The Battle of Bazentin Ridge (14–17 July 1916) was part of the Battle of the Somme (1 July – 18 November) on the Western Front in France, during the First World War. On 14 July, the British Fourth Army (General Henry Rawlinson) made a dawn attack against the German 2nd Army (General Fritz von Below) in the Brown Position (Braune Stellung), from Delville Wood westwards to Bazentin le Petit Wood.
The British attack succeeded but attempts to use the opportunity to capture High Wood failed, due to the German success in holding on to the north end of Longueval and parts of Delville Wood, from which attacks on High Wood could be engaged from the flank. The British cavalry, intended to provide a faster-moving exploitation force, was badly delayed by the devastated ground, shell-holes and derelict trenches.
In the afternoon, infantry of the British 7th Division attacked High Wood, when an earlier advance could have occupied the wood unopposed. The British found German troops in parts of the wood and in the Switch Line along the ridge, which cut through the north-east part of the wood. British cavalry eventually attacked east of the wood and overran German infantry hiding in standing crops, inflicting about 100 casualties for a loss of eight troopers.
The cavalry attack was supported by an artillery-observation aircraft, whose crew saw the Germans in the crops and fired at them with their Lewis gun. The British struggled to exploit the success and the 2nd Army recovered, leading to another period of attritional line straightening attacks and German counter-attacks before the British and French could resume general attacks in mid-September.
Background
Strategic developments
By mid-June, the certainty of an Anglo-French attack on the Somme against the 2nd Army (General der Infanterie Fritz von Below), had led General Erich von Falkenhayn, the Chief of the Großer Generalstab (German General Staff), to send four divisions and artillery reinforcements from the Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL, Supreme Army Command) reserve, enough to contain the British offensive. The 2nd Army had plenty of time to construct a defence in depth and was better prepared than at any time since trench warfare had begun to receive an attack by the British and the French. On 15 June, Falkenhayn had informed the 6th Army (Generaloberst Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria) that the main Entente attack would be against the 2nd Army, with a limited attack near Lens on the 6th Army, which had a shorter line to hold, with 17+1⁄2 divisions, plenty of heavy artillery and with three divisions of the OHL reserve close by.
Maintaining the strength of the 6th Army at the expense of the 2nd Army on the Somme was to conserve the means for a counter-offensive north of the Somme front, once the British offensive had been shattered by the 2nd Army. A German attack on Fleury at Verdun from 22 to 23 June succeeded and on 24 June, the Verdun offensive was limited, to conserve manpower and ammunition for the coming Entente offensive, except for preparations to attack Fort Souville in July, to gain control of the heights on the east bank of the Meuse, overlooking Verdun. The fort was the last significant French position on the east bank and the final objective of the offensive that had begun in February 1916, which had been intended to last only a few weeks.
The power of the Anglo-French offensive on the Somme surprised the Germans, despite the costly failure of the British attack on 1 July, north of the Albert–Bapaume road. The quantity of Entente artillery-fire caused many casualties and much of the 2nd Army artillery, vital to the defensive system, had been destroyed. The policy of meeting any Anglo-French success with an immediate counter-attack was also costly and in the first ten days, the Germans suffered 40,187 casualties, against 25,989 in the first ten days at Verdun. After a lull on the Eastern Front, the Russians had resumed the Brusilov Offensive in June and forced Falkenhayn to reorganise the Eastern front, send German divisions to bolster the Austro-Hungarians and make limited counter-attacks, that had little effect. In late June and early July the Russians inflicted more defeats and on 2 July attacked the German sector of the Eastern Front at Baranovitchi.
On 2 July, seven divisions had been sent from OHL reserve and from the 6th Army to the 2nd Army; another seven were en route by 9 July. On 7 July, Falkenhayn abandoned the plan for a counter-offensive by the 6th Army for lack of manpower. After the failure of the attack on Fort Souville at Verdun on 12 July, Falkenhayn ordered a "strict defensive" and the transfer of more troops and artillery to the Somme, the first visible strategic effect of the Anglo-French offensive. Falkenhayn adopted a strategy of defeating the offensive on the Somme to show the French that the German army could not be beaten and that a negotiated peace was inevitable. German casualties were so high that by mid-July Falkenhayn had sent the best divisions remaining in the 6th Army to the Somme, reduced the OHL reserve to one division and begun reducing the size of the divisions in the Westheer (Western Army), to allow complete divisions to be transferred to the Somme; the Entente had seized the initiative on the Western Front.
Tactical developments
On 1 July, the French Sixth Army and the right wing of the British Fourth Army had inflicted a considerable defeat on the German 2nd Army. From the Albert–Bapaume road north to Gommecourt, the Fourth Army attack had been a disaster, where most of the c. 57,000 British casualties were suffered. Against the wishes of Marshal Joseph Joffre, General Sir Douglas Haig abandoned the offensive north of the road to reinforce the success in the south. During the Battle of Albert (1–13 July), the Fourth Army pressed forward south of the road, through several intermediate defensive lines, towards the German second position. The attacks were hampered by supply routes becoming quagmires during rainy periods (lengthening the time for round trips), behind the French XX Corps (Général Maurice Balfourier) and the British XIII Corps (Lieutenant-General Walter Congreve), XV Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Horne) and III Corps (Lieutenant-General William Pulteney).
