The Soviet–Afghan War took place in Afghanistan from December 1979 to February 1989. Marking the beginning of the 48-year-long Afghan conflict, it saw the Soviet Union and the Communist-led Afghan military fight against the rebelling Afghan mujahideen. While backed by various countries and organizations, the majority of the mujahideen's external support came from Pakistan, the United States (as part of Operation Cyclone), the United Kingdom, China, Iran, and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, in addition to a large influx of foreign fighters known as the Afghan Arabs. American and British involvement on the side of the mujahideen escalated the Cold War, ending a short period of relaxed Soviet Union–United States relations.
Combat took place throughout the 1980s, mostly in the Afghan countryside, as most of the country's cities remained under Soviet control. The conflict resulted in the deaths of one to three million Afghans, while millions more fled from the country as refugees; most externally displaced Afghans sought refuge in Pakistan and in Iran. Between 6.5 and 11.5% of Afghanistan's population of 13.5 million people (per the 1979 census) is estimated to have been killed over the course of the Soviet–Afghan War. The decade-long confrontation between the mujahideen and the Soviet and Afghan militaries inflicted grave destruction throughout Afghanistan, and has been cited by scholars as a significant factor contributing to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991; it is for this reason that the conflict is sometimes referred to as "the Soviet Union's Vietnam".
A violent uprising broke out in Herat in March 1979, in which a number of Soviet military advisers were executed. The ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), having determined that it could not subdue the uprising by itself, requested urgent Soviet military assistance; in 1979, over 20 requests were sent. Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin, declining to send troops, advised in one call to Afghan prime minister Nur Muhammad Taraki to use local industrial workers in the province. This was apparently on the belief that these workers would be supporters of the Afghan government. This was discussed further in the Soviet Union with a wide range of views, mainly split between those who wanted to ensure that Afghanistan remained a socialist state and those who were concerned that the unrest would escalate. Eventually, a compromise was reached to send military aid, but not troops.
The conflict began when the Soviet military, under the command of Leonid Brezhnev, moved into Afghanistan to support the Afghan administration that had been installed during Operation Storm-333. Debate over their presence in the country soon ensued in international channels, with the Muslim world and the Western Bloc classifying it as an invasion, while the Eastern Bloc asserted that it was a legal intervention. Nevertheless, numerous sanctions and embargoes were imposed on the Soviet Union by the international community shortly after the beginning of the conflict. Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan's major cities and all main arteries of communication, whereas the mujahideen waged guerrilla warfare in small groups across the 80% of the country that was not subject to uncontested Soviet control—almost exclusively comprising the rugged, mountainous terrain of the countryside. In addition to laying millions of landmines across Afghanistan, the Soviets used their aerial power to deal harshly with both Afghan resistance and civilians, levelling villages to deny safe haven to the mujahideen, destroying vital irrigation ditches and other infrastructure through scorched earth tactics.
The Soviet government had initially planned to secure Afghanistan's towns and road networks quickly, stabilize the PDPA, and withdraw all of its military forces within a year. However, the military met fierce resistance from Afghan guerrillas and experienced operational difficulties on the rugged mountainous terrain. By the mid-1980s, the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan had increased to approximately 115,000 troops and fighting across the country intensified. The war gradually inflicted a high cost on the Soviet Union as military, economic, and political resources became increasingly exhausted. By mid-1987, the reformist Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, announced the Soviet military would begin a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan. On 15 February 1989, the last Soviet military column occupying Afghanistan crossed into the Uzbek SSR. With continued external Soviet backing, the PDPA government continued the war alone, and the conflict evolved into the first Afghan Civil War (1989–1992). Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, all support to the Democratic Republic was stopped, leading to the toppling of the government by the mujahideen in 1992 and the start of a second Afghan Civil War (1992–1996).
Naming
In Afghanistan, the war is usually called the Soviet war in Afghanistan (Pashto: په افغانستان کې د شوروي جنگ, romanized: Pə Afğānistān ke də Šurawi Jang; Dari: جنگ شوروی در افغانستان, romanized: Jang-i Šūrawī dar Afğānistān). In Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, it is usually called the Afghan war (Russian: Афганская война; Ukrainian: Війна в Афганістані; Belarusian: Афганская вайна; Uzbek: Afgʻon urushi); it is sometimes simply referred to as "Afgan" (Russian: Афган), with the understanding that this refers to the war (just as the Vietnam War is often called "Vietnam" or just "'Nam" in the United States). It is also known as the Afghan Jihad, especially by the non-Afghan volunteers of the Mujahideen.
