Trận đánh
13 March 1643
The First Battle of Middlewich took place on 13 March 1643, during the First English Civil War, and was fought between the Parliamentarians, under Sir William Brereton, and the Royalist supporters of King Charles I of England, under Sir Thomas Aston.
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The First Battle of Middlewich took place on 13 March 1643, during the First English Civil War, and was fought between the Parliamentarians, under Sir William Brereton, and the Royalist supporters of King Charles I of England, under Sir Thomas Aston.
In the summer of 1642 came the final split between the King and Parliament and both sides made preparations for raising an army. Throughout the summer the Commissioners of Array for the King and Deputy Lieutenants for Parliament attempted to raise the Trained Bands and to seize the magazine in every county. During the confusion caused by the troops waiting to be shipped from Chester to Ireland to suppress the rebellion there, Sir William Brereton, the Parliamentary representative in Cheshire, turned to what was virtually recruiting. He found himself opposed by Sir Thomas Aston and all the resident Cheshire nobility and he failed in his attempt to secure Chester for the Parliament.
At this time Aston was probably the recognized representative of the King in the county and was able to present the latter with a list of men willing to serve in the King's army. The King decided to base this army at Shrewsbury and when he arrived there on 20 September 1642 he wrote to Lord Kilmorey, Lord Cholmondeley and "the other of the subscribers for Horse in Cheshire" telling them to deliver their horses into the charge of Aston who was to bring the forces raised to Shrewsbury to join with the main body of the army. Charles made it unnecessary for Aston to leave for Shrewsbury as he instead came to Chester and it was from here that he issued, on 26 September, an order for the seizure of arms and horses from those people who had carried out Parliament's Militia Ordinance in Cheshire. These were to be delivered to Aston who was able to leave with the King at the head of three troops of horse.
Aston obviously conducted himself satisfactorily in the campaign culminating in the Battle of Edgehill because an order from Prince Rupert in January 1643 refers to him as a colonel of a regiment of cuirassiers, and two days later on 19 January the King announced that he was sending Aston as a major-general to Cheshire and Lancashire. Aston's orders were simply stated by Prince Rupert; he was to take his regiment to Shropshire, raise forces of horse and foot there, and then defend Cheshire against the Parliamentary force that was heading to the county from London under the leadership of Brereton. He was also to seize arms and ammunition for the King's use and "put into execution the laws and customs martial upon all offenders.....for the better preventing of disorders, plunderings and outrages which are often committed by soldiers." He was told to achieve this and return to the main army by 15 March unless he received orders to the contrary.
The preparations for Aston's march and arrival in Cheshire reveal the King's interest in keeping Cheshire Royalist. The authorities of the areas that Aston was to pass through on his way from Oxford to Cheshire were ordered to provide food and lodgings for his men. The Cheshire Commissioners of Array were also given explicit orders as to what they should do to help Aston. The King explained to them that, as the Parliamentarians had rejected the Bunbury Agreement and were sending a force to Cheshire, he was sending Aston and his regiment of horse to protect the county. The commissioners were to assemble the trained bands and summon Quarter Sessions to decide on a method of raising money to pay the soldiers. They were also to help Aston raise a regiment of dragoons and seize arms from "malignants" to arm them. In addition the parishes were to supply them horses.
Parliament also realised how important Cheshire was and sent Brereton to raise support for its cause. Geographically Cheshire lies between the Pennines and the Welsh hills and so whoever controlled Cheshire controlled the north – south corridor. For the Parliament, the control of Cheshire would mean separating the King's northern supporters from the King and his army at Oxford. It could also stop the King from bringing in reinforcements from his Irish army through the port of Chester.
When Aston arrived in Shropshire he found that there were only 60 dragoons instead of the 600 promised. The authorities promised him another 200 and so he decided to wait for two days before moving on to Cheshire. During this time he was ordered to Stafford to help the sheriff there (perhaps against the Moorlanders who had risen for Parliament). However Aston did not neglect his prime objective and ordered the Cheshire Commissioners of Array to defend Nantwich with 150 musketeers and to inform him of Brereton's progress. Neither order was carried out and Aston was not informed until it was too late to arrive at Nantwich before Brereton.
Brereton, meanwhile, had ridden into Congleton on the evening of 27 January with his own troop of horse and three companies of dragoons. Although he was joined in Congleton by the former mayor, William Edwards, with another troop of horse, his whole force could not have amounted to more than about 500 men. His mission, however, was not to conquer Cheshire but to rouse and organize the Parliamentary sympathizers in it. He had with him the cadre of a foot regiment, a case of drakes (small cannons about 7½ feet long) and 700 muskets in his baggage train as well as an experienced Scottish professional, Major James Lothian, to train recruits. He had wide powers to construct fortifications and raise more men and was to finance the whole enterprise by voluntary payment and distraint upon the rent and goods of local Royalists.
