The Great Naktong Offensive was a North Korean military offensive against United Nations Command (UN) forces early in the Korean War, taking place from September 1–15, 1950. It was the North Korean Korean People's Army (KPA)'s unsuccessful final bid to break the Pusan Perimeter established by the UN forces.
For the first several months of the war, the KPA defeated and pushed back the UN forces south at each encounter. However, by August the UN troops (which were composed mostly of troops from the United States (US) and Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) had been forced into the 140-mile (230 km) Pusan Perimeter on the southeast tip of the Korean Peninsula. For the first time, the UN troops formed a continuous line which the KPA could neither flank nor overwhelm with superior numbers. KPA offensives on the perimeter were stalled and by the end of August all momentum was lost. Seeing the danger in a prolonged conflict along the perimeter, the KPA sought a massive offensive for September to collapse the UN line.
The KPA subsequently planned a simultaneous offensive for their entire army along five axes of the perimeter; and on September 1 intense fighting erupted around the cities of Masan, Kyongju, Taegu, Yongch'on and the Naktong Bulge. What followed was two weeks of extremely brutal fighting as the two sides vied to control the routes into Pusan. Initially successful in some areas, the KPA were unable to hold their gains against the numerically and technologically superior UN force. The KPA, again stalled at the failure of this offensive, was outflanked by the Inchon landings on 15 September and on 16 September the UN forces began their breakout from the Pusan Perimeter.
Background
From the outbreak of the Korean War following the invasion of South Korea by the North in June 1950, the KPA had enjoyed superiority in both manpower and equipment over the ROKA and the UN forces dispatched to South Korea to prevent it from collapsing. The North Korean strategy was to aggressively pursue UN forces on all avenues of approach south and to engage them, attacking from the front and initiating a double envelopment of both flanks of the unit, which allowed the KPA to surround and cut off the opposing force, which would then be forced to retreat in disarray, often leaving behind much of its equipment. From their initial June 25 offensive to fights in July and early August, the KPA used this strategy to effectively defeat any UN force and push it south. However, with the establishment of the Pusan Perimeter in August, the UN troops held a continuous line which the KPA could not flank, and their advantages in numbers decreased daily as the superior UN logistical system brought in more troops and supplies to the UN forces.
When the KPA approached the Pusan Perimeter on August 5, they attempted the same frontal assault technique on the four main avenues of approach into the perimeter. Throughout August, the KPA 6th Division, and later the 7th Division engaged the US 25th Infantry Division at the Battle of Masan, initially repelling a UN counteroffensive before attacking Komam-ni and Battle Mountain. These attacks stalled as UN forces, well equipped and with large standing units of reserves, repeatedly repelled KPA attacks. North of Masan, the KPA 4th Division and the US 24th Infantry Division sparred in the Naktong Bulge area. In the First Battle of Naktong Bulge, the KPA was unable to hold its bridgehead across the river as large numbers of US reserves were brought in to repel it, and on August 19, the KPA 4th Division was forced back across the river with 50 percent casualties. In the Taegu region, five KPA divisions were repulsed by three UN divisions in several attempts to attack the city during the Battle of Taegu. Particularly heavy fighting took place at the Battle of the Bowling Alley where the KPA 13th Division was almost completely destroyed in the attack. On the east coast, three more KPA divisions were repulsed by the ROKA at P'ohang-dong during the Battle of P'ohang-dong. All along the front, the KPA were reeling from these defeats, the first time in the war their strategies were failing.
By the end of August the KPA had been pushed beyond their limits and many of the original units were at far reduced strength and effectiveness. Logistic problems racked the KPA, and shortages of food, weapons, equipment and replacement soldiers proved devastating for their units. By late August, the UN command had more combat soldiers in Korea than the North Koreans did, and UN superiority over the air and sea meant the North Koreans were at a disadvantage which was growing daily. KPA tank losses had been in the hundreds, and they had fewer than 100 tanks by the time of the Pusan Perimeter fight, to the Americans' 600 tanks. By the end of August the KPA's only remaining advantage was their initiative. However, their forces retained high morale and enough supply to allow for a large-scale offensive.
