Battle
1942 battle involving Japanese Empire and Dutch Empire
The Battle of Tarakan took place on 11–12 January 1942, a day after the Empire of Japan declared war on the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Although Tarakan was only a small marshy island off northeastern Borneo in the Netherlands East Indies (today's Indonesia), its 700 oil wells, refineries, and airfield made it a crucial objective for Japan in the Pacific War.
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Text from the Wikipedia article “Battle of Tarakan”, available under CC BY-SA 4.0.
The Battle of Tarakan took place on 11–12 January 1942, a day after the Empire of Japan declared war on the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Although Tarakan was only a small marshy island off northeastern Borneo in the Netherlands East Indies (today's Indonesia), its 700 oil wells, refineries, and airfield made it a crucial objective for Japan in the Pacific War.
Located at a remote edge in the Dutch colony of Netherlands East Indies and only 25 sq. miles in diameter, the discovery of oil at a relatively low depth below the ground (50 to 300 meters) brought great significance to Tarakan.
Pamoesian (Pamusian) on the western side of the island became the main drilling site before the war, where about 700 oil wells were established by the Bataafse Petroleum Maatschappij (BPM; "Batavian Petroleum Company"). In the vicinity of the drilling sites, housing centers for BPM European employees and Chinese residents was established. Further up north, BPM also established another drilling site at Djoeata (Juwata). To all intents and purposes, the oil wells became the source of living for the island's population.
Despite the prevalence of this massive production, before the war, most of Tarakan's hilly terrain at the center of the island, as well as the swamp coastlines in the east remained at their natural state. The road network was limited to connecting the Pamoesian and Djoeata drilling sites, the port facilities at Lingkas on the west and the airfield nearby with a 1,500 m runway.
As oil production began to grow, the Dutch began to contemplate the possibility of a Japanese military aggression, and with it, the need to protect the island's facilities.
In 1923, an infantry company was established in Tarakan to serve as a covering force during the destruction of oil refineries and other production installations in the event of an unforeseen attack. Increasing international tensions compelled the company to be strengthened into a battalion-sized force.
In 1930, the Committee on the Defense of Oil Ports was established, with the purpose of analyzing the defense of major oil ports in the Dutch East Indies. Naturally, the Commission concluded that a permanent occupation of Tarakan by a larger than company-sized force was an absolute necessity.
In 1933, a so-called "Reinforcement Detachment" from Java arrived to bolster Tarakan's defense, as tensions in the Pacific were brewing up at the time. After 4 months, the detachment was sent back and it was not until 1934 before a full battalion with auxiliary weapons came to defend Tarakan.
Before the Second World War, Tarakan produced around 6 million barrels of oil annually, an amount which accounts to 16% of the total Japanese annual oil consumption. This made the island one of the key goals of Japanese military (esp. the Imperial Japanese Navy) in their plans to occupy the Netherlands East Indies in the years leading up to the war.
Early Dutch plans before 1941 called for the defense of the oil fields and installations at all costs. If deemed impossible, Dutch forces were to deny the enemy the usage of Tarakan's oil-producing machinery, before withdrawing to mainland Borneo.
One major hindrance in the defense of Tarakan was the unsuitability of its airfield to accommodate both fighters and bombers. However, the plan also called for a persistent defense of the airfield, a task that, considering the airfield's size and the Japanese military strength — in particular the overall sea and air balance; — would bring limited results.
The deployment of the Tarakan Garrison was orchestrated to prevent enemy occupation of the port complex on the western part of the island. Defense positions consisted of several "fronts" of double fence barriers:
On the East Coast, Dutch troops prepared a platoon-strength support point at the mouth of the Amal River. This unit was intended to impede the enemy landing for a brief moment, before retreating to the Eastern Front. Additional infantry cover forces were established at the Djoeata, Peningki and Karoengan batteries.
The support points, on which the front is established, were occupied with 25 troops, supported by two light and two medium machine guns each. Housed in concrete pillboxes, each support point was surrounded by a double fence, yet the scarce manpower made it impossible to occupy all support points at the same time.
The coastal batteries monitored the minefields and the entrances to the harbor. Artillery in the Lingkas Front could also be utilized to support inland battles.
Initially, the airport was only defended with 20 mm anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. Abandoned before the Japanese landing, two sections of 40 mm anti-aircraft gun (minus one gun) stood at the airfield; the 20 mm guns were relocated to defend the Peningki and Karoengan batteries.
The Dutch Navy (Koninklijke Marine) laid extensive minefields at the approaches to the port. In the event of an attack, any sea lanes that were still open would be blocked by the minelayer Hr. Ms. Prins van Oranje.
Despite all of these preparations, in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack, a certain defeatist atmosphere had already enveloped the defenders even well before any signs of invasion.
For the capture of Tarakan, the Japanese planned for a two pronged landing from the eastern side of the Island. One prong of the advance, the Right Wing Unit (under Col. Yamamoto), would land at the shores near the Amal River and destroy any Dutch troops there. Without waiting for the landing to be completed, the unit would then move westwards through the jungle and launch a sudden attack to seize the Pamoesian oilfields. Upon securing Pamoesian, Yamamoto's troops would then advance to secure the installations at the Lingkas port before the Dutch could demolish it.
