The Battle of Heligoland Bight was the first Anglo-German naval battle of the First World War, fought on 28 August 1914, between ships of the United Kingdom and Germany. The battle took place in the south-eastern North Sea, when the British attacked German patrols off the north-west German coast. The German High Seas Fleet was in harbour on the north German coast while the British Grand Fleet was out in the northern North Sea. Both sides engaged in long-distance sorties with cruisers and battlecruisers, with close reconnaissance of the area of sea near the German coast—the Heligoland Bight—by destroyer.
The British devised a plan to ambush German destroyers on their daily patrols. A British flotilla of 31 destroyers and two cruisers under Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt, with submarines commanded by Commodore Roger Keyes, was dispatched. They were supported at longer range by an additional six light cruisers commanded by William Goodenough and five battlecruisers commanded by Vice Admiral David Beatty.
Surprised, outnumbered and outgunned, the German fleet suffered 712 sailors killed, 530 injured and 336 taken prisoner; three German light cruisers (SMS Ariadne, Cöln and Mainz) and one torpedo boat (SMS V187) were sunk; three more light cruisers (SMS Strassburg, Stettin and Frauenlob) and three torpedo boats suffered damage. The British suffered casualties of 35 killed and 55 wounded; one light cruiser and three destroyers suffered damage. Despite the disparity of the ships involved in the battle, the battle was regarded as a great victory in Britain, where the returning ships were met by cheering crowds.
Beatty was vaunted a hero, although he had taken little part in the action or planning of the raid, which was led by Commodore Tyrwhitt and conceived by him and Keyes, who had persuaded the Admiralty to adopt it. The raid might have led to disaster, had the additional forces under Beatty not been sent by Admiral John Jellicoe at the last minute. The German government, the Kaiser in particular, restricted the freedom of action of the German fleet, instructing it to avoid contact with superior forces for several months thereafter.
Prelude
The battle took place less than a month after the British declaration of war against Germany on 5 August 1914. The war on land led to defeat for the French and their Allies at the Battle of the Frontiers, the German invasion of Belgium and France. British naval tactics had typically involved a close blockade of ports and this had been the British plan for war against Germany up to 1913. The Admiralty had realised that the advent of submarines armed with torpedoes and mines meant that operations involving capital ships near an opponent's ports would place them at great risk of surprise attack. Ships would be obliged to keep moving and return to port every few days to refuel.
The German navy had expected that Britain would adopt its traditional approach and had invested in submarines and coast defences. The main body of the German navy—the High Seas Fleet (HSF)—was outnumbered by the British Grand Fleet stationed around home waters and could not expect victory in a general fleet engagement. The HSF adopted a strategy of waiting in defended home ports for opportunities to attack parts of the larger British force. The British adopted a strategy of distant blockade, patrolling the North Sea rather than waters close to Germany. The Germans had two alternatives to break out into the Atlantic Ocean, either by passing through the 20 mi (17 nmi; 32 km)-wide Straits of Dover, defended by British submarines, mine barrages and a large number of older and smaller warships or exit the northern end of the North Sea, running the gauntlet of the Grand Fleet based at Scapa Flow in Orkney and the 200 mi (170 nmi; 320 km)-wide narrow point between Britain and Norway. Without access to the Atlantic, the German ships were contained in an area where they could not attack Allied merchant shipping. To keep the HSF in harbour, the Grand Fleet made occasional forays and patrolled with smaller cruiser and battlecruiser squadrons.
The bulk of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was transported to France between 12 and 21 August, protected by British destroyers and submarines patrolling Heligoland Bight, which German ships would have to cross if they sortied from their bases. The Grand Fleet remained on patrol in the centre of the North Sea ready to move south but no attack came. The German army had anticipated a rapid transfer of the British army to France, German naval planners overestimated the time the British would need and German submarines were on patrol seeking the Home Fleet.
