghazza, which could only be crossed at four places, apart from the beach on the Mediterranean coast. These were the main Deir el Belah to Gaza road crossing; the Tel el Jemmi crossing, which had been used during the first battle of Gaza; the Shellal crossing on the Khan Yunis to Beersheba road; and the Tel el Fara crossing on the Rafa to Beersheba road. Difficulties crossing elsewhere along the wadi were due to the 50–60 feet (15–18 m) perpendicular banks cut into the Gaza–Beersheba plain by flooding two or three times a year. During the stalemate numerous additional crossings were constructed.
Viewing across the open eastern flank was possible from the top of the "curiously shaped heaps of broken earth" near Shellal. Two tels, indicating possible sites of ancient cities, stood high above the plain and also provided excellent views. The spectacular, flat-topped Tel el Jemmi, with its perpendicular sides, one side dropping into the Wadi Ghazza, could be seen for miles. It had been used as a lookout during the first battle of Gaza. Tel el Fara, on the Rafa to Beersheba road, was a flat-topped prominence with conical sides 7 miles (11 km) further south, and was approximately 16 miles (26 km) inland from the coast in the centre of the Gaza to Beersheba front line. This large mound, near the Wadi Ghazza at Shellal, was thought to have been built by the crusaders in the 13th century as an observation post; and it gave an "uninterrupted view for several miles northward and eastward." At the base of Tel el Fara huge stone buttresses and several courses of cut stone could be seen at water level.
To the west of the Wadi Ghazza a reserve line along the old battle line was held by one infantry brigade. To the east of the Wadi Ghazza, the front line consisted of 25 redoubts manned by one platoon in each redoubt, except redoubts 2, 11, and 12, which each had two platoons. These redoubts, fronted by continuous wire entanglements, formed the firing line between Gamli and Hiseia 12,000 yards (11,000 m) to the north. In addition, the front line was strengthened by a support line of trenches, located 300 yards (270 m) behind the firing line, along the east bank of the Wadi Ghazza. Continuous wire entanglements with gaps for the main roads stretched for 11,000 yards (10,000 m) south. This battle line was held by one infantry division, which deployed in the front line one brigade and one artillery brigade, the latter located along the west bank of the Wadi Ghazza, from which the guns could "sweep the ground in front of the battle line."
Attacks were to be resisted strongly. Each garrison of front line infantry was to be reinforced from the support line in sufficient numbers to replace casualties. If a redoubt was lost, it was to be retaken "at once," either by a bombing attack or an assault across open ground.