The Kamenets-Podolsky pocket (German: Kessel von Kamenez-Podolsk) was a key part of a major Soviet Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation (Russian: Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция), known on the German side by several names. It was conducted by the Soviet 1st Ukrainian Front against the German 1st and 4th Panzer Armies, and Hungarian forces of Army Group South in March-April 1944. The plan was to launch the main strike south, at the junction of the two German armies, thus cutting off the Lvov-Odessa railway line, vital for supplying Army Group South. The subsequent southerly advance to the Dniester aimed to cut off westward retreat routes for Army Group South, forcing it to use the long roundabout route through Romania for supply.
The offensive began on 4 March and the German front soon collapsed. By 10 March, the Lvov-Odessa railway was cut and the Soviets advanced 60–100 kilometers. At that point, the drive halted due to the arrival of German reserves and the logistical difficulties of advancing in rasputitsa. After regrouping and introducing the 1st Tank Army, the offensive resumed on 21 March, completely shattering the German front on the same day. On 23 March, the 1st Panzer Army lost contact with the 4th Panzer Army, and the 1st Tank Army reached the Dniester on 24 March. Major communication centers, notably Proskurov, Kamenets-Podolsky, and Chernovtsy, fell in rapid succession, encircling the 1st Panzer Army, which held a ration strength of 200,000 personnel. This encirclement, however, was incomplete, as understrength Soviet units operating on overextended lines over muddy terrain could not establish a tight ring, especially in the west. Moreover, anticipating a German breakout south across the Dniester, the Soviet command ordered the 1st Tank Army to the southern bank, which excluded it from active combat against the encircled forces.
The commander of the 1st Panzer Army, Generaloberst Hans Hube, intended to breakout south, as the Soviets had anticipated. However, Hube was overruled by Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein, who insisted that the army must breakout to the west, relying on the element of surprise and because the Soviet forces there were weak. As a relief force attacking from the west, Manstein received the II SS Panzer Corps from France. The westward breakout, supported by a major Luftwaffe airlift, began in late March. Only at the start of April did the Soviet command realize German forces were breaking out westward. Parts of the 1st Tank Army were redeployed from southern bank of the Dniester, but this was hampered by the destruction of the river crossings by the Germans. On 4 April, the II SS Panzer Corps, whose arrival was undetected by the Soviets, struck from the west. By 10 April, contact between the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies was reestablished.
After the breakout, the 1st Panzer Army was greatly weakened. All of its divisions were rendered combat-ineffective or suitable only for limited defense. Losses in heavy weapons, armored and motor vehicles were enormous, leaving units with a small number of them. The army reported that most personnel broke out, but noted that only a small part of the 200,000 ration strength were combat troops. The infantry strength was reduced to a fraction of authorized levels, forcing the assignment of specialists and personnel from rear services to the frontline. The troops emerged from the pocket debilitated, suffering from malnutrition and severe lice infestations, with the logistical breakdown triggering a decrease in discipline. According to the army’s field post inspection office, the hardships of this campaign had a devastating impact on morale, with four-year veterans describing it as the most difficult experience of the war.
Forces involved and names of this campaign
The offensive operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which began on 4 March and ended on 17 April 1944, was conducted against the German 1st and 4th Panzer Armies on the northern (or left) wing of Army Group South, as well as the Hungarian forces in the area of the Dniester and foothills of the Carpathians. It was the biggest and most important operation of the Dnieper-Carpathian offensive, encompassing a vast area. According to Manstein, in March 1944 the time had come "to foot the bill" for the German High Command's fundamental mistake of never wanting to give anything up - this northern wing of Army Group South was the "decisive spot", from which the Soviets could push the entire southern wing of the German armies southward toward the Black Sea or Romania. In the midst of this campaign, Manstein will be sacked by Hitler.
The right-wing forces and large parts of the main central grouping of the front were engaged against the German 4th Panzer Army (from north to south) in the area south of Kovel, Brody and Tarnopol regions. In the area south of Kovel, the forces of the front came into contact with the 2nd Belorussian Front, which was conducting the Polesskoe offensive (Battle of Kovel). Both Brody and Tarnopol were declared fortified places by Hitler and became areas of fierce fighting, with Tarnopol garrison being encircled and eventually destroyed- out of the original garrison of 4,600 troops, only 55 were able to escape by 18 April. Meanwhile, at the beginning of the offensive, the mass of the central grouping of the front was deployed at the boundary of the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies, between the areas of Tarnopol and Proskurov, through which the strategic Lvov-Odessa railway line was running. The left-wing forces of the front were deployed against the 1st Panzer Army and came into contact with the right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, which was conducting the Uman–Botoșani offensive against the German 8th Army. From late March onwards, in the area south of the Dniester and foothills of the Carpathians, the Hungarian forces became actively engaged in combat- at first it was only the VII Army Corps, then from April the mobilized 1st Army, which in the middle of the month went on a local counteroffensive.