He approached Nantwich on 28 January. not just "to releave the town, beinge in greate danger to be plundered and destroyed by the Kings Armye and Commissioners of Array", but also because it offered the only alternative to Chester as a county headquarters. It had sufficient wealth and housing to accommodate a large garrison and staff and was the centre of a network of roads leading to the Midlands and London, to North Wales, Lancashire, Yorkshire and Scotland.
Brereton sent ahead 50 dragoons under Lothian to occupy the town and they got there before Aston who had finally been informed of Brereton's progress by Orlando Bridgeman, the son of the Bishop of Chester. Aston had with him his own troop of horse and some companies of Shropshire dragoons under the command of Colonel Sir Vincent Corbet totalling about 500 men. Despite his superiority of numbers Aston failed to take the town and at dusk he retreated eastwards down Hospital Street. In a narrow lane his force met the remainder of Brereton's force and confusion was the result. A company of Brereton's dragoons dismounted but failed to leave anyone to control the horses which bolted into the fields and were taken by the Royalists for charging cavalry. The confusion was added to when some Parliamentarians loaded and fired one of the drakes. This does not seem to have caused any injury but the flash and the roar amid the general confusion frightened the Royalists so much "that they weire all scattered and quyte Rowted".
Aston turned up eventually at Whitchurch and, although he claimed the skirmish as a draw, his distance from Nantwich and his appeals for reinforcements indicates that the skirmish was a defeat for the Royalists, likely due to his men being exhausted after the long march from Oxford and that he did not receive the support from the Cheshire Commissioners of Array that he had expected. This lack of proper support continued over the next four or five weeks. An agreement was made to raise a contribution in the county to pay the soldiers but most was paid to the upkeep of the Chester garrison, not to Aston's regiment or to the trained bands. The Royalist leaders were never able to agree to a unified command which meant that they were never able to field an army that would outnumber Brereton's force. There was a force of 2,000 men at Warrington under the Earl of Derby, a Welsh force of 1,000 men at Chester and the Shropshire force at Whitchurch. These never combined and it was not until March that the Royalists decided to choose a place in the county "to summon in the King's friends".
Aston set out for Middlewich on Friday 10 March. His progress was delayed that night when his men, who had yet to be paid, mutinied. Apparently the money and provisions were issued on Saturday but it was so late that Aston had to leave two troops of horse in the forest to guard it - "though they lay in danger that night." It is not known why Middlewich was chosen as opposed to the much safer Knutsford where it would have been possible to retreat to Warrington if necessary. In his account of the battle of Middlewich, Aston did not say why he came to Middlewich on 11 March but explained that he had no wish to linger there. He realized the dangers of staying in an open town with enemy forces at both Northwich and Nantwich. Brereton, who was recruiting in Northwich, commented on the boldness of the Royalists for camping at Middlewich. He believed it resulted from overconfidence in their ability to win over the county and rid it of the Parliamentarians.
Aston arrived at Middlewich with about 500 mounted troops and over 1000 of the trained bands of the Broxton and Wirral Hundreds plus three cannons. William Brereton sent a strong party of horse from Northwich "who gave them an alarm." Aston had meanwhile received a letter from the Governor of Chester, Sir Nicolas Byron, telling him that if he provided an escort for the family and goods of Lord Brereton to Chester then the latter, who was a relative of Sir William Brereton, would provide men for Aston. Although reluctant to linger in Middlewich, Thomas, after consulting with the sheriff, Sir Edward Fitton and Colonel Ellice, decided it was worth waiting for another day. He therefore sent a letter to Lord Brereton urging him to act immediately even though it meant travelling on a Sunday.
Brereton, wanting to "annoy" the enemy, set out with two or three companies of dragoons to give alarm at Middlewich. He had no intention of attacking but wanted to harass the Royalists. In the meantime Lord Brereton had not done as Aston requested but instead came to Middlewich to confer further. Thomas believed that Lord Brereton's presence in Middlewich led to the attack by the Parliamentarians because they wanted to prevent the Royalists from joining forces. Sir William Brereton however, in his account of the battle, made it clear that he attacked because he believed a Royalist presence in Middlewich posed too much of a threat to be ignored.
In order to confer with Lord Brereton and also the sheriff's desire to "sumon the countrey with theire contribucon and assistance, necessitated a ioynt consent to stay there on Monday." Realising the danger posed by this decision Aston asked that the governor use the Whitchurch forces to threaten the Parliamentarians at Nantwich. According to the Commissioners of Array the Whitchurch force was not ordered to threaten Nantwich. In any case the forces there had been disbanded. Aston's fears were well founded as Brereton arranged to meet the Nantwich forces at six o'clock the next morning and to make a joint attack on Middlewich.
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