The Battle of Suối Châu Pha (6 August 1967) was fought during the Vietnam War between Australian troops and the Việt Cộng. The battle took place during Operation Ballarat, an Australian search and destroy operation in the eastern Hát Dịch area, north-west of Núi Đất in Phước Tuy province. Following a covert insertion the day before which had caught a number of Việt Cộng sentries by surprise, A Company, 7th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (7 RAR) had patrolled forward unaware of the presence of a large Việt Cộng main force unit nearby. Clashing with a reinforced company from the Việt Cộng 3rd Battalion, 274th Regiment, a classic encounter battle ensued between two forces of roughly equal size. Fought at close quarters in dense jungle amid a heavy monsoon rain, both sides suffered heavy casualties as neither was able to gain an advantage. Finally, after a battle lasting several hours, the Australian artillery proved decisive and the Việt Cộng were forced to withdraw, dragging many of their dead from the battlefield after having suffered crippling losses.
Background
Military situation
By the second half of 1967 the Việt Cộng seemed to have melted away in Phước Tuy province, abandoning many of their bunker systems and avoiding the main roads and towns. The Battle of Long Tân and Operation Bribie had weakened the communist forces in the province, while further operations had restricted their movement and logistics. This prompted the commander of the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF)—Brigadier Stuart Graham—to speculate that the Việt Cộng may have fled to the border, perhaps leaving the province altogether. Graham reasoned that a succession of operations in the south-east of the province and the completion of the barrier minefield at Đất Đỏ meant that no single, sizable threat remained to the populated areas of Phước Tuy.
The Australians had continued to operate independently within Phước Tuy province, and while the war had become a series of big unit search and destroy operations in a war of attrition for the Americans, they had pursued their own counter-insurgency campaign. Regardless, differences of opinion between Australian and American methods had produced friction, and increasingly impatient with the Australian approach, in early 1967 the Commander US MACV, General William Westmoreland, had complained to the Commander Australian Forces Vietnam, Major General Tim Vincent, demanding a more aggressive approach. However, the Australians were convinced that deliberate patrolling techniques were more effective in separating communist forces from the population in the villages while working towards slowly extending government control, and such urgings went largely unheeded.
The highway to Xuyên Mộc in the east had been reopened by the Australians in March and April, and with the Việt Cộng 275th Regiment believed to have been severely weakened following Long Tân, a series of operations aimed at destroying the Việt Cộng 274th Regiment were subsequently launched by 1 ATF. Australian assessments of the Việt Cộng 275th Regiment were seemingly reinforced by its unsuccessful attempt to ambush a convoy from US 11th Armoured Cavalry Regiment (11 ACR) on 2 December 1966. Meanwhile, after Westmoreland had again pressed Vincent on what he saw as the limited results achieved by Australian tactics, a large joint US-Australian operation was mounted against the Mây Tào mountains in Phước Tuy, moving against the communist bases in the area. The largest search and destroy operation mounted by the Australians to that point, Operation Paddington (9–15 July) was carried out in co-operation with American and South Vietnamese units based in Biên Hòa province, and targeted the Việt Cộng 5th Division.
Mounted on a large scale under American command and involving nearly 15,000 troops, Paddington failed to result in significant contact, in spite of the employment of well co-ordinated search techniques and blocking forces. A large number of Việt Cộng camps, bunkers and storage areas were however uncovered and destroyed, resulting in significant disruption to the communist logistic system. Under the overall command of Major General George G. O'Connor, commander US 9th Infantry Division, allied forces for Operation Paddington included the US 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, the 2nd Battalion, US 47th Infantry Regiment (Mechanised), the US 11th Armoured Cavalry Regiment, Task Force B Marine Corps (RVN) and the 1st Australian Task Force, as well as various supporting arms including two artillery batteries and more than a thousand armoured vehicles and helicopters. Việt Cộng casualties included 92 killed, including 31 by 1 ATF for the loss of one Australian killed and another wounded. Nonetheless, the results were disappointing for the Australians, and the Việt Cộng continued to elude them.
Prelude
Opposing forces
Based at Núi Đất in the III Corps Tactical Zone as part of US II Field Force, Vietnam, 1 ATF now included two infantry battalions plus armour, aviation, engineers and artillery support, with total Australian troop strength in Vietnam reaching 6,300 men. Logistic arrangements were provided by the 1st Australian Logistic Support Group based at the port of Vũng Tàu. The 5th and 6th Battalions, Royal Australian Regiment (6 RAR) subsequently returned to Australia in May and June 1967, and were replaced by the 2nd and 7th Battalions, Royal Australian Regiment (7 RAR). Meanwhile, Việt Cộng units operating in the province in early 1967 included Main Forces from the Việt Cộng 5th Division, which consisted of the 274th Regiment and 275th Regiment, each of three infantry battalions under the command of Senior Colonel Nguyen The Truyen. Supporting this force were a number of artillery, engineer, medical and logistic units. Group 89 (Artillery) was equipped with recoilless rifles, medium mortars and heavy machine-guns. Local Forces included D445 Provincial Mobile Battalion, a provincial unit normally operating in the south of the province and in Long Khánh, while guerrilla forces included two companies in the Chau Duc district, one in Long Dat and a platoon in Xuyên Mộc; in total around 4,500 men.
