The siege of Izmail (Turkish: İzmail Kuşatması), also called the storming of Izmail (Russian: Штурм Измаила), was a military action fought in 1790 on the Danube near the Black Sea during the Russo-Turkish War (1787–1792) and simultaneously the Austro-Turkish War (1788–1791). The Russians were led by Alexander Suvorov, who had defeated the Ottoman Turkish forces at Kinburn, Focsani, and Rymnik, as well as participating in the siege of Ochakov. The Black Sea rowing flotilla was commanded by the Spanish admiral José de Ribas (Iosif Deribas) who was in the service of the Russian Empire. In preparation for the storming, Suvorov personally trained his soldiers and, approaching Izmail Fortress at a distance of a gunshot, explained to senior officers how and where to act during the assault. It is regarded as one of Suvorov's finest victories and one of the greatest deeds in world military history.
The fortress was considered to be impregnable and was referred to as "a fortress without weak points", and was commanded by one of the best and most experienced Ottoman generals, Aydoslu Mehmed Pasha, who did not allow the Russian commanders Ivan Gudovich, Alexander Samoylov, Pavel Potemkin, and Deribas (November, 1790) to capture Izmail in the previous beleaguering. The Ottoman commander Hassan Pasha, after his defeat by Nikolai Repnin at Salcia, repelled Repnin's attempt to take Izmail in 1789; however, in this case, the blame lies largely with Repnin's own indecision.
Background
Suvorov gave Commander-in-Chief Potemkin advice regarding subsequent military operations; "rowing fleet should seize the Danube Delta, take Tulcha and Isaktcha, together with ground troops to conquer Izmail and Brailov and put a tremor on Sistovo". Two detachments were intended for action on the Lower Danube; with the help of a rowing fleet they were to take possession of all local Turkish fortifications, destroy Ottoman river vessels and generally clear the Lower Danube with its coasts. Most of this task was accomplished without special effort; by the end of November, the small fortresses of Kilia, Tulcea, and Isaktcha were in Russian hands, and the Ottoman rowing flotillas had been annihilated. There remained the formidable stronghold of Izmail, "the key to the Danube", built under the direction of German and French engineers, in the region of Budjak (now in Ukraine).
The siege of Izmail in December 1790 was undertaken due to order of the supreme commander of the Russian Southern Army, General-Feldmarshal Grigory Potyomkin, – commonly known as Potemkin, – appointing a new leader of the forces at Izmail. Neither Nikolay Repnin (1789), nor Ivan Gudovich, replaced by Samoylov, nor Pavel Potyomkin, nor Deribas (November, 1790) were able to meet the challenge, failing the siege either through lack of overall command, or sluggishness, or indecisiveness on the part of their troops or themselves; Grigory Potyomkin then assigned the task of supervising the troops assembled at Izmail to General-in-Chief Count Suvorov-Rymniksky, who was then watching Galatz and Brailov with his corps. During the entire last November siege, Deribas managed, however, to eliminate most of the Turkish small vessels (77 captured and 210 sunk). The news of Suvorov's appointment spread throughout the flotilla and the siege corps instantly. Every soldier understood what the denouement of the inaction would be, and one of the top officials in his private letter expressed himself: "as soon as Suvorov arrives, the fortress will be stormed".
Austrian actions
More recently in 1790, Coburg's Austrians took Orșova. Afterwards, they tried to besiege Giurgiu stronghold: at first things went well for the Austrians there, but the Ottomans, in Prince of Coburg's absence, made a very successful sortie that spoilt the whole affair. They drove the Austrians away, took their artillery, and inflicted a loss of 1,000 men. The Austrians were 6 times stronger than the garrison of Giurgiu, but despite this, they lost all their siege artillery and were forced to retreat from Giurgiu. Potemkin gloatingly described this affair to his sovereign, mentioning Coburg in every negative way, but Coburg had no part in this rout. The affair at Giurgiu was a mere private failure, which, at the end of the same month of June, General Clerfayt partly made up for by a victory over the Turks at the Battle of Calafat. But with these three deeds of the Austrians their active operations ended.
