The Tongo Tongo ambush or the Niger ambush occurred on 4 October 2017, when armed militants from the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) attacked Nigerien and US soldiers outside the village of Tongo Tongo, Niger, while they were returning to base after a stop in the village. During the ambush, four Nigeriens, four US soldiers, and at least 21 ISGS militants were killed, and eight Nigeriens and two US soldiers (including the team commander) were wounded. In the day preceding the ambush, the Nigerien and US soldiers conducted a mission attempting to locate and capture or kill Doundou Chefou, a commander in the ISGS.
The ambush sparked political debate over the presence of US forces in Africa and brought attention to previously under-reported US military activities in the region. The ambush also prompted congressional inquiries, and an investigation by the US Department of Defense (DoD). The DoD inquiry, completed in 2018, found that the 11-member US special forces team was not prepared for the mission, and identified other flaws in planning.
The ambush remains the largest loss of American lives in combat in Africa since the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993.
Background
In January 2013, a senior Nigerien official told Reuters that Bisa Williams, the then-United States Ambassador to Niger, requested permission to establish a drone base in a meeting with Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou. On 5 February, officials from both Niger and the United States said that the two countries signed a status of forces agreement that allowed the deployment of unarmed surveillance drones. In that month, US President Barack Obama sent 150 military personnel to Niger to set up a surveillance drone operation that would aid France in its counterterrorism efforts in the Northern Mali conflict. In October 2015, Niger and the US signed a military agreement committing the two countries "to work together in the fight against terrorism". US Army Special Forces personnel (commonly referred to as Green Berets) have deployed on numerous occasions to train personnel of the Niger Armed Forces (FAN) to assist in the fight against terrorists from neighboring countries. In October 2017, there were about 800 US military personnel in Niger, most of whom were working to build a second drone base for US and French aircraft in Agadez. The expectations were that construction of the base would be completed in 2018, which would allow the US to conduct surveillance operations with the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper to monitor ISIL insurgents flowing south and other extremists flowing north from the Sahel region.
In 2015, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara was established by Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, who was a spokesperson and senior leader of the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), a splinter group of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. In August 2013, MUJAO merged with al-Mourabitoun, which swore allegiance to al-Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiri. In May 2015, Sahrawi spoke on the behalf of al-Mourabitoun and had pledged his allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. However, the declaration was not recognized by the group's leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and the al-Qaeda loyalists, creating a split in the group. According to the United States Department of Defense, ISIL leaders in Syria had acknowledged Sahrawi's allegiance through their Amaq News Agency but ISGS "has not been formally recognized as an official branch of ISIL". The ISGS's first confirmed terror attack occurred on 2 September 2016 when fighters targeted a customs post in Markoye, Burkina Faso, an attack that left a border agent and a civilian dead. The ISGS had since been targeting pro-government militias that support the French and United Nations forces in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), at least 46 attacks occurred since early 2016 in the Tahoua and Tillabéri regions of Niger. OCHA also said that seven districts in the two regions had been under a state of emergency since March 2017, and the government renewed the measure for an additional three months on 18 September. The FAN had launched a military operation to reestablish security in Tillabéri in June 2017.
Pre-ambush
First mission
On 2 October 2017, a US special forces (SOF) team from 3rd Special Forces Group based in Quallam received intelligence that placed a high value ISGS sub-commander in their area of responsibility. Following this intelligence, the team submitted a mission plan for the vicinity of Tiloa the next day. The plan the team submitted did not accurately describe the mission's intention, describing it as civil/military reconnaissance instead of the actual purpose which was to locate and capture or if necessary kill the ISGS sub-commander. The mission plan was assessed and approved by the AOB Niger and SOCCE commanders and on 3 October at 5:59 am (local time), the team of 11 personnel consisting of eight US Special Forces operators, two support, and an intelligence contractor accompanying 35 Nigerien personnel from the Security and Intelligence Battalion (Bataillon Sécurité et de Renseignement or BSR) and the 433rd Special Interdiction unit, departed toward the vicinity of Tiloa in an eight vehicle convoy. The Americans traveled in two technicals and an unarmored Toyota Land Cruiser while the Nigeriens traveled in five vehicles, one of which had been provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and had specialized surveillance equipment on board.
Second mission
In Tiloa, the team failed to locate the ISGS commander and began their return to base. More than halfway back to base, the team received time sensitive intelligence that placed the commander northwest of Tiloa at the Mali border. The approved mission plan originally called for a helicopter team as the primary force with the Quallam team serving as a quick reaction force, however bad weather forced the helicopter team to cancel, forcing team Quallam to continue on their own. Through the night of the 4th, the team made their movement north and reached the objective officials referred to as "objective north" at sunrise. As the team searched they discovered enemy rations, uniforms and a motorcycle all of which were destroyed by partner Nigerien soldiers. After completion of the second mission the team was ordered to return to base. Before returning the team commander ordered an overhead ISR asset to continue monitoring the area in order to gather intelligence on possible enemy routes leading into Mali. This left the team unwatched as they departed toward Tongo Tongo at 8:30 am (local time).
