The Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River (Chinese: 清川江战役; pinyin: Qīngchuānjiāng Zhànyì), also known as the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on, was a battle in the Korean War that took place from November 25 to December 2, 1950, along the Ch'ongch'on River Valley in the northwestern part of North Korea. In response to the successful Chinese First Phase Offensive against the United Nations (UN) forces, General Douglas MacArthur launched the Home-by-Christmas Offensive to expel the Chinese forces from Korea and to end the war. Anticipating this reaction, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) Commander Peng Dehuai planned a counteroffensive, dubbed the "Second Phase Campaign", against the advancing UN forces.
Hoping to repeat the success of the earlier First Phase Campaign, the PVA 13th Army first launched a series of surprise attacks along the Ch'ongch'on River Valley on the night of November 25, 1950, at the western half of the Second Phase Campaign (Chinese: 第二次战役西线; pinyin: Dì'èrcì Zhànyì Xīxiàn), effectively destroying the Eighth United States Army's right flank, while allowing PVA forces to move rapidly into UN rear areas. In the subsequent battles and withdrawals from November 26 to December 2, 1950, although the Eighth Army managed to avoid being surrounded by PVA forces, the PVA 8th Army were still able to inflict heavy losses onto the retreating UN forces, which had lost all cohesion. In the aftermath of the battle, the Eighth Army's heavy losses forced all UN forces to retreat from North Korea to the 38th Parallel.
Background
Well, if they go fast enough, maybe some of them can be home by Christmas.
— General Douglas MacArthur
In the wake of the UN forces' successful landing at Inchon, the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter and the subsequent destruction of the Korean People's Army (KPA) during September 1950, the Eighth United States Army crossed the 38th Parallel and advanced rapidly towards the Sino-Korean border. Alarmed by this development, Chinese Communist Party chairman Mao Zedong ordered the PVA to intervene in Korea and to launch the First Phase Offensive against the UN forces.
Between October 25 and November 4, 1950, the PVA 13th Army Group surprised and defeated the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) II Corps and the US 1st Cavalry Division in a series of battles around Onjong and Unsan, destroying the right flank of the US Eighth Army while forcing the UN forces to retreat back to the Ch'ongch'on River. Although PVA forces were able to break through the UN line, logistics difficulties forced the PVA to withdraw on November 5, 1950.
Despite the success of the PVA First Phase Campaign, the UN planners still believed that China had not intervened in Korea on a large scale. The suddenness of the PVA withdrawal in the face of a victory further reinforced this belief. Working on the assumption that only 30,000 PVA troops could remain hidden in the hills, General Douglas MacArthur ordered the bombing of the bridges over the Yalu River in an effort to cut off PVA reinforcements. Confident that the UN air forces could detect and disrupt any troop movements across the Yalu River, MacArthur launched the Home-by-Christmas Offensive on November 24 to rout the remaining PVA and KPA forces and to end the Korean War.
Unknown to the UN planners, however, there were already 180,000 PVA troops stationed in Korea, with more reinforcements infiltrating across the border. Although the PVA was ordered to maintain a defensive posture in North Korea until Soviet weapons could arrive in the spring of 1951, its earlier successes convinced the Chinese leadership that the PVA was capable of turning the tide of UN advance. Encouraged by the fact that the UN did not know their true numbers, PVA Commander Peng Dehuai outlined the Second Phase Campaign, a counteroffensive aimed at pushing the UN forces back to a line halfway between Ch'ongch'on River and Pyongyang. As a part of a deception plan to further reinforce the weak appearance of PVA forces, Peng ordered all units to rapidly retreat north while releasing POWs along the way. With 230,000 troops at his disposal and another 150,000 heading to the Chosin Reservoir, Peng authorized the start of the Second Phase Campaign on November 22, 1950.