Preparations
Trainings
Arriving at Izmail on 13 December, Suvorov immediately began preparations for an assault. His troops were positioned in a semicircle 2.1 kilometres (1.3 mi) from the fortress; their flanks rested on the river, where Deribas' flotilla and the detachment on Çatal Island[ru] (5 battalions of infantry with 8 artillery batteries) started the blockade. Reconnaissance was underway for several days in a row, with the participation of both Suvorov himself and his superiors; ladders and fascines were being prepared at the same time; Suvorov went among the soldiers, egging them on, joking with them. He would point towards Izmail and say, "There is the fortress. Its walls are high, its ditches deep, but we must take it. Our Mother, the Empress, has ordered it, and we must obey her". Suvorov, who was accompanied by Ober-Quartermaster Lehn and many generals and staff officers (so that everyone could become more familiar with the approaches to the fortress), rode up to Izmail within gun range, indicating the points to which the columns should be directed, where to attack, and how to support each other. At first, the Turks fired at Suvorov's retinue, but later, [it seems] they no longer considered it worthy of attention. Suvorov carefully thought out and drew up plans to respond to a major sortie, based on his bitter experience at Ochakov. In order to inspire the Turks with the idea that the Russian meant to conduct a proper siege, on the night of 18 December, on both flanks were laid batteries, each with 10 guns: two — on the west side, 300 m. from the fortification, and two — on the east side, not more than 370 m. from the hedge. To train troops for making an assault, a large moat was dug in the distance and filleed ramparts in design like Izmail; secretly on the night of 19 and 20 December Suvorov personally showed the troops escalade techniques and taught them to act with a bayonet, with the Turks represented by the fascines. On 18 December, 2 o'clock in the afternoon, Suvorov sent a note to the commandant of Izmail:
To Serasker, elders and all your society: I arrived here with the troops. Twenty-four hours to think about surrender and twenty-four hours of liberty; my first shots mean that liberty is gone; the assault is death. This is what I leave you for consideration.
The next day came a reply from the serasker, who asked permission to send two men to the Grand Vizier for a command and offered to conclude an armistice for 10 days. By 20 December Suvorov replied that he could not agree to the serasker's request and gave a deadline until the morning of the 21st day. In the appointed time there was no reply and the fate of Izmail was decided.
"The Ottoman Turks estimated the Russian siege corps at 85,000 men, expecting an assault every night. Half the men remained awake and huddled in dugouts. The serasker circled the fortress two or three times a day, Tatar sultans and Janissary aghas inspected it at night, and patrols circulated from battalion to battalion. The common people were unwilling to defend themselves; women urged the pashas to surrender, but the latter wanted to fight back, and, in general, the military relied on their own strength." Such were the deserters' reports, not reassuring for Russian soldiers, but Suvorov ordered them made known to everyone, "from the highest commanders to the rank and file." This was his system, based on mutual trust between superiors and subordinates. The council of war, assembled by Suvorov on 20 December, unequivocally decided to assault.
Short bombardment
The Russians had only 40 field guns, but no siege guns at all. Field artillery had no more than one set of ammunition; there was an extreme shortage of food, which could not be replenished due to winter conditions and lack of time; there were many sick soldiers. On the whole the state of Russian affairs there seemed very disappointing; nevertheless the assault was militarily and politically necessary. Alexander Suvorov's aim was to squeeze the fortress with pincers from three sides. The Ottomans would greatly disperse their forces and would not be able to support each other in the event of a possible breakthrough of any of the sections. This applied not only to the Ottoman soldiers, but also to their guns, many of which would also go to defend against Deribas' flotilla, rather than against Suvorov's own assault columns.
