The battle of the Mérida pocket, also known as the closing of the Mérida pocket (Spanish: Cierre de la bolsa de Mérida), was a military engagement which took place during the Spanish Civil War in July 1938 in La Serena zone of Badajoz Province, Extremadura.
The Nationalist command engineered an offensive which aimed at wiping out a large Republican salient, potentially threatening the only railway line connecting rebel-held León and Andalusia. The Nationalists planned a pincer movement from the north and from the south of the salient. They grouped 7 infantry divisions against 4 divisions of the Republicans. The campaign was carried out successfully during 5 days and with no major battle having been fought. It left one Republican division trapped in the pocket and few others suffering significant losses.
The engagement was neither among the largest battles of the Spanish Civil War nor the one which became a milestone in its history. The Nationalists removed a threat to their logistics and seized some 5,000 square km, though the battle did not turn into a major breakthrough which decided the fate of the conflict. Its relevance was soon eclipsed by the onset of the Battle of the Ebro, which started when the Merida pocket was being closed and which turned into the largest battle of the war. However, the Battle of the Mérida pocket merits attention as a unique example of pincer strategy employed during the war, since most offensives of the conflict were carried out by means of a frontal assault.
Background
Since the summer of 1936 the Republicans controlled a large salient, located in north-eastern part of the Badajoz province, in the region of Extremadura; it covered the comarcas of La Serena, Don Benito and partially La Siberia and Campiña Sur. On the width of some 70 km it projected into the Nationalist-held territory by some 60 km. Total length of the frontlines around the salient was some 200 km and its size was some 5,000 square km. The salient was of little value itself. It was sparsely populated; the largest urban centres were Don Benito (20,000 inhabitants), Villanueva de la Serena (15,000), Campanario (10,000) and Castuera (9,000). The area was of certain importance mostly as an agricultural region of significant grain production. However, it mattered very much from the strategic point of view. It was the westernmost territory, held by the Republic. The frontline was located some 80 km from the Portuguese frontier and some 30 km from Mérida, an important junction with the only railway line connecting the Nationalist-held regions of León and Andalusia. The salient was a constant threat to Nationalist commanders. In case of a successful Republican offensive, the railway connection between Salamanca and Seville would have been broken; in case of an even more successful action, the Nationalist-held territory would have been cut in two. The chief Republican planner, general Rojo, already in May 1937 engineered a scheme, named "Plan P"; it envisioned a massive breakthrough offensive from the salient towards Portugal, but was abandoned due to political, not military reasons. In July 1938 the prime minister Negrín referred to "soldiers of Medellín" - furthermost point of the Republic - when advocating his strategy to keep fighting.
In June 1938 the Nationalists seemed fully in control of the war. In no section of the frontline they appeared endangered or challenged. Having reached the Mediterranean in April in mid-June they have seized Castellón and kept pursuing an offensive along the coast with the objective of taking Valencia. On 17 June lieutenant colonel Antonio Barroso, a high planning officer in Nationalist General Staff, came out with an idea of mounting an offensive which would wipe out the Merida Salient. He devised a plan based on pincer strategy, which would involve parallel attack from the north and the south of the salient, possibly trapping most of the enemy forces in a cauldron. The plan got approved and on 2 July it was incorporated into Instrucción General número 5, issued by the Nationalist high command and signed by Franco. The document acknowledged concentration of Republican troops in Maestrazgo and Levante, which presumably was carried out at the expense of other sections of the front, including Extremadura. It ordered a concentric offensive from the north and from the south; its objectives were doing away with the Merida salient, seizing the Merida-Almorchón railway line (which would provide the Nationalists with the second rail connection to Andalusia), and gaining position for a future offensive towards the province of Ciudad Real. The Nationalist command was not aware that in early July Ejército Popular was gearing up for the largest so far offensive of the war, to be commenced 600 km away; in late July it would begin as the Battle of the Ebro.
Ordre de Bataille
Nationalists
The Nationalist units marked for taking part in the offensive formed part of two armies:
- in the north it was Ejército del Centro, commanded by general Andrés Saliquet. The units selected for the offensive were commanded by general Salvador Múgica:
- 11. Division (right flank, general Maximino Bartomeu)
- 74. Division (left flank, coronel Pablo Arias)
- 19. Division (second wave, teniente coronel José Blanco)
- cavalry brigade (general Rafael Ibáñez de Aldecoa)
- various reserve units, subordinated to army command
- in the south it was Ejército del Sur, commanded by general Gonzalo Queipo de Llano. The units selected for the offensive were commanded by general Luis Solans:
- 102. Division (left flank, coronel Antonio Castejón)
- 112. Division (centre, coronel Manuel Baturone)
- 122. Division (right flank, coronel Luis Redondo)
- 22. Division (second wave, commander unclear)
- cavalry brigade (which included 2 motorised machine-gun squadrons, commander unclear)
- various reserve units, subordinated to army command
Both groups were to be assisted by some 17 artillery batteries, two squadrons of bomber aircraft (Ju 52 and He 70) and wings of fighter aircraft (CR-32) stationed in Mérida, Badajoz and Trujillo. In total, the Nationalists have grouped troops equivalent to some 25 regiments (some 65,000 people). The soldiers were generally in good spirits and well equipped, though some sub-units have been brought from various frontlines and were new to this combat zone. It is not clear who directed the entire operation; it had no specific code name.
Republicans
On the Republican side the salient was garrisoned by Ejército de Extremadura, the army commanded by colonel Ricardo Burillo.
