The February 26 incident (Japanese: 二・二六事件, Hepburn: Ni Ni-Roku Jiken), also known as the 2–26 incident, was an attempted coup d'état in the Empire of Japan on 26 February 1936. It was organized by a group of young Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) officers with the goal of purging the government and military leadership of their factional rivals and ideological opponents.
Although the rebels succeeded in assassinating several leading officials (including two former prime ministers) and in occupying the government center of Tokyo, they failed to assassinate Prime Minister Okada Keisuke or secure control of the Imperial Palace. Their supporters in the army made attempts to capitalize on their actions, but divisions within the military, combined with Imperial anger at the coup, meant they were unable to achieve a change of government. Facing overwhelming opposition as the army moved against them, the rebels surrendered on 29 February.
Unlike earlier examples of political violence by young officers, the coup attempt had severe consequences. After a series of closed trials, 19 of the uprising's leaders were executed for mutiny and another 40 were imprisoned. The radical Kōdōha faction lost its influence within the army, while the military, now free from infighting, increased its control over the civilian government, which had been severely weakened by the assassination of key moderate and liberal-minded leaders.
Background
Army factional rivalry
The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) had a long history of factionalism among its high-ranking officers, originally stemming from domainal rivalries in the Meiji period. By the early 1930s, officers in the high command had become split into two main informal groups: the Kōdōha "Imperial Way" faction led by General Sadao Araki and his ally General Jinzaburō Mazaki, and the Tōseiha "Control" faction identified with General Tetsuzan Nagata.
The Kōdōha emphasized the importance of Japanese culture, spiritual purity over material quality, and the need to attack the Soviet Union (Hokushin-ron), while the Tōsei-ha officers, who were strongly influenced by the ideas of the contemporary German general staff, supported central economic and military planning (total war theory), technological modernization, mechanization and expansion within China (Nanshin-ron). The Kōdōha was dominant in the IJA during Araki's tenure as Minister of War from 1931 to 1934, occupying most significant staff positions, but many of its members were replaced by Tōsei-ha officers following Araki's resignation.
The "young officers"
IJA officers were divided between those whose education had ended at the Army Academy (an undergraduate academy) and those who had advanced on to the prestigious Army War College (a graduate school for midlevel officers). The latter group formed the elite of the officer corps, while officers of the former group were effectively barred by tradition from advancement to higher-level staff positions. A number of the lesser-privileged officers formed the army's contribution to the young, highly politicized group often referred to as the "young officers" (青年将校, seinen shōkō).
The young officers believed that the problems facing the nation were the result of Japan straying from the kokutai (国体) (an amorphous term often translated as "national polity" which roughly signifies the relationship between the Emperor and the state). To them, the "privileged classes" exploited the people, leading to widespread poverty in rural areas, and deceived the Emperor, usurping his power and weakening Japan. The solution, they believed, was a "Shōwa Restoration" modeled on the Meiji Restoration of 70 years earlier. By rising up and destroying the "evil advisers around the Throne," the officers would enable the Emperor to re-establish his authority. The Emperor would then purge those who exploited the people, restoring prosperity to the nation. Those beliefs were strongly influenced by contemporary nationalist thought, especially the political philosophy of a former socialist, Ikki Kita. Almost all of the young officers' subordinates were from poor peasant family or working class, and believed that the young officers truly understood their predicaments and spirits.
The loose-knit young officers group varied in size, but is estimated to have had roughly 100 regular members, mostly officers in the Tokyo area. Its informal leader was Mitsugi (Zei) Nishida. A former IJA lieutenant and disciple of Kita, Nishida had become a prominent member of the civilian nationalist societies that proliferated in Japan from the late 1920s. He referred to the army group as the Kokutai Genri-ha (国体原理派; "National Principle") faction. Involved at least to some extent in most of the political violence of the period, following the March and October incidents of 1931, the army and navy members of the group split and largely ended their association with civilian nationalists.
Despite its relatively small size, the Kokutai Genri-ha faction was influential, due in no small part to the threat it posed. It had sympathizers among the general staff and the Imperial Family, most notably Prince Chichibu, the Emperor's brother (and, until 1933, his heir), who was friends with Nishida and other Kokutai Genri-ha leaders. Despite being fiercely anti-capitalist, the faction had also managed to secure irregular funding from zaibatsu leaders who hoped to shield themselves.
The exact nature of the relationship between the Kōdōha and the Kokutai Genri-ha was complicated, with historians treating the two factions either as the same entity or as two groups forming a larger whole. However, contemporary accounts and the writings of members of the two groups make clear they were actually distinct groups in a mutually beneficial alliance. The Kōdōha shielded the Kokutai Genri-ha and provided it with access, while they in exchange benefited from their perceived ability to restrain the radical officers.
Political violence
The years leading up to the February 26 Incident were marked by a series of violent outbursts by the young officers and their fellow nationalists against political opponents. Most notable was the May 15 Incident of 1932 in which young naval officers assassinated Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi. The incident is significant because it convinced the young army officers (who were aware of but not involved in the attack) of the need to use troops in any potential coup attempt. The ringleaders of the incident, as in the previous March and October incidents, received relatively light punishments.