Prelude
Location, terrain and weather
The battle was fought along the UN front line around the Ch'ongch'on River and its tributaries, which is located 50 mi (80 km) south of the Sino-Korean border. The UN front line stretched from the Korean west coast to the Taebaek Mountains in central Korea, while the Ch'ongch'on River crosses into the north of the UN line at the town of Kujang-dong (39°51′54″N 126°01′54″E / 39.865°N 126.0316°E). From west to east, a series of towns, such as Chongju, Yongsan-dong (39°49′36″N 125°41′24″E / 39.8266°N 125.69°E), Ipsok (39°53′12″N 125°48′56″E / 39.8866°N 125.8156°E), Kujang-dong, Tokchon, and Yongwon dot the front line, and connecting those towns are a series of road junctions located at Sinanju, Anju, Kunu-ri and Pukchang-ni. A road runs south from Kunu-ri into Sunchon and eventually into Pyongyang, and it would later become the main retreat route for the UN forces stationed at the center of the front line. The hilly terrain on the northern bank of the Ch'ongch'on River formed a defensive barrier that allowed the Chinese to hide their presence while dispersing the advancing UN forces. The battle was also fought during one of the coldest Korean winters in 100 years, with temperatures dropping to as low as −30 °F (−34 °C).
Forces and strategies
Acting on MacArthur's instructions, General Walton Walker's Eighth Army started the Home-by-Christmas Offensive at 10:00 on November 24, 1950. With a reconstituted ROKA II Corps placed on the Eighth Army's right flank, the advance was led by the US I Corps to the west, the US IX Corps in the center, and the ROKA II Corps to the east. The three corps advanced cautiously in a continuous front line in order to avoid more ambushes similar to the PVA First Phase Campaign, but the lack of manpower stretched the UN forces to the limit. Except for the strong PVA resistance against ROK II Corps, the Eighth Army met little opposition, and the line between Chongju to Yongwon was occupied on the night of November 25.
Despite the lack of manpower, the US Eighth Army had three and half times the firepower of the opposing PVA/KPA forces. The US Fifth Air Force, which was responsible for air support, also had little opposition due to the lack of anti-aircraft weapons by the PVA and KPA. Boosted by a Thanksgiving feast with roasted turkeys on the eve of the advance, morale was high among the UN ranks, and "home by Christmas" and "Germany by spring" was within reach. However, the high morale resulted in a degradation of troop discipline, and many units had discarded excess equipment and ammunition before the battle. One rifle company from the US IX Corps, for example, started its advance with most of their helmets and bayonets thrown away, and with less than one grenade and 50 rounds of ammunition on average carried per man. Because the UN planners did not foresee that the war would be dragged into a winter campaign, all elements of the Eighth Army started the offensive with a shortage of winter clothing.
While the Eighth Army was advancing towards the Yalu River, the PVA 13th Army was hiding in the mountains with the 50th and 66th Corps to the west, the 39th and the 40th Corps in the center, and the 38th and 42nd Corps to the east. Anticipating the UN advances, the PVA planned a series of counterattacks to catch the Eighth Army off guard. Hoping to repeat the success of the earlier First Phase Campaign, the 38th and 42nd Corps would first attack ROKA II Corps and destroy the UN right flank, then cut behind the UN lines. At the same time, the 39th and 40th Corps would hold US IX Corps in place while preventing any reinforcements to ROKA II Corps. The 50th and 66th Corps would stay behind and check the advances of the US I Corps.
Although the PVA 13th Army had a nominal strength of 230,000 men, its actual strength during the battle was as low as 150,000 men. The PVA 66th Corps, for example, had only 6,600 men per division at the start of the battle, as opposed to the authorized full strength of 10,000 men per division. There was also only one firearm available for every three soldiers, and the rest were employed as grenade throwers. Because the majority of the PVA's howitzers and other artillery were left behind in Manchuria, most PVA units only had mortars available as artillery support. For the counteroffensive, the average soldier was issued with only five days worth of rations and ammunition, and resupply could only be obtained by scavenging on the battlefield. To compensate for its shortcomings, the PVA relied extensively on night attacks and infiltrations in order to avoid UN air support. The primitive logistics system had also allowed the PVA to maneuver over the rough hilly terrains, thus enabled them to by-pass the UN defenses and to surround the isolated UN positions. Because the Chinese had captured large numbers of Nationalist weapons during the Chinese Civil War, most of the PVA men used US-made small arms such as the Thompson submachine gun, the M1 Garand rifle, the M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle, the bazooka and the M2 mortar.
