The Battle of Kyongju was an engagement between United Nations Command (UN) and North Korean forces early in the Korean War from August 31 to September 15, 1950, in the vicinity of Kyongju in South Korea. It was a part of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter, and was one of several large engagements fought simultaneously. The battle ended in a victory for the UN after large numbers of United States Army (US) and Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) troops repelled a strong North Korean Korean People's Army (KPA) attack.
Holding a line north of P'ohang-dong, An'gang-ni, and Kyongju, the so-called "Kyongju corridor," the ROKA I Corps was unexpectedly hit with an attack by the KPA's II Corps, part of the wider Great Naktong Offensive. The ROKA troops, already demoralized and struggling to maintain a strong defensive line, were easily pushed back from their positions. US units were called in to assist the ROKA to repel the attack.
Fighting was heavy and the two sides fought to capture and recapture P'ohang-dong and An'gang-ni, with the KPA seeking to break through the Kyongju corridor as a way to attack the UN base at Pusan. However, with large amounts of UN air and naval support, the US and ROK forces were able to rout and force back the KPA troops after two weeks of fighting.
Background
Pusan Perimeter
From the outbreak of the Korean War and the invasion of South Korea by the North, the KPA had enjoyed superiority in both manpower and equipment over both the ROKA and the UN forces dispatched to South Korea to prevent it from collapsing. The KPA strategy was to aggressively pursue UN and ROKA forces on all avenues of approach south and to engage them aggressively, attacking from the front and initiating a double envelopment of both flanks of the unit, which allowed the KPA to surround and cut off the opposing force, which would then be forced to retreat in disarray, often leaving behind much of its equipment. From their initial June 25 offensive to fights in July and early August, the KPA used this strategy to effectively defeat any UN force and push it south. However, when the UN forces, under the Eighth United States Army, established the Pusan Perimeter in August, the UN troops held a continuous line along the peninsula which KPA troops could not outflank, and their advantages in numbers decreased daily as the superior UN logistical system brought in more troops and supplies to the UN forces.
When the KPA approached the Pusan Perimeter on August 5, they attempted the same frontal assault technique on the four main avenues of approach into the perimeter. Throughout August, the KPA 6th Division, and later the 7th Division engaged the US 25th Infantry Division at the Battle of Masan, initially repelling a UN counteroffensive before countering with battles at Komam-ni and Battle Mountain. These attacks stalled as UN forces, well equipped and with plenty of reserves, repeatedly repelled KPA attacks. North of Masan, the KPA 4th Division and the US 24th Infantry Division sparred in the Naktong Bulge area. In the First Battle of Naktong Bulge, the KPA division was unable to hold its bridgehead across the river as large numbers of US reserve forces were brought in to repel it, and on August 19, the KPA 4th Division was forced back across the river with 50 percent casualties. In the Taegu region, five KPA divisions were repulsed by three UN divisions in several attempts to attack the city during the Battle of Taegu. Particularly heavy fighting took place at the Battle of the Bowling Alley where the KPA 13th Division was almost completely destroyed in the attack. On the east coast, three more KPA divisions were repulsed by the ROKA at P'ohang-dong during the Battle of P'ohang-dong. All along the front, the KPA troops were reeling from these defeats, the first time in the war their strategies were not working.
September push
In planning its new offensive, the KPA command decided any attempt to flank the UN force was impossible thanks to the support of the UN naval forces. Instead, they opted to use frontal attack to breach the perimeter and collapse it as the only hope of achieving success in the battle. Fed by intelligence from the Soviet Union the North Koreans were aware the UN forces were building up along the Pusan Perimeter and that it must conduct an offensive soon or it could not win the battle. A secondary objective was to surround Taegu and destroy the UN units in that city. As part of this mission, the KPA would first cut the supply lines to Taegu.
On August 20, the KPA commands distributed operations orders to their subordinate units. The plan called for a simultaneous five-prong attack against the UN lines. These attacks would overwhelm the UN defenders and allow the KPA to break through the lines in at least one place to force the UN forces back. Five battle groupings were ordered. The easternmost of these was for the KPA 12th and 5th Divisions break through the ROK Capital and 3rd Infantry Divisions to P'ohang-dong and Kyongju.
Battle
The KPA attack struck first on the UN's right flank on Korea's east coast. Although the KPA II Corps general attack in the north and east was planned for September 2, the KPA 12th Division, now with a strength of 5,000 men, started to move forward from the mountains earlier than planned, from where it had reorganized after its defeat in the Kigye and P'ohang-dong area. The division was low in food supply, weapons, and ammunition, and its men suffered from low morale. On August 26, US and ROKA officers in the P'ohang-dong and Kigye area were optimistic; they congratulated each other on having repulsed what they thought was the last serious threat to the Pusan Perimeter.
Early attack
Facing the KPA 12th Division was the ROKA Capital Division. At 04:00 August 27, a KPA attack overran one company of the ROKA 17th Regiment, Capital Division, north of Kigye. This caused the whole regiment to buckle and retreat. Then the ROKA 18th Regiment to the east fell back because of its exposed flank. The ROKA 17th Regiment lost the town of Kigye in pulling back, and the entire Capital Division fell back 3 miles (4.8 km) to the south side of the Kigye valley.
