The Bloody Monday raid (Somali: Isniintii Dhiiga; Arabic: الإثنين الدامي), also known as the Abdi House raid or Operation Michigan, was a US military operation that took place in Mogadishu on 12 July 1993, during the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) phase of the UN intervention in the Somali Civil War. Carried out by American QRF troops on behalf of UNOSOM II, the raid was the war's deadliest incident in Mogadishu to that point and a turning point in the UN operation. It inflamed anti-UN and anti-American sentiments among Somalis, galvanizing the insurgency that the US military faced during the Battle of Mogadishu three months later.
As part of the hunt for General Mohammed Farah Aidid after the attack on Pakistani peacekeepers on 5 June 1993, U.S. forces conducted a 17-minute raid on a villa owned by Aidid's Interior Minister, Abdi "Qeybdiid" Awale. The villa was hosting a gathering attended by high-ranking elders of the Habar Gidir and other major subclans, along with prominent members of the Aidid-led Somali National Alliance (SNA).
UNOSOM II officials claimed that the gathering was a war council composed of hardliners taking place at an SNA command center, making it a legitimate military target, but never produced evidence to justify its claims. In contrast, Somali accounts of the raid maintain that the meeting was a peace conference in which eminent elders, SNA moderates, and civilians convened to discuss a proposed diplomatic resolution to the escalating conflict between the SNA and UNOSOM II.
The raid was one of the most pivotal events during UNOSOM II, as it had a serious adverse effect on the relationship between foreign troops and the Somali people, while alarming numerous UNOSOM troop-contributing nations, some of which withdrew from military operations. The 12 July operation was heavily criticized by UNOSOM II's own Justice Division, Doctors Without Borders, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Organization of African Unity.
Background
The day immediately following the 5 June 1993 attack on Pakistani forces, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 837, calling for the arrest of those responsible for the death of the peacekeepers. Though General Mohammed Farah Aidid was not directly named in Resolution 837, his political organization, the Somali National Alliance was blamed; subsequent investigation concluded that the SNA was most likely behind the attack.
This marked the beginning of a new phase of escalating tit for tat violence that began with retaliatory AC-130 strikes on SNA sites and attempts to capture Aidid. These were met with response ambushes, mortar attacks, and assassinations of Somali UNOSOM II employees by the SNA. But UNOSOM efforts to capture Aidid in the month following the passing of Resolution 837 would repeatedly end in failure.
UN planning
The planned surprise attack was both unique and historic, in that it was the first attack where the target would be Somalis instead of weapon caches or other structures and is referred to by Washington Post reporter Keith B. Richburg as, "the UN's first ever officially authorized assassination".
Abdi "Qeybdiid" Awale's residence, a villa in the Hodan district of southern Mogadishu, was well known to have been holding regular clan meetings for the Habar Gidir and became a target, as Qeybdiid was a high ranking member of the SNA, and the organization was composed in large part of members from the Habar Gidir. In the days and weeks following the commencement of military operations, UNOSOM had (via radio broadcast and propaganda leaflets dropped over Mogadishu) made the clear distinction that it was not the enemy of the Habar Gidir clan, but only wanted to capture Aidid. Following the raid, in late July Under Secretary for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff reiterated in a statement before a U.S. Senate committee that UNOSOM had no dispute with Habar Gidir and that the clan would remain in negotiations on political reconciliation.
Detailed planning for a strike on a future gathering at Abdi Qeybdiid Awale's villa began on July 7, 1993. Turkish commander of UNOSOM II forces, General Çevik Bir had privately declared on July 9, 1993, "I will kill Aidid within four days." UNOSOM command considered the planned assault as a legitimate defensive action that would weaken Aidid's influence within the Habar Gidir clan. They were also concerned about the possibility of the Italian contingent secretly negotiating a unilateral agreement with Aidid, which could inadvertently bolster his popular support.
