Axis and Soviet air operations during Operation Barbarossa took place over a six-month period, 22 June – December, 1941. Aviation played a critical role in the fighting on the Eastern Front during this period, in the battles to gain and maintain air superiority or air supremacy, to offer close air support to armies on battlefield, interdicting enemy supply lines, while supplying friendly forces. The Axis air forces were generally better equipped, trained and experienced in executing military tactics and operations. This superiority increased because of the Great Purge in the 1930s and mass expansion of Soviet air forces, which did severe damage to organisational structures.
On the opening day, Axis counter-air operations succeeded in destroying 2,000 Soviet aircraft, and gaining air superiority. The success of the strike enabled the Axis to support their armies in highly successful encirclement battles in July to September 1941. Its transport fleet helped fly in vital supplies to the army when the Russian Winter weather made supply difficult on the ground. In particular, the Luftwaffe played an important role on the defensive, countering the Soviet offensive in December 1941. Despite debilitating losses, Soviet aviation also played a crucial role in stemming the invasion and allowing the Red Army to organise defences; first before Leningrad in July, then in slowing down the occupation of Ukraine, enabling the withdrawal of industries to the Ural Mountains, in Crimea, enabling a long-term stand at Sevastopol, and then during the defence and counter-offensive at Moscow.
In the event, the Axis land and air operations failed to achieve their ultimate goal – the defeat of the Soviet armed forces. When operations ended in December 1941, both sides had suffered heavy losses, unparalleled in the history of air warfare to this point. Some 21,000 Soviet and several thousand Axis aircraft were destroyed. With its factories in the Urals, out of range from Axis medium bombers, Soviet production increased, out-stripping its enemies and enabling the country to replace its aerial losses. The Axis had vastly underestimated Soviet industrial and technical potential. In the following years, Soviet air power recovered from the purges and losses, gradually gaining in tactical and operational competence while closing the technical gap.
Background
By 1941, the Axis powers were in a comfortable position after defeating the Allies in Scandinavia, Western Europe and in the Balkans (leaving the British Empire as the only significant opposition). Axis forces deployed in Europe could only be engaged in the air or at sea, while the North African Campaign was unlikely to threaten its European territories. However, by this point of the war, Germany was in dire need of raw materials and oil resources available in the Soviet Union.
Adolf Hitler predicted this problem and on 18 December 1940 had issued Directive 21. It ordered the beginning of the preparations for Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the USSR. On the other hand, the war with the British was far from concluded and the United States of America were supporting them, while showing an increasingly hostile attitude towards the Axis. A protracted war in the east could be disastrous, so a quick victory was essential.
The plan was to destroy the Soviet Union as a military, political and economic power, by occupying the country up to the A–A line (which fell just short of the Ural Mountains). This would yield vast resources such as oil, rare metals, industrial cities and huge populations which would work for the Third Reich as slave labourers. It would also provide enormous living space (German: Lebensraum) to the Reich and destroy what Hitler perceived to be Communism and Jewish Bolshevism (the main themes for the National Socialists since Hitler's political testament in Mein Kampf, published in 1924). His recently acquired allies (Romania, Slovakia and Finland) were to assist militarily and allow their countries to be used as a base for the German Defence Force (German: Wehrmacht) to launch its offensive.
Although defeated in the Battle of Britain, Germany's Air Force (German: Luftwaffe) played a vital role in the success of the German Army (German: Heer) during the Axis military campaigns against the Western Allies. For Operation Barbarossa, around 65% of the Luftwaffe would be deployed to support the rest of the Wehrmacht in defeating the Soviet Union.
German offensive plan
The German plan for the USSR was to win a quick war, before Soviet superiority in numbers and industry could take effect, and before the Red Army officer corps (decimated by Joseph Stalin's Great Purge in the 1930s) could recover. The method is usually labelled Blitzkrieg, though the concept is controversial and unrelated to any specific German doctrine.
Barbarossa's task was to destroy as much of the Soviet military forces as possible, west of the Dnieper River in Ukraine, in a series of encirclement operations, to prevent a Red Army retreat into the more eastern areas of Russia. There was hope this would be enough to force a collapse of the USSR and then the Wehrmacht could "mop up" the remaining enemy forces beyond the Dniepr.
The Luftwaffe was essential in the kind of operations the Axis' ground forces were going to perform. In the Inter-War period, the Luftwaffe developed its communications, aircraft, training programs, and to an extent its logistics to support mobile operations. Its primary mission was not direct close air support but operational-level interdiction. This entailed attacking enemy logistics, communications and air bases. Air strikes on Soviet war-making potential were forbidden by Hitler. It made little sense to destroy industry that would soon be in Axis hands; the German High Command (German: Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW) did not believe the USSR could transfer its industry to the Ural Mountains. Counter-air operations were considered more important. In order for the Heer and the Luftwaffe's bombers to operate effectively in their roles, the first task of the Axis aviation was to eliminate the Soviet Air Force and deny the enemy the means to interfere with their operations. Once this had been carried out, close air support could be rendered to the ground forces. This had always been a core tenet of Luftwaffe doctrine. Once the A–A line had been reached, the Luftwaffe was to destroy the surviving factories in the Urals.
The Luftwaffe thus began preparations to neutralize the Military Aviation of the Workers' and Peasants Red Army (Russian: Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily Raboche-Krestyanskaya Krasnaya Armiya, VVS-RKKA often abbreviated to VVS). Airborne infantry operations were considered to capture river crossings but the heavy losses during the Battle of Crete consigned the Luftwaffe's paratrooper forces to a reserve role (when deployed, it was usually for special operations).