Prelude
In planning its new offensive, the KPA command decided any attempt to flank the UN force was impossible thanks to the support of the UN naval forces. Instead, they opted to use a frontal attack to breach the perimeter and collapse it as the only hope of achieving success in the battle. Fed with intelligence from the Soviet Union the North Koreans were aware that the UN forces were building up along the Pusan Perimeter and that it must conduct an offensive soon or it could not win the battle. A secondary objective was to surround Taegu and destroy the UN units in that city. As part of this mission, the KPA would first cut the supply lines to Taegu.
North Korean planners enlarged the KPA force in anticipation of a new offensive. The KPA, originally numbering 10 divisions in two corps, was enlarged to 14 divisions with several independent brigades. The new troops were brought in from reserve forces from North Korea. Marshal Choe Yong Gun served as deputy commander of the KPA, with General Kim Chaek in charge of the Front Headquarters. Beneath them were the II Corps in the east, commanded by Lieutenant General Kim Mu Chong, and I Corps in the west, under Lieutenant general Kim Ung. II Corps controlled the 10th Division, 2nd Division, 4th Division, 9th Division, 7th Division, 6th Division and 105th Armored Division, with the 16th Armored Brigade and 104th Security Brigade in support. I Corps commanded the 3rd Division, 13th Division, 1st Division, 8th Division, 15th Division, 12th Division and 5th Division with the 17th Armored Brigade in support. This force numbered approximately 97,850 men, although a third of it comprised raw recruits, forced conscripts from South Korea, and lacked weapons and equipment. By August 31 they were facing a UN force of 120,000 combat troops plus 60,000 support troops.
On August 20, the North Korean commands distributed operations orders to their subordinate units. The plan called for a simultaneous five-prong attack against the UN lines. These attacks would overwhelm the UN defenders and allow the KPA to break through the lines in at least one place to force the UN forces back. Five battle groupings were ordered:
- 6th and 7th Divisions break through the US 25th Infantry Division at Masan.
- 9th, 4th, 2nd and 10th Divisions break through the US 2nd Infantry Division at the Naktong Bulge to Miryang and Yeongsan.
- 3rd, 13th and 1st Divisions break through the US 1st Cavalry Division and ROKA 1st Infantry Division to Taegu.
- 8th and 15th Divisions break through the ROKA 8th Infantry Division and 6th Infantry Division to Hayang and Yongch'on.
- 12th and 5th Divisions break through the ROKA Capital Division and 3rd Infantry Division to P'ohang-dong and Kyongju.
On August 22 the North Korean premier, Kim Il Sung, had ordered his forces to conclude the war by September 1, yet the scale of the offensive did not allow this. Groups 1 and 2 were to begin their attack at 23:30 on August 31, and Groups 3, 4 and 5 would begin their attacks at 18:00 on September 2. The attacks were to closely connect in order to overwhelm UN troops at each point simultaneously, forcing breakthroughs in multiple places that the UN would be unable to reinforce. The KPA relied primarily on night attacks to counter UN air superiority and naval firepower, with the KPA generals believing that such attacks would prevent UN forces from firing effectively and result in heavy casualties from friendly fire.
The attacks caught UN planners and troops by surprise. By August 26, the UN troops thought they had destroyed the last serious threats to the perimeter, and anticipated the war ending by late November. ROKA units, in the meantime, suffered from low morale as a result of their failures to defend effectively thus far in the conflict, and a cautious US Eighth Army commander Lieutenant general Walton Walker ordered Major general John B. Coulter to the P'ohang-dong area to shore up the ROKA I Corps, which was falling apart due to low morale. UN troops were preparing for Operation Chromite, an amphibious assault on the port of Inchon on September 15, and did not anticipate that the KPA would mount a serious offensive before then.