Unlike in previous raids, Çevik Bir, his deputy US Lieutenant General Thomas M. Montgomery, and other coalition military leaders decided, after weeks of agonizing, not to issue any warnings prior to the attack. The purpose of this was twofold: first it would, in theory, enable them to fully decapitate the leadership of the SNA; second, it would reduce the risk of friendly casualties. The first reason was pragmatic in nature and based on past experiences where cordons had failed and key SNA targets had slipped away. The second reason was partly pragmatic and partly political. As head of UNOSOM II, retired US Adm Johnathan Howe could have overruled the military, but chose not to as heavier casualties sustained from recent firefights, partly due to the SNA's deliberate use of human shields to test the UN peacekeepers' rules of engagement, had made the force's commanders wary and lowered the bar for acceptable risk to civilians during military operations. Sebastian Kaempf, a Senior Lecturer at the University of Queensland's Political Science department, argued that by not issuing a warning, UNOSOM II leadership had concluded that military necessity and the perceived risk of US casualties had overruled concerns for Somali civilians.
The White House directly signed off on permission for the operation, but it is disputed if President Clinton knew if Somalis were being directly targeted when he did. The raid was directed by the deputy commander of UNOSOM II, Lt. Gen. Montgomery, who was overhead in a helicopter during in the strike.
The 12 July 1993 conference
Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid served as the nominal leader of the Somali National Alliance, but his ability to make decisions for the organization was limited. A council of elders held decision-making power for most significant issues, and elections were held that threatened his leadership. The elder councils moved forward via consensus decision-making after a period of extensive deliberations and discussion.
On July 9, 1993, a handful of prominent Somalis, including Sheikh Haji Mohamed Iman Aden, the most senior member of the Habar Gidir clan, and former Deputy Prime Minister Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, met with US Admiral Johnathan Howe, the special representative of the UN Secretary-General in Somalia. Howe had requested that they search for a peaceful resolution to the ongoing war between the SNA and UNOSOM II. UNOSOM considered Sheikh Haji Mohamed Iman Aden a moderate alternative to Aidid. Under the mounting pressure of the UNOSOM hunt, six representatives of the different sub clans within the SNA met and agreed to enter into a political dialogue with UNOSOM on 11 July 1993. At the meeting, headed by Abdiqasim Salad Hassan (later President of Somalia in 2000), a decision was also made to completely untangle the Habar Gidir clan from politics and leave political national issues to the SNA. It was also agreed that a twenty-five member Supreme Council would be created in order to keep the clan united and an election for it was scheduled to take place on July 15, 1993.
Howe's request for dialogue and the need to explain the developments of Abdiqasim Salad's 11 July 1993 meeting to the other members of the Habar Gidir, prompted the unusually high profile Monday 12 July 1993, gathering. Aidid reportedly disapproved of the meeting taking place, as his authority in both the SNA and Habar Gidir was now being held in serious question. According to Black Hawk Down author Mark Bowden: "...[a]ll leaders and elders of Habr Gidr clan [were present], most of whom were opposed to the military posture that Aideed was taking against the UN. The meeting was about forcing Aideed to comply with UNOSOM II". In an interview with journalists, Abdi Qeybdiid remarked on the conference: "Everybody was interested in stopping the fighting, to open a dialogue. It was in the interest of all." The conference to discuss Howe's peace initiative included high-ranking elders, intellectuals, businessmen, former judges, military officers, representatives of women's organizations, and other notable clansmen of the Habar Gidir clan. Representatives and notable figures of other Somali clans were present such as the:
- Gaalje'el and Sheikhal
- Rahanweyn and Dir
- Ogaden and Majerteen; Darod sub clans
- Hawadle and Murosade; Hawiye sub clans
Abdi Qeybdiid's villa was selected for the talks, as it possessed a large carpeted conference room on the second floor capable of holding a gathering of over a hundred people. The meeting had been publicized in Mogadishu's newspapers as a peace conference the day before and an American war correspondent in Mogadishu who was a witness of the raid, Scott Peterson, corroborated the Somali account that a group of elders had gathered to discuss to how to end the violence between the SNA and UN forces.
