The Battle of Hat Dich (3 December 1968 − 19 February 1969) was a series of military actions fought between an allied contingent, including the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) and the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and Viet Cong (VC) during the Vietnam War. Under the code name Operation Goodwood, two battalions from 1 ATF deployed away from their base in Phước Tuy Province, operating against suspected PAVN/VC bases in the Hat Dich area, in western Phước Tuy, south-eastern Biên Hòa and south-western Long Khánh provinces as part of a large allied sweep known as Operation Toan Thang II. The Australians and New Zealanders conducted sustained patrolling throughout the Hat Dich and extensively ambushed tracks and river systems in the Rung Sat Special Zone, occupying a series of fire support bases as operations expanded. Meanwhile, American, South Vietnamese and Thai forces also operated in direct support of the Australians as part of the division-sized action.
On 6 February 1969, two additional battalions from the Thủ Đức VC Regiment were reported to have entered the Hat Dich area and 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) which consisted of three Australian and two New Zealand companies, was subsequently redeployed with tanks and armoured personnel carriers in support, resulting in the heaviest contacts of the operation. The fighting lasted 78 days and was one of the longest out of province operations mounted by the Australians and New Zealanders during the war. Although there were few major actions, the fighting resulted in heavy PAVN/VC casualties and forced them to abandon their permanent bases in the Hat Dich, as well as disrupting their preparations for an upcoming offensive during Tết. Immediately following the operation, the ANZACs were redeployed to block the approaches towards key US and South Vietnamese bases in Biên Hòa, Long Binh and Saigon in anticipation of the 1969 Tet offensive, during Operation Federal.
Background
1968 was a turning point in the war in Vietnam. Losing more than 45,000 killed—against Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and allied losses of 6,000 men—the Tet Offensive had been a tactical disaster for the PAVN and Viet Cong. Regardless, prior to Tet American commanders and politicians had talked confidently about winning the war, arguing that General William Westmoreland's strategy of attrition had reached the point where the PAVN/VC were losing soldiers and equipment faster than they could be replaced. Yet the scale of the fighting, and the surprise and violence with which the offensive was launched, had shocked the public, contradicting such predictions of imminent victory. Confidence in the military and political leadership declined, as did public support for the war in America. Ultimately, Tet was a publicity and media triumph for the PAVN/VC, and Hanoi emerged with a significant political victory.
The offensive had a similar effect on Australian public opinion, and caused growing uncertainty in the government about the determination of the United States to remain militarily involved in Southeast Asia. Amid the initial shock, Prime Minister John Gorton unexpectedly declared that Australia would not increase its military commitment in Vietnam beyond the current level of 8,000 personnel. The war continued without respite however, and between May and June 1968 1 ATF was again deployed away from Phước Tuy in response to intelligence reports of another impending offensive. The Australians subsequently took up positions north-east of Saigon during Operation Toan Thang I to interdict PAVN/VC lines of communication, fighting a series of significant actions over a 26-day period that became known as the Battle of Coral–Balmoral.
On 10 June 1968, General Creighton Abrams had replaced Westmoreland as commander of US and Free World Military Assistance Forces in Vietnam and the change in command had resulted in a change in both the concept of the war and its conduct. Abrams directed that the allied main effort would switch to protecting population centres, rather than searching for and attempting to destroy PAVN/VC main force units as they had done previously. Equally, the prosecution of the war would increasingly be handed over to the South Vietnamese under a policy of Vietnamization, with the Americans aiming to keep PAVN/VC units off balance to prevent them from interfering with resupply and reinforcement until the South Vietnamese could fight the war on their own. For the Australians the change in allied strategy foreshadowed a return to the pacification of Phước Tuy Province. Operations outside the province over the previous eighteen months had been costly, and of the 228 Australians killed and 1,200 wounded during the war to that point almost two-thirds had been killed since January 1967.
From July, 1 ATF completed a number of search-and-clear operations along the northern border areas and west of their tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) in Phước Tuy province. From the Nui Thi Vai and Nui Dinh hills in the west of the Phước Tuy, thick jungle stretched north to the junction of Biên Hòa and Long Khánh provinces, in an area known as the Hat Dich. Like the May Tao Mountains in the north-east and the Long Hải hills in the south, these areas of mountains and jungle had been used extensively by the VC as base areas for many years. The Hat Dich was used by the VC because of its proximity to Saigon, as well as the important South Vietnamese and US base areas in the Long Binh−Biên Hòa complex. The VC had been using the northern border regions—including the Thua Tich and Courtenay Rubber Plantation—to link their base areas in the Mây Tào Mountains in the north-east with the sparsely populated, but heavily vegetated Hat Dich area in the west. Over time, Australian operations in these areas usually resulted in contacts with varying size groups, including VC Main Force and occasionally PAVN units, and ultimately led to the destruction of their transit and training camps, as well as a series of bunker systems and logistic storage facilities.
Prelude
By late-1968 a significant build-up of PAVN/VC forces was occurring in the III Corps Tactical Zone, with 70 Main and Local Force battalions augmented by four divisions moving back from sanctuaries in Cambodia. Meanwhile, the PAVN had established a new unit, Headquarters Military Region 7, to co-ordinate operations in the area to the east and north-east of Saigon. This development, coupled with extensive troop movements in the Hat Dich, indicated to the South Vietnamese and their allies the possibility of an imminent offensive, possibly targeting Biên Hòa, Long Binh, Bearcat Base or even Saigon. Commander US II Field Force Vietnam (IIFFV) subsequently committed 1 ATF—by then commanded by Brigadier Sandy Pearson—to operations in the Hat Dich as part of a large allied sweep across Phước Tuy, Biên Hòa and Long Khánh Provinces known as Operation Toan Thang II. The Australians would be tasked with locating and destroying PAVN/VC elements to disrupt such an offensive and prevent Route 15 from being interdicted. To achieve this Pearson devised Operation Goodwood, planning to employ all three of his Australian battalions, supported by tanks, cavalry and artillery. Several American infantry and artillery units were also placed under his command, as were a number of South Vietnamese infantry and marine battalions. In total the allied force approached the size of a division and included nearly 10,000 men.