Battle
Kyongju corridor
The first KPA attack struck the UN right flank on the east coast. Although the KPA II Corps' general attack in the north and east was planned for September 2, the KPA 12th Division, now with a strength of 5,000 men, started to move forward from the mountains earlier than planned, from where it had reorganized after its defeat in the Kigye and P'ohang-dong area. The division was low in food, weapons, and ammunition, and its men suffered from low morale. Facing the 12th Division was the ROKA Capital Division. At 04:00 on August 27, a KPA attack overran one company of the ROKA 17th Regiment, Capital Division, north of Kigye. This caused the whole regiment to buckle and retreat. Then the ROKA 18th Regiment to the east fell back because of its exposed flank. The ROKA 17th Regiment lost the town of Kigye in pulling back, and the entire Capital Division fell back 3 miles (4.8 km) to the south side of the Kigye valley.
Walker ordered Coulter to observe the ROKA troops on the east. Coulter flew to Kyongju, arriving there at 12:00 that day. Walker in the meantime formally appointed Coulter Deputy Commander, Eighth Army, placing him in command of ROKA I Corps which controlled the Capital and 3rd Divisions, the US 21st Infantry Regiment, the 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment and the 73rd Medium Tank Battalion, less C Company. Coulter designated these units Task Force Jackson and established his headquarters in the same building in Kyongju in which the ROKA I Corps commander and the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) officers had their command post.
Coulter was tasked with eliminating the KPA penetration in the Kigye area and of seizing and organizing the high ground extending from north of Yongch'on to the coast at Wolp'o-ri, about 12 miles (19 km) north of P'ohang-dong. This line passed 10 miles (16 km) north of Kigye. Coulter was to attack as soon as possible with Task Force Jackson to gain the first high ground north of Kigye. The US 21st Infantry Regiment was moving to a position north of Taegu on the morning of August 27, when Walker revoked its orders and instructed it to turn around and proceed as rapidly as possible to Kyongju and report to Coulter. Coulter immediately sent the 3rd Battalion north to An'gang-ni where it went into a position behind the ROKA Capital Division.
Coulter's plan to attack on August 28 had to be postponed. Brigadier general Kim Hong-il, the ROKA I Corps commander, told him he could not attack, that there were too many casualties and the South Koreans were exhausted. The KPA 5th Division above P'ohang-dong had begun to press south again and the ROKA 3rd Division in front of it began to show signs of pulling back. On the 28th, the KMAG adviser to the ROKA 3rd Division and Brigadier general Kim Suk Won clashed over whether the division should retreat or attack. That day, August 28, Walker issued a special statement addressed to the ROKA, and meant also for the South Korean Minister of Defense, Shin Sung-mo. He called on the ROKA troops to hold their lines in the Pusan Perimeter, and implored the rest of the UN troops to defend their ground as firmly as possible, counterattacking as necessary to prevent the KPA from consolidating their gains.
At the same time, elements of the KPA 5th Division penetrated the ROKA 3rd Division southwest of P'ohang-dong. Coulter directed the 21st Infantry to repel this penetration. During the day on August 29, B Company, 21st Infantry, supported by a platoon of tanks of B Company, 73rd Medium Tank Battalion, successfully counterattacked northwest from the southern edge of P'ohang-dong for a distance of 1.5 miles (2.4 km), with ROKA troops following. The American units then withdrew to P'ohang-dong. That night the ROKA withdrew and the next day an American infantry-tank force repeated the action of the day before. The 21st Infantry then took over from the ROKA 3rd Division a sector extending north and northwest of P'ohang-dong. Also on August 29, the ROKA Capital Division, with American tank and artillery support, recaptured Kigye and held it during the night against KPA counterattacks, only to lose it again at dawn. UN air attacks continued at an increased tempo in the Kigye area.