Leningrad strategic defensive operation is the term in Soviet historiography for the defensive operations in the area south of Leningrad by the Red Army and the Soviet Navy during World War II from 10 July to 30 September 1941. The following operations are considered as part of the strategic operation:
Positions of the German forces at the start of the operation
After the start of Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941, the German Army Group North, consisting of the 18th, the 4th Panzer Group and 16th Armies, had made a spectacular advance through the Baltic states.
In two and a half weeks, Lithuania and Latvia had been overrun and on 9 July, the 4th Panzer Group had already reached Pskov in Russia and the southern shore of Lake Peipus, with a bulge to the north-east towards Slavkovich. On the left flank of the bulge was the XXXXI Motorized Corps and on the right the LVI Motorized Corps.
The German 18th Army had advanced along the coast and pursued the Soviet 8th Army from its position on the border. The Soviet 8th Army was able to break contact and establish new defensive lines farther to the rear of the pre-war borders. On 10 July the German 18th Army, helped by the local Forest Brothers, had entered Southern Estonia and was positioned with its left flank occupying positions north of the city of Pärnu, along the Pärnu River through the Võhma District and then south-east to Tartu and Lake Peipus.
The 16th Army was at that time on the southern flank of the Army Group around the Velikaya River and west of Novorzhev. The Infantry of the 16th Army was lagging behind the 4th Panzergroup because of the difference in speed, but also because it was asked to support Army Group Center on its right flank.
Area covered during the operation
Territory
The campaign was conducted in the area to the northwest of the Kalinin Region to the Baltic Sea. In the north the land line of operations was limited to the shores of the Gulf of Finland, north of the Gulf Soviet troops were engaged in the Arctic–Karelia strategic defensive and the defense of the Hanko Peninsula. In the east the German troops reached the southern shore of Lake Ladoga, south along the Kirisha River to Kirishi, then south along the Volkhov River to Veliky Novgorod, including the city, then along the western side of Lake Ilmen to Staraya Russa, from there to the north end of Lake Vella and from the western boundary of the lake to the north shore of Lake Seliger to the region west of Peno. South of the border demarcation operated the forces of German Army Group Center. The length of the fighting front was roughly 450 kilometers and advanced a total of 270–300 kilometers due to Soviet withdrawals.
Background and operational plans of the forces involved
German plans
On 10 July, it was decided that Panzer Group 4 was to launch a two-pronged attack, without waiting for the slower infantry to arrive.
The XXXXI Panzer Corps of Georg-Hans Reinhardt was to attack towards the city of Luga, while LVI Panzer Corps of Erich von Manstein was to advance toward Lake Ilmen in a flanking movement.
Soviet plans
On 4 July, General Georgy Zhukov, chief of the General Staff, gave the Military Council of the Northern Front instructions to defend Leningrad. The guideline envisaged the construction of a defensive line between Narva, Luga and Staraja Russa and expanding it to a depth of 10 to 15 km. From the end of June, three divisions of national people's militia were recruited in Leningrad and used to occupy the Luga line. On 6 July, General Konstantin Piadyshev was appointed commander of the new line of defense along the Luga River, and the Northern Front Military Council decided to strengthen the Luga section by transferring the 237th Rifle Division from Petrozavodsk and the 21st and 24th Tank Division of the 10th Mechanized Corps from Karelia. Stawka Guideline No. 260 of 7 July ordered that the commander of the Northern front immediately transfer the 70th and 177th Rifle Division to the commander of the Northwestern Front.
When the German breakthrough began to emerge south of Lake Peipus, the troops of the new line of defense were combined on 6 July to form the Luga Operational Group under General Konstantin Piadyshev's command. The Leningrad Infantry School (2000 men), the Kingisepp Militia and the Leningrad Gun and MG Infantry School (1900 men) soon concentrated in the area east of the city of Narva. A separate mountain rifle brigade (5800 men), which was recruited in Leningrad, was designated to secure the Luga line. The defined line of defense extended almost 250 kilometers in length from the Gulf of Finland along the rivers Luga, Mshaga, Luga Shelon to Lake Ilmen.
The Luga Operational Group consisted of 4 rifle divisions: 70th, 111th, 177th and 191st rifle division as well as the 1st, 2nd and 3rd division of the national militia and the 41st Rifle Corps with the 90th, 235th and 118th rifle divisions.
Order of battle
The German ground forces were supported by Luftflotte 1 which was reinforced by the 8th Fliegercorps as the operation progressed.
Course of the operation
Offensive of the XXXXI Panzer Corps (10–14 July)
On 10 July 1941, the advanced units of German Army Group North, breaking the line of the Velikaya River, continued their attack on Leningrad. The XXXXI Panzer Corps, under command of Georg-Hans Reinhardt and consisting of two panzer, motorized and infantry divisions and supported by aircraft, pushed the 118th Rifle Division back to Gdov, and the 90th and 111th Rifle Divisions back to Luga. On July 12, German troops clashed with covering units of the Luga defensive line in the Plyussa River area and were stopped during stubborn fighting. Unable to bypass the defending troops from the flanks because of the swampy terrain, Reinhardt left the 269th Infantry Division at Luga, and diverted the main forces of the XXXXI Panzer Corps towards the north-west and by 14 July captured two bridgeheads on the right bank of the Luga River near the villages of Ivanovskoye and Bol'shoy Sabsk in the area of Kingisepp. The German troops were stopped at these positions by the forces of the Luga Operational Group and were only able to continue the offensive a month later. Meanwhile, a large gap was created between the two Corps of the 4th Panzer Group, which was now divided into two parts heading in different directions. Furthermore, the swampy-wooded area of the Leningrad region seriously impeded the independent actions of the tank units.
