The Battle of Arawe (also known as Operation Director) was fought between Allied and Japanese forces during the New Britain campaign of World War II. The battle formed part of the Allied Operation Cartwheel and was a diversion before a larger landing at Cape Gloucester in late December 1943. The Japanese military was expecting an Allied offensive in western New Britain and was reinforcing the region at the time of the Allied landing in the Arawe area on 15 December 1943. The Allies secured Arawe after about a month of intermittent fighting with the outnumbered Japanese force.
Initial Allied goals for the landing at Arawe included securing a base for American PT boats and diverting Japanese forces away from Cape Gloucester. The PT boat base was subsequently deemed unnecessary and not built. Only a small Japanese force was stationed at Arawe at the time, although reinforcements were en route. The main Allied landing on 15 December was successful despite a failed subsidiary landing and problems coordinating the landing craft. American forces quickly secured a beachhead and dug in. Japanese air units made large-scale raids against the Arawe area in the days after the landing, and in late December Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troops unsuccessfully counterattacked the American force. In mid-January 1944 the American force, reinforced with additional infantry and tanks, launched a brief offensive that pushed the Japanese back. The Japanese units at Arawe withdrew from the area towards the end of February as part of a general retreat from western New Britain.
There is no consensus among historians on whether the Allied offensive at Arawe was necessary. While some have argued that the landing served as a useful diversion ahead of the Cape Gloucester operation, others believe that the entire campaign in western New Britain was unnecessary and that the force employed at Arawe could have been better used elsewhere.
Background
Military situation
Prior to World War II the island of New Britain was administered by Australia as part of the Territory of New Guinea. The Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force had captured the island from Germany in September 1914. Both Germany and Australia maintained colonial administrations and a plantation had been established at Arawe early in the period in which the island was ruled by Germany. New Britain was captured by Japan in early 1942.
In July 1942, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that the main objective of the Allied forces in the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific area commands was to capture the major Japanese base at Rabaul on the northeastern tip of New Britain. From August 1942, U.S. and Australian forces conducted a series of offensives in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, with the goals of eliminating Japanese positions in the region and establishing air bases close to Rabaul. The Japanese forces in the area mounted a strong resistance but were unable to stop the Allied advance.
In June 1943 the Allies launched a major offensive—designated Operation Cartwheel—to capture Rabaul. During the next five months, Australian and U.S. forces under the overall command of General Douglas MacArthur advanced along the north coast of eastern New Guinea, capturing the town of Lae and the Huon Peninsula. U.S. forces under the command of Admiral William Halsey, Jr. simultaneously advanced through the Solomon Islands from Guadalcanal and established an air base at Bougainville in November 1943. In June 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that it was unnecessary to capture Rabaul as the Japanese base there could be neutralized by blockade and aerial bombardment. MacArthur initially opposed this change in plans, but it was endorsed by the British and United States Combined Chiefs of Staff during the Quebec Conference in August 1943.
The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters assessed the strategic situation in the Southwest Pacific in late September 1943 and concluded that the Allies would attempt to break through the northern Solomon Islands and Bismarck Archipelago in the coming months en route to Japan's inner perimeter in the western and central Pacific. Accordingly, reinforcements were dispatched to strategic locations in the area in an attempt to slow the Allied advance. Strong forces were retained at Rabaul, however, as it was believed that the Allies would attempt to capture the town. At the time, Japanese positions in western New Britain were limited to airfields at Cape Gloucester on the island's western tip and several small way stations which provided small boats travelling between Rabaul and New Guinea with shelter from Allied aerial attacks.
On 22 September 1943 MacArthur's General Headquarters (GHQ) directed Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Alamo Force to secure western New Britain and the surrounding islands. This operation had two goals, the first of which was to establish air and PT boat bases to attack the Japanese forces at Rabaul. The second objective was to secure the Vitiaz and Dampier Straits between New Guinea and New Britain so that convoys could safely pass through them en route to conduct further landings along New Guinea's north coast and beyond. To this end, GHQ directed that both Cape Gloucester and Gasmata on New Britain's south coast be captured. This offensive was code-named Operation Dexterity. The 1st Marine Division was selected for the Cape Gloucester operation, and the heavily reinforced 126th Regimental Combat Team from the 32nd Infantry Division was to attack Gasmata.
Senior Allied commanders disagreed over whether it was necessary to land forces in western New Britain. Lieutenant General George Kenney—commander of the Allied Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific—opposed the landings, arguing that his forces did not need air fields at Cape Gloucester as the existing bases in New Guinea and surrounding islands were adequate to support the planned landings in the region. Vice Admiral Arthur S. Carpender—commander of both the 7th Fleet and the Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area—as well as Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey—commander of Task Force 76—supported occupying Cape Gloucester to secure both sides of the straits, but he opposed the landing at Gasmata as it was too close to the Japanese air bases at Rabaul. The Gasmata operation was cancelled in early November in response to the concerns raised by Kenney and the Navy as well as intelligence reports that the Japanese had reinforced their garrison there.
On 21 November, a conference between GHQ, Kenney, Carpender and Barbey was held in Brisbane at which it was decided to land a small force in the Arawe area. This operation had three goals: to divert Japanese attention from Cape Gloucester, to provide a base for PT boats, and to establish a defensive perimeter and make contact with the Marines once they landed. It was intended that PT boats operating from Arawe would disrupt Japanese barge traffic along the southern shore of New Britain and protect the Allied naval forces at Cape Gloucester from attack.
