The Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano was sunk on May 2, 1982, by the British nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror during the Falklands War. The sinking led to the death of 323 Argentine sailors, almost half of all Argentine casualties during the conflict, and sparked controversy, as the attack occurred outside the exclusion zone established by the British government around the islands. In the UK, some commentators have suggested that the action may have been motivated by political considerations, such as undermining peace talks or bolstering Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's popularity among the British public. In Argentina, some critics have characterized the sinking of the cruiser as a contentious act, with some even suggesting it could constitute a war crime, though this interpretation is debated and has not been legally substantiated. Some analyses argue that, from a military perspective, the sinking contributed to British naval superiority, which may have influenced the outcome of the conflict. However, this perspective remains part of broader debates about the strategic and ethical implications of the event.
The sinking of the General Belgrano was the first case of a warship being torpedoed and sunk in action by a nuclear submarine, and one of only five cases of a warship being sunk by any type of submarine since the end of the Second World War.
Background
Argentina
In March 1982, diplomatic relations between Argentina and the United Kingdom became increasingly strained following stalled negotiations over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands. An incident on South Georgia Island on March 19, when a group of workers from an Argentine company contracted to dismantle old whaling facilities on the island landed in Port Leith and hoisted an Argentine flag, was interpreted by the British as a provocation and led to an escalation of tension between the two countries, with the Argentine fleet anchored in Port Belgrano going on alert and secretly beginning its preparations, which, according to later accounts, were aimed at asserting Argentina's claim over the islands through a military operation. Commander Héctor Bonzo, captain of ARA General Belgrano, later commented about the first notification received from the Argentine Navy's General Staff about the war action to be taken in the Falkland Islands, stating: "We were asked for total and absolute secrecy regarding this decision since the surprise factor would be a priority in this maneuver."
The Argentine fleet set sail from Port Belgrano on March 28, becoming Task Force 40 (FT 40) under the command of Rear Admiral Walter Allara, with the Argentine forces landing on the Falkland Islands on April 2 and South Georgia the following day, asserting their claim to sovereignty over the territories. The General Belgrano was the only Argentine warship that did not take part in the operation, as its annual maintenance and repairs were still underway and could not be expedited in time for the mission. The Argentine fleet only returned to Port Belgrano on April 6; in its absence, the repair teams' efforts could be concentrated on the cruiser, and its repairs were completed after the first week of April. In addition, an Alouette III helicopter from the Argentine Naval Aviation was embarked, thus increasing the ship's surveillance capacity. After the repairs were completed, the focus shifted to training the recruits, which was emphasized as an essential aspect of the ship's readiness. The ship's medical department was also reinforced to address potential wartime needs. In peacetime the crew was 30% smaller than in wartime, but on this occasion, the Belgrano had 1,093 men, including 408 recruits and two civilians. The ship then adopted three rotating guard shifts as long as the ship was not in combat, with each crew member working an eight-hour shift each day. In this way, the ship aimed to remain operational and prepared to respond promptly with all systems and services, according to the protocols established at the time.
With the British expeditionary force moving toward the South Atlantic, and given the lack of progress at the diplomatic level towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict, the ships of the Argentine Navy became "Task Force 79" (FT 79) under the command of Rear Admiral Walter Allara, and its main ships were distributed into three task groups: Task Group 79.1 (GT 79. 1), made up of the aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo, three corvettes, a destroyer and a tanker; Task Group 79.2 (GT 79.2), made up of five destroyers and a tanker; and Task Group 79.3 (GT 79.3), made up of ARA General Belgrano. In distributing the forces across the theater of operations, strategic emphasis was placed on the area to the north of the islands, where "GT 79.1" and "GT 79.2" were deployed, while "GT 79.3" was positioned in the southern area.
- To head for their area of operations off the Isle of States, sailing close to the coast to conceal intentions and reduce the submarine threat;
- Monitor the southern access to the theater of operations, intercept enemy units by the orders received, and serve as a regional deterrent;
- Avoid tactical contact with enemy units armed with anti-ship missiles;
- If necessary, and depending on the situation, refuel at Ushuaia Naval Base.
After postponing its departure twice, the cruiser set sail from Port Belgrano on April 16, arriving at Isla de los Estados on April 19. After patrolling the area for a few days and carrying out live-fire exercises off the island's southern coast, the General Belgrano docked at Ushuaia Naval Base at 18:30 on April 22, to refuel and exchange a batch of defective ammunition. The members of its crew used this stop to send letters to their families and friends, which were dispatched before the ship resumed its mission. The cruiser left Ushuaia at 8:30 a.m. on April 24, having received a communication that afternoon transmitting the reorganization of "FT 79" and new orders; two destroyers and a tanker had been assigned to "GT 79.3", which, with the Belgrano as its flagship, was tasked with operating in the area between the meridians of Isla de los Estados and Burdwood Bank. ARA Piedra Buena and ARA Hipólito Bouchard then separated from GT 79.2 and headed south to join GT 79.3, meeting up with the General Belgrano and the tanker YPF Puerto Rosales north of Isla de los Estados on April 28, with joint exercises being held that afternoon between the cruiser and the destroyers to practice tactical maneuvers and improve communication between the ships. The destroyers' mission was to protect the Belgrano from surface enemies, air attacks, and submarines, forming a curtain of protection.
