The Spanish coup of July 1936 was a military uprising against the Second Spanish Republic launched on 17–18 July 1936 by a coalition of conservative, monarchist, and far-right officers and civilians. Planned chiefly by Generals Emilio Mola and José Sanjurjo and joined by Francisco Franco, it was intended to overthrow the Popular Front government and replace it with an authoritarian regime. Instead of securing a rapid transfer of power, the coup only partially succeeded and precipitated the Spanish Civil War.
The rebellion began in Spanish Morocco on 17 July and spread to mainland garrisons the following day. It triumphed in parts of northern, western, and southern Spain, but failed in key political and industrial centres including Madrid, Barcelona, and Valencia. Because neither the rebels nor the government secured an immediate nationwide victory, Spain was divided between Nationalist and Republican zones. The government's decision to arm workers' organisations helped defeat the uprising in several major cities while also accelerating revolutionary change in parts of the Republican rear.
The failed coup transformed a political crisis into the Spanish Civil War, which lasted until 1939. It ended with the defeat of the Republic, the victory of Franco's Nationalists, and the establishment of the Franco dictatorship, which ruled Spain until 1975.
Background
Following the elections of November 1933, Spain entered what was called by the left-wing parties the "black biennium" (Spanish: bienio negro). Both Carlists and Alfonsist monarchists continued to prepare and received the backing of Benito Mussolini. José-María Gil-Robles, the leader of the moderate-right Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rights (CEDA), supported a centrist Radical Republican Party minority government and controlled his party's more radical youth wing. Monarchists, however, turned their attention to the fascist Falange Española, led by José Antonio Primo de Rivera. Open violence occurred in the streets of Spanish cities. Gil-Robles successfully used an anti-strike law to provoke and to break up unions, one at a time. Efforts to remove local councils from socialist control prompted a general strike, which was brutally put down, with the arrest of four deputies and other significant breaches of Articles 55 and 56 of the constitution.
On 26 September 1934, the minority government was replaced by a cabinet including the RRP and three CEDA members. A UGT general strike in early October 1934 was quickly put down throughout most of Spain. General Francisco Franco was put in informal command of the military effort against the Asturian miners' revolt of 1934, during which striking labourers had occupied several towns and the provincial capital. Around 30,000 workers had been called to arms in ten days. Franco's men, some brought in from Spain's Army of Africa, killed civilians, including men, women and children, and carried out summary executions when the main cities of Asturias were retaken. About 1,000 workers and about 250 government soldiers were killed, which marked the effective end of the republic. Months of retaliation and repression by both sides followed, and torture was used on political prisoners. Bombings, shootings, and political and religious killings were frequent in the streets. Political parties created armed militias. In 1935, a new government under prime minister Alejandro Lerroux saw CEDA increasing its share of ministries to five, with Gil-Robles becoming minister of war. The military was purged of left-wing members and reformed. Those loyal to Gil-Robles were promoted, and Franco was made chief of staff.
Contested under violent circumstances, the 1936 general election was narrowly won by a grouping of left-wing parties, the Popular Front, which defeated the Nationalist group by less than 1% of the vote. As a consequence, the Nationalists began to conspire to overthrow the Republic, rather than take control of it. The government was weak, Manuel Azaña led a minority government, and reconciliation would have been an enormous task. Acts of violence and reprisals spiralled. In April, the Cortes (parliament) replaced Niceto Alcalá-Zamora with Azaña as president, who, however, was increasingly isolated from everyday politics, and his replacement as prime minister, Casares Quiroga, was weak.
This development led much of the right to abandon parliamentary politics. The monarchist José Calvo Sotelo replaced CEDA's Gil-Robles as the leader of the right in the Cortes. CEDA turned its campaign chest over to the army plotter Emilio Mola. At the same time, communists quickly took over the ranks of socialist organisations, which frightened the middle classes. Several generals decided that the government had to be replaced to prevent the dissolution of Spain, as they held professional politicians in contempt.
Preparations
Following the election of 18 January 1936, the Republican government in the winter and spring that year faced numerous challenges, not least of which was balancing itself between the threat posed by leftist unions, the counter for which might prove to be the continued support of the right-leaning military. As a consequence, Azaña had undertaken reassignment rather than dismissal of suspect generals from their posts. Franco was relieved as chief of staff and transferred to command the Canary Islands. Goded was replaced as Inspector General and made general of the Balearic Islands. Emilio Mola was moved from leading the Army of Africa to the post of military commander of Pamplona in Navarre. This allowed Mola to direct the mainland uprising, although the relationship between him and Carlist leaders was problematic. General José Sanjurjo became the figurehead of the operation and helped to come to an agreement with the Carlists. Mola was the chief planner and second in command. José Antonio Primo de Rivera was released from prison in mid-March to restrict the Falange. However, government actions were not as thorough as they might have been, since warnings by the director of security and others were not acted upon.