Strength of the Luftwaffe
Supporting industry
There was no marked increase in German production in the autumn, 1940, in preparation for this major campaign. On 15 October, General Tschersich, the Luftwaffe's chief of procurement, was basing aircraft replacement on the assumption peace with Britain would be secured, and there would be no further military operations until 1 April 1947. Either the procurement officers of the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Air Force High Command or OKL) were unaware of Hitler's intentions, or they did not take him seriously.
Erhard Milch, responsible for production, warned the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German High Command or OKW) that the Soviet Union could not be defeated in 1941. He called for winter preparations and increases in production in the expectation the war in the East, even if successful, would last several years. Joseph Schmid, senior intelligence officer, and Otto Hoffmann von Waldau, Luftwaffe chief of operations, were also opposed to Barbarossa. Schmid still felt the Luftwaffe could defeat Britain by attacking its industries, while Waldau argued that dissipating German air strength along a wide 'air front' was deeply irresponsible. Waldau's continuing realism and non-concealed criticism of the Luftwaffe leadership and its prosecution of the war, led him to being removed from his post in 1942. Milch's skepticism soon became despair. He convinced himself a war in the East would be a disaster, and did everything he could to influence Göring to persuade Hitler not go ahead with Barbarossa. Initially, Göring kept his word, and argued that pursuing a strategy in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, particularly in conjunction with the Regia Marina (Italian Navy) against Gibraltar, while weakening the British hold on the eastern Mediterranean would be the most ideal strategy. Hitler dismissed this. Hitler also dismissed the Kriegsmarine's objections that it was the British and their shipping lanes that was the main enemy.
The battles in the Netherlands, Belgium, France and in the Balkans had inflicted losses the Luftwaffe had not fully replaced. By the conclusion of the Balkans campaign, the strain put on German resources and its effects on production was already showing, even before Barbarossa began. The Germans had only 1,511 bombers available for operations on 21 June 1941, compared with 1,711 on 11 May 1940, two hundred fewer. While overall, the Luftwaffe had remained much the same size, it was arguably weaker in crew quality than it had been in 1939, owing to the losses it had suffered, even in successful campaigns. The failures in production, and the fact that Barbarossa began with an inadequate number of aircraft, would lead to the Luftwaffe being severely depleted by the end of the year, and becoming increasingly ineffective, while consequently the VVS, thought destroyed in the early battles, became increasingly potent by end of 1941. The planning for Barbarossa went ahead, regardless of these failures, and the knowledge that experience in Western Europe had shown that while highly effective, close support operations were costly, and reserves needed to be created to replace losses.
In a document issued by the Department of the Luftwaffe General Staff on 15 November 1940, it was clear that production was barely adequate to maintain current strength, much less expansion of the Luftwaffe. It stated:
[Germany's] own [aircraft] production at best ensures maintenance of the present strength. Expansion is impossible (either in personnel or in material).
The Luftwaffe's production problems in 1941 lay not on the dilettantism of the Nazi leadership, but with a military leadership which did not understand the difficulties in producing modern weapons in large numbers and who evinced little worry about their enemy's capabilities. Udet, who had replaced Milch in technical and production affairs, possessed neither the temperament or technical background to do the job. The Chief of the General Staff, Hans Jeschonnek, displayed little interest in non-operational matters and the requirements of production and planning. Thus operational plans and production plans were not synthesised. In the coming campaigns, with increased commitment of the Luftwaffe, production remained the same. Production had always risen in 1933 to 1937, but thereafter it was allowed to level off, and did not pick up again until 1942. From 1 September 1939 to 15 November 1941, 16 revisions of production and planning were called for and designed, but none were carried through.
The strength of the Luftwaffe amounted to 4,389 aircraft, of which 2,598 were combat types and 1,939 were operational. The inventory amounted to 929 bombers, 793 fighters, 376 dive-bombers, 70 destroyers (Messerschmitt Bf 110s), 102 reconnaissance, and 60 ground attack aircraft, plus 200 fighters in reserve and 60 miscellaneous types. This force was spread across; 31 bomber, eight dive bomber, "one, one-third" ground attack, two twin-engine, and 19 single-engine fighter groups (Gruppen). Around 68 per cent of the German air strength was operational.
Operational capabilities
The Luftwaffe was highly effective at carrying out close support operations, in direct or indirect support of the army and at winning and maintaining air superiority. German doctrine, and experiences in the Spanish Civil War, then Europe, had developed suitable aircraft for the role, such as the Messerschmitt Bf 109, Heinkel He 111, Dornier Do 17, Junkers Ju 88 and Junkers Ju 87. Their aircrews were still highly trained, and despite attrition, still had a cadre of experienced personnel. The air-to-ground support was the best in the World at the time. Forward air controllers (Flivos) were attached to every mechanised and panzer division, to allow for accurate air support, free from friendly-fire incidents and in real time.
The German air operations staff, at all levels, also practiced the concept of Auftragstaktik (or mission command) doctrine. It encouraged the improvisation of tactics within the framework of set operational goals and advocated by-passing some levels of command under some circumstances. The air units were told what to achieve by high echelons, but not how to do it. This form of command was encouraged at the lowest levels to maintain the initiative and operational tempo. The form of warfare was an ad hoc style, but it allowed field commanders to dis-assemble and re-assemble command structures at Air Corps level, and commit them to a crisis, or urgent operations within a short period of time. This gave the Luftwaffe an unmatched degree of tactical and operational flexibility.