The second prong, the Left Wing Unit, would land further south at Tandjoeng Batoe (Tanjung Batu) and make their way west to capture the Peningki-Karoengan gun batteries, before moving to Lingkas, passing by the 2nd Kure Special Landing Force at the airfield, to attack and capture the Gunung Cangkol and Djoeata oil fields and the Djoeata battery up north. Once these key points of Tarakan Island were cleared, the Army would turn over guard duty to the Navy, and the force would be assembled in Tarakan and its vicinity to prepare for the capture of Balikpapan.
On 10 January 1942, after an MLD Dornier Do 24 spotted the approaching Japanese invasion fleet, Lt. Col. Simon de Waal ordered the destruction of all oil installations on the island. The engineer platoons dynamited the drilling pipes, causing an underground explosion that prevented the wells and oil below from being extracted in the near future. By 10:00 P.M., 100,000 tons worth of oil had been engulfed in flames.
At 03:00 A.M. on 11 January, Sergeant-Major C.P.E. Spangenberg, commanding the Amal River support point (with 53 troops) reported sighting landing vessels nearing the coast. At that point, the Right Wing Unit of the Japanese invasion force began to land on the eastern parts of Tarakan under the silhouette of the blazing oil fields.
Since Dutch forces had arranged their dispositions to defend attacks from a westerly direction, they were still uncertain that the enemy forces that had been concentrating on the eastern parts of the island constituted the main attacking force. Diversionary landings and maneuvers were still being considered, even as another Japanese landing force had already been sighted at 05:00 A.M. by the defending force at Tandjoeng Batoe, further south of the Amal River.
Col. Yamamoto's Right Wing Unit, having mistaken the fires at the Gunung Cangkol oil field for that of the Lingkas oil field to the south, landed four to six km further north of their intended landing point, the mouth of the Amal River. Spangenberg's forces also mistook the Japanese landing vessels, which were circling around at the time, and making a direct landing attempt and ordered his forces to open fire at them.
Reaching the Amal river by 05:00, the unit attacked and outflanked Spangenberg's pillboxes located there, defeating his troops. With 25-30 of his troops that were left, Spangenberg withdrew to a new support point near the Pamoesian River. As fires from the oil fields rendered many support points useless, Spangenberg's had become the main point of defense on the Eastern Front. Under the overall command of Capt. Saraber, the point became a rallying base for retreating troops, enabling the Dutch to restore the front line.
To support this line, the Dutch constructed a second front line behind Saraber's. Consisting of around 650 men, the line was supported by Everaars' Javanese machine gun company, Treffers's Ambonese soldiers and several of overvalwagens. Everaar's troops, however, had not received proper training; many of their machine guns malfunctioned and the company had virtually little to no ammunition.
Meanwhile, from information obtained through interrogating captured soldiers, the Right Wing Unit now advanced to the north side of the Tarakan oil field. As they approached the oil fields, the unit's advance was bogged down from artillery and mortar fire from Saraber's support point. The Dutch attempted their own offensive, supported by artillery and led by Treffers's company in their first baptism of fire. The attack did not succeed, and Treffers could not advance beyond the second front line.
Frustrated by the Dutch resistance, Gen. Sakaguchi requested air strike support on the batteries of Djoeata up north and on Sadau Island at the far west of Tarakan, in addition to Tarakan city itself for the following day. As night fell, both sides attempted to launch simultaneous counterattacks. de Waal planned for the Dutch's last offensive attempt at 05:15. the next day with all of his available personnel (incl. engineers, ammunition staff, clerks and chefs).
The Japanese, however, took the first initiative. Launching a series of night raids at the same time, Yamamoto's troops managed to capture both lines of Dutch barracks. In the midst of the chaos, the Japanese killed many Dutch troops, including Bakker and van den Belt. Treffers was also killed, as his company made a retreat towards the headquarter. Despite this, the Right Wing Unit failed to capture the Dutch headquarter.
With supplies dwindling, the number of troops thinning out and communications with the coastal batteries breaking down, the Dutch finally decided to capitulate. At 07:30 on the 12th, de Waal dispatched a bearer of a flag of truce to announce the surrender. Colonel Yamamoto immediately sent a wire to Detachment Commander Sakaguchi, stating: “The [Dutch] commander and his men have announced surrender at 08:20. Therefore, the prompt landing of the detachment commander by way of the Lingkas Pier is requested.”
Maj. Kanauji's Left Wing Unit landed near Tandjoeng Batoe at 04:00 on the 11th, but by 17:00 on the same day, its whereabouts were still virtually unknown to the invasion force. At that point, having landed, Ken'ichi's force tried to advance directly through the jungle towards the rear of the Karoengan battery. However, due to the dense vegetation and steep jungle terrain, the unit could only advance by about 100 meters per hour, while under disorientation about their surroundings.
Text from the Wikipedia article “Battle of Tarakan (1942)”, available under CC BY-SA 4.0.