In early December 1968 the first Australian units were inserted into their new area of operations (AO)—known as AO Townsville—east of Saigon, halfway between Biên Hòa and Nui Dat, 30 kilometres (19 mi) to the south-east. Initially the force consisted of one infantry battalion—1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Bennett—and support arms including Centurion tanks from C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, M113 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) from A Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, 105 mm M2A2 Howitzers from the batteries of 12th Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery and 155 mm M109 self-propelled artillery from A Battery, US 2/35 Artillery Regiment and C Battery, US 2/40 Artillery Regiment, as well as engineers from 1 Field Squadron. Later, following an extension of the AO a second battalion—at first the joint New Zealand and Australian 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) and later 9 RAR—would be deployed. It was planned to rotate the infantry battalions throughout the operation, with 1 ATF intending to maintain two battalions on Operation Goodwood at all times. The concept of operations divided AO Townsville into a number of battalion sized TAORs. Headquarters 1 ATF would be inserted into fire support base (FSB) Julia, situated north of the village of Thai Thein on Route QL 14 in Biên Hòa Province, while 1 RAR would be inserted from Nui Dat into FSB Dyke. The Australians then planned to conduct a reconnaissance-in-force, with extensive patrolling and ambushing by the infantry battalions supported by tanks and APCs, along with fire support from the field artillery batteries that would occupy a series of fire support bases as operations expanded. A number of SAS patrols were also scheduled to be inserted by air and APC to provide information on troop movements. The Royal Thai Army Expeditionary Division would also operate to the north-west in AO Banglane, while the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment (detached from US 199th Light Infantry Brigade) and two troops from 3rd Battalion, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (3/11 ACR) as well as the ARVN 2nd Airborne Brigade would operate in direct support of 1 ATF until released.
PAVN and VC units identified in AO Townsville included 274th Regiment, PAVN 74 Artillery Regiment, D67 Engineer Battalion, Thủ Đức Regiment, D1, D2 and D6 Sapper Reconnaissance Battalions and D440 and D445 Provincial Mobile Battalions; all under the overall command of Headquarters Military Region 7. Of particular interest to the Australians was 3 Battalion, 274th Regiment, which was, according to intelligence sources, believed to have recently received large numbers of North Vietnamese replacements. The battalion was estimated to include between 250 and 300 men, and was well equipped. Located in the Hat Dich, the battalion was believed to be occupying a number of permanent base camps, complete with numerous trench systems, bunkers and tunnels.
Battle
Initial operations in AO Townsville, 3–10 December 1968
The operation commenced on 3 December with Headquarters 1 ATF moving forward by road into FSB Julia. 1 RAR then deployed into FSB Dyke 6 kilometres (3.7 mi) east in the western Hat Dich, moving in APCs from A Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, along with the tanks from C Squadron, 1 Armoured Regiment and the battalion's direct support battery, the 102nd Field Battery. The insertion was subsequently completed successfully, with the position secured by 11:00. Initially cautious, A Company moved in AO Wondai with 2 Troop of the tank squadron, while B and C Companies followed. Yet with no immediate threat against their position detected, the Australians commenced reconnaissance-in-force operations, with D Company also moving into its assigned area, entrusting the security and defence of FSB Dyke to Support Company. Although signs of VC activity were soon located—including a freshly killed deer—there were no contacts on the first day. Meanwhile, the Thais had also commenced operations in AO Banglane, and the American artillery from A Battery, US 2/35 Artillery Regiment and C Battery, US 2/40 Artillery Regiment had moved by road to occupy FSB Chestnut on the outskirts of Thai Thien in the southern sector of Biên Hòa Province from where they would operate in direct support of 1 ATF.
The following day, 4 December, at 08:30 C Company 1 RAR encountered three small groups of VC, and a platoon attack was launched under the cover of indirect fire, with little result. Meanwhile, a bombed out bunker system was encountered by B Company from 10:00, while other minor contacts developed as the Australians continued to advance, during which they uncovered a cache of rice. At 13:47 9 Platoon C Company was briefly engaged, and during a further reconnaissance of the area the Australians located a VC camp. They subsequently withdrew, calling in an air strike with napalm to destroy the bunkers. C Company returned to the area as dusk approached and was unable to search the area until the following day. At 07:40 on 5 December the Australians assaulted the camp with the tanks, destroying a number of bunkers at point-blank range with their main armament, while the infantry grenaded the pits. Yet once again the VC were found to have fled, leaving behind one dead body from the contact the previous afternoon. The camp was estimated to be adequate for a company-sized force and was found to be untouched by the air strike the previous day, which had fallen too far west. Leaving a small force of infantry and the tanks to destroy the camp, C Company continued and was again engaged at 11:05 by three VC at close range. Pushing on however, the Australians were subsequently fired on from at least five bunkers. Bennett ordered B Company into a blocking position to the north, while the tank troop was pushed up to support C Company which was preparing to conduct a company-attack. At 15:00 the camp was assaulted and it was again found to have been abandoned. Despite locating numerous bunkers, the Australians continued to pursue the VC, however their advance was hampered by the mechanical break-down of one of the Centurions; the vehicle was subsequently recovered to FSB Dyke.