Stop at Tongo Tongo
In a video recorded before the ambush, young men can be seen on motorbikes armed with rifles and machine guns, repeating Islamist slogans, and discussing what they would do in the event they captured soldiers, with one of them saying that they would decapitate them.
At 10:30 am (local time), 4 October, the convoy stopped at the village of Tongo Tongo so that partner Nigeriens could eat breakfast and get water. During this, team members met with local leaders and 27 men of the village. The US and Nigerien team leaders objected to the task because they were not heavily armed or equipped for intense combat should they encounter Chefou's ISGS fighters alone, but the team leaders' concerns were overruled by a higher command. The US soldiers were divided in two groups: one that would stay back and guard the vehicles and another that would attend the meeting. However, the meeting would drag on with the local leaders delaying the soldiers' departure by stalling and keeping them waiting. The group guarding the vehicles began to suspect that something was wrong when they witnessed two motorcycles race out of the village. The team believed the local leader was complicit in an impending attack. After completion of the meeting, the soldiers walked back to the rest of the unit and their unarmored pickup trucks. The meeting lasted 30 minutes longer than the team leader expected.
Ambush
The eight vehicle convoy left the village at 11:35 a.m. on their planned route back to base. Approximately 100 meters (110 yd) outside of the village, armed ISGS militants believed to be led by Doundou Chefou, a lieutenant in the terrorist group given the code name "Naylor Road" by US forces, began their assault against the rear of the convoy. The militants, who had arrived with a dozen technicals and about 20 motorcycles and were equipped with small arms, vehicle mounted heavy machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, and mortars had allowed the convoy to move through the kill zone before attacking, trapping the rear of the convoy.
As the enemy force mounted and advanced through the tree line, the convoy halted. The team reported enemy contact and immediately returned fire using vehicle mounted M240 machine guns while the rest of the team dismounted from their vehicles, donned protective equipment, and began to exchange small arms fire. The team leader and four Nigerien soldiers moved to the southeast to flank what was thought to be a small enemy force; meanwhile the team sergeant ordered the rear US vehicle to the middle of the convoy to better coordinate machine gun fire with US vehicle one.
It was during this time that the rear Nigerien vehicle departed the area by an unknown route. The team leader and the four Nigerien soldiers continued their flanking movement until they were stopped by a body of water, at which point they identified and engaged the enemy across the water, killing approximately four combatants. The team leader observed a larger enemy force moving from his east consisting of armed men on motorcycles and vehicles with mounted machine guns. The team leader returned to the halted convoy at 11:57 a.m. and ordered the convoy to head south to prevent getting outflanked. Members of team Quallem killed several enemies during this movement out of the ambush site. Niger vehicles one and two were the first vehicles to depart. A team member threw a smoke grenade to conceal the team's movement south to regroup with the Nigeriens. Team members last saw Staff Sergeants Bryan Black, Jeremiah Johnson, and Dustin Wright taking cover behind the team's unarmored SUV.
Wright got in the SUV and began to slowly drive south while Black and Jeremiah Johnson ran alongside, continuing suppressive fire at the enemy while under heavy fire. After passing the colored smoke, Black ran and took cover behind a nearby tree while Jeremiah Johnson fired over the hood of the vehicle towards the tree line. As they continued their movement towards the south under fire, Jeremiah Johnson fell to the ground, leaving him exposed to enemy fire. Wright immediately backed up the SUV to bring him into cover. Simultaneously, Black was slightly ahead of the SUV and was hit by small arms fire, killing him instantly. Jeremiah Johnson regained his footing and ran to Black, checking for wounds. Wright exited the halted vehicle, looked toward the enemy and then dragged Black into cover. The two remained with Black's body and further assessed his wounds.
Eventually, as enemy combatants pushed forward, they hastily abandoned their position. Approximately 85 meters (93 yd) southwest of the SUV, Jeremiah Johnson was hit by enemy fire and collapsed; Wright stopped running and returned to Jeremiah Johnson's position. Wright continued to engage the enemy until incapacitated by enemy fire. Wright and Jeremiah Johnson were shot multiple times at close range by the militants, killing them.
After initially escaping the ambush site, the American and Nigerien forces established a secondary position. Upon realizing Black, Jeremiah Johnson, and Wright were missing, Two team members volunteered to head back to the ambush site in an attempt to locate vehicle there. As they advanced toward the ambush site they engaged and killed several militants before retreating to a safe position due to overwhelming fire. At this point two additional team members would head back toward the initial ambush site to help locate the missing teammates.