During the afternoon of April 29, two communications were received, one ordering the GT 79.3 to head east towards the area south of the Falkland Islands on May 1, and the other authorizing the use of weapons against targets identified as enemy, subject to operational discretion. One of the measures to prepare for departure was the refueling of the ships by the YPF Puerto Rosales, which was scheduled for the following day.
During the morning of April 30, the refueling of the two destroyers was completed; the refueling of the cruiser began at 4 p.m. but was interrupted an hour later due to worsening weather conditions. That afternoon, the Argentine government issued Communiqué 37, stating that any British ship or aircraft within 200 nautical miles (370 km; 230 mi) of the Argentine coast, including the mainland and the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, and South Sandwich, would be considered a potential threat. The refueling of the General Belgrano was completed during the morning of May 1, and GT 79.3 began sailing east at around noon, leaving the Puerto Rosales anchored off the island of Estados. That day, the Argentine government issued Communiqué 40, broadening the scope of the declaration to include all British ships in the South Atlantic that were heading for the theater of operations or perceived as posing a threat to national security.
On May 1, British forces began naval bombardments and air raids against military targets in the Falkland Islands, and their persistence and intensity, along with the approach of a significant portion of the British fleet to the eastern coast of the archipelago, led the Argentine military leadership to assess that a landing was likely imminent. The Argentine Air Force responded to the offensive but faced resistance from the Sea Harriers launched from the aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible, with the Argentine Navy receiving urgent communication shortly after 8 p.m. with new orders for the task groups, which were instructed to position themselves to potentially engage the British fleet, assessing its operational focus as a factor that could limit its flexibility.
The operation planned by the Argentine Navy General Staff consisted of a pincer maneuver around the islands, with GT 79.1 led by the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo positioning itself to engage from the north and GT 79.3 led by the General Belgrano attacking from the south. The mission of GT 79.3 involved utilizing the French-made MBDA Exocet anti-ship missiles carried by the destroyers to engage enemy ships, with the General Belgrano prepared to target any previously damaged vessels using its six-inch gun turrets. The scenarios evaluated by Commander Héctor Bonzo and his staff included entering the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) decreed by the British around the islands, tactical contact with enemy ships, repelling air attacks and attack by nuclear submarines. The British nuclear submarines were considered highly effective due to their speed and extended ability to remain submerged, providing a significant tactical advantage over the resources available to the Argentinians; The cruiser lacked dedicated anti-submarine systems, while the destroyers were equipped with systems offering moderate capability against conventional submarines.
The new orders indicated that at 05:30 on May 2, GT 79.3 should head towards the British task force, which was inside the TEZ. However, a malfunction in one of the engines of the Veinticinco de Mayo and unfavorable weather conditions for the operation of its planes led to the postponement of the start time of the attack, the element of surprise was compromised when GT 79.1 was detected by a British plane at around 00:00. A report received at 01:00 suggested a possible cancellation of the operation, as the British fleet had ceased its air attacks on Stanley and the aircraft carriers had repositioned themselves away from the islands, increasing their operational flexibility. The order to definitively cancel the attack came at 05:00, with GT 79. 3 to head west and remain on standby between the Ignacio and Julián tactical zones, around 100 nautical miles (190 km; 120 mi) east of Isla de los Estados and 35 nautical miles (65 km; 40 mi) south of the TEZ. So, at 05:11 the Belgrano headed west, arriving at the indicated standby zone at around 15:20, noting a worsening of weather conditions throughout the day, indicating the likelihood of an approaching storm.
United Kingdom
Following the deployment of Argentine forces to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, and South Sandwich on April 2, 1982, the United Kingdom sent two British Royal Navy task forces totaling 109 vessels and 15 air squadrons to the South Atlantic, with the stated objective of asserting sovereignty over the islands: Task Force 324 (TF 324), commanded directly from the Strategic Command in Northwood by Admiral John Fieldhouse, composed of the nuclear submarines (HMS Conqueror, HMS Courageous, HMS Valiant, HMS Spartan and HMS Splendid); and Task Force 317 (TF 317), under the operational command of Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, made up of aircraft carriers (HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible), destroyers, frigates, transport ships and other auxiliary vessels. On April 12, with the fleet in full swing, the UK established a 200-nautical mile Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) around the Falkland Islands, within which Argentine military vessels were subject to attack, with the objective of limiting the reinforcement of Argentine positions on the islands. On April 23, the British government sent a message to the Argentine government via the Swiss embassy in Buenos Aires, stating that, irrespective of the establishment of the MEZ, any Argentine vessel or aircraft perceived as a threat to British forces could be engaged. The most relevant units of the British expeditionary force arrived at the MEZ on April 29; having established its presence in the area, on April 30 the United Kingdom established a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) with the same area as the MEZ, within which any vessel or aircraft could be attacked without warning.