The Sino-Indian War, also known as the China–India War or the Indo-China War, was an armed conflict between China and India that took place from October to November 1962. It was a military escalation of the Sino-Indian border dispute. The fighting was concentrated in two locations along the India-China border, the North-East Frontier Agency (NESA), and the Aksai Chin region, which were roughly 1,000 km (620 mi) apart. The conflict arose due to China's claims over the Aksai Chin and NESA, with both countries relying on different historical border agreements. India recognised the Johnson Line in the west and the McMahon Line in the east, while China did not recognise them.
A series of border skirmishes arose between the two countries after the 1959 Tibetan uprising, when India granted asylum to the 14th Dalai Lama. The border dispute was not resolved through bilateral talks, and China's construction of a strategic road through Aksai Chin further escalated the dispute. Chinese military action grew increasingly aggressive after India rejected proposed Chinese diplomatic settlements throughout 1960–1962, with China resuming previously banned "forward patrols" in Ladakh after 30 April 1962. In September–October 1962, tensions escalated at Dhola Post and Thagla Ridge on the eastern front, where India interpreted the McMahon Line to run along the ridge, while China rejected this claim. A series of clashes ended with Chinese forces gaining the advantage, and by 18 October, China had amassed a large number of troops for a major offensive.
China abandoned all attempts towards a peaceful resolution on 20 October 1962, and launched simultaneous offensives in NESA (eastern front) and Aksai Chin (western front). The Chinese forces overran the Indian Army positions at Namka Chu and Tawang in the eastern front, and Chip Chap Valley and Pangong Lake in the western front, after a heavy fighting and forced the Indian troops to withdraw. After a three week lull period, China resumed its offensive on 14 November 1962, and captured key positions at Se La, Bomdila, and Gurung Hill on the eastern front. In the western front, the fierce battles of Rezang La and Gurung Hill resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. The conflict ended when China unilaterally declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962 and simultaneously announced its withdrawal to its pre-war position, the effective China–India border.
Much of the fighting consisted of mountain warfare, entailing large-scale combat at altitudes of over 5,000 m (16,000 ft). The war took place entirely on land, without the use of naval or air assets, and neither side officially declared a war, or broke off diplomatic relations. The conflict was viewed as a major military and political setback in India. In response, India rapidly modernised and expanded its armed forces, and strengthened border defences. India reassessed its policy towards China, and the conflict permanently damaged the Sino-Indian relations. As the Sino-Soviet split deepened, the Soviet Union supported India with the sale of military hardware, while India were also compelled to turn to the Soviets for military aid as the United States and the United Kingdom refused to sell them advanced weaponry.
Location
China and India shared a long border. India claimed a 3,488 km (2,167 mi)-long border, while China claimed a shorter border. A number of disputed regions lie along this border. At its western end is the Aksai Chin region, roughly spread across 38,000 km2 (15,000 sq mi), which was claimed by China, while India considered it as part of Ladakh. At its eastern end, China claimed the North East Frontier Agency (NESA), roughly spread across 90,000 km2 (35,000 sq mi), which was administered by India.
The border consisted of mountainous terrain at high elevations. The Aksai Chin region is a cold desert located at an average altitude of 5,000 m (16,000 ft), while NESA consisted of hilly terrain with several peaks exceeding 5,000 m (16,000 ft). The conflict happened in high altitude and freezing conditions, which caused logistic and welfare difficulties for the fighting armies. The harsh conditions also resulted in several casualties, with many troops on both sides succumbing to the cold temperatures.
Background
The main cause of the war was a dispute over the sovereignty of the widely separated Aksai Chin and NESA border regions. Aksai Chin was claimed by India as belonging to Ladakh and by China to be a part of Xinjiang. China constructed a road through the region that connected the Chinese regions of Tibet and Xinjiang, which was one of the triggers of the conflict.
Aksai Chin
The western portion of the Sino-Indian boundary originated in 1834, with the conquest of Ladakh by the armies of Raja Gulab Singh (Dogra) under the suzerainty of the Sikh Empire. Following an unsuccessful campaign into Tibet, Gulab Singh and the Tibetans signed a treaty in 1842 agreeing to stick to the "old, established frontiers", which were left unspecified. The British defeat of the Sikhs in 1846 resulted in the transfer of the Jammu and Kashmir region including Ladakh to the British, who then installed Gulab Singh as the Maharaja under their suzerainty. British commissioners contacted Chinese officials to negotiate the border, who did not show any interest. The British boundary commissioners fixed the southern end of the boundary at Pangong Lake, but regarded the area north of it till the Karakoram Pass as terra incognita.
