series of attacks on Buddhist pagodas in South Vietnam on 21 August 1963 by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Special Forces and combat police, ordered by Ngô Đình Nhu
The Xá Lợi Pagoda raids (Vietnamese pronunciation: [saː˦˥ ləːj˨˩˨]) were a series of synchronized attacks on a number of Buddhist pagodas in the major cities of South Vietnam shortly after midnight on 21 August 1963. The raids were executed by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Special Forces under Colonel Lê Quang Tung and combat police, both of which took their orders directly from Ngô Đình Nhu, the younger brother of the Catholic president Ngô Đình Diệm. The Xá Lợi Pagoda, the largest in the South Vietnamese capital Saigon, was the most prominent of the raided temples. Over 1,400 Buddhists were arrested, and estimates of the death toll and missing ranged up to the hundreds. In response to the Huế Vesak shootings and a ban on the Buddhist flag in early May, South Vietnam's Buddhist majority rose in widespread civil disobedience and protest against the religious bias and discrimination of the Catholic-dominated Diệm government. Buddhist temples in major cities, most prominently the Xá Lợi pagoda, became focal points for protesters and assembly points for Buddhist monks from rural areas.
In August, several Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) generals proposed the imposition of martial law, ostensibly to break up the demonstrations, but in reality to prepare for a military coup. Nhu, already looking to arrest Buddhist leaders and crush the protest movement, used the opportunity to preempt the generals and embarrass them. He disguised Tung's Special Forces in army uniforms and used them to attack the Buddhists, thereby causing the general public and South Vietnam's U.S. allies to blame the army, diminishing the generals' reputations and ability to act as future national leaders. Soon after midnight on 21 August, Nhu's men attacked the pagodas using automatic firearms, grenades, battering rams and explosives, causing widespread damage. Some religious objects were destroyed, including a statue of Gautama Buddha in the Từ Đàm Pagoda in Huế, which was partially leveled by explosives. Temples were looted and vandalized, with the remains of venerated monks confiscated. In Huế, violent street battles erupted between government forces and rioting pro-Buddhist, anti-government civilians.
The Ngô family claimed the army had carried out the raids, something their U.S. allies initially believed. This was later debunked, but the incident prompted the United States to turn against the regime and begin exploring alternative leadership options, eventually leading to Diệm's overthrow in a November coup. In South Vietnam, the raids stoked widespread anger. Several high-ranking public servants resigned, and university and high school students boycotted classes and staged riotous demonstrations, resulting in further mass incarcerations. As most of the students were from middle-class public service and military families, the arrests caused further upset among the Ngô family's power base.
The Xá Lợi Pagoda raids (Vietnamese pronunciation: [saː˦˥ ləːj˨˩˨]) were a series of synchronized attacks on a number of Buddhist pagodas in the major cities of South Vietnam shortly after midnight on 21 August 1963. The raids were executed by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Special Forces under Colonel Lê Quang Tung and combat police, both of which took their orders directly from Ngô Đình Nhu, the younger brother of the Catholic president Ngô Đình Diệm. The Xá Lợi Pagoda, the largest in the South Vietnamese capital Saigon, was the most prominent of the raided temples. Over 1,400 Buddhists were arrested, and estimates of the death toll and missing ranged up to the hundreds. In response to the Huế Vesak shootings and a ban on the Buddhist flag in early May, South Vietnam's Buddhist majority rose in widespread civil disobedience and protest against the religious bias and discrimination of the Catholic-dominated Diệm government. Buddhist temples in major cities, most prominently the Xá Lợi pagoda, became focal points for protesters and assembly points for Buddhist monks from rural areas.
In August, several Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) generals proposed the imposition of martial law, ostensibly to break up the demonstrations, but in reality to prepare for a military coup. Nhu, already looking to arrest Buddhist leaders and crush the protest movement, used the opportunity to preempt the generals and embarrass them. He disguised Tung's Special Forces in army uniforms and used them to attack the Buddhists, thereby causing the general public and South Vietnam's U.S. allies to blame the army, diminishing the generals' reputations and ability to act as future national leaders. Soon after midnight on 21 August, Nhu's men attacked the pagodas using automatic firearms, grenades, battering rams and explosives, causing widespread damage. Some religious objects were destroyed, including a statue of Gautama Buddha in the Từ Đàm Pagoda in Huế, which was partially leveled by explosives. Temples were looted and vandalized, with the remains of venerated monks confiscated. In Huế, violent street battles erupted between government forces and rioting pro-Buddhist, anti-government civilians.
The Ngô family claimed the army had carried out the raids, something their U.S. allies initially believed. This was later debunked, but the incident prompted the United States to turn against the regime and begin exploring alternative leadership options, eventually leading to Diệm's overthrow in a November coup. In South Vietnam, the raids stoked widespread anger. Several high-ranking public servants resigned, and university and high school students boycotted classes and staged riotous demonstrations, resulting in further mass incarcerations. As most of the students were from middle-class public service and military families, the arrests caused further upset among the Ngô family's power base.