At a briefing in Taegu on August 27, Eighth Army commander Lieutenant general Walton Walker showed his concern over this development. One of those present was Major general John B. Coulter who had arrived in Korea about a month earlier. Half an hour after the briefing ended, Walker ordered Coulter to observe the ROKA troops on the east. Coulter flew to Kyongju, arriving there at 12:00 that day. Walker in the meantime formally appointed Coulter Deputy Commander, Eighth Army, placing him in command of the ROKA I Corps which controlled the Capital and 3rd Divisions, the US 21st Infantry Regiment, the 3rd Battalion, US 9th Infantry Regiment and the 73rd Medium Tank Battalion, less C Company. Coulter designated these units Task Force Jackson and established his headquarters in the same building in Kyongju in which the ROKA I Corps' commander and the KMAG officers had their command post.
When he arrived at Kyongju that day, Coulter found ROKA I Corps disintegrating rapidly and in low morale. Walker had instructed him to issue his orders to the ROKA I Corps commander as advice, which Coulter did. Coulter had the mission of eliminating the KPA penetration in the Kigye area and of seizing and organizing the high ground extending from north of Yongch'on to the coast at Wolp'o-ri, about 12 miles (19 km) north of P'ohang-dong. This line passed 10 miles (16 km) north of Kigye. Coulter was to attack as soon as possible with Task Force Jackson to gain the first high ground north of Kigye. The US 21st Infantry Regiment was moving to a position north of Taegu on the morning of August 27, when Walker revoked its orders and instructed it to turn around and proceed as rapidly as possible to Kyongju and report to Coulter. The regiment departed Taegu at 10:00 and arrived at Kyongju that afternoon. Coulter immediately sent the 3rd Battalion north to An'gang-ni where it went into a position behind the ROKA Capital Division.
UN counterattack
Coulter's plan to attack on August 28 had to be postponed. Major general Kim Hong Il, the ROKA I Corps commander, told him he could not attack, that there were too many casualties and the South Korean were exhausted. The KPA 5th Division above P'ohang-dong had begun to press south again and the ROKA 3rd Division in front of it began to show signs of pulling back. On the 28th, the KMAG adviser to the ROKA 3rd Division, at a time he deemed favorable, advised ROKA Brigadier general Kim Suk Won, the division commander, to counterattack, but Kim refused to do so. The next day Kim said he was going to move his command post out of P'ohang-dong. The KMAG adviser replied that the KMAG group was going to stay in P'ohang-dong. Upon hearing that, Kim became hysterical but decided to stay for the time being to avoid loss of face. That day, August 28, Walker issued a special statement addressed to the ROKA, and meant also for the South Korean Minister of Defense, Shin Sung-mo. He called on the ROKA troops to hold their lines in the Pusan Perimeter, and implored the rest of the UN troops to defend their ground as firmly as possible, counterattacking as necessary to prevent the KPA from consolidating their gains.
The ROKA disorganization was so great in the face of continued KPA pressure that Task Force Jackson could not launch its planned attack. The US 21st Infantry was in an assembly area north of An'gang-ni and ready for an attack the morning of the 28th, but during the night the ROKA 17th Regiment lost its position on the high ridge northward at the bend of the Kigye valley, and the attack was canceled. The ROKA regained their position in the afternoon but that night lost it again. At the same time, elements of the KPA 5th Division penetrated the ROKA 3rd Division southwest of P'ohang-dong. Coulter directed the 21st Infantry to repel this penetration. During the day on August 29, B Company, 21st Infantry, supported by a platoon of tanks of B Company, 73rd Medium Tank Battalion, successfully counterattacked northwest from the southern edge of P'ohang-dong for a distance of 1.5 miles (2.4 km), with ROKA troops following. The US units then withdrew to P'ohang-dong. That night the ROKA withdrew, and the next day a US infantry-tank force repeated the action of the day before. The 21st Infantry then took over from the ROKA 3rd Division a sector extending north and northwest of P'ohang-dong.
Also on August 29, the ROKA Capital Division, with US tank and artillery support, recaptured Kigye and held it during the night against KPA counterattacks, only to lose it again at dawn. UN air attacks continued at an increased tempo in the Kigye area. ROKA troops reported finding the bodies of many KPA, apparently killed by air attack. They also found many suits of white clothing scattered on the ground, abandoned when KPA soldiers changed from civilian disguises into military uniforms.
With this air action in the Kigye area, US naval vessels continued their efforts to help stop the KPA 5th Division on the east coast. A cruiser and two destroyers concentrated their firepower on the Hunghae area 5 miles (8.0 km) north of P'ohang-dong where the KPA 5th Division's troop assembly and forward supply center were located. On August 29 and 30 the three vessels fired almost 1,500 5-inch shells at targets there in support of the ROKA 3rd Division. Despite this aerial and naval support, on August 31 the battle continued to go against the ROKA forces both at Kigye and P'ohang-dong.
Kigye recaptured
UN aerial observation on September 1 discovered the KPA were moving southward in the mountains above Kigye and P'ohang-dong. The next day another major attack was forming north and northwest of Kigye. In the afternoon, KMAG advisers with the Capital Division estimated that 2,500 KPA soldiers had penetrated a gap between the ROKA 17th and 18th Regiments.