The Battle for Hill 140 was fought on 9 August 1944 as part of Operation Totalize between a battle group from the 4th Canadian Division and German troops, mainly from the 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend". It occurred several miles east of the village of Estrées-la-Campagne, when, during a night attack, the Canadian troops strayed east from the axis of advance, occupying the wrong area on a forward slope. The consequence of the mistake was the destruction of the Canadian combat group by a German counterattack that lasted several hours. It was an unprecedented case during the Normandy campaign and probably the entire World War II, for such a large force to lose track of the terrain, lose its way and consequently be completely wrecked.
Background
The attack of the II Canadian Corps south of Caen, codenamed "Totalize", began on the night of August 7–8. The plan, prepared by the corps commander, Maj. Gen. Guy Simonds, envisaged that Allied units would penetrate German defensive lines to a depth of 20 km and swiftly seize the hills directly north of the town of Falaise. In reality, the advance progressed at a very slow pace, with the two armored divisions expected to play a major role – 4th Canadian Division (4th AD) and Polish 1st Armoured Division (1st AD) – making only small gains throughout August 8, suffering heavy casualties in men and equipment. The Canadians advanced just over 2 km, reaching Cintheaux, while the Poles were halted at their starting positions near Cramesnil.
In the evening of August 8, Simonds ordered his armored divisions to resume the attack the next day. The 1st AD (commanded by Brigadier General Stanisław Maczek) was tasked with capturing the village of Cauvicourt and the Hill 140, located 5 km to the south, from which the crossings on the Laison river could be controlled. Meanwhile, acting to the right of the Poles, the 4th AD (commanded by Major General George Kitching) was to advance along the Caen–Falaise road (Route Nationale 158) and capture another key terrain feature – Hill 195. According to the corps commander's order issued in the evening, both divisions were to set out during the night and launch the attack at dawn.
Kitching entrusted the capture of Hill 195 to the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade. In order to accomplish this task, its commander, Brigadier Eric Booth, reorganized his forces into two tactical groups, named after the commanding officers, known as Halpenny Force and Worthington Force. The former was to capture the village of Bretteville-le-Rabet, while the latter, moving along the Caen–Falaise road, was to strike at Hill 195 located 6 km further south, seize and hold it until reinforcements arrived.
Units of both sides
The Worthington Force consisted of the 28th Armoured Regiment "British Columbia" (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Donald "Don" Worthington), whose core comprised three squadrons of Sherman tanks, as well as three infantry companies from the "Algonquin" Regiment on M2 half-track armored cars (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A.J. Hay). At 31 years old, Worthington was the youngest regimental commander in the 4th AD, but he enjoyed the trust of Kitching, who considered him one of his best officers. The forces entrusted to him were rested but inexperienced. They did not participate in the fighting on August 8; the attack on Hill 195 was to be their baptism of fire.
The opponent of the armored divisions of the II Canadian Corps was the 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend", which had been fighting in Normandy for over two months (commanded by SS-Brigadeführer Kurt Meyer), supported by elements of the shattered 89th Infantry Division from the first phase of Operation Totalize. Meyer divided his forces into four kampfgruppen. Defending the area of Hill 195, the target of Worthington's attack, was Kampfgruppe Olboeter (reinforced III Battalion of the 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment). To its right, in the Quesnay forest, was Kampfgruppe Wünsche (remnants of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment, reinforced by Tiger tanks from the 102nd SS Heavy Tank Battalion). Engaged in combat against the Poles near Cramesnil was Kampfgruppe Waldmüller (reinforced I Battalion of the 25th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment). Facing the risk of being outflanked, Meyer ordered Waldmüller to withdraw to the area of Hill 140 on the night of August 8–9. Further east, near Rouvres, was Kampfgruppe Krause (reinforced I Battalion of the 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment).
Although the 12th SS Panzer Division lost over 20 of its approximately 50 operational tanks on August 8, and the combat strength of the 89th Infantry Division, which bore the brunt of the Allied attack, was reduced by over half, Meyer largely managed to conduct a coordinated retreat and restore defensive lines based on the Quesnay forest. Additionally, reinforcements were hastening to his aid in the form of the 85th Infantry Division. Nevertheless, the intelligence of the II Canadian Corps downplayed the enemy's combat capability and overestimated the losses inflicted upon them. As a result, Worthington expected to encounter only "a few minor German formations" on his path.
Course of battle
The Attack on Hill 195
Booth issued the order to attack around midnight. His intention was for Worthington's group to set out as quickly as possible and, utilizing the element of surprise, seize Hill 195 with the break of dawn. Around 1:30 A.M., Worthington gathered his officers and conducted a short briefing during which he outlined the objective and the method of attack:
The enemy is disorganized. Command wants to exploit this and intends to continue the offensive (...). The brigadier wants to secure the terrain feature, Hill 195 (...). I intend to seize it and hold it until the rest of our forces can reach us. Execution – we will depart from our current position, then cross the road about 300 yards to the south from here, bypassing the positions of the "Lake Superior" Regiment, and then we will proceed south, staying on the eastern side of the road until we reach the target area. Then we will again cross the road and attack the hill from the southeast. Tanks will lead the way to the target. Keep advancing at all times; strive to reach the objective before dawn.