Offensive of the LVI Panzer Corps (10–14 July)
On 10 July, the 3rd Motorized Division of the LVI Panzer Corps occupied the city of Porkhov and continued the offensive in the direction of Dno. The 182nd Soviet Rifle Division fought against the advance, successfully repulsed two attacks, and inflicted casualties of about 400 soldiers and officers on the German 3rd Motorized Division. In addition, Soviet gunners destroyed or damaged 20 enemy tanks. Despite this, by nightfall, the Germans were able to advance east of Porkhov for another three kilometers.
On 12 July, the SS Totenkopf Division was left behind in the Porkhov area, and the 3rd motorized division was directed along a side road to the north. The 8th Panzer Division launched an attack on Shimsk, moving along the highway on the left bank of the Shelon River in the direction of Novgorod. The remnants of the 3rd Tank Division of the 1st Mechanized Corps were trying to hold back the German offensive, retreating from line to line.
On 14 July, German units occupied Soltsy and reached the line of the Mshaga River. Despite the fact that German air reconnaissance had reported a great concentration of Soviet troops and reinforcements from the north, the 8th Panzer Division was ordered to capture the bridge over Mshaga in an intact state.
By 14 July, the right flank of the LVI Corps, which was not covered by anything, turned out to be 70 km long, and the uncovered left flank, some 40 km. The command of the Corps believed that its safety was ensured by its speed.
Soviet counter-attack : Battle of Soltsy (14–22 July)
The Soviet command decided to take advantage of the fact that the LVI Panzer Corps was left without cover. The commander of the Northwestern Front, Major General Pyotr Sobennikov, on 13 July 1941, issued Order No. 012 to the troops of the 11th Army under command of Lieutenant General Vasili Morozov, reinforced by formations of the Northern Front (21st Tank, 70th and 237th Rifle divisions), to carry out a counter-attack and restore the situation in the Soltsy area.
After approvals, on the evening of 13 July, the commander of the 11th and 27th Armies was sent directive No. 010 on the beginning of the counterstrike. The development of the counterstrike plan took place under the leadership of the Chief of Staff of the North-Western Front Nikolai Vatutin. It was based on the information printed on a secret map that fell into the hands of the Soviet command. It marked the position of all six divisions of Hoepner's Panzer Group. After checking the intelligence data, the headquarters of the North-Western Front developed a counter-offensive plan.
By order of the headquarters of the North-Western Front, the commander of the Soviet 11th Army created two groups of forces for counterattack - the northern and southern. They were to cut off the German force that had broken through to the Mshaga River.
From the northern group, two divisions (the 21st Tank and 237th Rifle divisions) advanced from the Gorodishche and Utorgosh line in a southwest direction on Baranovo and Sitnya, and the 70th Rifle division advanced in a southern direction, towards Soltsy. The 1st Separate Mountain Rifle Brigade (1GSSR) also attacked Soltsy from the east.
The divisions of the southern group (the 183rd rifle from the 27th army) were to advance in the northern direction, to Sitnya, and there to join up with the units of the northern group.
On 14 July 1941, with the support of 235 aircraft, the Soviet 11th Army went on the offensive.
The sudden counterattack of Soviet troops came as a complete surprise to the German command. The bulk of the German 8th Panzer Division was surrounded. At the same time, the German 3rd Motorized Infantry Division was placed in a difficult position.
On 16 July, the Soviet 70th Rifle Division under the command of Major General Andrey Fedyunin occupied Soltsy. On the same day, the commander of the Northwestern Front ordered the front armies to complete the defeat of the enemy in the Soltsy area and by firmly holding the line occupied by the center and left flank of the 27th Army, the rest of the forces went on the offensive.
However, Manstein ordered the proper counter-action: he withdrew his troops some 40 km and prepared for all-out defence. Most of the LVI Panzer Corps managed to break out of the encirclement and on 16 July, the SS Totenkopf Division was transferred to the LVI Panzer Corps, which restored the situation on the Shelon River.
The Soviets launched wave after wave of attacks on the German positions, but were thrown back with heavy losses.
The fierce Soviet counterattack had the effect that on 19 July the entire German Army Group "North" suspended the offensive towards Leningrad. The 8th Panzer Division, which had suffered serious losses, was withdrawn to the rear.
On 16 July, the 1st Army Corps had been transferred to the 4th Panzer Group and on 18 July it took Dno from the 22nd Rifle Corps. Soltsy was retaken on 22 July but an attack of the German 21st Infantry Division on Shimsk was repulsed.
Only on 27 July did the situation along the entire front between Narva and Lake Ilmen stabilize, and Army Group North able to think again about continuing the offensive against Leningrad.
Renewed German offensive : Battle of Luga–Kingisepp (8 August – 23 August)
The German command had decided to wait for the arrival of the bulk of the 18th Army from Northern Estonia and the 16th Army from Eastern Latvia, to launch a new offensive.
On 8 August the LVI Panzer Corps attacked in the area of Luga but failed to advance against strong Soviet defensive positions.