British plan
At Harwich, Commodore Roger Keyes commanded a squadron of long-range submarines that regularly patrolled the Heligoland Bight and Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt commanded a destroyer patrol. They observed that German destroyers had adopted a regular pattern of patrols where each evening cruisers would escort destroyers out of harbour to patrol for British ships during the night before being met and escorted home each morning. Keyes and Tyrwhitt proposed to send a superior force during darkness to ambush the German destroyers as they returned. Three British submarines would surface in a position to draw the destroyers back out to sea while a larger British force of 31 destroyers accompanied by nine submarines would cut them off from Germany. Other submarines would wait for any larger German ships leaving the Jade estuary to help.
Keyes impressed Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty with the daring of his plan, which was adopted with some changes. An attack at 08:00 on the German daytime patrol was preferred. Keyes and Tyrwhitt requested support for their operation, in particular bringing the Grand Fleet south and the support of the squadron of six light cruisers commanded by Commodore William Goodenough. This was refused by the Chief of Staff, Vice Admiral Doveton Sturdee, who instead agreed to place only lighter forces consisting of Cruiser Force K (Rear Admiral Gordon Moore) with the battlecruisers HMS New Zealand and Invincible 40 mi (35 nmi; 64 km) to the north-west and Cruiser Force C comprising the Cressy-class armoured cruisers, HMS Cressy, Aboukir, Bacchante, Hogue and Euryalus, 100 mi (87 nmi; 160 km) west.
The attack was planned for 28 August; the submarines were to sail on 26 August, while Keyes would travel on the destroyer Lurcher and the surface ships would depart at dawn on 27 August. Tyrwhitt, aboard the brand new light cruiser HMS Arethusa, would command the 3rd Flotilla of 16 modern Laforey-class destroyers, whilst his subordinate, Captain William Blunt, aboard the light cruiser HMS Fearless, would command the 1st Destroyer Flotilla of 16 older destroyers. Tyrwhitt had requested the replacement of his cruiser HMS Amethyst because she was too slow to keep up with his destroyers but Arethusa did not arrive until 26 August. Her crew was inexperienced and it was discovered that its new 4 in (102 mm) Mk V guns jammed when fired.
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, commanding the Grand Fleet, was not told of the plan until 26 August. Jellicoe immediately requested permission to send reinforcements to join the raid and to move the fleet closer to the action but was allowed only to send battlecruisers in support. Jellicoe dispatched Vice Admiral David Beatty with the battlecruisers HMS Lion, Queen Mary and Princess Royal; Goodenough, with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, comprising the light cruisers HMS Southampton, Birmingham, Falmouth, Liverpool, Lowestoft and Nottingham. Jellicoe sailed south from Scapa Flow with the remainder of the fleet. Jellicoe sent a message advising Tyrwhitt that he should expect reinforcements but the signal was delayed at Harwich and never received. Tyrwhitt did not discover the additional forces until Goodenough's ships appeared through the mist, leading to a certain apprehension because he was expecting to meet only German vessels. The E-class submarines HMS E4, E5 and E9 were ordered to attack reinforcing or retreating German vessels. HMS E6, E7 and E8 were positioned 4 mi (3.5 nmi; 6.4 km) further out to draw the German destroyers out to sea. HMS D2 and D8 were stationed off the river Ems to attack reinforcements should they come from that direction.
Battle
At around 07:00, Arethusa, steaming south towards the anticipated position of the German ships, sighted a German torpedo boat, G194. Accompanying Arethusa were the 16 destroyers of the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla. 2 mi (1.7 nmi; 3.2 km) behind were Fearless with the 1st Destroyer Flotilla of 16 destroyers and 8 mi (7.0 nmi; 13 km) behind them was Goodenough with the six cruisers; visibility was no more than 3 mi (2.6 nmi; 4.8 km). G194 immediately turned towards Heligoland, sending wireless reports Rear Admiral Leberecht Maass, commander of the German destroyer squadron. Maass informed Rear Admiral Franz von Hipper, responsible for local defence and commander of the German battlecruiser squadron. Hipper was unaware of the scale of the attack but ordered the light cruisers SMS Stettin and Frauenlob to defend the destroyers. The light cruisers SMS Mainz moored on the Ems, SMS Strassburg, Cöln, Ariadne, Stralsund and Kolberg from the river Jade, Danzig and München from Brunsbüttelkoog on the river Elbe were ordered to raise steam.