The departure took place from the area north of Cintheaux at 2:00 A.M. on August 9th. Tanks and transporters followed one another, and the cohesion of the long column moving in the darkness of the night depended on the drivers maintaining continuous visual contact with the vehicle in front of them. The initial stretch of the route proceeded without obstacles. According to the plan, the formation crossed Route Nationale 158, passed the positions of the "Lake Superior" Regiment preparing for the attack on Bretteville-le-Rabet, and then, sticking to the eastern side of the road, headed south. After covering about one mile, the first contact with the enemy was made when Squadron C, leading the way between Cintheaux and Cavicourt, engaged in a firefight with German infantry. Nevertheless, the attack continued to unfold.
Between 4 and 5 o'clock, the formation reached an area near Bretteville-le-Rabet, where the belated attack by Halpenny Force had just begun. Worthington faced a choice of whether to halt and wait until the town was cleared or to deviate from the route, bypass the village with a wide arc from the east, and continue the attack. He opted for the latter, wanting to exploit the element of surprise that was still on the side of the Canadians.
Losing the way
Worthington's decision, as it later turned out, had tragic consequences. The battle group indeed veered east and bypassed Bretteville-le-Rabet, but instead of eventually turning west and returning to RN 158, for unknown reasons, they continued to move southeast along a secondary road known as Chemin Haussé. Furthermore, the approaching dawn and the associated improvement in visibility caused the leading tanks to increase their speed, resulting in the column becoming fragmented and partially dispersed.
At the forefront still was Squadron C along with the regimental command tanks with Worthington and Hay. Following them at some distance was Squadron B. As it passed an unidentified village (most likely Estrées-la-Campagne), its commander, Major Carson, was the first to realize that the group had lost its way. Not only did he order his subunit to halt, but he also sent one of the platoons southwest, which, as it later turned out, was the correct direction. Confident in his decision, Worthington, however, ordered Carson over the radio to follow in his footsteps. In the meantime, Companies B and C of the "Algonquin" Regiment joined Squadron B. Squadron A and Company D were still far behind.
Around 6:40 A.M., completely unaware of the mistake, Worthington arrived at the foot of a hill, which he assumed to be Hill 195. He deployed his forces nearby, in a rectangular field bordered by a 1.5-meter-high hedge, shrubs and clumps of trees. In reality, however, it was the area between Hills 140 and 111, located 2 km southeast of Estrées-la-Campagne and over 6 km northeast of Hill 195.
Shortly afterward, Squadron B (without the 2nd platoon, which was heading towards the "real" Hill 195), Company C, and Company B also arrived there. The latter arrived without its 10th platoon, which had fallen behind and lost contact with the rest of the group. However, it was found and personally brought back by the company commander; as it turned out, the platoon had strayed from the road after detecting and destroying a position of two 88 mm guns, eliminating their 30-man crew in a bayonet charge.
At 6:50 A.M., Worthington reported to the command of the 4th Armoured Brigade via radio that he had occupied Hill 195: "No enemy, but evidence of their recent presence. Several destroyed trucks, trenches, and scattered tools. We will hold this position until our friends arrive and secure the area".
German reaction
The relative ease with which the Canadian battle group penetrated so deep behind enemy lines was not only due to the surprise caused by the night attack on the Germans. Above all, it was influenced by the fact that Kampfgruppe Waldmüller did not occupy the terrain around Hill 140, despite Meyer's orders, as it had not yet had time to regroup. Thus, the unexpected appearance of Worthington's forces there drove a wedge between the units of the 12th SS Panzer Division, threatened its headquarters (only 3 km away), and cut off the retreat route for Kampfgruppe Waldmüller. However, neither Worthington nor Booth and Kitching were aware of this, remaining under the mistaken belief that they had seized Hill 195.
In contrast to the Canadian command, the Germans quickly grasped the seriousness of the situation and took appropriate actions. Shortly after their appearance in the vicinity of Hill 140, Worthington's tanks were detected by SS-Obersturmführer Meitzel, a staff officer assigned to Kampfgruppe Wünsche. He immediately notified SS-Obersturmbannführer Max Wünsche, who passed on the information to Meyer, who in turn ordered the Canadians to be eliminated as quickly as possible. In response, Wünsche directed 15 Panther tanks from the 1st Battalion of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment and 5 Tiger tanks from the 102nd SS Heavy Tank Battalion, supported by at least two companies of panzergrenadier, against them from the area of Quesnay forest. Several surviving Tigers from the 101st SS Heavy Tank Battalion, which had fought the previous day as part of Kampfgruppe Waldmüller, also joined the fight.
Battle
Worthington set out for battle at the head of a full armored regiment and three infantry companies. As a result of the column breaking up, he was left with only 31 Sherman tanks, 1 light Stuart tank, and approximately 220 infantry soldiers. Nevertheless, he decided to organize a circular defense of the occupied position and await reinforcements. The tanks were positioned just behind the hedge, along each side of the rectangular field. Infantry dug trenches in front of them. Inside the formation, two medium mortar sections took positions in bomb craters.