Battle
As the US Eighth Army stopped its advance on the afternoon of November 25, 1950, the PVA 13th Army commenced the Second Phase Campaign. A massive frontal attack was launched against the entire ROKA/UN line from Yongsan-dong to Yongdong-ni (39°42′22″N 126°32′06″E / 39.706°N 126.535°E). To the west, the ROKA 1st Infantry Division of US I Corps was attacked by the PVA 66th Corps at Yongsan-dong. In the center, strong probing actions by the PVA 39th and 40th Corps were carried out against US IX Corps at Ipsok and Kujang-dong. In the east, the PVA 38th and 42nd Corps broke through ROKA II Corps' line at Tokchon and Yongdong-ni. The Home-by-Christmas Offensive was completely stalled on the morning of November 26.
Actions at Tokchon and Yongdong-ni
In the aftermath of the Battle of Onjong, the Chinese recognized ROKA II Corps as the most vulnerable unit of the Eighth Army. Besides lacking the firepower of their US counterpart, the Corps also held the most difficult terrain on the UN right flank. At 10:00 on November 24, the ROKA 7th Infantry Division on the II Corps' left flank attacked north from Tokchon. At the same time, the ROKA 8th Infantry Division on the II Corps' right flank advanced north from Yongdong-ni, but their advance was halted by the PVA 38th and 42nd Corps' stubborn resistance. The continuous fighting for the next two days failed to create any gains for the ROKA. During the advances, the PVA defenses managed to create a wedge in the center of the ROKA 7th Infantry Division, forcing the division to commit most of its reserves on the front line. Meanwhile, the ROKA 6th Infantry Division in the II Corps' rear could only offer its 2nd Infantry Regiment as the Corps' reserve due to the earlier losses at Onjong.
As the ROKA were preparing their defensive positions at dusk on November 25, the two PVA corps were mobilizing for a decisive counterattack against the Eighth Army's right flank. The PVA 38th Corps planned to attack in full force against the ROKA 7th Infantry Division's center and right flank, while two divisions from the 42nd Corps started to march through the hills in order to bypass the ROKA 8th Infantry Division's right flank. Given the importance of this assault, Han Xianchu, one of Peng's deputies, personally commanded the 38th and 42nd Corps for the rest of the battle.
The PVA 38th Corps landed the first blow against ROKA II Corps at 17:00 on November 25. Aided by total surprise, the PVA 113th Division, 38th Corps first shattered the 7th Infantry Division's Reconnaissance Company on the division's right flank, creating a 0.5 mi (800 m) gap between the 7th and 8th Infantry Divisions. Simultaneously, the PVA 114th Division, 38th Corps attacked the center-right of the 7th Infantry Division, pushing the 5th and 8th Infantry Regiments back in the process. When the 7th Infantry Division's center and right were in complete chaos, the PVA 112th and the 113th Division, 38th Corps slipped past the ROKA/UN lines and advanced towards Tokchon. With only one battalion in reserve to check the PVA divisions, the Tokchon garrison and the 7th Infantry Division headquarters were soon surrounded and attacked by the two PVA divisions at 16:00 on November 26. Under heavy pressures from the PVA 114th Division, the 5th and 8th Infantry Regiments tried to fall back to Tokchon, but PVA ambushes in the rear scattered the unsuspecting ROKA troops. On the afternoon of November 26, Tokchon was captured by the PVA, and the 3rd Infantry Regiment on the 7th Infantry Division's left flank drifted westward and joined the US 2nd Infantry Division.