Tyrwhitt ordered four destroyers to attack G194 and the sound of gunfire alerted the remaining German destroyers moving north, that turned south towards home. Before they could complete the turn, they were sighted by British destroyers which commenced firing. The trailing destroyer V1 was hit, followed by the destroyer-minesweepers D8 and T33. G9 called for fire against the attacking ships from coastal artillery but the mist meant the gunners could not tell which ships were which. At 07:26, Tyrwhitt turned east, to follow the sound of gunfire sighting ten German destroyers, which he chased through the increasing mist for 30 minutes, until the ships reached Heligoland and he was forced to turn away. At 07:58, Stettin and Frauenlob arrived, reversing the situation so that the British destroyers were obliged to retreat towards Arethusa and Fearless. Stettin withdrew, since the German destroyers had escaped but Frauenlob was engaged by Arethusa. Arethusa was better armed but two of its four 4 in (102 mm) guns jammed and another was damaged by fire. Frauenlob — armed with ten 10.5 cm (4.1 in) guns — caused considerable damage before a shell from one of Arethusa's two 6 in (152 mm) guns destroyed her bridge, killing 37 men including the captain, forcing her to withdraw and return to Wilhelmshaven badly damaged.
At 08:12, Tyrwhitt returned to the original plan to sweep the area from east to west. Six returning German destroyers were sighted which turned to flee, when V187 turned back. The German ship had seen two cruisers, Nottingham and Lowestoft from Goodenough's squadron ahead and tried to pass through the British destroyers by surprise, only to be surrounded by eight destroyers and sunk. As British ships began to rescue survivors from the water, the German light cruiser Stettin approached and opened fire, forcing the British to abandon the rescue, leaving behind British sailors. The British submarine E4 had observed the action and launched a torpedo at Stettin but missed; Stettin attempted to ram the submarine, which dived to escape. When E4 resurfaced the larger ships had gone and the submarine rescued the British crewmen afloat in small boats with the German survivors. The Germans were left behind with a compass and direction toward the mainland as the submarine was too small to take them.
Confusion of ships
At 08:15, Keyes—with Lurcher and another destroyer—sighted two four-funnelled cruisers. Still unaware that additional British ships were involved, he signalled Invincible that he was chasing two German cruisers. Goodenough received the signal, abandoned his search for enemy vessels to attack and steamed to assist Keyes against his own ships, Lowestoft and Nottingham. Keyes, being chased by four more German cruisers, attempted to lure them towards Invincible and New Zealand, reporting them as enemy ships. Eventually, Keyes recognised Southampton and the ships attempted to rejoin Tyrwhitt. The British submarines were still unaware that the other ships were present and at 09:30, a British submarine fired two torpedoes at Southampton; the submarine missed and then escaped when Southampton tried to ram it. Lowestoft and Nottingham remained out of communication range; separated from the rest of their squadron, they took no further part in the action. Tyrwhitt turned to assist Keyes, on receipt of the signal that he was being chased, sighted Stettin but lost her in the mist before coming upon Fearless and her destroyer squadron. Arethusa was badly damaged and at 10:17 Fearless came alongside and both cruisers were stopped for twenty minutes while repairs were made to the boilers.
German cruisers
Cöln, Strassburg and Ariadne had sailed from Wilhelmshaven to join the German ships, while Mainz was approaching from a different direction. Admiral Maass was still unaware of the nature of the attack and dispersed his ships in search of the enemy. Strassburg was first to find Arethusa and attacked with shells and torpedoes but was driven off by torpedo attacks from the destroyers. As Tyrwhitt turned away to the west, Cöln—with Admiral Maass—approached from the south-east and was also chased away by torpedoes. Tyrwhitt signalled Beatty requesting reinforcements and Goodenough with the four cruisers remaining with him came to assist; the force turned west.