The Somaliland War of Independence also known as the National Liberation Struggle in Somaliland (Somali: Halgankii Gobanimo-doonka, lit. 'The National Liberation Struggle'), the Northern Rebellion (Somali: Kacdoonkii Waqooyi, lit. 'The Northern Uprising') in Somalia, and sometimes called the Great Isaaq Uprising or the Isaaq Rebellion was an Isaaq rebellion waged by the Somali National Movement (SNM) against the ruling military junta in Somalia led by General Siad Barre lasting from its founding on 6 April 1981 and ended on 18 May 1991 when the SNM declared what was then northern Somalia independent as the Republic of Somaliland. The conflict served as the main theater of the larger Somali Rebellion that started in 1978. The conflict was in response to the harsh policies enacted by the Barre regime against the main clan family in Somaliland, the Isaaq, including a declaration of economic warfare on the clan-family. These harsh policies were put into effect shortly after the conclusion of the disastrous Ogaden War in 1978.
As a direct response to the harsh policies enacted by the Barre regime against the Isaaq people, in April 1981 a group of Isaaq businesspeople, students, former civil servants and former politicians founded the Somali National Movement in London. From February 1982, Isaaq army officers and fighters started moving into Ethiopia where they formed the nucleus of what would later become the armed wing of the SNM. Throughout the early to mid 1980s SNM launched a guerrilla war against the Barre regime through incursions and hit and run operations on army positions within Isaaq territories, especially into the Waqooyi Galbeed and Togdheer regions.
After the conclusion of a peace deal between Somalia's military junta and Ethiopia in April 1988 the SNM launched a major offensive in late May 1988, overrunning the cities of Hargeisa and Burao, then the second and third largest cities of Somalia. During the ongoing conflict, the Somali government's genocidal campaign against the Isaaq took place between May 1988 and March 1989, with explicit aims of handling the "Isaaq problem", Barre ordered the shelling and aerial bombardment of the major cities in the northwest and the systematic destruction of Isaaq dwellings, settlements and water points. The Siad Barre regime targeted civilian members of the Isaaq group specifically, especially in the cities of Hargeisa and Burao, and to that end employed the use of indiscriminate artillery shelling and aerial bombardment against civilian populations belonging to the Isaaq clan.
By early 1990, the Barre regime had lost control of large parts of the northern regions, and by its collapse in January 1991, the SNM succeeded in taking full control of northern Somalia including Hargeisa and other regional capitals, after which the organisation quickly opted for a cessation of hostilities and reconciliation with non-Isaaq communities, culminating in the "Grand Conference of the Northern Clans" in Burao between 27 April and 18 May 1991 and the subsequent formation of the Republic of Somaliland.
Background
Postcolonial era
The first Somali state to be granted its independence from colonial powers was Somaliland, a former British protectorate that gained independence on 26 June 1960. The rest of what came to be known as the Somali Republic was under Italian rule under the title Trust Territory of Somaliland (also known as Somalia Italiana). Shortly after Somaliland gained independence, it was to form a union with its southern neighbour to create the Somali Republic. Henceforth British Somaliland was referred to as the northern (or north western) region of the Somali Republic, whilst the former Italian colonial state was referred to as the south.
Within British Somaliland the Isaaq constituted the majority group within the protectorate with Dir and Harti groups also having sizeable populations to the west and east of Isaaq respectively.
The union of the two states proved problematic early on when it was discovered that the two polities had been unified under different Acts of Union. The newly unified Somali Republic's parliament promptly created a new Act of Union for all of Somalia, but this new Act was widely rejected in the former State of Somaliland in a referendum held on 20 June 1961; with half of the population in the State of Somaliland (the north-west of nascent Somali Republic), the major cities of the former British protectorate voted against the ratification of the constitution – Hargeisa (72%), Berbera (69%), Burao (66%) and Erigavo (69%) – all returning negative votes. This was in contrast to the south (ex-Italian colony) which returned a strong support for the constitution (and four times the expected vote numbers in the south, indicating electoral fraud; an example of this is a small southern village called Wanlaweyn registered a yes vote higher than the 100,000 votes counted in all of the north). This was a major signal of discontent coming from the north only a year after forming the union. Northern support for the union consequently began to deteriorate as result of political and economic mismatches that were the result of two contrasting colonial experience that operated in the two parts of the unified republic. Another example of the simmering discontent in the north was a coup attempt by northern officers that was thwarted in 1961.