On 12 June, Prime Minister Casares Quiroga met General Juan Yagüe, who was accused of masterminding the growing conspiracy in North Africa. Yagüe managed, falsely, to convince Casares of his loyalty to the Republic. Mola held a meeting between garrison commanders in northern Spain on 15 June, and local authorities, on hearing of that meeting, surrounded it with civil guards. However, Casares ordered their removal and said that he trusted Mola. Mola began serious planning in the spring, but Franco hesitated until early July, which inspired other plotters to refer to him as "Miss Canary Islands 1936". Franco was a key player because of his prestige as a former director of the military academy, and as the man who suppressed the socialist uprising of 1934. He was well respected in the Spanish Moroccan army, Spain's strongest military force. He wrote a cryptic letter to Casares on 23 June which suggested that the military was disloyal but could be restrained if he were put in charge. Casares did nothing, and failed to arrest or to buy off Franco. Franco was due to be assigned control of Morocco in the new regime and largely sidelined. On 5 July an aircraft was chartered to take Franco from the Canary Islands to Morocco; it arrived on 14 July.
Murder of Calvo Sotelo
On 12 July 1936 in Madrid, a member of the Falange, Jorge Bardina, murdered lieutenant José Castillo of the assault guards police force. Castillo was a member of the Socialist Party. The next day, members of the assault guards arrested José Calvo Sotelo, a leading Spanish monarchist and a prominent parliamentary conservative; the original target had been Gil Robles, but he could not be found. Calvo Sotelo had protested against agricultural reforms, expropriations and restrictions on the authority of the Catholic Church, which he considered to be Bolshevist and anarchist. He instead advocated the creation of a corporatist state. The guards shot Calvo Sotelo without trial.
The killing of Calvo Sotelo, a prominent member of Parliament, and the involvement of the police aroused suspicions and strong reactions among the government's opponents on the right. Massive reprisals followed. Although the conservative Nationalist generals had already been in the advanced stages of a planned uprising, the event provided a catalyst and a convenient public justification for their coup, particularly that Spain had to be saved from anarchy by military, rather than democratic, means. The socialists and communists, led by Prieto, demanded that arms be distributed to the people before the military took over, but the prime minister was hesitant.
Franco's plane landed in Gran Canaria on 14 July, but since he was based in Tenerife, he would not have made the plane without the death of General Amado Balmes, the military commander in Gran Canaria, who was killed in a shooting on 16 July. Whether his death was an accident, suicide or murder is unknown. Balmes reportedly shot himself in the stomach by accident and died shortly after. Some conspiracy theories suggest that he was murdered, but he would have had enough time to denounce his murderers if they had existed, and the officer who certified his death as an accident was not a conspirator and remained loyal to the Republic during the Civil War.
Beginning
The uprising was intended for 18 July, at 5 a.m. in Morocco; most garrisons in Spain were supposed to rise one day later. The rising was intended to be a swift coup d'état, but the government retained control of most of the country.
Rebel control in Spanish Morocco was all but certain. The 30,000-strong Army of Africa was the professional elite of the Spanish Army. Many of its soldiers acted as mercenaries, and the vast majority of officers backed the rebel cause. The regulares, troops recruited from the local tribes, were predominantly Muslim and were told that the Republic wished to abolish Allah. The plan was discovered in Morocco during 17 July, which prompted it to be enacted immediately. By the scheduled time, Spanish Morocco had already been secured, as legionnaires moved into working-class areas and shot trade unionists. The army commander in eastern Morocco, General Manuel Romerales, and other senior officers loyal to the Republic were executed. Little resistance was encountered; in total, 189 people were shot by the rebels. Goded and Franco immediately took control of the islands to which they were assigned. Warned that a coup was imminent, leftists barricaded the roads on the Canary Islands on 17 July, but Franco avoided capture by taking a tugboat to the airport.
On 18 July, Casares Quiroga refused an offer of help from the CNT and UGT and proclaimed that only Spanish Morocco had joined the rebels and that the populace should trust legal methods to deal with the uprising. Handing out weapons would be illegal. The CNT and the UGT proclaimed a general strike, which was in effect a mobilisation. They opened weapons caches, some buried since the 1934 risings. The paramilitary forces were better trained than the army but often waited to see the outcome of militia action before either joining or suppressing the rebellion. Quick action by either the rebels or anarchist militias was often enough to decide the fate of a town.
Although the uprising began in Spanish Morocco, its success depended on whether mainland garrisons joined it. By 19–20 July the revolt had failed in several of Spain's largest cities but succeeded across much of the conservative interior, leaving the country divided between rebel and government-held zones.
Coup in military districts
In mid-1936, Peninsular Spain was divided into eight military districts, each home to one division. Most senior staff forming the local command layer were not involved in the conspiracy. Out of eight district commanders and commanders of respective divisions at the same time, there was only one engaged in the plot and adhered to the coup. Out of eight district chiefs of staff, there were three officers involved in the conspiracy, and three more joined the unfolding rebellion. The conspiracy relied mostly on mid-range staff and line officers; they were expected to take control of the garrisons and either overpower their seniors or persuade them to join. In some districts, like Zaragoza or Valladolid, the conspiracy network was well developed, and Emilio Mola was confident of success. In other districts, like Valencia or La Coruña, the network was sketchy, and the plotters took into account a possible failure.
L = loyal; C = conspirator; A/U = ambiguous or unknown.