The Battle of Basantar, also known as the Battle of Shakargarh or Battle of Barapind (December 4–16, 1971), was one of the vital battles fought as part of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 in the western sector of India. The Indian troops won a hard-fought battle that secured this area in the Jammu sector. The name Battle of Basantar actually encompasses the entire gamut of battles and skirmishes fought in the Shakargarh sector in the 1971 war.
Location of battle
Basantar river flows in Samba of Jammu and Kashmir. It is a tributary of the Ravi River. This battle took place in the Shakargarh Sector or the Shakargarh Bulge that includes Jarpal and surrounding areas. The bulge was close to (5–15 miles) India's main road link to Jammu and Kashmir. By contrast, the area was not as vital for Pakistan.
Shakargarh was not easily defensible (one analyst called it "a defender's nightmare"). Unlike in other places in Punjab, Shakargarh does not have any serious water obstacles, nor boggy patches, and is relatively flat.
Reasoning behind the battle
As the war began on the eastern front, Pakistan decided to open up the western sector to divert Indian troops from the Eastern front in Bangladesh and prolong the war. Shakargarh bulge was a key strategic area for India as it comprised road links between Jammu and Punjab, India. Therefore, securing the region was crucial for India as Pakistan had a military base nearby in Sialkot and therefore could have easily launched a massive invasion of the Shakargarh region, cutting Jammu and Kashmir from the rest of India. The Indian Army maintained a base at Pathankot, twenty three miles away from Shakargarh and quickly mobilized forces to defend the region. In an attempt to gain advantage through the element of surprise, the Indian Army, though outnumbered, attacked Pakistani positions in Jarpal area, triggering the Battle of Basantar.
Battle plan
According to David R. Higgins, the Order of Battle was -
Pakistan -
- I Corps
- 8th Infantry Division
- 15th Infantry Division
- 8th Armoured Brigade
India-
- I Corps
- 36th Infantry Division (8, 115 Brigades initially)
- 39th Infantry Division
- 54th Infantry Division
- 2 Armoured Brigades
- 2 independent artillery brigades
The battle
The offensive in this sector was launched a few days after war broke out between the two nations. The Indian I Corps moved into the sector to capture the key areas. The 54th Infantry Division under Maj Gen WAG Pinto and 16th Armoured Brigade moved towards the area. As they advanced they were met series of minefields and by stiff Pakistani resistance. A troop of T-55 tanks with trawls, created and trained by Captain JDS Jind, of the 7th Light Cavalry were attached for trawling with 16 (Independent) Armoured Brigade at the outbreak of hostilities on 3 December 1971, during the Indo-Pak war. The entire trawling ahead of 54 Infantry Division, led by 16 (Independent) Armoured Brigade was done by this troop. This allowed the tanks to move ahead before the "all vehicle safe lane was cleared by the Engineers. Thus, while the Indian division was bogged down as the engineers had not cleared all the mines, 2nd Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal of the 17th Poona Horse regiment, in a daring counter-attack, led his three tanks into the minefield area. A fierce tank battle ensued where a Pakistani tank was taken down. After suffering initial setbacks, the 8th Armoured Brigade of the Pakistan Army was called in to help the Pakistani resistance in the area. However, the Indian Army continued the assault and Lt. Arun Khetarpal with his two remaining tanks fought off and destroyed ten tanks before he was killed in action. Following the defeat in the battle, Pakistan launched a massive counter-attack which was planned in five phases:
- Ph I To capture North Portion of Lalial Res forest and beat back any local counter-attack (2145h on 15 Dec 71)
- Ph II to capture Jarpal and Lohal by 0500h 16 dec 71.
- Ph III To Est Bridge H incl area North of Lalial Forest, Jarpal and Lohal on Ni 15/16 Dec 71.
- Ph IV To Break out
After days of intense fighting that saw both sides gaining and losing territory, the battle was turning into a stalemate. However, despite being at a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage, Indian troops made massive gains during the final days of the battle and also repelled the Pakistani thrust. Towards the tail end of the battle, Pakistan Army's Lieutenant Colonel Akram Raja made a frantic attempt to counter-attack the Indian stronghold near Shakargarh by jumping into an old-style cavalry charge with his tanks. Launched in broad daylight in view of the Indian defensive positions which were well secured, the campaign was a disaster. The Indians continued their military thrust deep inside Pakistan and came threateningly close to the Pakistan Army base at Sialkot. Because of being outnumbered by the advancing Indian Army, the Pakistan Army called-in the Pakistan Air Force to repel the Indian attack on the base. Expecting another massive assault by the Indian Army, this time backed by Indian Air Force-support, and in no position to launch any counter-offensive operations in the region, Pakistan offered unconditional surrender which led to ceasefire. India had gained control of more than a thousand square miles before finally settling down to 350 sq mi (910 km2) - 1000 km2 of Pakistan territory that included approximately 500 villages. 1 corps has 6 trawls from 7 cavalry under command of Capt. JDS Jind, that cleared 6 of the 9 attempted lanes, paving way for the Indian tanks to advance ahead.
75 Medium Regiment at the Battle of Basantar
75 Medium Regiment was placed in direct support of 16 (Independent) Armoured Brigade and remained so throughout the operation. The 47 Infantry Brigade and 91 Infantry Brigade along with 17 Horse sped forward towards Basantar. observation post officers of 75 Medium Regiment with these formations and units engaged a large number of active enemy targets including missile, launching bases and RCLs in area Lagwal. A number of direct hits on enemy tanks were scored by the regiment enhancing the morale of troops.