The whole March-April 1944 offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front was named the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation (Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция) by the Soviet side after the war. It was divided into two phases- the first phase lasted from 4 to 20 March, the second phase lasted from 21 March to 17 April, when Stavka from Moscow ordered the front to go on the defensive. It was early in the second phase of this Soviet offensive (on 23 March), when the simultaneous encirclement of the 1st Panzer Army in the Kamenets-Podolsky pocket and Tarnopol fortified place of the 4th Panzer Army had happened. By that point, the Soviet and German formations had been in non-stop combat for nearly 3 weeks.
For the German side, this campaign is known by several designations, as defined in the OKH document dated October 1944. Although the Soviet offensive was conducted against both German armies at the same time, the battles and their designations are divided separately by each army.
In the sector of the 1st Panzer Army, this campaign is known as the Defensive battle in the area of Vinnitsa - Yampol - Chernovits (Abwehrschlacht im Raum Winniza - Jampol - Tschernowitz), which lasted from 4 March to 10 April 1944. The Breakthrough battles at Kamenets-Podolsk (Durchbruchskämpfe bei Kamenez-Podolsk), which lasted from 26 March to 10 April 1944, are part of this. Although the army was cut off on 23 March, the start of the breakthrough battles is given as 26 March, because on that day Manstein's plan was given approval and the course was set for the army to breakout to the west, even though the actual breakout to the west did not begin until 28 March.
In the sector of the 4th Panzer Army, this campaign is known as the Fighting in the Tarnopol - Kovel area (Kämpfe im Raum Tarnopol - Kowel), which lasted from 3 March to 27 April 1944. It is divided into the following battles:
- Defensive Battle of Tarnopol and Brody (Abwehrschlacht von Tarnopol und Brody), 15 March - 20 April 1944;
- Defense of the Tarnopol Fortified Place (Verteidigung des Festen Platzes Tarnopol), 23 March - 16 April 1944;
- Battle of Kovel (Schlacht um Kowel), 14-26 March 1944;
- Defense of the Kovel Fortified Place (Verteidigung des Festen Platzes Kowel), 16-26 March 1944.
The Kovel area was located at the boundary of two army groups, thus there were elements from the 4th Panzer Army of Army Group South and 2nd Army of Army Group Center. The ending date for the battle in the Kovel area (26 March) is given for specific reason. On 27 March 1944, to simplify command arrangements, the boundary of the 4th Panzer Army and 2nd Army was pushed south of Kovel. Thus, from that day onwards, the Kovel Fortified Place, as well as the forces assembling to rescue the garrison of Kovel, were subordinated to the 2nd Army.
Background
Throughout February, main forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front repulsed heavy blows from the units of the 1st Panzer Army in their attempts to de-blockade the trapped German forces at the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket.
At the same time, the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front had executed the Rovno–Lutsk offensive, spearheaded by 2 Cavalry Corps. In the course of that operation, a new bulge was created, in which the Soviets dangerously hanged from the north over the 1st Panzer Army and the rest of the Army Group South in Ukraine.
It would be there, in the Shepetivka area, where Soviets will shift their main weight of attack. By striking south from that area towards the Dniester river, the 1st Panzer Army and all German forces operating in the right-bank Ukraine would be cut off from Germany and pressed against the Carpathian Mountains.
Furthermore, the Ternopil–Khmelnytskyi railway junction, which was part of a wider Lviv–Odessa railway, was a major German communication and supply center that linked together northern and southern portions of Army Group South. It was also the last railroad before the Carpathian Mountains. If this railroad was cut, the southern group of German forces would have to use the long roundabout route through the Balkans, with all of the supplies being rerouted over the Romanian railroads, which were in poor condition.
Soviet preparations
On 18 February 1944, immediately after the end of the Battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket, the 1st Ukrainian Front received the task of carrying out a new offensive operation, which is known as the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation.