Despite the optimistic Australian assessments of Việt Cộng capability, rather than having left Phước Tuy the communists were more likely reinforcing and consolidating in preparation for future operations, avoiding battle with the Australians in order to preserve their strength. Regardless, D445 Battalion had suffered heavy casualties and posed a diminished threat, while the headquarters of the Việt Cộng 5th Division was located near the northern border, west of the Mây Tào mountains, with its fighting formations widely dispersed. The Việt Cộng 275th Regiment was reported to have moved north to War Zone D for retraining and refitting, and the Việt Cộng 274th Regiment had moved from its scattered locations in the north-west Hát Dịch to replace it in the north-east of the province, and was now operating in unfamiliar terrain. Meanwhile, casualties, illness and poor local recruitment meant they were now largely reliant on reinforcements from North Vietnam. Unsure of the next move, the Việt Cộng 5th Division adopted a cautious posture, with only the 1st Battalion, 275th Regiment remaining in the Mây Tào mountains while the 274th Regiment dispersed east of Route 2 for the remainder of the month.
Planning and preliminary operations
The province now seemed secure and Graham saw the opportunity to continue pacification on a more methodical basis in Phước Tuy. Planning to attack the remaining Việt Cộng where they were most vulnerable, the Australians returned to interdicting communist supply lines and bases, with 2 RAR conducting two search and destroy operations to the east of Đất Đỏ—Operation Cairns in late-July followed by Operation Atherton in mid-August, both of which resulted in only minor contact. Meanwhile, the Hát Dịch area had been quiet since US forces had swept of the area as part of Operation Akron (9–29 June), and Australian intelligence assessed that it was free of Việt Cộng main force combat units. By late-July communist rear services units and other supporting units were believed to have begun moving back into the area, in an attempt to rehabilitate their base areas that had been destroyed in the earlier fighting. Yet in reality the location of communist forces was largely unknown to the Australians. In mid-July, the Việt Cộng 274th Regiment—now believed to be commanded by Ut Thoi—had been forced to move from the Hát Dịch towards its north-eastern base areas due to Operation Paddington and Australian signals intelligence had been able to effectively track the regiment's movement due to the location of its transmitter. However, 1 ATF intelligence officers had then lost track of the unit.
Operation Ballarat was subsequently planned to assess the extent of the Việt Cộng's efforts to re-establish their supply lines and to repair bunkers and camps in the eastern Hát Dịch that had been destroyed by previous operations. The concept of operations envisioned 7 RAR, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Eric Smith, creating a series of company patrol bases, from which platoon fighting patrols would gather intelligence on Việt Cộng activities. An ambush plan would then be developed. The twelve-day battalion search and destroy operation subsequently commenced on 4 August 1967, within AO Lion, 9 kilometres (5.6 mi) north-west of Núi Đất. In an attempt to achieve surprise the rifle companies moved into their respective areas of operation by foot, rather than by helicopter, carrying five days rations and supplies to reduce the need for resupply and the likelihood of detection by the Việt Cộng. With stealth considered key to the operation it was intended that any bunkers and camps located during the patrol phase of the operation would not be destroyed until after the ambush phase. Regardless, the Australians expected only to encounter rear guard elements.
Fire Support Base Giraffe was subsequently established with the new 105-millimetre (4.1 in) M2A2 Howitzers of 106th Field Battery and 81-millimetre (3.2 in) mortars from Mortar Platoon, 7 RAR providing indirect fire support, while elements of the Australian Reinforcement Holding Unit provided protection. Further support was provide by 155-millimetre (6.1 in) M109 self-propelled medium guns from the US 2/35th Artillery Regiment, while American 8-inch (200 mm) and 175-millimetre (6.9 in) heavy artillery were also available if required. Meanwhile, elements of 1st Field Squadron, Royal Australian Engineers had been tasked with clearing Route 2 of vegetation and rubber north of Núi Đất and D Company, 2 RAR was attached for the operation, providing security for the engineers and additional protection to the fire support base in conjunction with a troop of M113 armoured personnel carriers from A Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment which would support the infantry during the day.
Battle
Insertion and patrolling, 5–6 August
A Company, 7 RAR had already been patrolling in the Hát Dịch since 3 August when the orders for the operation were issued. Utilising an insertion technique perfected by the Special Air Service Regiment they were subsequently re-supplied early on the evening of 5 August, with the supplies successfully unloaded and the helicopters departing within three minutes. The covert infiltration of the infantry companies went undetected, and on the morning of 6 August A Company began to patrol towards the intended site of their initial patrol base. Under the command of Major Ewart O'Donnell, by-mid morning the Australians were approximately 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) east of Phu My. At 10:40, moving north-west with 2 Platoon leading, the Australians crossed a creek, the Suối Châu Pha, and shortly afterwards located a fresh track which had only recently been used. O'Donnell ordered the lead platoon into ambush positions astride the track, while he moved forward to conduct a reconnaissance. Minutes later two Việt Cộng sentries walked into the ambush with their weapons slung, and they were killed instantly by a short burst from an M60 machine-gun, likely surprised by the silent insertion of the Australians.