The Battle of Oshakan (Armenian: Օշականի ճակատամարտ) was a battle that took place on 29 August 1827 during the Russo-Persian War (1826–1828) between the army of the heir to the Persian throne Abbas Mirza and the Russian detachment of Lieutenant General Afanasy Krasovsky.
At the beginning of August 1827, the Persian army invaded Eastern Armenia, and, joining with the troops of sardar Husayn Khan Qajar of the Erivan Khanate, besieged the Etchmiadzin Monastery. The Russian military detachment of General Krasovsky, which was located 35 versts from Etchmiadzin, along with Armenian and Georgian volunteers who joined him, set out to aid the besieged monastery and, despite the tenfold numerical superiority of the Persian army, managed to break through the enemy's blocking lines, after which the siege was lifted that same night. During the battle, the Russian detachment suffered heavy losses. This was the greatest damage to the Russian army in all wars with Persia.
The most valuable information about the battle was left by its direct participants: the detachment commander A. Krasovsky, Captain M. Sobolev and the Decembrist Yevdokim Lachinov.
The course of the battle was greatly influenced by the heat that prevailed that day and the lack of water sources along the route of the Russian detachment. The detachment's actions were significantly constrained by the supply train with provisions. The columns moved under dense artillery and rifle fire from the enemy. While the Russian vanguard "cleared the way with bayonets," the rearguard repelled attacks by the Persians from the rear. The enemy, occupying an advantageous position, inflicted flanking strikes on the Russian detachment. The successful passage of Krasovsky's detachment was also facilitated by the competent actions of the Russian artillery, which occupied the most advantageous heights, and the guns, under the cover of riflemen, restrained the enemy's attacks as much as possible. The ferocity of the Iranians reached the point that, despite heavy losses from canister shot and rifle fire, they broke into the ranks of the Russian infantry, which repelled the enemy back with bayonets.
Significant assistance and support to the Russian army was provided by the local Armenian population and Armenian volunteers.
In 1833–1834, at the initiative of the Catholicos of All Armenians Ep'rem I Zoragetts'i and Archbishop Nerses Ashtaraketsi, with funds from the monastery and local residents, a commemorative obelisk was erected in honor of the battle.
On 19 April 2011, the solemn opening of the Oshakan Memorial Complex To the Russian Warrior-Saviors of the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin, Fallen in the Battle of Oshakan in 1827 took place.
This battle with Battle of Sultanabad the greatest victories of Qajar iran in war with empire of russia
Background
Lifting of the Erivan siege
On 15 June 1827, the 20th Infantry Division under the command of General Krasovsky arrived for the siege of Erivan. The summer of 1827 was extremely hot and dry. Temperatures reached 43 °R (53.7 °C) in the sun and 33 °R (41.2 °C) in the shade. The local climate contributed to the spread of mass diseases among soldiers who had recently arrived from Russia. Fevers and the outbreak of a dysentery epidemic left less than 4,000 combatants in the 20th Division fit for duty. Thus, in August, the commander of the Caucasus Corps, adjutant general I. F. Paskevich, describing the general situation in the Russian army in the Caucasus, reported to Nicholas I that the heat continued, there was no forage, the horses were exhausted, and 1/3 of the troops were in hospitals. In regiments with 1,800 men according to the establishment, about 1,000 remained in the ranks (with the exception of the guard, in which the number of sick was no more than 200, and 900 remained under arms). It was decided to lift the siege of Erivan and retreat to the mountains before the onset of autumn. Another reason was that the transport with provisions and siege guns was not expected until August.
On the night of 21 June the division withdrew from the siege positions and retreated to the Etchmiadzin Monastery. A hospital for sick soldiers was set up in the monastery. One field gun was installed on each of the three monastery towers. On 24 June up to 2,000 soldiers began procuring provisions.
Having supplied the monastery with a sufficient amount of provisions, Krasovsky on 30 June with his corps headed to the Bash-Abaran heights and encamped at the Dzhenguli tract. In the monastery remained a battalion of the Sevastopol Infantry Regiment (up to 500 bayonets), 5 guns, a mounted hundred from the Armenian volunteer detachment, which had asked Krasovsky for permission to stay to defend the monastery, and 700 sick soldiers.