South of the Albert–Bapaume road, La Boisselle was captured on 4 July, Bernafay and Caterpillar woods were occupied from 3 to 4 July and fighting for Trônes Wood, Mametz Wood and Contalmaison took place until early on 14 July. The Germans opposite the Fourth Army were kept disorganised and the British closed to within striking distance of the German second position, a significant but costly victory. The Fourth Army attacks were not co-ordinated, tactically crude, wasteful of manpower and gave the Germans an opportunity to concentrate their inferior resources on narrow fronts, multiplying their effect. The loss of c. 57,000 British casualties on 1 July was not repeated. From 2 to 13 July, the British attacked 46 times and suffered c. 25,000 casualties, a change in the rate of loss from 57,000 to 2,083 per day. Around 14 July, Général Émile Fayolle wrote that the French had taken 12,000 prisoners and 70 guns, the British 7,500 prisoners and 24 guns but that the British had 70,000 men "in the ground" (sic) and were still short of the German second position.
The strain imposed by the Entente attacks after 1 July, led Below to issue an order of the day (2nd Army Order I a 575 secret) on 3 July, forbidding voluntary withdrawals,
The outcome of the war depends on 2nd Army being victorious on the Somme. Despite the current enemy superiority in artillery and infantry we have got to win this battle.... For the time being, we must hold our current positions without fail and improve on them by means of minor counter-attacks. I forbid the voluntary relinquishment of positions.... The enemy must be made to pick his way forward over corpses.
— 3 July 1916
after Falkenhayn sacked the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Army, Generalmajor Paul Grünert and General Günther von Pannewitz the XVII Corps commander, defending the south side of the Somme, after Grünert had allowed Pannewitz to withdraw to the third position where the Somme flows south to north, to shorten the corps front; Grünert was replaced by Colonel Fritz von Loßberg. First-class German reinforcements reaching the Somme front were thrown into the battle piecemeal, which caused them higher casualties. German attacks were poorly organised, insufficient time was allowed for reconnaissance and the infantry was inadequately supported by the artillery, which sometimes fired on German troops. German counter-attacks were even less well-organised than their British equivalents and most failed.
Prelude
German preparations
The Germans defending the Braune Stellung (second position), which had few deep dugouts, suffered many casualties on 7 July. British artillery was directed by artillery-observation aircraft and a battalion of Reserve Infantry Regiment 122 (RIR 122) suffered 243 casualties. British artillery-fire cut communications and the XIV Reserve Corps (Generalleutnant Hermann von Stein) lost touch with the front line, not knowing if it still existed from Contalmaison to Pozières. A counter-attack by RIR 122 and Infantry Regiment 183 (IR 183) was postponed and lack of information led to the attack being cancelled next day. The commander of the 185th Division, which contained a motley of units from four divisions, was put in charge of the line from the south of Mametz Wood to Ovillers, to fill the gap from Contalmaison to Pozières by dawn on 9 July. I Battalion, RIR 122 relieved I Battalion, Lehr Regiment, which had suffered 618 casualties in Contalmaison from the constant British artillery-fire, its troops having had to lie in mud, among the sick, wounded and dead. The battalions in the area received about 100 recruits each as reinforcements and RIR 77 arrived from the 2nd Guard Reserve Division. The IV Corps (General Friedrich Sixt von Armin) with the 7th Division (Major-General Friedrich von Bernhardi) and the 8th Division (Ernst II, Duke of Saxe-Altenburg) was en route for the Somme.
From 6 to 13 July, 63 heavy artillery batteries, three artillery flights, two reconnaissance flights and a bombing flight of Die Fliegertruppen (Imperial German Air Service) arrived and Below asked for more machine-gun units, on which the defence was being based. On 12 July, Falkenhayn ordered the 5th Army at Verdun to assume a "strict defensive", ordered artillery to the Somme and urged Below to hold on to the area of Hardecourt to Trônes Wood, to counter French or British attacks from the flank, if it became possible to deliver an organised counter-attack. Below wanted to attack south of the Somme, where artillery-fire could be concentrated but needed five fresh divisions, which did not exist and next day all counter-attacks were cancelled. Such confusion had been created by the arrival of units milked from divisions beyond the Somme, that the battlefield was divided into permanent corps areas, the corps headquarters, heavy artillery and supply services to remain as a permanent administrative organisation. Brigades and divisions were to be transferred in and out, with the group maintaining the command arrangements and continuity of policy. On 13 July, the 2nd Army created Gruppe Gossler (the HQ of the (VI Reserve Corps)) from the Somme to Hardecourt, Gruppe Sixt von Armin (IV Corps), Hardecourt to Pozières and Gruppe Stein (XIV Reserve Corps) from Pozières across the Ancre to Gommecourt.
British plan
Before the Fourth Army had captured Trônes Wood, Mametz Wood and Contalmaison, Rawlinson issued a warning order for an attack on the German second position; engineers and pioneers began to clear roads and fill in derelict trenches. Guns and ammunition were moved forward and the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) photographed the German second and third positions. With the corps commanders and artillery commanders, Rawlinson decided that the attack should begin at dawn, when there would be insufficient light for German machine-gunners to see far ahead. XIII Corps was to attack with two divisions from Longueval to Bazentin-le-Grand, after forming up in no man's land, 500 yd (460 m) short of the German trenches. XV Corps was to attack from the north edge of Mametz Wood, on a front from Bazentin le Grand wood to Bazentin le Petit village and its cemetery, where no man's land was much narrower. The 1st Division of III Corps was to attack further west as a flank guard.