The Uganda–Tanzania War of 1978–79 included an air campaign, as the air forces of Uganda and Tanzania battled for air superiority and launched bombing raids. In general, the conflict was focused on air-to-ground attacks and ground-based anti-aircraft fire; only one dogfight is known to have occurred.
The Uganda Army Air Force dominated the air space during the initial Ugandan invasion of northwestern Tanzania, but achieved little due to bad co-ordination with ground forces and a general lack of planning. At the same time, it suffered increasingly heavy losses as pilots deserted, and the Tanzanian anti-aircraft defenses became more effective. The initiative thus switched to the Tanzania Air Defence Command which supported the country's counter-offensive into Uganda. In the conflict's later stages, the Libyan Arab Republic Air Force intervened on the side of Uganda, but failed to make a tangible impact. The Uganda Army Air Force was eventually destroyed on 7 April 1979 when Tanzanian ground forces overran its main air base at Entebbe. The remaining Ugandan loyalist air pilots subsequently fled the country or joined the Libyan military.
Background to the Uganda–Tanzania War
In 1971 Uganda Army soldiers launched a military coup that overthrew the President of Uganda, Milton Obote, precipitating a deterioration of relations with neighbouring Tanzania. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere had close ties with Obote and had supported his socialist orientation. Uganda Army Colonel Idi Amin installed himself as President of Uganda and ruled the country under a repressive dictatorship. Nyerere withheld diplomatic recognition of the new government and offered asylum to Obote and his supporters. With the approval of Nyerere, these Ugandan exiles organised a small army of guerillas, and attempted, unsuccessfully, to invade Uganda and remove Amin in 1972. Amin blamed Nyerere for backing and arming his enemies, and retaliated by bombing Tanzanian border towns. Subsequent mediation resulted in the signing of the Mogadishu Agreement, which established a demilitarised zone at the border and required that both countries refrain from supporting opposition forces that targeted each others' governments. Nevertheless, relations between the two presidents remained tense; Nyerere frequently denounced Amin's regime, and Amin made repeated threats to invade Tanzania. Uganda also disputed its border with Tanzania, claiming that the Kagera Salient—a 720-square-mile (1,900 km2) stretch of land between the official border and the Kagera River 18 miles to the south, should be placed under its jurisdiction, maintaining that the river made for a more logical border. The circumstances immediately surrounding the outbreak of the Uganda–Tanzania War in 1978 remain unclear.
Opposing forces
Uganda
The Uganda Army Air Force (UAAF) was established in 1964 with Israeli aid. Its first aircraft was consequently of Israeli origin, and its initial pilots trained in Israel. As Uganda's government forged closer links with the Eastern Bloc, the UAAF began to acquire more aircraft as well as support in training from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Libya. Israeli aid initially continued as well. The UAAF was gradually expanded, and several air bases were built. Following Amin's coup in 1971, the Ugandan military began to deteriorate. International support for Amin's regime eroded over the next years. Israel turned from an ally into an enemy, and the relations with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia worsened as well though they were not completely severed. The foreign supply of aircraft and spare parts for the UAAF was gradually cut off. As result, it became increasingly difficult to maintain the UAAF's fighters. At the same time, tribalism, corruption, and repeated purges negatively affected the military's combat capabilities. Furthermore, the Israeli-initiated Operation Entebbe resulted in the destruction of a quarter of the UAAF in 1976; Amin's regime subsequently received a substantial number of replacement MiG-21s from the Soviet Union and Libya.
