The Capture of Ovillers (1–16 July 1916) was a British local operation during the Battle of Albert in France, the name given by the British to the first two weeks of the Battle of the Somme. The village of Ovillers-la-Boisselle (commonly shortened to Ovillers) forms part of the small commune of Ovillers-la-Boisselle, about 22 mi (35 km) north-east of Amiens in the Somme department in Picardie in northern France. By 1916, the village was called Ovillers by the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to avoid confusion with La Boisselle south-west of the road.
On 1 July 1916, the first day on the Somme, Ovillers was attacked by the 8th Division, part of the III Corps. The attack was a disaster and the division suffered 5,121 casualties, the defending Infantry Regiment 180 had 280 casualties and Reserve Infantry Regiment 110 35 casualties. The 8th Division was withdrawn and replaced by the 12th (Eastern) Division, which resumed the attack on Ovillers on 3 July and suffered 4,721 casualties by the time it was relieved. Attacks by the 25th Division continued and the village was captured during the evening of 16 July.
Background
1914
In 1914, Ovillers was a village to the north of the D 929 Albert–Bapaume road, north-east of Aveluy and south-west of Pozières. To the south-east, across the D 929 at the junction of the D 104 to Contalmaison, lay La Boisselle. The XIV Reserve Corps (Generalleutnant [Lieutenant-General] Richard von Schubert then Generalleutnant Hermann von Stein from 14 September) began operations west of Bapaume in late September by advancing down the Bapaume–Albert road to the Ancre river, preparatory to an advance down the Somme valley to Amiens. By 29 September, the attack had been stopped by the French around Fricourt and La Boisselle, south of Ovillers. In early November, French artillery reinforcements arrived and bombardments beyond the front line began. On 19 November, two divisions of XI Corps attacked to fix German troops but were repulsed and on 28 November, an attack by the XIV Corps managed to advance the French line by 980–1,310 ft (300–400 m). In early December, IV Corps attacked and gained 980–3,280 ft (300–1,000 m). The French attacks had been costly and gained little ground.
Attacks by the French 53rd Reserve Division of XI Corps, took place from 17 December, the 118th Battalion reached the cemetery of La Boisselle and the 19th Infantry Regiment closed on the western fringe of Ovillers. A German counter-bombardment then swept the ground west of Ovillers and Ravine 92, which prevented the approach of French reserves. During the night the French survivors fell back to the French front line, except at La Boisselle. Next day the XI Corps broke through the German defences at La Boisselle cemetery but was stopped a short distance forward, in front of trenches protected by barbed wire. On 24 December, the 118th Infantry Regiment and two battalions of the 64th Infantry Regiment attacked again at La Boisselle at 9:00 a.m. after a bombardment. The 118th Regiment captured a small number of houses in the south-east of the village and consolidated the area during the night. The 64th Regiment overran the German first line but was held up short of a second trench, which had not been discovered before the attack and then dug in, having lost many casualties.
1915
In January 1915, General Erich von Falkenhayn, head of Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL, German General Staff) ordered the creation of a systematic defensive system on the Western Front, capable of withstanding attacks indefinitely, with a relatively small garrison. Barbed wire obstacles were enlarged from one belt 5–10 yd (4.6–9.1 m) wide to two, 30 yd (27 m) wide and about 15 yd (14 m) apart. Double and triple thickness wire was used and laid 3–5 ft (0.91–1.52 m) high. The front line was increased from one trench to three, dug 150–200 yd (140–180 m) apart, the first trench (Kampfgraben) to be occupied by sentry groups, the second (Wohngraben) for the front-trench garrison and the third trench for local reserves. The trenches were traversed and had sentry-posts in concrete recesses built into the parapet. Dugouts had been deepened from 6–9 ft (1.8–2.7 m) to 20–30 ft (6.1–9.1 m), 50 yd (46 m) apart and made large enough for 25 men. An intermediate line of strong points (Stützpunktlinie) about 1,000 yd (910 m) behind the front line was also built. Communication trenches ran back to the reserve line, renamed the second line, which was as well built and wired as the first line. The second line was beyond the range of Allied field artillery, to force an attacker to stop and move artillery forward before assaulting the line.
In mid-July 1915, extensive troop and artillery moves north of the Ancre were seen by German observers. The type of shell fired by the new artillery changed from high explosive to shrapnel and unexploded shells were found to be of a different design. The new infantry opposite did not continue the live-and-let-live practices of their forerunners and a larger number of machine-guns began firing against the German lines, which did not pause every 25 shots, like French Hotchkiss machine guns. German troops were reluctant to believe that the British had assembled an army large enough to extend as far south as the Somme and a soldier seen near Thiepval, was thought to be a French soldier in a grey hat. By 4 August, it was officially reported by OHL that the 52nd Division and the 26th Reserve Division had seen a man in a brown suit. On 9 August, the situation became clear when a British soldier working in no man's land got lost in a mist and was captured.
1916
After the Second Battle of Champagne (Autumn Battle 25 September – 6 November 1915), a third defence line another 3,000 yd (1.7 mi; 2.7 km) back from the Stützpunktlinie was begun in February and was nearly complete on the Somme front when the battle began. German artillery was organised in a series of Sperrfeuerstreifen (barrage sectors); each officer was expected to know the batteries covering his section of the front line and the batteries to be ready to engage fleeting targets. A telephone system was built, with lines buried 6 ft (1.8 m) deep for 5 mi (8.0 km) behind the front line, to connect the front line to the artillery. The Somme defences had two inherent weaknesses which the rebuilding had not remedied. The front trenches were on a forward slope, lined by white chalk from the subsoil and easily seen by ground observers. The defences were crowded towards the front trench, with a regiment having two battalions near the front-trench system and the reserve battalion divided between the Stützpunktlinie and the second line, all within 2,000 yd (1,800 m) and most troops within 1,000 yd (910 m) of the front line, accommodated in the new deep dugouts.