Background
South Vietnam was often portrayed as having a Buddhist majority, comprising 70% or more of the population. These figures, reported by foreign journalists, were overestimated, as Westerners commonly mistook folk religion for Buddhism. The actual number of Buddhists was much smaller, at most about 27%. Ngo Dinh Diem was regarded by "orthodox" historians as having pursued pro-Catholic policies that antagonized many Buddhists. The government was regarded as being biased towards Catholics in public service and military promotions, as well as the allocation of land and business favors. Allegedly, there were Buddhist villages that tried to convert en masse to avoid being moved during the resettlement program.
The Catholic Church was the largest landowner in the country, and the "private" status that was imposed on Buddhism by the French, which required official permission to conduct public Buddhist activities, was not repealed by Diệm. Allegedly, U.S. aid was disproportionately distributed to Catholic majority villages. Under Diệm, the Catholic Church enjoyed special exemptions in property acquisition, and in 1959, he dedicated the country to the Virgin Mary. The white and gold Catholic flag was allegedly flown at major public events in South Vietnam. However, portrayals by Western media at the time were severely distorted, as Vietnamese Buddhism in fact flourished under Diệm's First Republic.
A rarely enforced 1958 law—known as Decree Number 10—was invoked in May 1963 to prohibit the display of religious flags. This disallowed the flying of the Buddhist flag on Vesak, the birthday of Gautama Buddha. The application of the law caused indignation among Buddhists on the eve of the most important religious festival of the year. This was exacerbated as a week earlier Catholics had been encouraged to display Catholic flags at a government-sponsored celebration for Diem's brother, Archbishop Pierre Martin Ngô Đình Thục, the most senior Catholic cleric in the country. On 8 May in Huế, a crowd of Buddhists protested against the ban on the Buddhist flag. The police and army broke up the demonstration by firing guns at and throwing grenades into the gathering, killing nine people.
Diệm's denial of governmental responsibility for the incident—he instead blamed the Việt Cộng—added to the anger and discontent of the Buddhist majority. The incident spurred a protest movement against the religious discrimination of the Roman Catholic–dominated Diệm regime, resulting in widespread large-scale civil disobedience among the South Vietnamese public persisting throughout May and June. This period of political instability was known as the "Buddhist crisis". The objectives of the protests were to have Decree Number 10 repealed and to force the implementation of religious equality. On 11 June, Buddhist monk Thích Quảng Đức self-immolated in downtown Saigon. Images were shown by news outlets across the world, embarrassing Diệm's government and bringing negative global attention. A few days later, under mounting American pressure, Diệm signed the Joint Communique with senior Buddhist leaders, making various concessions to the Buddhists, who in turn agreed to stop the civil unrest and return to normal life.
Neither the Ngô family nor the Buddhists were happy with the agreement, and it failed to solve the dispute. Both sides accused the other of failing to uphold their obligations; the government accused the Buddhists of continuing to vilify them in demonstrations, while the Buddhists accused Diệm of stalling and not acting on his commitments to religious reform, and continuing to detain arrested Buddhist dissidents. The demonstrations and tension continued throughout July and August, with more self-immolations and an altercation (known as the Double Seven Day scuffle) between secret police and American journalists reporting on a Buddhist protest.
Xá Lợi
The hub of Buddhist activism in Saigon was the Xá Lợi Pagoda. It was the largest Buddhist temple in the capital, located in the city center, and built in the late 1950s. Many monks from outside Saigon—including prominent Buddhist leaders—had congregated at Xá Lợi since the dispute began and it was used as a venue for press conferences, media interviews, publication of pamphlets and to plan and organize mass demonstrations. At the time, Ngô Đình Nhu was known to favor an even harder line against the Buddhists. Nhu was the younger brother of President Diệm and his main confidant, and was regarded as the real power behind the Ngô family's rule. There were persistent reports on Nhu seeking to usurp power from his elder brother and attack the Buddhists. When interviewed about this, Nhu said if the Buddhist crisis was not resolved, he would stage a coup and head a new anti-Buddhist government. The news was promptly published, which the American embassy largely disregarded, purportedly unconvinced as to Nhu's seriousness.
Nhu prepared the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Special Forces commanded by Colonel Lê Quang Tung—who took his orders directly from Nhu and not the senior generals—for the raids. An American-trained outfit created to fight the Việt Cộng, the Special Forces were better-equipped, better-trained and better-paid than the regular army. They were used by the Ngô family as a private army for repressing dissidents and protecting their rule, rather than fighting for the national interest. As such, they spent the majority of their time in Saigon warding off coup attempts. Tung brought more Special Forces into Saigon, bringing the total from two to four battalions in the capital. On Sunday, 18 August, the Buddhists staged a mass protest at Xá Lợi, attracting around 15,000 people. The attendance was approximately three times higher than the previous Sunday's rally. The event lasted for several hours as speeches by the monks interspersed religious ceremonies. A Vietnamese journalist said it was the only emotional public gathering in South Vietnam since Diệm's rise to power almost a decade earlier. David Halberstam of The New York Times speculated the Buddhists were saving their biggest demonstration for the scheduled arrival of the new U.S. ambassadorHenry Cabot Lodge Jr. the following week and not exploiting the large crowd by staging a protest march towards the Gia Long Palace or other government buildings.