Coup attempt
Unrest and opposition to the union further increased as southern politicians began taking up the majority of political positions in the newly unified Somali Republic. This led to fears that the former State of Somaliland could become a neglected outpost. In turn, many northern administrative officials and officers were moved to the south to defuse regional tensions.
In addition to these tensions, there were also personal grievances among several officers of northern descent. They felt that officers from the south who had been appointed as their superiors following the unification were poorly educated and unfit as commanders. In addition, it was suspected that the government preferred Italian-trained officers from the south over British-trained officers from the north. A group of at least 24 junior officers, including several who had been trained in Great Britain, eventually conspired to end the union between Somalia and Somaliland. One of the coup plotters was Hussein Ali Duale who later became a leading Somaliland separatist politician. The conspirators believed that they enjoyed the support of General Daud Abdulle Hirsi, head of the Somali National Army.
When the coup plotters launched their revolt in December 1961, they wanted to take over major towns in Somaliland. Researcher Ken Menkhaus argued that the coup attempt had "no chance of success" from the start, as the coup plotters did not enjoy majority support among the northern population or the local troops. One group of junior officer seized control of the radio station in Hargeisa, announcing their intentions and that they were supported by General Hirsi. Another group of coup plotters attempted arrest superior officers of southern origin in the town of Burao, but failed.
The government in Mogadishu was surprised at the revolt, but reacted quickly. General Hirsi declared via Radio Mogadishu that he was not involved in the revolt, whereupon non-commissioned officers of northern origin moved against the coup members in Hargeisa. The loyalists retook Radio Hargeisa, killing one coup member. The revolt was put down in a matter of hours. All surviving coup members were arrested.
Though the revolt had not been supported by the northern population, the locals still sympathized with the coup members. The government was thus inclined to opt for a lenient treatment. The conspirators were put on trial, and the British judge acquitted them, reasoning that there existed no legitimate Act of Union. In consequence, the officers could not be sentenced based on the Act, while the entire southern presence in the north became legally questionable. The ruling's wider implications was generally ignored in Somalia at the time, but later became important for northerners who wanted to justify the separation of Somaliland from Somalia. Regardless, the Somali government accepted the ruling and released the junior officers.
Social, political and economic marginalisation
The northern dissatisfaction with the constitution and terms of unification was a subject that the successive civilian governments continued to ignore. The northerns, especially the majority Isaaq, believed that the unified state would be divided federally (north and south) and that they would receive a fair share of representation post unification. The south proceeded to dominate all of the important posts of the new state, this included the President, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Minister of Interior and Minister of Foreign Affairs posts all given to politicians hailing from the south. The political marginalisation that majority of northerners felt was further exacerbated by economic deprivation, the north received just under 7 percent of nationally disbursed development assistance by the late 1970s, as more than 95% of all development projects and scholarships were distributed in the south. One example is cited by Hassan Megag Samater, the former director in charge of the Ministry of Education in Somaliland, he states that he had handed his post in 1966 with the northern region having "several hundred schools at all levels, from elementary schools to college. By the last year of the Barre regime, there was not a single school functioning at full strength."