Siege of the Etchmiadzin Monastery
The Erivan sardar Husayn Khan, learning that only battalion of the Sevastopol Regiment was in the Etchmiadzin Monastery, attempted to capture the monastery, and on 3 July, 4,000 cavalry (according to other sources, 500) and two battalions of sarbazes (2,000 men) with two (according to other sources, three) guns left Erivan and besieged the monastery the next day. On the slopes of Mount Aragats, opposite the Russian camp, a detachment of Karapapakh cavalry of 1,000 men under the leadership of Nagi Khan was positioned to monitor the actions of Krasovsky's corps.
The commandant of the Etchmiadzin garrison at that time was an elderly staff officer of the 20th Artillery Brigade — Lieutenant Colonel Lindenfeld. The sardar sent him a letter assuring the commandant that Paskevich with the main forces had retreated from Nakhichevan to Georgia and no help could be expected for the Etchmiadzin garrison, offering the latter to leave the monastery. For his part, Husayn Khan guaranteed safe passage for the garrison in any direction, vouching for its safety. Otherwise, the monastery would be taken by force, and then no one would be spared.
The response to the letter was a cannon shot from the monastery tower. Husayn Khan was forced to move the troops to a safe distance and, surrounding the monastery, blocked all communication routes. However, on 5 July, several local Armenians still managed to reach the Russian camp at Dzhenguli and inform Krasovsky of the besieged state of the monastery. Krasovsky immediately dispatched two battalions with four guns toward Etchmiadzin. The Karapapakh detachment informed Husayn Khan of the Russian movement, and the sardar, lifting the blockade, retreated to Sardarabad and then withdrew to Erivan.
The Persian Army's invasion
Reconnaissance
The Persian command used spies and scouts, mainly among the local population — Armenians, Tatars, and Persians. Usually these were sutlers, trading in the Russian camp. Krasovsky, to obtain information about the enemy, more often had to conduct reconnaissances and cavalry scouts.
The reason for the weaker intelligence network of the Russian command was the executions and cruel tortures by the Iranians of Russian spies or scouts, while detected Iranian spies were flogged and, after being held under guard for some time, released, after which the latter could continue their craft.
In Etchmiadzin, Nerses Ashtaraketsi established a system for collecting information about the enemy. Scouts were sent from him to Erivan and Sardarabad. Reports to the commander-in-chief were duplicated. An Armenian, Kaziyar Arutyunov, was engaged in reconnaissance of enemy movements. Krasovsky was passed valuable information by the nephew of Archbishop Ashtaraketsi — Pedros Markarov. The latter reported on 6 August about the invasion of Persian troops. The same news was confirmed the next day by the arriving from the Persian camp Armenian elder melik Saak Agamalyan, who commanded the Armenian infantry of the Erivan sardar Husayn Khan.
Information about the enemy in the Russian headquarters sometimes had a contradictory character. When Krasovsky sent a report to Paskevich in the main camp at Kara-Baba about the concentration of large Persian forces near his camp, Paskevich replied that, according to the information he had, a mutiny had occurred in the Persian army, and Abbas Mirza himself had been arrested and was under guard in Chors. Krasovsky later wrote:
Such contradictory to the truth information served as clear proof that at corps headquarters they did not know at all that Abbas Mirza with his main forces was opposite me in the Erivan province, which is why I had to be convinced that there was no way I could expect reinforcements.
— — from "Diary of General Krasovsky 1826–1828" dated 13 August
Invasion
Having gathered all the necessary information about the Russians, Husayn Khan sent a letter to Abbas Mirza, in which he wrote that Erivan had been freed from the blockade; the Russians, leaving many sick and a small garrison in the Etchmiadzin Monastery, had retreated to the mountains; Krasovsky's detachment was small and consisted of young and inexperienced soldiers there was nothing easier than to capture Etchmiadzin now, recapture the siege artillery still moving in the Bazum Mountains and, destroying Krasovsky, open the road to Georgia.
On 4 August, the army of Abbas Mirza (15,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry with 22 guns), crossing the Araks near Sardarabad, invaded the Erivan Khanate, and on 8 August, occupied the village of Ashtarak, located between Etchmiadzin and the Russian camp at Dzhenguli. Convinced of the impregnability of the Russian positions on the Bash-Abaran heights, Abbas Mirza withdrew his troops to Oshakan and encamped.
Purpose of the invasion
It was planned to capture the Etchmiadzin Monastery, then by a flanking march through Gyumri to invade Georgia and raze Tiflis to the ground, after which—through Elisavetpol and the Karabakh province via the Hudafarin Bridge or through the Aslanduz ford to cross the Araks and return to Azerbaijan.