By late 1978, the UAAF was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Gore and consisted of at least two dozen MiG-21MFs, MiG-21UMs, MiG-17s, MiG-15UTIs, and L-29s. In addition, several unarmed trainer and transport aircraft were in service, including a single Lockheed C-130 Hercules cargo transport. The exact number of Ugandan combat aircraft at the time of the war's outbreak is disputed. Based on reports by Ugandan exiles, journalist Martha Honey estimated that the UAAF consisted of 26 combat aircraft. According to J. Paxton, Uganda possessed 10 MiG-21s, 12 MiG-17s, 2 MiG-15s, and 5 L-29s, while journalist Dominique Lagarde stated that the UAAF consisted of 12 MiG-21s, 10 Mig-17s, 2 MiG-15s, and 12 L-29s. The Soviet ambassador to Uganda claimed that Uganda had 10 MiGs and eight helicopters at the conflict's start. Some of the available aircraft were not combat-ready, however, and were abandoned during the Uganda–Tanzania War without seeing action. The lack of spare parts especially affected the Mig-15s and MiG-17s.
The UAAF was split into three fighter squadrons. Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Mukooza commanded the MiG-17 squadron, while Lieutenant Colonel Ali Kiiza led the MiG-21 squadron which was called the "Suicide Strike Command", and nicknamed "Sungura". Paxton stated that the UAAF employed about 600 personnel by 1978, while Lagarde claimed that it had 1,000 personnel. In general, the UAAF lacked pilots at the war's start. In addition, the Ugandan military possessed fifty 40mm anti-aircraft guns, man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and nine radar stations for air defence. A rebel group, the Save Uganda Movement (SUM), later alleged that a number of UAAF members had covertly joined the anti-Amin resistance before the Uganda–Tanzania War; these individuals reportedly helped to sabotage the UAAF's operations from within.
At least some of the Suicide Strike Command's pilots were possibly Libyan-trained Palestinians. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was known to train pilots for its own air force in Uganda. In addition, Pakistani "technicians and air force personnel" reportedly supported Amin's forces during the war with Tanzania. The Soviet Union also loaned air force personnel to Uganda, but the Ugandan Foreign Ministry announced that they were being placed on leave on 30 October 1978, as the conflict with Tanzania began, "to keep them out of the situation that does not concern them".
Tanzania
Tanzania established its air force as the "Air Wing" (Kiswahili: Usafirashaji wa Anga) of the Tanzania People's Defence Force's (TPDF) Air Defence Command in 1965. As it was following an international policy of non-alignment, Tanzania procured aircraft and trainers from a variety of countries, most notably China, Canada, and the Soviet Union. By 1978, the Tanzanian Air Wing possessed 14 MiG-21MFs, two MiG-21UMs, 22 Shenyang J-5s (F-5), 12 Shenyang J-6s (F-6), as well as several transport and trainer aircraft. Furthermore, the country's Air Defence had access to SA-3 surface-to-air missiles, SA-7 MANPADS, 14.5mm and 36mm or 37mm anti-aircraft guns, and ground support equipment—including early-warning radars.
The Air Wing was eventually organised into three Kikosi cha Jeshi or KJ Brigades, with each brigade focusing on one particular element of air warfare: aircraft and helicopters (601 KJ), technical support (602 KJ), and air defence (603 KJ). The fighter aircraft unit of 601 KJ, known as "Squadron 601", was based at Mwanza Air Base (MiG-21s) and Ngerengere Air Force Base (F-5s, F-6s). In 1978 the Air Defence Command employed approximately 1,000 personnel.
Libya
The Libyan Arab Republic Air Force (LARAF) intervened in the Uganda–Tanzania War's later stages. The LARAF was a large and well-equipped force, though it suffered from limitations in regard to its personnel. Its squadrons were often understrength, and many pilots lacked proper training. Though it is disputed how many and which types of Libyan aircraft were sent to Uganda, the presence of at least two Tupolev Tu-22 bombers was confirmed. LARAF's Tu-22s were operated by the No. 1022 Squadron (also known as "Second Bomber Squadron"). The Libyan Tu-22s were second-hand aircraft imported from the Soviet Union, and suffered from serviceability issues; the bombers were both difficult to maintain and to fly. In addition, Libyan Tu-22 crews were regarded by their Soviet instructors as being subpar, incapable of flying sophisticated bombing missions and more interested in their own safety than carrying out their tasks. The Soviet ambassador to Uganda argued in early March 1979 that the Tu-22 was not suited to a "bush war" in Uganda.