Planning
On the evening of 18 August, ten senior ARVN generals met to discuss the situation regarding the Buddhist unrest and decided martial law was needed. They wanted to disperse the monks who had gathered in Saigon and other regional cities and return them to their original pagodas in the rural areas. Nhu summoned 7 of the 10 generals to Gia Long Palace on August 20 for consultations. They presented their request for martial law and discussed how to disband the groups of monks and their supporters from the temples in Saigon. Nhu sent the generals to see Diệm, and the president listened to the group of seven led by General Trần Văn Đôn. The group included Army Chief General Trần Thiện Khiêm and General Nguyễn Khánh, commander of the II Corps in the Central Highlands. Also present was Đôn's brother-in-law General Đỗ Cao Trí, commander of I Corps, which oversaw the northernmost region around Huế, and General Lê Văn Kim, head of the military academy. General Tôn Thất Đính, a brash paratrooper, commanded the III Corps surrounding Saigon. General Huỳnh Văn Cao was the commander of the IV Corps in the Mekong Delta.
Trần Văn Đôn claimed communists had infiltrated the monks at Xá Lợi and warned ARVN morale was deteriorating because of civil unrest and the consequent disruption of the war effort. He claimed it was possible the Buddhists could assemble a crowd to march on Gia Long Palace. Diệm agreed to declare martial law effective on the next day without consulting his cabinet, and troops were ordered into Saigon to occupy strategic points. Don was appointed as the acting Chief of the Armed Forces in place of General Lê Văn Tỵ, who was terminally ill with cancer and receiving medical treatment abroad. Đôn claimed Diệm was concerned for the welfare of the monks, allegedly telling the generals he did not want any of them hurt. The martial law orders were then signed and authorized by Đôn. The real purpose of Đôn asking for martial law was to maneuver troops in readiness for a coup, and he had no concrete plans to send the regular army into the pagodas. Nhu sidestepped him and took the opportunity to discredit the army by using Tung's Special Forces and the combat police to attack the pagodas. Đính, the officer most trusted by the Ngô family, was the only general who was given advance notice of the raids.
With the approval of Diệm, Nhu used the declaration of martial law to order armed men into the Buddhist pagodas. Nhu chose a time when he knew the American Embassy was leaderless. Frederick Nolting had returned to the United States and his successor Lodge was yet to arrive. As the high command of the ARVN worked closely with American military advisers deployed in the country, Nhu used the combat police and Tung's Special Forces, who took their orders directly from him. The men were dressed in standard army uniforms such as paratroop attire to frame the regulars for the raids. Nhu's motive was to avoid responsibility for a violent operation which would anger the Vietnamese public and the American leadership. By falsely implicating the army in the attacks, Nhu intended to dent the confidence of the Vietnamese populace and the Americans in the senior officers plotting against him. Nhu evidently hoped the Buddhist majority and the Americans would blame the army for the raids and become less inclined to support a coup by the generals. In the past, Nhu's tactics of playing the generals against one another had kept conspirators off-balance and thwarted coup attempts. The raids were not unexpected, as the Buddhists had prepared themselves for the attacks, as had journalists, who were watching military installations for signs of movement.
Raids
Saigon
The Buddhists in Saigon were aware a raid on the pagodas was imminent. Buddhist relatives of Special Forces and combat police personnel had tipped off the monks, and Buddhists who lived near pagodas had observed them move into the region in the lead-up. American journalists were tipped off and traveled through Saigon to visit the pagodas ahead of the raids. The pagodas had been locked by the monks in preparation for the attacks and the doors were barricaded with furniture, and reinforced by nailing wooden planks across them. The monks told members of the U.S. press corps in Saigon the raids were coming, allowing them to be more prepared for the event than the U.S. embassy. In the afternoon before the raids, trucks filled with soldiers headed past the offices of media outlets—where the journalists saw them—destined for the Ấn Quang Pagoda. More troops were seen congregating at police headquarters, ready to board trucks moving towards Xá Lợi. The American-made trucks had been provided as part of the U.S. military aid program for South Vietnam. Late at night, the convoys arrived and surrounded Xá Lợi from several sides, causing a traffic jam in the city center. Several thousand personnel were estimated to have been present. Journalists were informed as soon as the attacks began, even as Nhu's men cut communications lines, and they rushed to Xá Lợi.