The concentration of troops in the front line on a forward slope guaranteed that it would face the bulk of an artillery bombardment, directed by ground observers, on clearly marked lines. Digging and wiring of a new third line began in May, civilians were moved away and stocks of ammunition and hand-grenades were increased in the front-line. By mid-June Below and Rupprecht expected an attack on the 2nd Army which held the front from Noyon to beyond Gommecourt, although Falkenhayn was more concerned about an offensive in Alsace-Lorraine and then a possible attack on the 6th Army, which held the front from near Gommecourt to St. Eloi close to Ypres. In April, Falkenhayn had suggested a spoiling attack by the 6th Army but lack of troops and artillery engaged in the offensive at Verdun, made it impractical. Some labour battalions and captured Russian heavy artillery were sent to the 2nd Army, Below proposed a preventive attack in May and a reduced operation from Ovillers to St. Pierre Divion in June but got only one extra artillery regiment. On 6 June, Below reported that air reconnaissance indicated an offensive at Fricourt and Gommecourt.
The south side of the Somme had been reinforced by the French, against whom the XVII Corps was overstretched, with twelve regiments to hold 22 mi (36 km) and no reserves. In mid-June, Falkenhayn was sceptical of an offensive on the Somme, since a great success would lead to operations in Belgium, when an offensive in Alsace-Lorraine would take the war and its devastation into Germany. More railway activity, fresh digging and camp extensions around Albert opposite the 2nd Army, was seen by German air observers on 9 and 11 June and spies reported an imminent offensive. On 24 June, a British prisoner spoke of a five-day bombardment, to begin on 26 June and local units expected an attack within days. On 27 June, 14 balloons were visible, one for each British division but no German reinforcements were sent to the area until 1 July and only then to the 6th Army, which was given control of the three divisions in reserve behind it. At Verdun on 24 June, Crown Prince Wilhelm was ordered to conserve troops, ammunition and equipment and further restrictions were imposed on 1 July, when two divisions were put under OHL control.
Prelude
British offensive preparations
The British front line from Bécourt to Authuille was held by III Corps (Lieutenant-General William Pulteney) and lay along the forward slope of a low ridge between La Boisselle and Albert, east of Tara and Usna hills, which was a continuation of the south-west spur from the main Bazentin Ridge on which lay Ovillers. In dead ground behind the ridge, field artillery was deployed in rows and artillery observers watched from positions on the ridge, with a perfect view of the German front position, which ran along the higher slopes of three spurs, which descend south-west from the main ridge, where each trench had a distinct white chalk parapet. No man's land was up to 800 yd (730 m) wide, with the left flank of the corps west of Ovillers Spur. Depressions between the spurs called Mash and Nab valleys were about 1,000 yd (910 m) wide at their broadest points, which made an advance up them vulnerable to crossfire, from trench networks and machine-gun posts on either side. Thiepval Spur to the north, opposite X Corps, overlooked the ground across which the III Corps divisions must advance.
The III Corps artillery had 98 heavy guns and howitzers, and the loan of a groupe of the French 18th Field Artillery Regiment, to fire gas shells. The corps artillery was divided into two field artillery groups for each attacking division and a fifth group, containing the heaviest artillery, to cover the corps front. The artillery was supported by most of 3 Squadron Royal Flying Corps (RFC) for artillery observation and reconnaissance sorties. There was one heavy gun for each 40 yd (37 m) of front and a field gun for every 23 yd (21 m). The heavy group had one 15-inch howitzer, three 12-inch howitzers on railway mountings, twelve 9.2-inch howitzers, sixteen 8-inch howitzers and twenty 6-inch howitzers, one 12-inch gun, one 9.2-inch gun (both on railway mountings), four 6-inch guns, thirty-two 60-pounder guns and eight 4.7-inch guns. During the preliminary bombardment, the III Corps artillery was hampered by poor-quality field gun ammunition, which caused premature shell-explosions in gun barrels and casualties to the gunners. Many howitzer shells fell short and there was a large number of blinds (duds) but long-range fire was more successful and a 12-inch railway gun chased Generalleutnant Hermann von Stein, the XIV Reserve Corps commander and his staff out of Bapaume on 1 July.
British plan of attack
In the III Corps area, heavy artillery fire was to jump from one German defence line to the next in eight lifts. The infantry advance was to be preceded by field artillery barrages which moved back slowly on a timetable. The sixth lift was to fall on a line behind Contalmaison and Pozières, 85 minutes after zero hour and the eighth lift was to fall 1,000 yd (910 m) beyond after another 22 minutes, a procession into the German defences of 2 mi (3.2 km) in 107 minutes. The field artillery barrage was to move "very slowly", raking back to the next German trench line in lifts of 50–100–150 yd (46–91–137 m) but was to move faster than the speed of the infantry advance, so was not a true creeping barrage. On 28 June, the Fourth Army headquarters ordered that if the initial attacks caused the German defence to collapse, the closest infantry would exploit without waiting for cavalry of the Reserve Army (Lieutenant-General Hubert Gough), which was assembled 5 mi (8.0 km) west of Albert and was to advance once the roads had been cleared.