Geography
The Arawe area lies on the south coast of New Britain about 100 mi (160 km) from the island's western tip. Its main geographical feature is Cape Merkus, which ends in the L-shaped Arawe Peninsula. Several small islands called the Arawe Islands lie to the southwest of the cape.
In late 1943, the Arawe Peninsula was covered by coconut trees which formed part of the Amalut Plantation; the terrain inland from the peninsula and on its offshore islands was swampy. Most of the shoreline in the area has limestone cliffs. There was a small unused airfield 4 mi (6.4 km) east of the neck of the Arawe Peninsula, and a coastal trail leading east from Cape Merkus to the Pulie River where it split into tracks running inland and along the coast. The terrain to the west of the peninsula was a trackless region of swamp and jungle, which was very difficult for troops to move through. Several of the beaches in the Arawe area were suitable for landing craft; the best were House Fireman, on the peninsula's west coast, and one near the village of Umtingalu to the east of the peninsula's base.
Prelude
Planning
Alamo Force was responsible for coordinating plans for the invasion of western New Britain. The Arawe landing was scheduled for 15 December as this was the earliest date by which the air bases around Nadzab in New Guinea—which were needed to support the landing—could be made operational. This date also gave the landing force time to conduct essential training and rehearsals. As Arawe was believed to be only weakly defended, Krueger decided to use a smaller force than the one which had been intended for the landing at Gasmata. This force, designated the Director Task Force, was concentrated at Goodenough Island where it was stripped of all equipment not needed for combat operations. Logistical plans called for the assault echelon to carry 30 day's worth of general supplies and enough ammunition for three days of intensive combat. After the landing, holdings would be expanded to 60 day's worth of general supplies and six day's worth of all categories of ammunition other than anti-aircraft ammunition, for which a 10-day supply was thought necessary. The assault force and its supplies were to be carried in fast ships which could rapidly unload their cargo.
The commander of the PT boat force in the Southwest Pacific, Commander Morton C. Mumma, opposed building extensive PT boat facilities at Arawe as he had sufficient bases and Japanese barges normally sailed along the north coast of New Britain. Mumma took his concerns to Admiral Arthur S. Carpender and Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, who eventually agreed that he would not be required to establish a base there if he thought it unnecessary. Instead, Mumma assigned six boats stationed at Dreger Harbor in New Guinea and Kiriwina Island to operate along the south coast of New Britain east of Arawe each night, and he asked only for emergency refuelling facilities at Arawe.
The Director Task Force's commander—Brigadier General Julian Cunningham—issued orders for the landing on 4 December. He directed that the Task Force would initially capture the Arawe Peninsula and its surrounding islands and establish an outpost on the trail leading to the Pulie River. The main body was to land at House Fireman Beach on the Arawe Peninsula at about dawn. Two troop-sized forces would conduct separate operations about an hour before the main landing. One troop was to capture Pitoe Island to the peninsula's south, as it was believed that the Japanese had established a radio station and a defensive position there which commanded the entrance to Arawe Harbor. The other troop was to land at Umtingalu and establish a blocking position on the coastal trail east of the peninsula. Once the beachhead was secure, amphibious patrols would be conducted to the west of the peninsula in an attempt to make contact with the 1st Marine Division at Cape Gloucester. U.S. Navy personnel on the planning staff were concerned about these subsidiary landings, as a night-time landing conducted at Lae in September had proven difficult.
Opposing forces
The Director Task Force was centered around the U.S. Army's 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team (112th RCT). This regiment had arrived in the Pacific in August 1942 but had not seen combat. It was dismounted and converted to an infantry unit in May 1943 and undertook an unopposed landing at Woodlark Island (designated Operation Chronicle) on 23 June. The 112th Cavalry Regiment was smaller and more lightly armed than U.S. infantry regiments as it had only two battalion-sized squadrons compared to the three battalions in infantry regiments. Moreover, the squadrons were smaller and more lightly equipped than their infantry equivalents. The 112th RCT's combat support units were the M2A1 howitzer-equipped 148th Field Artillery Battalion and the 59th Engineer Company. The other combat units of the Director Task Force were two batteries of the 470th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion (Automatic Weapons), most of the 236th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion (Searchlight), "A" Company of the United States Marine Corps 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion and a detachment from the 26th Quartermaster War Dog Platoon. The 2nd Battalion of the 158th Infantry Regiment was held in reserve to reinforce the Director Task Force if required. Several engineer, medical, ordnance and other support units were scheduled to arrive at Arawe after the landing was completed. Cunningham requested a battery equipped with 90 mm (3.54 in) anti-aircraft guns, but none were available. The U.S. Navy's Beach Party Number 1 would also be landed with the Director Task Force and remain at Arawe until the beachhead was secured.
The Director Task Force was supported by Allied naval and air units. The naval force was drawn from TF 76 and comprised U.S. Navy destroyers USS Conyngham (Barbey's flagship), Shaw, Drayton, Bagley, Reid, Smith, Lamson, Flusser and Mahan and a transport group with destroyer transports USS Humphreys and Sands, the Australian landing ship infantry HMAS Westralia, landing ship dock USS Carter Hall, two patrol craft and two submarine chasers. The naval force also included a service group with three LSTs, three tugboats and the destroyer tender USS Rigel. United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) units operating under the Fifth Air Force would support the landing, but only limited air support was to be available after 15 December as the available aircraft were needed for strategic missions against Japanese bases.