A CIA informant inside the clan passed intelligence that a meeting was to take place and that present among the gathered would be some of those who had part taken in the June 5, 1993, attack. Aidid was allegedly tipped off that something would happen to the conference a few hours prior, by his own intelligence network or by the Italian element of UNOSOM II, who were allegedly sympathetic to him.
Attack
On the morning of July 12, 1993, Operation Michigan was commenced by the 10th Mountain Division and Task Force Safari air units of the American Quick Reaction Force (QRF) in Mogadishu under the provisions of UN Resolution 837. For at least a week before the raid, US Army Special Forces had staked out the compound, surveilling Aidid and other members of the SNA come and go. The QRF had been on standby for the past few days and was prepared to launch the operation on just a five minutes notice.
Earlier that morning, the US State Department issued a warning that the CIA had received a memo revealing a plan by the SNA to launch a large scale attack on United Nations officials in Mogadishu, possibly giving American commanders a plausible reason to launch the assault. In the aftermath of the raid, it was discovered that the CIA report had been incorrect.
Air strike phase
Following confirmation of the codeword Michigan, an armada of 17 helicopters took off from Mogadishu International Airport and surrounded the villa within minutes.
Around 10:18 am a CIA informant walked out of the meeting to the main gate of the compound, in full view of the waiting attack helicopters that had just begun encircling the villa, wearing an arranged set of clothing as a signal to begin the attack. Seconds later, following visual confirmation of the signal and without any warning, six AH-1 Cobras and four OH-58 Kiowas launched a total of sixteen TOW missiles and 2,200 rounds of 20 mm caliber cannon fire into the building for a total of six to eight minutes.
The AH-1 Cobras launched the TOWs into the second floor of the villa where the conference was taking place, then specifically targeted the building's stairwells to block any escape routes and finally aimed for the roof in an attempt to crush the occupants.
"Our orders were to destroy the conference room on the second floor where everybody was supposed to be meeting, then we were to destroy the staircase in the back of the house so no one could get away...I was flying security for battle position one and my job was to wax anybody if they tried to leave the compound, or if they came outside and tried to shoot at us. Then I was supposed to destroy the front gate of the compound so that the infantry could get in".
Chief Warrant Officer Christopher Roben
Moments before the TOWs hit the villa, Abdi Qeybdiid had just begun addressing the crowd of approximately 80 to 100 Somalis that had gathered. Present among them were prominent sheikhs, former judges, famous poets, professors, engineers, military officers, representatives of women's organizations and intellectuals who represented the most respected and best-educated of the Habar Gidir clan. The first TOW broke through the second story wall, flew past Qeybdiid's face and exploded. A survivor recounted that the first missile had torn a hole in the wall and revealed the mass of encircling helicopters that appeared to be almost at eye level over the city. The Habar Gidir's most senior elder, Sheik Haji Mohamed Iman Aden, who was over 90 years old, was instantly killed in the first TOW missile volley along with other elders, as they were all directly sitting against the walls of the conference room.
What Farah saw and heard was a flash of light and a violent crack. He stood and took one step forward and heard the whooosh! of a second missile. There was another flash and explosion. He was thrown to the floor. Thick smoke filled the room. He tried to move forward but his way was blocked by bodies, a bloody pile of men and parts of men a meter high...Those who survived the first blast were feeling along the wall, groping for the door when the second missile had exploded. The air was thick with dark smoke and smelled of powder, blood, and burned flesh. Farah found the stairs, stood, and had taken one step down when a third missile exploded, disintegrating [sic] the staircase. He tumbled to the first floor. He sat up stunned, and felt himself for broken bones and wet spots...There was another explosion above him. Then another and another.