The British airborne operations in North Africa were conducted by British paratroopers of the 1st Parachute Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Edwin Flavell, as part of the Tunisian campaign of World War II, over the period between November 1942 and April 1943.
When planning began for Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa in 1942, it was decided to attach the 1st Parachute Brigade, part of the 1st Airborne Division, to the Allied forces taking part, as an American airborne unit, the 2nd Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment, was also to be used during the invasion. After a short period of training and being brought up to operational strength, mainly with men from the 2nd Parachute Brigade, also part of the 1st Airborne Division, the brigade was deployed to North Africa in November 1942.
Units from the 1st Para Brigade dropped near Bône on 12 November, then near Souk el-Arba and Béja on 13 November, and at Pont Du Fahs on 29 November, seizing airfields, fighting as infantry after each action and linking up with an Allied armoured force, supporting it until December. Due to the inability of units of the British First Army to link up with the Pont Du Fahs force, the 2nd Parachute Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel John Frost, was forced to retreat over fifty miles towards the nearest Allied units; it was attacked several times during the retreat, and although it reached Allied lines safely it had taken more than 250 casualties.
For the next four months the 1st Para Brigade was used in a ground role, serving under several formations and advancing with Allied ground forces; it suffered heavy casualties on several occasions but also took large numbers of Axis prisoners. The brigade was transferred out of the front in mid-April 1943 and left to rejoin the rest of the 1st Airborne Division to train for Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Sicily.
Background
The German military was one of the pioneers of the use of airborne formations, conducting several successful airborne operations during the Battle of France in 1940, including the Battle of Fort Eben-Emael. Impressed by the success of German airborne operations, the Allied governments decided to form their own airborne formations. This decision would eventually lead to the creation of two British airborne divisions, as well as a number of smaller units. The British airborne establishment began development on 22 June 1940, when the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, directed the War Office in a memorandum to investigate the possibility of creating a corps of 5,000 parachute troops. Despite the Prime Minister's desire to have 5,000 airborne troops within a short period, a number of problems were rapidly encountered by the War Office. Very few military gliders existed in Britain in 1940, and these were too light for military purposes, and there was also a shortage of suitable transport aircraft to tow gliders and carry paratroopers. On 10 August, Churchill was informed that although 3,500 volunteers had been selected to train as airborne troops, only 500 could currently begin training because of limitations in equipment and aircraft. The War Office stated in a memorandum to the Prime Minister in December 1940 that 500 parachute troops could probably be trained and be ready for operations by the spring of 1941, but this figure was purely arbitrary; the actual number that could be trained and prepared by that period would rely entirely on the creation of a training establishment and the provision of required equipment.
A training establishment for parachute troops was set up at RAF Ringway, near Manchester, on 21 June 1940 and named the Central Landing Establishment, and the initial 500 volunteers began training for airborne operations. A number of gliders were being designed and constructed by the Royal Air Force, which had also provided a number of Armstrong Whitworth Whitley medium bombers for conversion into transport aircraft. Organizational plans were also being laid down, with the War Office calling for two parachute brigades to be operational by 1943. However, the immediate development of any further airborne formations, as well as the initial 500 volunteers already training, was hampered by three problems. With the threat of invasion in 1940, many War Office officials and senior British Army officers did not believe that sufficient men could be spared from the effort to the rebuild the Army after the Battle of France to create an effective airborne force; many believed that such a force would only have a nuisance raiding value and would not affect the conflict in any useful way. There were also material problems; all three of the armed services were expanding and rebuilding, particularly the Army, and British industry had not yet been organised to a sufficient war footing to support all three services as well as the fledgling airborne force. Finally, the airborne forces lacked a single, coherent policy, with no clear idea as to how they should be organised, or whether they should come under the command of the Army or the RAF; inter organizational rivalry between the War Office and the Air Ministry, in charge of the RAF, was a major factor in delaying the further expansion of British airborne forces.
Expansion
However, despite these difficulties, by mid 1941 the fledgling airborne establishment was able to form the first British airborne unit. This was No. 11 Special Air Service Battalion, which numbered approximately 350 officers and other ranks, and had been formed by converting and retraining No. 2 Commando. On 10 February 1941 thirty eight men from the battalion conducted the first British airborne operation, Operation Colossus, a raid against an aqueduct in southern Italy; it was hoped that the destruction of the aqueduct would deprive Italian civilian and military installations of their water supply, damage Italian morale and the Italian war effort in North Africa. The raid was a failure, with all but one of the airborne troops being captured by Italian military forces, but it did help provide the British airborne establishment with vital lessons for future operations. Shortly after the operation had been conducted, a memorandum was circulated through the War Office by the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Royal Air Force requiring that No. 11 Special Air Service Battalion be expanded into a Parachute Brigade. In July, after a period of discussion about the problems of creating such a formation, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff authorised the raising of a brigade headquarters, 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Parachute Battalions and an air troop of sappers from the Royal Engineers. Given the title of 1st Parachute Brigade, volunteers from infantry units were recruited for the new formation from 31 August. Initially commanded by Brigadier Richard Nelson Gale, who was replaced in mid 1942 by Brigadier Edwin Flavell, the brigade began an extensive training regime, which included conducting trials and tests of new airborne equipment. On 10 October it was joined by 1 Airlanding Brigade, which had been formed from 31 Independent Brigade Group, a formation recently returned from India. This was shortly followed, on 29 October, by the formation of Headquarters 1st Airborne Division under the command of Brigadier F.A.M. Browning, who would have under his control 1st Parachute Brigade, 1st Airlanding Brigade, and the glider units currently training with the two brigades.