- Most of the salient was within the section assigned to the VII. Corps, commanded by colonel Antonio Rúbert. In the salient it was composed of:
- 36. Division (which held the section south of the Tagus, slightly north of the salient, teniente coronel Francisco Gómez)
- 29. Division (on both banks of the Guadiana, facing northern flank of the salient, teniente coronel Fernando Monasterio)
- 37. Division (facing western flank of the salient, teniente coronel Alejandro Sánchez-Cabezudo)
- direct reserve, composed of one brigade and other units
- The southern part of the salient was within the operational zone of the VIII. Corps, commanded by colonel Manuel Márquez Sánchez de Movellán. The groups which garrisoned the area were:
- 38. Division (facing southern flank, major Carlos García Quijada)
- direct reserve, composed of 68. Division (coronel Justo López Mejías), 12. Brigada de Asalto, 5. Regimiento de Caballería, 2 machine-gun battalions, one penal battalion and an armoured train
In total the Republicans manned the salient with 15 mixed brigades, roughly equivalent to Nationalist regiments (some 45,000 people). Headquarters of Ejército de Extremadura was in Almadén, of the VII. Corps in Cabeza del Buey and of the VIII. Corps in Pozoblanco. There was no direct air support available. Republican soldiers have not seen much combat during 1937 and 1938 and suffered few casualties. However, they spent most of the time in trenches on stationary positions, without much rotation and with almost no leaves; their morale was not high, especially that various units were extracted from the sector and moved elsewhere.
Battle
Intelligence services of the Republican Ejército de Extremadura have correctly identified enemy gear-up north of the salient, in Trujillo and Zorita, though they failed to note similar preparations south. Since 16 July the army Boletín de Información was warning about Nationalist preparations, and on 17 July it predicted almost precisely "ofensiva del enemigo en las 48 horas próximas". The anticipated enemy assault was to stretch along a 40-km section from Navalvillar de Pela in the east to Don Benito in the west. In response Burillo ordered state of alert and regrouping of own reserves. On 19 July 1938 the Nationalists opened artillery barrage and mounted an infantry assault on the Republican bridgehead on the Tagus at Puente del Arzobispo, some 100 km from the Merida Pocket and at the extreme right flank of the Ejército de Extremadura. It was engineered as a diversionary attack and it worked; Burillo despatched a brigade from the army reserve to support the defenders. The weather was typical for Extremadura in the summer period: extreme heat made daytime operations very difficult, though on the other hand low waters rendered most rivers relatively easy to cross.
20 July
The actual offensive against the salient began on 20 July with simultaneous actions from the north and from the south. In the north the Nationalist units advanced along the Vivares – Palazuelo – Madrigalejo line. During the day at some points they crossed a minor river Rio Gargáligas, though at some they had to withdraw, the result of the Republicans setting fire to vegetation. On average they advanced some 6–7 km, and seized the villages of Rena, Acedera and Obando; the cavalry performed a 10-km raid on the left flank and seized the place known as Case del Fraile. In the south the Nationalists advanced from Peraleda del Zaucejo, Los Blazquez and Valsequillo, on both banks of the Zujar river. They crossed some minor hilly ranges – culminations of Sijuela and Pícuda - and overran few small settlements, but did not reach any significant town. However, by the end of the day the gap between two pincer groups was reduced to some 60 km. Burillo was primarily concerned about would-be Nationalist takeover of the Almorchón railway junction, gradually within reach of right-wing unit advancing from the south. He started to re-group his units in order to form a makeshift División Zújar, supposed to deliver a counter-attack which would push the Nationalists back.
21 July
On 21 July northern divisions of the Nationalists made further moderate progress of some 5–7 km along the 25-km-long breakthrough section, defended by the Republican 29. Division; they advanced well south of Rio Gargáligas. On their left flank they seized Navalvillar de Pela; in the centre they crossed hills known as Sierra de Pela, including the Repica summit, and started to approach Orellana la Vieja and Orellana de la Sierra; on the right flank some units reached northern banks of the Guadiana river. In the south all units cross the upper Zujar, which at that time of the year was no major obstacle either for men or for equipment; in the central part of the breakthrough section they crossed a low range of Sierra del Oro and reached the outskirts of Monterrubio de la Serena. By the end of the day the Nationalist pincers were gradually building a potential cauldron for Republican troops, with the exit gap of some 50 km. However, Burillo contacted commanders of both army corps and demanded that positions be maintained and retreat is performed only on clear orders from the army command; he also contacted general Miaja and asked for 2 brigades of reinforcements.
22 July
The day of 22 July was the most challenging one for the northern units of the Nationalists: they had to cross the Guadiana, the only major natural obstacle. The entire advance had been planned few days earlier mostly around possible Guadiana crossings; it turned out that the points chosen, either bridges or fords, were usable, both Orellanas were seized with almost no combat, Republican troops did not offer major resistance, and the Nationalists advanced a few kilometres south of the river. In the south the 112. Division was engaged in first major combat against sub-units of the Republican 38. Division on approaches to Monterrubio; having seized the town, later they had to withstand repeated though somewhat disorganised Republican counter-attacks. The cavalry on the right flank reached the village of Helechal, just 7 km from the Almorchón railway junction. At that point possible encirclement of the Republican 37. Division was already becoming a reality. Both commander and head of staff of the VII. Corps suggested withdrawal, but Burillo did not agree. He trusted in his new División Zújar and in possible reinforcements, even though the exit gap from the pocket was merely some 30 km wide.