The direct prelude to the February 26 Incident, however, was the 1934 Military Academy Incident (November Incident) and its consequences. The incident consisted of the arrests of Captain Takaji Muranaka and Captain Asaichi Isobe, prominent members of the Kokutai Genri-ha, for planning a coup with a group of military cadets. Muranaka and Isobe admitted discussing such a coup but denied having any plans of actually carrying it out. The military court investigating the incident found there was insufficient evidence to indict, but Muranaka and Isobe were suspended by the army. The two were convinced that the incident was a Tōsei-ha attack on the young officers and began circulating a pamphlet calling for a "housecleaning" of the IJA and naming Tetsuzan Nagata as the "chief villain." They were then expelled from the IJA.
At around this time, General Jinzaburō Mazaki, the last Kōdōha officer in a prominent position, was forced out of office. The insidious and cantankerous Mazaki was generally disliked by his colleagues and his removal was not purely political, but the young officers were enraged because Mazaki had become the focus of their hopes after they became disillusioned with Araki for his failures to overcome resistance in the cabinet during his time as War Minister. Muranaka and Isobe released a new pamphlet attacking Nagata for the dismissal, as did Nishida.
On 12 August 1935, in the Aizawa Incident, Lieutenant-Colonel Saburō Aizawa, a member of the Kokutai Genri-ha and a friend of Mazaki, murdered Nagata in his office in retaliation. Aizawa's public trial, which began in late January 1936, became a media sensation, as Aizawa and the Kokutai Genri-ha leadership, in collusion with the judges, turned it into a soapbox from which their ideology could be broadcast. Aizawa's supporters in the mass media praised his "morality and patriotism," and Aizawa himself came to be seen as "a simple soldier who sought only to reform the army and the nation according to the true National Principle."
Preparations
Deciding to act
The Kokutai Genri-ha had long supported a violent uprising against the government. The decision to finally act in February 1936 was caused by two factors. The first was the decision announced in December 1935 to transfer the 1st Division, to which most of the Kokutai Genri-ha's officers belonged, to Manchuria in the spring. That meant that if the officers did not strike before then, any possible action would be delayed by years. The second was Aizawa's trial. The impact of his actions had impressed the officers, and they believed that by acting while his trial was still in progress, they could take advantage of the favorable public opinion it was engendering.
The decision to act was initially opposed by Nishida and Kita when they learned of it. The pair's relationship with most of the officers had become relatively distant in the years leading up to the uprising, and they were against direct action. However, once it was clear that the officers were determined to act anyway, they moved to support them. Another barrier to be overcome was opposition to the involvement of troops from Teruzō Andō, who had sworn an oath to his commander not to involve his men in any direct action. Andō's position in the 3rd Infantry Regiment (the largest source of troops) was essential to the plot, so Muranaka and Shirō Nonaka spoke with him repeatedly, ultimately wearing down his resistance.
February 26 was chosen because the officers had been able to arrange to have themselves and their allies serve as duty officers on that date, facilitating their access to arms and ammunition. The date also allowed Mazaki to testify at Aizawa's trial as scheduled on the 25th.
Planning and manifesto
The uprising was planned in a series of meetings held between 18 and 22 February by Nishida, Yasuhide Kurihara, Teruzō Andō, Hisashi Kōno, Takaji Muranaka and Asaichi Isobe. The plan decided upon was relatively simple. The officers would assassinate the most prominent enemies of the kokutai, secure control of the administrative center of the capital and the Imperial Palace, then submit their demands (the dismissal of certain officers and the appointment of a new cabinet led by Mazaki). They had no longer-term goals, believing that those should be left to the Emperor. It is believed that they were prepared to replace Hirohito with Prince Chichibu if necessary, however.
The young officers believed they had at least tacit approval for their uprising from a number of important IJA officers after making a number of informal approaches. They included Araki, Minister of War Yoshiyuki Kawashima, Jinzaburō Mazaki, Tomoyuki Yamashita, Kanji Ishiwara, Shigeru Honjō and their own immediate commanders, Kōhei Kashii and Takeo Hori. Kawashima's successor as Minister of War later remarked that if all the officers who had supported the rebels had been forced to resign, there would not have been enough high-ranking officers left to replace them.
The young officers prepared an explanation of their intentions and grievances in a document entitled "Manifesto of the Uprising" (蹶起趣意書, Kekki Shuisho), which they wanted to be handed to the Emperor. The document was prepared by Muranaka, but written in Nonaka's name as he was the highest-ranking officer involved in the plot. The document was entirely in line with Kokutai Genri-ha ideals, blaming the genrō, political leaders, military factions, zaibatsu, bureaucrats and political parties for endangering the kokutai through their selfishness and disrespect for the Emperor and asserting the need for direct action:
Now, as we are faced with great emergencies both foreign and domestic, if we do not execute the disloyal and unrighteous who threaten the kokutai, if we do not cut away the villains who obstruct the Emperor's authority, who block the Restoration, the Imperial plan for our nation will come to nothing [...] To cut away the evil ministers and military factions near the Emperor and destroy their heart: that is our duty and we will complete it.
Seven targets were chosen for assassination for "threatening the kokutai":
The first four mentioned in the above list survived the attempted coup. Saionji, Saitō, Suzuki and Makino were targeted because they were the most influential Imperial advisers. Okada and Takahashi were moderate political leaders who had worked to restrain the military. Finally, Watanabe was targeted as a member of the Tōsei-ha and because he had been involved with Mazaki's removal.