Background
Russian interest in Central Asia
In the 19th century, the British Empire was fearful that the Russian Empire would invade Afghanistan and use it to threaten the large British colonies in India. This regional rivalry was called the "Great Game". The Afghan–Russian border was agreed by the joint Anglo-Russian Afghan Boundary Commission of 1885–1887.
Following Amanullah Khan's ascent to the throne of Afghanistan in 1919 and the subsequent Third Anglo-Afghan War, the British conceded Afghanistan's full independence. King Amanullah afterwards wrote to Russia (now under Bolshevik control) desiring for permanent friendly relations. A treaty of friendship between Afghanistan and Russia was finalized in 1921. The Soviets saw possibilities in an alliance with Afghanistan against the United Kingdom, such as using it as a base for a revolutionary advance towards British-controlled India.
Soviet–Afghan relations post-1920s
Russian economic aid to Afghanistan had begun as early as 1919, shortly after the Russian Revolution. In 1942, the USSR moved to strengthen the Afghan Armed Forces by providing small arms and aircraft and establishing training centers in Tashkent, Uzbek SSR. Soviet-Afghan military cooperation began on a regular basis in 1956, and further agreements were made in the 1970s, which saw the USSR send advisers and specialists. The Soviets also had interests in the energy resources of Afghanistan, including oil and natural gas exploration from the 1950s and 1960s. The USSR began to import Afghan gas from 1968 onwards. Between 1954 and 1977, the Soviet Union provided Afghanistan with economic aid worth of about 1 billion rubles.
Afghanistan–Pakistan border
In the 19th century, with Czarist Russian forces moving closer to the Pamir Mountains near the border with British India, civil servant Mortimer Durand was sent to outline a border, likely in order to control the Khyber Pass. The demarcation of the mountainous region resulted in an agreement, signed with the Afghan Emir, Abdur Rahman Khan, in 1893. It became known as the Durand Line.
In 1947, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Afghanistan, Mohammad Daoud Khan, rejected the Durand Line.
The British Raj came to an end in 1947, and the Dominion of Pakistan gained independence from British India and inherited the Durand Line as its frontier with Afghanistan.
The regime of Daoud Khan had hostile relations with both Pakistan and Iran. Like all previous Afghan rulers since 1901, Daoud Khan wanted to emulate Emir Abdur Rahman Khan and unite his divided country.
1960s–1970s: Proxy war
In 1954, the United States began selling arms to its ally Pakistan, while refusing an Afghan request to buy arms, out of fear that the Afghans would use the weapons against Pakistan. As a consequence, Afghanistan, though officially neutral in the Cold War, drew closer to India and the Soviet Union, which were willing to sell them weapons.
As a result of continued resentment against Daoud's autocratic rule, close ties with the Soviet Union and economic downturn, Daoud Khan was forced to resign by the King of Afghanistan, Mohammed Zahir Shah. Following his resignation the crisis between Pakistan and Afghanistan was resolved and Pakistan re-opened trade routes. The King installed a new prime minister and started creating a balance in Afghanistan's relation with the West and the Soviet Union, which angered the Soviet Union.
1973 coup d'état
In 1973, Daoud Khan, supported by Soviet-trained Afghan Army officers and a large base of the Afghan Commando Forces, seized power from the King in a bloodless coup, and established the first Afghan republic. Following his return to power, Daoud revived his Pashtunistan policy and for the first time started proxy warring against Pakistan. The Pakistani government of prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was alarmed by this. The Soviet Union supported Daoud Khan's militancy against Pakistan as they wanted to weaken Pakistan, which was an ally of both the United States and China. The Soviet Union believed that the hostile behaviour of Afghanistan against Pakistan and Iran could alienate Afghanistan from the west, and Afghanistan would be forced into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union.
In response to Afghanistan's proxy war, Pakistan started supporting Afghans who were critical of Daoud Khan. Pakistan's goal was to overthrow Daoud's regime and establish an Islamist theocracy in its place.
President Daoud Khan began to realize that a friendly Pakistan was in his best interests. He agreed to stop supporting anti-Pakistan militants and to expel any remaining militants in Afghanistan. Daoud also started reducing his dependence on the Soviet Union. As a consequence Afghanistan's relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated.