The Maharaja of Kashmir and his officials were keenly aware of the trade routes from Ladakh. Starting from Leh, there were two main routes into Central Asia: one passed through the Karakoram Pass to Shahidulla at the foot of the Kunlun Mountains and went on to Yarkand through the Kilian and Sanju passes; the other went east via the Chang Chenmo Valley, passed the Lingzi Tang Plains in the Aksai Chin region, and followed the course of the Karakash River to join the first route at Shahidulla. The Maharaja regarded Shahidulla as his northern outpost, in effect treating the Kunlun mountains as the boundary of his domains. His British suzerains were sceptical of such an extended boundary because Shahidulla was 79 miles (127 km) away from the Karakoram Pass and the intervening area was uninhabited. Nevertheless, the Maharaja was allowed to treat Shahidulla as his outpost for more than 20 years.
Chinese Turkestan regarded the "northern branch" of the Kunlun range with the Kilian and Sanju passes as its southern boundary. Thus the Maharaja's claim was uncontested. After the 1862 Dungan Revolt, which saw the expulsion of the Chinese from Turkestan, the Maharaja of Kashmir constructed a small fort at Shahidulla in 1864. The fort was most likely supplied from Khotan, whose ruler was now independent and on friendly terms with Kashmir. When the Khotanese ruler was deposed by the Kashgaria strongman Yakub Beg, the Maharaja was forced to abandon his post in 1867. It was then occupied by Yakub Beg's forces until the end of the Dungan Revolt.
In the intervening period, W. H. Johnson of Survey of India was commissioned to survey the Aksai Chin region. While in the course of his work, he was "invited" by the Khotanese ruler to visit his capital. After returning, Johnson noted that Khotan's border was at Brinjga, in the Kunlun mountains, and the entire Karakash Valley was within the territory of Kashmir. The boundary of Kashmir that he drew, stretching from Sanju Pass to the eastern edge of Chang Chenmo Valley along the Kunlun mountains, is referred to as the "Johnson Line" (or "Ardagh-Johnson Line").
After the Chinese reconquered Turkestan in 1878, renaming it Xinjiang, they again reverted to their traditional boundary. By now, the Russian Empire was entrenched in Central Asia, and the British were anxious to avoid a common border with the Russians. After creating the Wakhan corridor as the buffer in the northwest of Kashmir, they wanted the Chinese to fill out the "no man's land" between the Karakoram and Kunlun ranges. Under British (and possibly Russian) encouragement, the Chinese occupied the area up to the Yarkand River valley (called Raskam), including Shahidulla, by 1890. They also erected a boundary pillar at the Karakoram pass by about 1892. These efforts appear half-hearted. A map provided by Hung Ta-chen, a senior Chinese official at St. Petersburgh, in 1893 showed the boundary of Xinjiang up to Raskam. In the east, it was similar to the Johnson line, placing Aksai Chin in Kashmir territory.
By 1892, the British settled on the policy that their preferred boundary for Kashmir was the "Indus watershed", i.e., the water-parting from which waters flow into the Indus river system on one side and into the Tarim basin on the other. In the north, this water-parting was along the Karakoram range. In the east, it was more complicated because the Chip Chap River, Galwan River and the Chang Chenmo River flow into the Indus whereas the Karakash River flows into the Tarim basin. A boundary alignment along this water-parting was defined by the Viceroy Lord Elgin and communicated to London. The British government in due course proposed it to China via its envoy Sir Claude MacDonald in 1899. This boundary, which came to be called the Macartney–MacDonald Line, ceded to China the Aksai Chin plains in the northeast, and the Trans-Karakoram Tract in the north. In return, the British wanted China to cede its 'shadowy suzerainty' on Hunza.
