The Battle of Guningtou (古寧頭之役), also known as the Battle of Kuningtou or the Battle of Kinmen (Chinese: 金門戰役), was fought in October 1949 on the island of Kinmen (Quemoy), located in the Taiwan Strait, during the final stages of the Chinese Civil War.
The battle resulted in a decisive victory for the Republic of China (ROC, known today as Taiwan) forces and marked a significant turning point in the civil war. The defeat of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forces not only preserved Kinmen under ROC control but also effectively halted CCP plans for an immediate invasion of Taiwan. The victory ensured the survival of the Republic of China government on Taiwan and reshaped the strategic landscape of the Taiwan Strait.
Starting in 2025, October 25 is designated annually as "Taiwan Retrocession Day and the Anniversary of the Battle of Guningtou" to commemorate victory of the battle along with the Taiwan Retrocession Day, which is a public holiday in Taiwan.
Prelude
Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949, the government of the Republic of China (ROC) under Chiang Kai-shek began withdrawing its forces from mainland China to Taiwan. However, ROC garrisons remained stationed on the offshore islands of Kinmen (Quemoy) and the Matsu archipelago, situated just off the coast of Fujian Province. Commanders of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) viewed Kinmen and Matsu as strategically necessary stepping stones before any potential operation against Taiwan island itself.
In early July 1949, the PLA began invading Fujian under the command of the 10th Corps of the Third Field Army, led by General Ye Fei. The 10th Corps had already conducted major operations in eastern China, including the campaigns for Fuzhou, Pingtan Island, and Zhangzhou–Xiamen. On 15 October, the PLA launched an amphibious operation against Xiamen, first conducting a diversionary attack on Gulangyu to draw away ROC attention. The main force then landed on multiple beaches across Xiamen, overcoming the defending ROC troops. On 17 October, General Tang Enbo, acting director of the Fuzhou Pacification Office (福州綏靖公署), abandoned the city of Xiamen. Following the capture of Xiamen, the PLA secured positions north of Kinmen, including Dadeng Island, Xiaodeng Island, Lienho (蓮河), Shihching (石井), and Aotou (澳頭).
General Ye Fei then reassigned vessels from the PLA 32nd Army to reinforce the 28th Army, concentrating assets for a seaborne assault on Greater Kinmen. The insufficient number of transport craft, however, caused the planned crossing to be delayed several times. It was not until the evening of 24 October that the final order was given to launch the attack.
The PLA intended to land an initial force of 9,000 troops to establish a beachhead, followed by a second wave of approximately 10,000 reinforcements, expecting to seize the entire island within three days. The PLA operational plan called for landings from the areas around Aotou, Dadeng, and Lienho. However, PLA planners significantly underestimated ROC strength, believing Kinmen to be defended by no more than two understrength divisions—roughly 12,000 troops—composed mostly of green recruits and survivors from previous defeats. In reality, ROC strength on the island had been significantly reinforced.
Expecting an imminent assault, ROC commanders had begun constructing defences across the island. By October, ROC troops had laid 7,455 land mines, erected approximately 200 earthen bunkers, and deployed anti-landing beach obstacles. The island garrison included hardened veterans of earlier campaigns, supplemented by elements from the 12th Army Corps. The defensive line at the northern beaches was further strengthened by the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Tank Regiment, consisting of 22 M5A1 Stuart light tanks organised into two companies. These units had prior combat experience in the Burma campaign during the Second World War.
In the early hours of 25 October, the PLA launched its amphibious assault using hundreds of wooden fishing boats. Their aim was to land at Lungkou (壠口), the narrowest part of Kinmen. However, strong currents, poor weather, and the rudimentary design of the craft caused many of the vessels to drift off course, with large numbers instead landing further northwest at Kuningtou, where ROC defences were better entrenched.
At the time, Kinmen was home to an estimated 40,000 civilian residents. Despite its small size, the island's close proximity to the mainland rendered it strategically vital. Control of Kinmen enabled command of sea lanes to and from Xiamen, making it a critical outpost for the ROC's defensive perimeter during its retreat to Taiwan.
People's Liberation Army
Order of battle
- 3rd Field Army (第三野戰軍): -Commander and Political Commissar: Chen Yi-Deputy Commander：Su Yu
- 10th Corp -Commander – Ye Fei -Director of Political Department – Liu Peishan
- 28th Army -Commander – Zhu Shaoqing-Deputy Commander and Main Planner of the Attack Plan – Xiao Feng (蕭鋒)-Deputy Political Commissar – Li Mancun (李曼村)
- 29th Army -Commander – Hu Bingwen (胡炳雲)-Deputy Commander – Duan Huanjing (段煥競)-Deputy Political Commissar – Huang Huoxing (黃火星)
Preparations for the campaign
Following rapid advances into Northern and Southern Fujian, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 10th Corps had positioned seven armies (the 25th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, and 32nd) along the Fujian front by September–October 1949. However, the PLA lacked experience in naval operations and had no air or naval cover for amphibious assaults. The 10th Corps planned to seize Greater Kinmen using elements from the 28th and 29th Armies—seven regiments in total—under the command of the 28th Army. Simultaneously, the 31st Army was tasked with capturing Lesser Kinmen.
Nevertheless, since the crossing of the Yangtze River, the PLA's Third Field Army had not encountered large-scale organised resistance from ROC forces. As a result, no detailed staff planning or training had been conducted for amphibious operations. Most coastal vessels had been destroyed by the ROC Regime, and only a limited number of civilian boats had been requisitioned, sufficient to transport just one battalion at a time. Owing to this severe shortage, the plan to involve the 31st Army was cancelled, and it was decided that the 28th Army alone would launch the assault on both Greater and Lesser Kinmen.