The 1st Ukrainian Front front had at its disposal the 13th, 60th, 1st Guards, 18th and 38th Combined-Arms Armies, 3rd Guards, 1st and 4th Tank Armies, 2nd Air Army, 4th Guards and 25th Tank Corps, 1st and 6th Guards Cavalry Corps.
The directive of the Supreme High Command (STAVKA) for this operation stated:
To prepare an offensive with the inclusion in the composition of the strike group of the front the troops of the 13th, 60th, 1st Guards Armies, 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies. To launch an attack from the front of Dubno, Shepetovka, Lyubar in a southerly direction with the task of smashing the German grouping in the area of Kremenets, Starokonstantinov, Tarnopol and seizing Berestechko, Brody, Tarnopol, Proskurov, Khmilniki areas. In the future, to advance in the general direction on Chortkov, in order to cut off the southern group of German forces the withdrawal paths westward in the area north of the Dniester river.
In the final form, the plan of the operation saw the main attack to be launched by the forces of the 13th, 60th, 1st Guards Combined-Arms Armies, 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies from the front of Torgovitsa, Shepetivka, Lyubar to the south in the general direction on Brody, Ternopil, Chortkiv, Khmelnytskyi. Secondary attacks were to be delivered by the 18th and 38th armies towards the Khmilnyk, Zhmerynka and Vinnytsia areas.
During the preparation of the operation, large re-grouping of the troops was carried out. Throughout the February 1944, the 1st Ukrainian Front participated in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky Operation. Therefore, a significant number of front-line troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front by mid-February were on its left wing. The new operation required the creation of a strong strike force closer to the right wing. It was necessary to transfer the 3rd Guards Tank Army and a significant number of artillery, tank, engineering units from the Berdychiv area to the Shumsk region, to regroup the 60th and 1st Guards armies almost completely into their new lines, and also to move the 18th and 38th armies to the right wing as well. Meanwhile, the 4th Tank Army had to advance 350 kilometers from the area west of Kiev.
The huge transfer of forces 200–350 km westwards, through the deep spring mud or rasputitsa, as well as destroyed landscape, was extremely challenging. By the beginning of the operation, it was not possible to create the necessary fuel reserves. On the eve of the attack, fuel stocks for tank units dropped alarmingly to less than 3 day's supply. Despite this, Zhukov and the front command decided to launch the operation, as the mudslide intensified more and more, and every day of respite gave the Germans time to recover. It was taken into account that the additional amount of fuel would go to the troops on the 3rd or 4th day of the operation. However, the fuel and ammunition shortages would be a recurring issue.
The STAVKA and the front command paid great attention to ensuring the secrecy of the preparations- the Maskirovka. For this, a limited circle of people was involved in the development of a plan of operation, the telephone conversations on issues related to the upcoming operation were strictly forbidden. All troop movements were carried out at night or in daytime in conditions of poor visibility with the strictest camouflage measures. For the purpose of misinforming the Germans and misleading them regarding the true direction of the main attack, the concentration of rifle and tank forces was imitated in the 38th Army's sector and rumors about a large-scale offensive in the area were spread through the local population. All these measures had a positive effect: they ensured a surprise of the strike on the tactical level and forced the Germans to hold significant forces against the 18th and 38th armies.
All told, on the eve of the attack on 4 March 1944, on the 400 km front, the 1st Ukrainian Front numbered 646,842 combat troops, 11,221 artillery guns and mortars, 1,409 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 477 aircraft.
German preparations
The Soviet 1st Ukrainian Front was opposed by the Wehrmacht's 1st and 4th Panzer Armies, belonging to Army Group South. It consisted of a total of 25 divisions (including 10 panzer and panzer-grenadier divisions), a motorized brigade, 2 heavy panzer battalions, 5 brigades of StuG assault guns, 2 consolidated groups and a large number of police, paramilitary, artillery, engineering, security and other units. These troops were supported by the 8th Air Corps of the Luftflotte 4.
The command of Army Group South watched with great concern the situation on its left flank, in the sector west of Lutsk, Shepetivka, which it considered, not without reason, one of the most vulnerable in its defense. The strike of the Soviet forces in this area to the south had very serious consequences- all German troops operating in Right-Bank Ukraine could have been cut off from the central regions of Germany and pressed against the Carpathian Mountains.