The Battle of Tabu-dong was an engagement between United Nations Command (UN) and North Korean forces early in the Korean War from September 1 to September 15, 1950, in the vicinity of Tabu-dong, Chilgok County, north of Taegu in South Korea. It was a part of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter, and was one of several large engagements fought simultaneously. The battle ended in a victory for the UN after large numbers of United States Army (US) and Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) troops repelled a strong Korean People's Army (KPA) attack.
Holding positions north of the crucial city of Taegu, the US 1st Cavalry Division stood at the center and the ROKA 1st Division held at the northwest of the Pusan Perimeter defensive line, tasked with keeping the UN headquarters secured from attacks from the KPA. On September 1, the KPA 3rd Division attacked as part of the Great Naktong Offensive.
What followed was a two-week battle around Tabu-dong and Waegwan in which the KPA were able to gradually push the 1st Cavalry Division back from its lines. However, the KPA were not able to force the US and ROKA troops to withdraw completely or push the UN out of Taegu. The KPA was outflanked by the Inchon landings on 15 September and on 16 September the UN forces began their breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, forcing the KPA to abandon their attacks on Tabu-dong.
Background
Pusan Perimeter
From the outbreak of the Korean War and the invasion of South Korea by the North, the KPA had enjoyed superiority in both manpower and equipment over both the ROKA and the UN forces dispatched to South Korea to prevent it from collapsing. The KPA strategy was to aggressively pursue UN forces on all avenues of approach south and to engage them aggressively, attacking from the front and initiating a double envelopment of both flanks of the unit, which allowed the KPA to surround and cut off the opposing force, which would then be forced to retreat in disarray, often leaving behind much of its equipment. From their initial June 25 offensive to fights in July and early August, the KPA used this strategy to effectively defeat any UN force and push it south. However, when the UN forces, under the Eighth United States Army, established the Pusan Perimeter in August, the UN troops held a continuous line along the peninsula which KPA troops could not flank, and their advantages in numbers decreased daily as the superior UN logistical system brought in more troops and supplies to the UN forces.
When the KPA approached the Pusan Perimeter on August 5, they attempted the same frontal assault technique on the four main avenues of approach into the perimeter. Throughout August, the KPA 6th Division, and later the KPA 7th Division engaged the US 25th Infantry Division at the Battle of Masan, initially repelling a UN counteroffensive before countering with battles at Komam-ni and Battle Mountain. These attacks stalled as UN forces, well equipped and with plenty of reserves, repeatedly repelled KPA attacks. North of Masan, the KPA 4th Division and the US 24th Infantry Division sparred in the Naktong Bulge area. In the First Battle of Naktong Bulge, the KPA division was unable to hold its bridgehead across the river as large numbers of US reserve forces were brought in to repel it, and on August 19, the KPA 4th Division was forced back across the river with 50 percent casualties. In the Taegu region, five KPA divisions were repulsed by three UN divisions in several attempts to attack the city during the Battle of Taegu. Particularly heavy fighting took place at the Battle of the Bowling Alley where the KPA 13th Division was almost completely destroyed in the attack. On the east coast, three more KPA divisions were repulsed by the ROKA at P'ohang-dong during the Battle of P'ohang-dong. All along the front, the KPA troops were reeling from these defeats, the first time in the war their strategies were not working.
September push
In planning its new offensive, the KPA command decided any attempt to flank the UN force was impossible due to the support of the UN naval forces. Instead, they opted to use frontal attack to breach the perimeter and collapse it as the only hope of achieving success in the battle. Fed by intelligence from the Soviet Union the KPA were aware the UN forces were building up along the Pusan Perimeter and that it must conduct an offensive soon or it could not win the battle. A secondary objective was to surround Taegu and destroy the UN forces in that city. As part of this mission, the KPA would first cut the supply lines to Taegu.
On August 20, the KPA commands distributed operations orders to their subordinate units. The plan called for a simultaneous five-prong attack against the UN lines. These attacks would overwhelm the UN defenders and allow the KPA to break through the lines in at least one place to force the UN forces back. Five battle groupings were ordered. The center attack called for the KPA 3rd, 13th and 1st Divisions to break through the US 1st Cavalry Division and ROKA 1st Division to Taegu.
Battle
While four divisions of the KPA II Corps attacked south in the P'ohang-dong, Kyongju and Yongch'on area, the remaining three divisions of the corps-the 3rd, 13th and 1st conducted their converging attack on Taegu from the north and northwest. The KPA 3rd Division was to attack in the Waegwan area northwest of Taegu, the KPA 13th Division down the mountain ridges north of Taegu along and west of the Sangju-Taegu road, and the KPA 1st Division along the high mountain ridges just east of the road.
Defending Taegu, the US 1st Cavalry Division had a front of about 35 miles (56 km). Division Commander Major general Hobart R. Gay outposted the main avenues of entry into his zone and kept his three regiments concentrated behind the outposts. At the southwestern end of his line Gay initially controlled the US 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division, which had been attached to the 1st Cavalry Division. On September 5 the British 27th Commonwealth Brigade, in its first commitment in the Korean War, replaced that battalion. Next in line northward, the US 5th Cavalry Regiment defended the sector along the Naktong around Waegwan and the main Seoul highway southeast from there to Taegu. Eastward, the US 7th Cavalry Regiment was responsible for the mountainous area between that highway and the hills bordering the Sangju road. The US 8th Cavalry Regiment, responsible for the latter road, was astride it and on the bordering hills.