Saur Revolution of 1978
The Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan's strength grew considerably after its foundation. In 1967, the PDPA split into two rival factions, the Khalq (Masses) faction headed by Nur Muhammad Taraki and the Parcham (Flag) faction led by Babrak Karmal. The radical Khalq faction believed in rapidly transforming Afghanistan, if necessary even using violence, from a feudal system into a Communist society, while the moderate Parcham faction favored a more gradualist and gentler approach.
Intense opposition from factions of the PDPA was sparked by the repression imposed on them by Daoud's regime and the death of a leading PDPA member, Mir Akbar Khyber. The mysterious circumstances of Khyber's death sparked massive anti-Daoud demonstrations in Kabul, which resulted in the arrest of several prominent PDPA leaders. On 27 April 1978, the Afghan Army, which had been sympathetic to the PDPA cause, overthrew and executed Daoud along with members of his family. After this the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was formed. On 5 December 1978, a treaty of friendship was signed between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.
"Red Terror" of the revolutionary government
We only need one million people to make the revolution. It doesn't matter what happens to the rest. We need the land, not the people.
After the revolution, Nur Muhammad Taraki assumed the leadership, prime ministership and general secretaryship of the PDPA. The government was divided along factional lines, with Taraki and Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin of the Khalq faction pitted against Parcham leaders such as Babrak Karmal. Immediately after coming to power, the Khalqis began to persecute the Parchamis. Within the PDPA, conflicts resulted in exiles, purges and executions of Parcham members. The Khalq state executed between 10,000 and 27,000 people, mostly at Pul-e-Charkhi prison, prior to the Soviet intervention. Political scientist Olivier Roy estimated between 50,000 and 100,000 people disappeared during the Taraki–Amin period:
There is only one leading force in the country – Hafizullah Amin. In the Politburo, everybody fears Amin.
During its first 18 months of rule, the PDPA applied a Soviet-style program of modernizing reforms, many of which were viewed by conservatives as opposing Islam. By mid-1978, a rebellion started. In September 1979, Hafizullah Amin seized power, arresting and killing Taraki. More than two months of instability overwhelmed Amin's regime as he moved against his opponents in the PDPA and the growing rebellion.
Affairs with the USSR after the revolution
We believe it would be a fatal mistake to commit ground troops. [...] If our troops went in, the situation in your country would not improve. On the contrary, it would get worse. Our troops would have to struggle not only with an external aggressor, but with a significant part of your own people. And the people would never forgive such things.
— Alexei Kosygin, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, in response to Taraki's request for Soviet presence in Afghanistan
Following the Herat uprising, the first major sign of anti-regime resistance, Taraki contacted Alexei Kosygin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and asked for "practical and technical assistance with men and armament". Kosygin rejected attempts by Taraki to solicit Soviet military aid in Afghanistan. Following Kosygin's rejection, Taraki requested aid from Leonid Brezhnev, who warned Taraki that full Soviet intervention "would only play into the hands of our enemies – both yours and ours".
Initiation of the rebellion
The government brooked no opposition, responding with violence to unrest. Between April 1978 and the Soviet Intervention of December 1979, thousands of prisoners, perhaps as many as 27,000, were executed.
Large parts of the country went into open rebellion. By the spring of 1979, 24 of the 28 provinces had suffered outbreaks of violence. The rebellion began to take hold in the cities: in March 1979 in Herat, rebels led by Ismail Khan revolted. Between 3,000 and 5,000 people were killed and wounded during the Herat revolt. Some 100 Soviet citizens and their families were killed. By August 1979, up to 165,000 Afghans had fled across the border to Pakistan. The main reason the revolt spread so widely was the disintegration of the Afghan army in a series of insurrections. The numbers of the Afghan army fell from 110,000 men in 1978 to 25,000 by 1980. The U.S. embassy in Kabul cabled to Washington the army was melting away "like an ice floe in a tropical sea".
Pakistan–U.S. relations and rebel aid
Pakistani intelligence officials began privately lobbying the U.S. and its allies to send materiel assistance to the Islamist rebels. In March 1979, the "CIA sent several covert action options relating to Afghanistan to the SCC [Special Coordination Committee]" of the United States National Security Council. At a 30 March meeting, U.S. Department of Defense representative Walter B. Slocombe "asked if there was value in keeping the Afghan insurgency going, 'sucking the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire?'"
President Carter signed two presidential findings in July 1979 permitting the CIA to spend $695,000 on non-military assistance (e.g., "cash, medical equipment, and radio transmitters") and on a propaganda campaign targeting the Soviet-backed leadership of the DRA, which (in the words of Steve Coll) "seemed at the time a small beginning."