Following the Xinhai Revolution in 1911 which resulted in power shifts in China, the fall of Tzarist Russia in 1917 and the end of World War I in 1918, the British officially used the Johnson Line but had lost the urgency to enforce this boundary. They took no steps to establish outposts or assert control on the ground. According to Neville Maxwell, the British had used as many as 11 different boundary lines in the region, as their claims shifted with the political situation. From 1917 to 1933, the "Postal Atlas of China", published by the Government of China in Peking had shown the boundary in Aksai Chin as per the Johnson line, which runs along the Kunlun Mountains. The "Peking University Atlas", published in 1925, also put the Aksai Chin in India.
The use of Johnson line or Macartney-MacDonald line was neglected by the colonial administrators and by 1947, when India gained independence, the British left the government of India with high ambiguity about the settled border to the North. The Indian government choose to lay claim to Aksai Chin after 1947. On 1 July 1954, India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru definitively stated the Indian position, claiming that Aksai Chin had been part of the Indian Ladakh region for centuries, and that the border (as defined by the Johnson Line) was non-negotiable. According to George N. Patterson, when the Indian government finally produced a report detailing the alleged proof of India's claims to the disputed area, "the quality of the Indian evidence was very poor, including some very dubious sources indeed".
In 1956–57, China constructed a road through Aksai Chin, connecting Xinjiang and Tibet, which ran south of the Johnson Line in many places. Aksai Chin was easily accessible to the Chinese, but access from India, which meant negotiating the Karakoram mountains, was much more difficult. The road came on Chinese maps published in 1958.
The McMahon Line
In 1826, British India gained a common border with Tibet after the British wrested control of Manipur and Assam from the Burmese, following the First Anglo-Burmese War of 1824–1826. In 1847, Major J. Jenkins, agent for the North East Frontier, reported that the Tawang was part of Tibet. In 1872, four monastic officials from Tibet arrived in Tawang and supervised a boundary settlement with Major R. Graham, NEFA official, which included the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet. In 1873, the British drew an "Inner Line" as an administrative line to inhibit their subjects from encroaching into the tribal territory within its control. The British boundary, also called the "Outer Line", was defined to mark the limits of British jurisdiction. But it was not significantly different from the Inner Line in this region.
By 1873, it was clear that the British treated the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet. This boundary was confirmed in a 1 June 1912 note from the British General Staff in India.
In 1904, in order to skew Tibet away from Russian influence, an Anglo-Tibetan treaty was written called the Convention of Lhasa. This treaty alarmed the Chinese which started displaying power by crushing rebellions and erecting flags and boundary stones in the Lohit Valley which were mostly removed by the British by 1910. Such aggression from the Chinese conveyed to the Colonial administration that the Tawang tract could serve as a route of invasion in the future.
After the 1911 Revolution, UK sat a weakened China along with Tibet in the Simla Convention to settle the borders between Tibet, China and British India. The foreign secretary of the British Indian government, Henry McMahon was the driving force in this conference. After carrying out surveys, the conference drew the McMahon Line. Whilst all three representatives initialed the agreement, Beijing later objected to the proposed boundary and did not ratify it. McMahon decided to bypass the Chinese (although instructed not to by his superiors) and settle the border bilaterally by negotiating directly with Tibet.
According to later Indian claims, this border was intended to run through the highest ridges of the Himalayas, as the areas south of the Himalayas were traditionally Indian. The McMahon Line lay south of the boundary India claims. India's government held the view that the Himalayas were the ancient boundaries of the Indian subcontinent, and thus should be the modern boundaries of India, while it is the position of the Chinese government that the disputed area in the Himalayas have been geographically and culturally part of Tibet since ancient times.
The British-run Government of India initially rejected the Simla Agreement as incompatible with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which stipulated that neither party was to negotiate with Tibet "except through the intermediary of the Chinese government". The British and Russians cancelled the 1907 agreement by joint consent in 1921. It was not until the late 1930s that the British started to use the McMahon Line on official maps of the region.
China took the position that the Tibetan government should not have been allowed to make such a treaty, rejecting Tibet's claims of independent rule. For its part, Tibet did not object to any section of the McMahon Line excepting the demarcation of the trading town of Tawang, which the Line placed under British-Indian jurisdiction. Up until World War II, Tibetan officials were allowed to administer Tawang with complete authority. Due to the increased threat of Japanese and Chinese expansion during this period, British Indian troops secured the town as part of the defence of India's eastern border.