1969 coup
In October 1969 the military seized power in a coup following the assassination of President Abdirashid Shermarke and the ensuing political parliamentary debate on succession which ended in a deadlock. The army banned political parties, suspended the constitution and closed the National Assembly, General Siad Barre was chosen as the head of state and presided over the supreme revolutionary council. The new regime outlawed political dissent and employed a heavy handed approach in managing the state. The United Nations Development Programme stated that "the 21-year regime of Siyad Barre had one of the worst human rights records in Africa." The new regime became a client state of the Soviet Union and on the first anniversary of the coup officially adopted 'Scientific socialism as its core ideology.
Prelude
Ethio-Somali War
Successive Somali governments had continually supported the cause of Somali irredentism and the concept of 'Greater Somalia', a powerful sentiment many Somalis carried, as a core goal of the state. This particularly had strong support from the Isaaq clan who notably sent many volunteers, especially in 1976 as they joined WSLF guerrilla insurgencies and sent many volunteers a year before the war took place. Another factor behind the strong support from the Isaaq was the fact that the border that was drawn between Ethiopia and Somalia cut off important grazing grounds for Isaaq tribesmen. Barre along with the Supreme Revolutionary Council, to entrench their rule and in an attempt to regain the Somali Region of Ethiopia, launched a war against Ethiopia in 1977, this war was referred to in Somalia as 'The War for Western Somalia'. The Soviet Union, which at the time was allied to both Somalia and Ethiopia turned against Barre, and (with their allies) provided enough support to the Ethiopian army to defeat the Somali forces and force a withdrawal from the Somali region of Ethiopia.
Displacement of Isaaq and arming of refugees
All of Somalia felt the impact of the Ogaden War defeat, however the northern region (where Isaaqs live) experienced the majority of the physical and human destruction due to its geographical proximity to the fighting. Somalia's defeat in the Ethio-Somali War caused an influx of Ethiopian refugees (mostly ethnic Somalis and some Oromo) across the border to Somalia. By 1979, official figures reported 1.3 million refugees in Somalia, more than half of them were settled in Isaaq lands in the north. This has caused great deal of burden on both the local Isaaqs and state apparatus, especially coming off a costly war with Ethiopia, Somali studies scholar I. M. Lewis noted that "the stark fact remained that the economy of the country simply did not possess the resources to absorb so many uprooted people."
The presence of such a large number of refugees, especially when Somalia's total population at the time was 4.1 million (UN estimates) meant that virtually one out of every four people in Somalia was a refugee. The Barre regime exploited the presence of such a large number of refugees as means of seeking foreign aid, as well as a vehicle to displacing those deemed hostile to the state, notably the Isaaqs, Human Rights Watch noted that:
"Northerners [Isaaqs] were dismissed from and not allowed to work in government offices dealing with refugee affairs, so that they would not discover the truth about the government's policies. Instead refugees, registered with UNHCR were given jobs in the offices dealing with refugee matters."
As the state became increasingly reliant on international aid, aid resources allocated for the refugees caused further resentment from the local Isaaq residents, especially as they felt no effort was made on the government's part to compensate them for bearing the burden of the war. Furthermore, Barre heavily favoured the Ogaden refugees, who belonged to the same clan (Darod) as him. Due to these ties, the Ogaden refugees enjoyed preferential access to "social services, business licenses and even government posts."
As expressed animosity and discontent in the north grew, Barre armed the Ogaden refugees, and in doing so created an irregular army operating inside Isaaq territories. The regime's use of armed refugees against local Isaaq populations in the north is also referenced in an Africa Watch report:
"[M]any Ogadeni refugees were recruited into the WSLF. The WSLF was ostensibly being trained to fight Ethiopia to regain the Ogaden [Western Somalia], but, in fact, terrorized the Isaak [Isaaq] civilian population living in the border region, which came to fear them more than the Ethiopian army. Killings, rape and looting became common."
Barre was essentially ensuring the loyalty of the Ogaden refugees through continued preferential treatment and protection at the expense of the local Isaaq who were not only bypassed for economic, social and political advancement but also forcefully suppressed by both the Somali Armed Forces and the Ogaden refugee militias.