Air campaign
Invasion of Kagera
In early September 1978 the Tanzanians noticed a high volume of Ugandan air reconnaissance flights. By the middle of the month the Ugandan aircraft began crossing into Tanzanian airspace. At this stage, Amin reportedly ordered the UAAF to start bombing Tanzanian targets. SUM member Paul Oryema Opobo claimed that the pilots selected for this mission, Lieutenant David Omita and Lieutenant Sam Walugembe, were supportive of the anti-Amin resistance. Thus, they deliberately launched their bombs at Lake Victoria instead of any Tanzanian settlements. Ugandan troops made their first incursion into Tanzania on 9 October 1978 when a motorised detachment entered a Tanzanian village only to be repulsed by artillery. The next day UAAF MiG fighters bombed forests in the Kagera Salient without effect. On 18 October, Ugandan MiGs bombed Bukoba, the capital of the West Lake Region. Despite facing ineffectual Tanzanian anti-aircraft fire, the bombings caused little damage. However, the explosions' reverberations shattered windows and incited the population to panic. On 25 October the Uganda Army attempted to invade northern Tanzania. The ground attack was repulsed by artillery, but UAAF MiGs continued to cross into Tanzanian airspace, where they were again harassed by ineffectual anti-aircraft fire. Ugandan MiGs bombed Bukoba and the Kyaka Bridge—a key crossing over the Kagera River—on 21 and 27 October; most of their bombs hit forests, but one barely missed Bukoba's hospital. The second attack prompted Bukoba's residents to flee the town.
On 27 October, the first Tanzanian reinforcements arrived in the war zone. Among them was a team of six soldiers equipped with SA-7 MANPADS who took up position at Kyaka, and waited for enemy aircraft to enter their range. Around this time, the UAAF was ordered to bomb Tanzania's Field Tactical Headquarters at Kapwepwe. The pilots selected for the mission were Omita, Lieutenant Atiku, Lieutenant Abusala, and possibly Walugembe. Flying MiG-21s, they carried out the sortie, but as they returned to Uganda crossed into air space protected by the SA-7 team. The Tanzanians promptly hit the right wing of Omita's plane. He managed to safely eject just before his MiG exploded, and parachuted into a forest. From there, he managed to escape to Mutukula in Uganda. Amin's government admitted the loss, but downplayed it by claiming to have shot down several Tanzanian fighters which had allegedly attempted to bomb Ugandan cities. Furthermore, Amin promoted Omita, Atiku, Abusala, and Walugembe to the rank of captain.
On 30 October the Ugandan Army launched a second invasion of northern Tanzania. Tanzanian forces were overwhelmed and quickly withdrew south of the Kagera River. Fearing that the TPDF could stage a counter-attack across the Kyaka Bridge, Ugandan commanders ordered it to be destroyed. The UAAF attacked the crossing from 1 to 3 November; these air strikes either missed or proved ineffective. In contrast, the Tanzanian SA-7 team advanced up to the bridge and reportedly shot down several Ugandan MiGs during these days. After the repeated failures by their air force, the Ugandans finally employed a mining specialist who successfully destroyed the Kyaka Bridge.
Meanwhile, the TPDF's high command decided to redeploy a squadron of F-6s to Mwanza. As the fighters approached the air base on 3 November, however, they entered the air space protected by a Tanzanian SA-3 team as well as anti-aircraft artillery. The latter had not been informed about the redeployment, and mistook the F-6s for enemy fighters, opening fire. One aircraft was hit, and its pilot Ayekuwa Akiirusha was killed. Another fighter diverted from its course and crashed after running out of fuel, though its pilot safely ejected. The other F-6s braved the anti-aircraft fire and successfully landed at Mwanza. A monument was later built in honour of Akiirusha. Several other Tanzanian aircraft, mostly MiGs, were lost due to other accidents during the war.