Browning was shortly after promoted to the rank of Major General, and he then supervised the newly formed division as it underwent a prolonged of expansion and intensive training, with new brigades being raised and then assigned to the division and even more new equipment being tested. By mid April 1942 the division was able to conduct a small scale airborne exercise for the benefit of the Prime Minister, in which twenty one transport aircraft and nine gliders participated, and by late December the division had been brought up to full strength. In mid September, as the division was coming close to reaching full strength, Browning was informed that Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa, would take place in November. After being informed that the 2nd Battalion of the American 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment was to take part in the campaign, he argued that a larger airborne force should be utilised during the invasion, as the large distances and comparatively light opposition would provide a number of opportunities for airborne operations. The War Office and Commander in Chief, Home Forces were won over by the argument, and agreed to detach 1st Parachute Brigade from 1st Airborne Division and place it under the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who would command all Allied troops participating in the invasion. The Air Ministry was unable to provide transport aircraft or aircrews to operate with the brigade, so the United States Army Air Forces took over this responsibility, providing 60 Group of 51 Wing which flew Douglas C-47 Dakotas. A practice drop was conducted with a unit from the brigade on 9 October, although a lack of American familiarity with British airborne equipment and parachuting technique, as well a lack of British familiarity with the Dakota, led to three men being killed; this meant a delay in training whilst new techniques were developed, which in turn resulted in the majority of the brigade's personnel travelling to North Africa without having conducted a training drop from a Dakota. After it had been brought to full operational strength, partly by cross posting personnel from the newly formed 2nd Parachute Brigade, and had been provided with sufficient equipment and resources, the brigade departed for North Africa at the beginning of November.
Operations
Bône
As an insufficient number of transport aircraft were allocated to the brigade, it was only possible to transport 3rd Parachute Battalion by air, with the battalion's strength consisting of its headquarters staff and 'B' and 'C' companies. The battalion landed at Gibraltar at dawn on 10 November, and its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Pine Coffin, was informed that the battalion was scheduled to conduct an airborne operation the next day. Pine Coffin was briefed by Lt. Gen. Kenneth Anderson, commander of the British First Army, on the mission; it was to take off from the airfield at Maison Blanche and conduct a parachute drop to capture an airfield near the port of Bône, which bordered both Tunisia and Algeria. It was known by Allied intelligence that a battalion of German Fallschirmjaeger were currently stationed at Tunis, and that they were likely to be given the same task; as such, it was vital that the two companies capture the airfield first. Once this had been achieved, it would then hold the airfield until relieved by No. 6 Commando, which would conduct an amphibious landing, capture Bône itself and link up with the battalion. This was a challenging task for Pine Coffin, as the battalion had arrived in fewer Dakotas than it would need to conduct a parachute drop, and two aircraft had failed to arrive at Gibraltar; however, sufficient aircraft were found and at 04:30 on 11 November they took off from Gibraltar, landing at Maison Blanche at 09:00. However, since the American pilots flying the Dakotas had no experience with night drops and locating drop zones in darkness was extremely difficult, it was decided to delay the mission until dawn on 12 November.
The day before the operation, Pine Coffin and his staff began to plan for the mission. The 29 Dakotas that were to transport the battalion would take off from Maison Blanche and follow the coast until they reached the harbour at Bône. The leading Dakota would then turn south east and fly low over the airfield to ascertain its status. If it was unoccupied, the paratroopers would be dropped onto the airfield, but if the Fallschirmjaeger were present then the Dakotas would drop the companies a mile away; there they would form up and launch an attack on the airfield. The planning was completed by 16:30, and at 20:00 the American pilots were briefed on the operation, which was briefly interrupted when a German aircraft flew over the area and dropped a stick of bombs. The aircraft took off at 08:30 the next day and experienced an uneventful flight to the airfield, although two aircraft experienced mechanical problems and ditched into the ocean, causing three casualties. The lead Dakota flew over the airfield, and after observing the airfield to be unoccupied, dropped its paratroopers, followed in succession by the remaining transport aircraft. The drop was reasonably accurate, with a few containers and paratroopers being dropped three miles from the airfield. Thirteen men were injured during the drop, primarily when they landed, and one was killed when he accidentally shot himself with his Sten gun. One officer was knocked unconscious during landing and remained so for the next four days, on occasion being heard to murmur "I'll have a little more of the turbot, waiter!".