One day before the assault (21 December), Suvorov ordered the bombardment of Izmail (with naval and ground cannons). The only unprotected section of this fortress was on the Danube side, which was supposed to be defended by ships. Yet the Ottoman fleet had already been defeated by the Russian one during the Battle of Tendra by the great Russia's admiral of those times — Fyodor Ushakov.
An artillery duel took place. At sunrise the assault preparation was begun by fire from the flank batteries, Çatal, and flotilla ships; cannons were smashing Izmail until late at night; the Turkish artillery answered, but soon the firing from the fortress became weaker and finally stopped. Thanks to the fleet, the Russians had an advantage in guns. The firefight started unsuccessfully for the Russians, when a lucky Ottoman cannonball hit the powder chamber of the frigate Konstantin, after which it blew up, but this did not help the Ottomans win the duel either. The bombardment continued until 3:00 am, but since there were no siege guns on land, the walls could not be breached.
The assault and its planning
Disposition
Numbers
On the early dusky morning of 22 December 1790, the Russians hoped to take their enemy by surprise, however, information about Suvorov's plans of assault was leaked to the Turkish camp, but Turks were unable to pinpoint the exact location of main Russian attack. The Russians began the assault on Izmail, which had a garrison of 35,000 soldiers (or 40,000), of which around 15,000 regular troops and ~20,000 militias, under the leadership of Aydoslu Mehmed Pasha, a firm, resolute, and battle-tested commander. Suvorov had 31,000 troops, of which 15,000 were irregular and poorly armed.
Plan of attack
Suvorov's troops consisted of: the right wing, commanded by Pavel Potyomkin, formed out of the columns of Lvov, Lacy, and Meknob; the left wing, commanded by Alexander Samoylov, formed out of the columns of Orlov, Platov, and Golenishchev-Kutuzov (Kutuzov); the fleet — Iosif Deribas — his landing columns under the command of Arsenyev, Chepiha, and Markov. The detachment of Deribas (9,000) was to attack from the river side, with the right column of Major General Arsenyev (3 battalions and 2,000 Cossacks) was given the task to attack the New Fortress, the middle column of Brigadier Chepiha (3 battalions and 1,000 Cossacks) — the center of the coastal front, the left column of Major General Markov (5 battalions and 1,000 Cossacks) — the Old Fortress. The flotilla was ordered to approach Izmail, being built in two lines: the 1st — 145 light ships and Cossack boats with landing troops, the 2nd — 58 large ships, which by fire of heavy guns were to cover the landing. The detachment of Lieutenant General Potyomkin (7,500) was to lead the assault against the fortress' western side with the right column of Major General Lvov to seize the redoubt of Tabia and then spread to the left; the middle column of Major General Lacy to seize the curtain wall at the Bros gate and spread to the left all the way to the Khota gate; the left column of Major General Meknob was to seize the curtain wall at the Khota gate and spread to the left. Each column consisted of 5 battalions; 150 jaegers were to go at the head, followed by 50 workers with tools, then 3 battalions with fascines and ladders, and a reserve of 2 battalions at the tail. The detachment of Lieutenant General Samoylov (12,000) was to go against the eastern front, with the leading column of Brigadier Orlov (2,000 Cossacks) was to seize the rampart east of the Bender gate and spread to the left to support the middle column of Brigadier Platov (5,000 Cossacks), which was to climb the rampart through the valley that divided the Old and New Fortress, and then contribute to the Deribas troops; 150 selected Cossacks with rifles were to march in front of each column, followed by 50 workers, and then the remaining Cossacks on foot; two battalions of infantry were to serve as a reserve for both columns, given under the command of Major General Bezborodko; left column of Major General Golenishchev-Kutuzov (5 battalions and 1,000 Cossacks) was to seize the rampart at Cilic gate, then spread to the right and left. Westphalen's cavalry (2,500) was assigned to the reserve; 10 squadrons were divided into 3 detachments, which stood against the Bros, Khota and Bender gates; 4 Cossack regiments were positioned further to the east and 1 squadron was left at wagon fort.