The Battle of Basantar bridgehead was an outstanding example of a well-integrated all arms battle, which turned the flank of a major enemy fortified obstacle and opened the way for Dhamtal and Zafarwal. The battle involved the breaching of minefield across Basantar about 1600 m in depth, establishing a bridgehead across the minefield clearing enemy pockets of resistance and enlarging the bridgehead, inducting troops across the minefield under heavy artillery fire and finally repulsing a number of enemy counterattacks with armour and infantry supported by air. A heavy concentration of accurate artillery fire was provided by the regiment during this battle.
The regiment, in addition to 2 observation post officers each with the forward Squadrons of 4 Horse and 17 Horse respectively, provided an observation post officer with 18 Rajputana Rifles (APC) and one observation post officer each with 47 Infantry Brigade and 91 Infantry Brigade, respectively. The regiment provided intimate medium artillery fire support throughout the battle.
On the morning of 16 December 1971, Captain Satish Chander Sehgal the observation post officer with 17 Horse, who in addition to his duties of observation post officer was performing the duty of the commander of his tank, engaged enemy tanks 200 yards away which were attempting to withdraw behind a smokescreen. He brought down large crumps of medium artillery fire forcing the enemy tanks to withdraw into a forest nearby, he then charged forward and destroyed the enemy tank trying to escape with his tank gun. In the action that pursued, his own tank was hit and caught fire. With utter disregard for his safety, he along with his radio operator, helped to extricate the driver and gunner from the burning tank. While doing so he was hit by enemy machine gun fire and was killed in action.
Thereafter the artillery engagement continued with the remaining forward observers passing corrections to the commanding officer of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel KN Thadani, over the armour net. The intimate artillery fire support provided by the regiment to the advancing armoured squadrons made a significant contribution in immobilizing the enemy, thereby facilitating the advance across the bridgehead. In support of this action the commanding officer of the regiment also planned and coordinated the artillery fire of 54 Artillery Brigade and 41 (Independent) Artillery Brigade.
After the battle, the Commander of 16 (Independent) Armoured Brigade, Brigadier AS Vaidya MVC, came to the gun position of the regiment and told the gunners that he would like to have the Regiment with him again for the next round of battle. It was heartwarming for the gunners to listen to their commander.
75 Medium Regiment in direct support of 16 (Independent) Armoured Brigade
In the event of War, the 75 Medium Regiment was placed in direct support of 16 (Independent) Armoured Brigade and remained so throughout the operation. The regiment was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel KN Thadani, leading the regiment from the front. The regiment moved from its peacetime location to its operational location in area Gagwal.
During the period immediately preceding the war Lieutenant Colonel KN Thadani initiated intensive affiliation training, particularly with armoured squadrons. 10 tanks were allotted to the regiment for the observation post officers (OP officers), and the cavalry officers imparted intensive training to the OP officers in operating the tanks, which later proved to be of major advantage.
- The following OP officers were provided
- Major MS Brar (Battery Commander) OP officer with 'A' Squadron 4 HORSE
- Major A Gopala Krishna (Battery Commander) OP officer with 'A' Squadron 17 HORSE
- Captain Madhu Mahbubani OP officer with 'C' Squadron 4 HORSE
- Captain Satish Chander Sehgal OP officer with 'C' Squadron 17 HORSE
- Captain Mohan Krishnan OP officer with 47 Infantry Brigade (16 DOGRA 3-15 Dec 71) ('C' Company 3 Grenadiers – JARPAL 16-17 Dec 71)
- Captain SV Bhong OP officer with 91 Infantry Brigade (3/1 GR)
- 2/Lieutenant AK Mudgal (Troop Leader 752, then OP officer with 39 Artillery Brigade 9-17 Dec 71)
- One OP officer each with 'B' Squadron 4 HORSE and 'B' Squadron 17 HORSE from 70 Medium Regiment.
- At the Gun Position
- Major BS Sahrawat (2IC)
- Major Tyagarajan (Regiment Medical officer)
- Captain Rajesh Kumar (Adjutant)
- Captain SS Yadav (Survey Officer)
- Captain Sawinder Singh (Quarter Master)
- 2/Lieutenant TN Ram (Gun Position officer, 751)
- 2/Lieutenant Ashok Arora (Gun Position officer, 752)
- 2/Lieutenant AK Mudgal (Troop Leader, 752)
- Subedar Major Mohinder Singh (Administration of troops & Local defences)
- Subedar Narayan Singh (Gun Position officer, 753)
- Subedar Jagan Nath (Troop Leader, 751)
All ranks set about making themselves operationally ready for the task ahead. Ammunition was brought forward to the gun position, gun pits and bunkers dug and local defence coordinated. At the brigade, regiment and battery levels operational conferences/briefings were held and detailed preparations carried out for the on-coming battle. At this stage the OP parties were integrated with respective armoured squadrons/infantry companies.
The pre-emptive strike by the Pakistan air force on the air fields at, Pathankot, Jammu, Srinagar, Adampur and Amritsar on 3 Dec 71 was like a bugle call to the forces in the Samba-Zafarwal sector. The armoured and infantry units moved forward into their battle locations, the radio silence a lull before the storm.
The forces in Samba-Zafarwal sector consisting of 54 Infantry Division with under command 16 (Independent) Armoured Brigade with 75 Medium Regiment in direct support were unleashed on the enemy. The enemy border posts were soon captured and the offensive resumed under cover of artillery fire. The regiment engaged a number of tanks, RCLs, active machine guns and mortar positions considerably facilitating the advance of the armoured and infantry columns.