With the appearance of the Persian army in the rear of the main Russian forces, Paskevich would have been forced to abandon the campaign against Tabriz. Krasovsky assessed Abbas Mirza's actions as follows:
...he [Abbas Mirza] could easily have carried out [his plans], without encountering anywhere more than one battalion for defense, within 10-15 days, and then all our troops located in the main forces at Kara-Baba, at Dzhenguli, and generally in the Erivan and Nakhichevan provinces, would necessarily have had to, suffering disaster without provisions, return to Georgia and seek it there for their salvation.
— — from "Diary of General Krasovsky 1826–1828"
However, Abbas Mirza's plans became known to the Tiflis military governor adjutant general N. M. Sipyagin, who immediately transferred two companies of the 41st Jaeger Regiment from Tsalka to Bashkychet, and to Gyumri were transferred a company of the Tiflis Infantry Regiment with two guns and a battalion of the Sevastopol Infantry Regiment from Gen. Krasovsky's corps.
First encounters
In the morning of 10 August, 2000 Persian cavalry appeared in front of the Russian camp on the side of the Abanani River. The Cossack outpost pickets, maneuvering, grouped up to fifty men and fired until reinforcements arrived. Two Cossack hundreds and two infantry battalions with two guns were sent to help. With the arrival of reinforcements, the Cossacks, supported by infantry, counterattacked and drove back the Persian cavalry. In the battle, the chorunzhiy (second lieutenant) Kryukov was wounded in the leg by a saber.
On the night of 13 August, Persian cavalry approached the Russian camp from several sides through hidden gorges and at dawn suddenly attacked the Cossack outposts. However, the Cossacks managed to hold out until the infantry arrived, after which the Iranians were repulsed from all directions. At that time, Krasovsky with General P. Kh. Truzson and 50 Cossacks was conducting a reconnaissance along the Etchmiadzin road. Fearing for the detachment commander, an infantry battalion with one gun moved from the camp toward him. In the gorge of Mount Karni-Yarykh, Truzson with five Cossacks, who were ahead of the reconnaissance detachment, noticed an ambush from afar and stopped. A Cossack patrol went to that place daily to obtain information by telegraph about the situation in the Etchmiadzin Monastery. About 500 Persian horsemen, realizing they had been detected, rushed in pursuit of the detachment, but after a few versts saw the approaching battalion of Russian infantry and turned back.
The same day, from Krasovsky's camp, the movement of large Iranian forces toward Sudagent was noticed, from where at that very time the Tiflis military governor Sipyagin was to arrive from the main camp at Kara-Baba on Paskevich's orders. Krasovsky immediately set out in that direction with two infantry battalions and four guns to help Sipyagin. On the Sudagent road, the latter was indeed attacked by Persian cavalry, but the battalion of the Sevastopol Regiment sent the day before to meet the governor managed to repel all enemy attacks.
Up to 4,000 Persian cavalry appeared between Mount Aragats and the Russian camp. Krasovsky moved against them with two infantry battalions, up to 50 men of Borchal cavalry, two guns with Cossacks, and a detachment of Congreve rockets. In his dispatch, Krasovsky noted the successful action of the latter. Up to 20 Congreve rockets were fired, "which dispersed the enemy crowds". The battalion of the 40th Jaeger Regiment, reinforced by Sevastopol men, "pressed him until night".
Siege of the Etchmiadzin Monastery
On 15 August, a part of the Persian army—under the command of Yusuf Khan (Yusup Khan), Zograb Khan and Topchiba — besieged the Etchmiadzin.
On the proposal of Yusuf Khan to surrender the monastery, the commandant replied: "I will not surrender". Then Yusuf Khan tried to persuade Lindenfeld to enter the shah's service, promising all possible privileges. The Persian dignitaries were not stingy with promises. Lindenfeld replied:
"Russians do not trade themselves, and if the monastery is needed by the Persians, then let them enter it as honest warriors, with weapons in hand".
Yusuf Khan sent a letter to Archbishop Nerses with the following content:
"If you do not voluntarily open the gates, then I will surround the monastery with all the artillery, cannons, mortars—and raze it to the ground. Then, Nerses, the sin will lie on your soul".
Nerses gave the following response:
"The abode is strong with the protection of God, try to take it...".