Hill 518
Eighth United States Army commander Lieutenant general Walton Walker ordered the 1st Cavalry Division to attack north on September 1 in an effort to divert some of the KPA strength from the US 2nd and 25th Infantry Divisions in the south. Gay's initial decision upon receipt of this order was to attack north up the Sangju road, but his staff and regimental commanders all joined in urging that the attack instead be against Hill 518 (36°03′29″N 128°26′24″E / 36.058°N 128.44°E) in the 7th Cavalry zone. Only two days before, Hill 518 had been in the ROKA 1st Division zone and had been considered a KPA assembly point. The 1st Cavalry Division, accordingly, prepared for an attack in the 7th Cavalry sector and for diversionary attacks by two companies of the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, on the 7th Cavalry's right flank. This left the 8th Cavalry only one infantry company in reserve. The regiment's 1st Battalion was on the hill mass to the west of the Bowling Alley and north of Tabu-dong; its 2nd Battalion was astride the road.
This planned attack against Hill 518 coincided with the defection of KPA Major Kim Song Jun of the 19th Regiment, 13th Division. He reported that a full-scale KPA attack was to begin at dusk that day. The 13th Division, he said, had just taken in 4,000 replacements, 2,000 of them without weapons, and was now back to a strength of approximately 9,000 men. Upon receiving this intelligence, Gay alerted all front-line units to be prepared for the attack. The ROKA 1st Division under command of Brigadier general Paik Sun Yup also braced his men for attack.
Complying with Eighth Army's order for a spoiling attack against the KPA northwest of Taegu, Gay ordered the 7th Cavalry to attack on September 2 and seize Hill 518. Hill 518, also called Suam-san, is a large mountain mass 5 miles (8.0 km) northeast of Waegwan and 2 miles (3.2 km) east of the Naktong River. It curves westward from its peak to its westernmost height, Hill 346, from which the ground drops abruptly to the Naktong River. Situated north of the lateral Waegwan-Tabu–dong road, and about midway between the two towns, it was a critical terrain feature dominating the road between the two places. After securing Hill 518, the 7th Cavalry attack was to continue on to Hill 314 (36°03′40″N 128°24′58″E / 36.061°N 128.416°E). Air strikes and artillery preparations were to precede the infantry attack.
On the morning of September 2 the US Air Force (USAF) delivered a 37-minute strike against Hills 518 and 346. The artillery then laid down its concentrations on the hills, and after that the planes came over again with napalm, leaving the heights on fire. Just after 10:00, and immediately after the final napalm strike, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, attacked up Hill 518. The heavy air strikes and the artillery preparations had failed to dislodge the KPA. From their positions they delivered mortar and machine gun fire on the climbing infantry, stopping the weak, advanced US force short of the crest. In the afternoon the US battalion withdrew from Hill 518 and attacked northeast against Hill 490, from which other KPA troops had fired in support of the KPA on Hill 518.
The next day at 12:00, the newly arrived 3rd Battalion resumed the attack against Hill 518 from the south, as did the 1st Battalion the day before, in a column of companies that resolved itself in the end into a column of squads. Again the attack failed. Other attacks failed on September 4. A KPA forward observer captured on Hill 518 said that 1,200 KPA were dug in on the hill and that they had large numbers of mortars and ammunition to hold out.
North Korean flanking moves
While these attacks were in progress on its right, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, on September 4 attacked and captured Hill 303. The next day it had difficulty in holding the hill against counterattacks. By September 4 it had become clear that the KPA 3rd Division in front of the 5th and 7th Cavalry Regiments was also attacking, and despite continued air strikes, artillery preparations and infantry efforts on Hill 518, it was infiltrating large numbers of its troops to the rear of the attacking US forces. That night large KPA forces came through the gap between the 3rd Battalion on the southern slope of Hill 518 and the 2nd Battalion westward. The KPA turned west and occupied Hill 464 (36°01′41″N 128°27′22″E / 36.028°N 128.456°E) in force. By September 5, Hill 464 to the rear of the 7th Cavalry had more KPA on it than Hill 518 to its front. KPA cut the Waegwan to Tabu-dong road east of the regiment so that its communications with other US units now were only to the west. During the day the 7th Cavalry made a limited withdrawal on Hill 518, giving up on capturing the hill.
On the division right, Tabu-dong was in KPA hands, on the left Waegwan was a no-man's land, and in the center strong KPA forces were infiltrating southward from Hill 518. The 7th Cavalry Regiment in the center could no longer use the Waegwan-Tabu-dong lateral supply road behind it, and was in danger of being surrounded. After discussing a withdrawal plan with Walker, Gay on September 5 issued an order for a general withdrawal of the 1st Cavalry Division during the night to shorten the lines and to occupy a better defensive position. The movement was to progress from right to left beginning with the 8th Cavalry Regiment, then the 7th Cavalry in the Hill 518 area, and finally the 5th Cavalry in the Waegwan area. This withdrawal caused the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, to give up a hill it had just attacked and captured near the Tabu-dong road on the approaches of the Walled City of Ka-san. In the 7th Cavalry sector the 1st, 3rd, and 2nd Battalions were to withdraw in that order, after the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, on their right. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, on Hill 303 north of Waegwan was to cover the withdrawal of the 7th Cavalry and hold open the escape road.
Further US withdrawal
In his withdrawal instructions for the 7th Cavalry, Colonel Cecil Nist, the regimental commander, ordered the 2nd Battalion to disengage from the KPA to its front and attack to its rear to gain possession of Hills 464 and 380 on the new Main line of resistance to be occupied by the regiment. Efforts to gain possession of Hill 464 by other elements had failed in the past several days.