PLA intelligence also proved unreliable. During the earlier battle for Dadeng and Xiaodeng, soldiers from the ROC 31st Regiment, 11th Division, 18th Army—part of the 12th Army Corps—were captured. PLA 28th Army Deputy Commander Xiao Feng personally interrogated the prisoners and reported his findings to higher command. However, senior leaders dismissed the intelligence, believing the defending forces were preparing to retreat. Even General Ye Fei remarked, "Impossible. Hu Lien's Army Corps is still in the Teochew-[Shantou] region and has not yet moved", adding, "It seems there will be no major battles left on the mainland. Let the 28th Army just wrap things up."
Under repeated urging from the PLA 10th Corps commanding section, the 28th Army finally issued orders for the assault on Greater Kinmen on 18 October. On 21 October, PLA reconnaissance confirmed the arrival of the ROC 12th Army Corps at Kinmen Bay, having begun maritime transport from Teochew and Shantou. By 23 October, the 118th Division had already landed on Greater Kinmen, with follow-on units en route.
Despite these developments, PLA command remained uncertain whether the ROC intended to reinforce Kinmen or withdraw to Taiwan. Consequently, no contingency measures were implemented. On 24 October, the PLA 28th Army reported that the assault on Kinmen would commence that night. During a command meeting, General Ye Fei inquired whether the ROC 12th Army Corps had arrived on Kinmen. Staff officers incorrectly replied that the force was still at sea. Based on this assessment, Ye authorised the operation to begin before ROC reinforcements could arrive.
That evening, the PLA's first echelon—comprising three regiments and over 9,000 troops from the 28th Army—was dispatched for the landing.
PLA's plan for the operation
After the fall of Fuzhou to the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the PLA 10th Corps convened a combat planning meeting, deciding to launch the Zhangzhou–Xiamen–Kinmen campaign in mid-September 1949. On 19 September, the PLA planned to first seize Zhangzhou. During a follow-up meeting on 26 September regarding operational plans for the Kinmen–Xiamen campaign, three options were proposed: "seize Kinmen and Xiamen simultaneously", "Xiamen first, Kinmen later", and "Kinmen first, Xiamen later". After repeated discussions and analysis, General Ye Fei chose the "simultaneous seizure of Kinmen and Xiamen" plan. The 28th Army would be tasked with capturing Kinmen, while the 29th and 31st Armies would focus on Xiamen. On 11 October, the East China Field Army replied in agreement, expressing concerns over whether sufficient shipping was available. The message stated that if preparations were complete, both Kinmen and Xiamen could be seized simultaneously; otherwise, Xiamen should be taken first, followed by Kinmen. The final decision was to be made by the 10th Corps based on the situation.
On 4 October, the 10th Corps issued a preliminary combat directive assigning the 31st and 29th Armies to capture Xiamen and the 28th Army to capture Kinmen. The severe shortage of vessels caused the operational plan to be changed from "simultaneous seizure" to "Xiamen first, Kinmen later." Between 10 and 12 October, the 28th Army occupied Dadeng and Xiaodeng Islands. The army then deployed along the line from Lienho to Dadeng, Xiaodeng, and Shihching, maintaining close surveillance of ROC forces on Kinmen. On 17 October, the PLA captured Xiamen. After the fall of Xiamen, Deputy Commander of the 28th Army, Xiao Feng, issued an order on 18 October to initiate operations against Kinmen. The assault was scheduled to begin on 20 October, involving six regiments in two echelons. The first echelon would land in three routes:
- The eastern route, led by the 244th Regiment, was to land between Lungkou (壠口) and Housha (後沙) on Kinmen, quickly advancing to capture Houpan Hill (後半山) and Shuangju Hill (雙乳山), and establishing control over the midsection of Kinmen from Chiunglin (瓊林) to Shatou (沙頭). This would secure the eastern peninsula and protect the flanks of the 251st and 253rd Regiments during their assault on the county seat.
- The central route, led by the 251st Regiment, was to land between Hsipao (西堡) and Kuningtou, rapidly advancing toward the Hunan Heights (湖南高地) and Panglin (榜林) to support the 253rd Regiment in attacking the Kinmen Capital Buildings neighbourhood.
- The western route, led by the 253rd Regiment, was to land at Kuningtou, quickly seize Lintso (林厝) and Putou (埔頭), and proceed with an assault on the county seat, aiming to annihilate ROC forces on the western half of the island.
Following the proposed destruction of ROC forces on the western peninsula, the next phase would involve all three regiments from the first echelon, joined by three more from the second echelon and the 92nd Division in reserve. These forces were to advance from Shuangju Hill in two columns, north and south, to encircle and eliminate ROC forces on the eastern peninsula. The entire operation was projected to be completed within three days.
Attack waves
- First Wave
- 82nd Division, 244th Regiment of the 28th Army
- 84th Division, 251st Regiment of the 28th Army
- 85th Division, 253rd Regiment of the 29th Army
- Second Wave (only 10 platoons actually landed)
- 82nd Division, 245th Regiment of the 28th Army
- 82nd Division, 246th Regiment of the 28th Army (2 companies sent for reinforcement)
- 87th Division, 259th Regiment of the 29th Army (2 companies sent for reinforcement)
Republic of China Armed Forces
Order of battle
-Chief Executive of the Southeast Military and Political Office: Chen Cheng-Deputy Chief Executive: Luo Zhuoying-Acting Director of the Fuzhou Pacification Office: Tang Enbo