On the morning of Wednesday, 16 April 2014, the ferry MV Sewol sank while en route from Incheon towards Jeju City in South Korea. The 6,825-ton vessel sent a distress signal from about 2.7 kilometres (1.7 mi; 1.5 nmi) north of Byeongpungdo at 08:58 KST (23:58 UTC, 15 April 2014). Out of 476 passengers and crew, 304 people died in the disaster, including around 250 students from Danwon High School in Ansan. Around 82% of the Sewol's casualties were children. Out of the 172 survivors, more than half were rescued by fishing boats and other commercial vessels that arrived at the scene approximately 40 minutes before the Korea Coast Guard (KCG).
The sinking of Sewol resulted in widespread social and political reaction within South Korea. In a short-answer poll taken by Hankyoreh newspaper in December 2014, the Sewol disaster was voted the second most important historical event in South Korea since the country's independence, behind only the Korean War. Many people criticized the actions of the ferry's captain and most of the crew. Also criticized were the ferry's operator, Chonghaejin Marine, and the regulators who oversaw its operations, along with the administration of President Park Geun-hye for her response to the disaster and attempts to downplay government culpability, and the Korean Coast Guard for its poor handling of the disaster, and the perceived passivity of the rescue-boat crew on scene. Outrage has also been expressed against the initial false reporting of the disaster by the government and South Korean media, who claimed everyone aboard had been rescued, and against the government for prioritizing public image over the lives of its citizens in refusing help from other countries, and publicly downplaying the severity of the disaster.
On 15 May 2014, the captain and three crew members were charged with murder, while the other eleven members of the crew were indicted for abandoning the ship. As part of a government campaign to manage public sentiment over the official response to the sinking, an arrest warrant was issued for Yoo Byung-eun (described as the owner of Chonghaejin Marine), but he could not be found despite a nationwide manhunt. On 22 July 2014, the police announced that a body found in a field in Suncheon, roughly 290 kilometres (180 mi) south of Seoul, was identified as Yoo.
Background
At the time of its purchase by Chonghaejin Marine on 8 October 2012, the ship that would come to be known as MV Sewol was eighteen years old and dilapidated. It was originally named Ferry Naminoue and was operated from 1994 to 2012 as a transport ship for cargo and passengers by the Japanese company A-Line Ferry. According to A-Line Ferry, it did not experience any problems during its service in Japan.
Chonghaejin modified the ship from 12 October 2012 to 12 February 2013, and registered it on 22 October 2012. The modifications included adding two decks of passenger space and expanding cargo space. Gross tonnage increased by 239 tons to 6,825 tons and passenger capacity increased by 116 people for a total of 956 passengers and crew. The modifications shifted the center of gravity up by 0.51 m (1 ft 8 in) and created a left-right imbalance. After the sinking, Korean website Daily Labor News reported that the modifications were illegal before retracting the statement.
The modified ship was inspected and certified by the Korean Register of Shipping (KR). KR reduced the maximum cargo load by 1,450 tons to 987 tons, and increased the ballast carried by 1,333 tons to 1,703 tons. The cargo limits were not known by the Korea Shipping Association, which managed ferries, or the Korea Coast Guard (KCG), which oversaw the Shipping Association. Certification included an inclining test. Sewol received its inspection certification and certification for the prevention of sea pollution on 12 February 2013. After the inspections, 37 tons of marble were added to the exhibition room at the rear of the new bridge deck. After the sinking, the Board of Audit and Inspection discovered that KR's licensing was based on falsified documents.
Sewol began operations on 15 March 2013. She made three round trips per week from Incheon to Jeju, each one-way voyage of 425 kilometres (264 mi) taking 13.5 hours to complete. On 19 February 2014, she received an interim inspection and a periodic inspection from the Register. It made 241 round trips by the day of the incident.
On 15 April 2014, Sewol scheduled departure from the port at Incheon at 6:30 p.m. KST. was delayed by fog, which reduced visibility to less than 1 kilometre (0.62 mi). A low visibility warning issued by the port's vessel traffic service (VTS) was in effect from around 5:30 p.m. to 8:35 p.m. During this period, the Shipping Association held Sewol's departure. The Shipping Association checked the weather conditions with the operator of the Palmido lighthouse and consulted the KCG before authorizing the ship to proceed at about 8:50 p.m. Sewol departed around 9 p.m., and was the only ship to leave port that evening.
Sewol carried 476 passengers and 33 crew members. The passengers included 325 students and 14 teachers on a field trip from Danwon High School. Five passengers were of non-Korean nationality. Nineteen crew members were irregular, part-time workers. The ship was commanded by 69-year-old Captain Lee Joon-seok, who replaced the regular captain. Lee had over forty years of experience at sea and had traveled the route before. He was hired on a one-year contract, with a monthly salary of ₩2.7 million (roughly US$2,500).
The ship also carried 2,142.7 tons of cargo - including 185 cars- which exceeded the maximum allowed 987 tons and was improperly secured. Only 761.2 tons of ballast were taken on board, the ballast tanks had not been properly maintained, and the previous voyage had been made without making further adjustments to the ballast during the journey. Shin, Sewol's regular captain, had warned Chonghaejin about the reduced stability which he attributed to the removal of the side ramp; Shin later claimed that the company threatened to fire him if his objections continued. Shin's warnings were also relayed to the Incheon Port Authority on 9 April 2014; a Chonghaejin official responded by stating that he would deal with anyone making the claims. Shin had also requested repairs for the malfunctioning steering gear on 1 April 2014, but this was not done. The KR stability test report dated 24 January 2014 stated that Sewol had become "too heavy and less stable after modifications were made".
Chonghaejin spent ₩2.6 thousand (US$2) on safety training for the crew in 2013, which was used to buy a paper certificate.
Wednesday, 16 April 2014
On 16 April at 7:30 a.m. (KST), third mate Park Han-kyul and helmsman Cho Joon-ki took over the watch from the previous team. At this time, Sewol was heading at a course of about 165 degrees at a speed of about 20 knots (37 km/h; 23 mph) and was operating two radar devices. Around 8:20 a.m. when the ship was about 3–5 kilometres (2–3 nmi) from entering the Maenggol Channel, Park ordered Cho to change the steering system from autopilot to manual steering. When Sewol arrived at the channel at 8:27 a.m. at a course of around 137 degrees, the wind speed was between 4–7 metres per second (8–14 kn; 14–25 km/h), the wave height about 0.5 meters (1 ft 8 in), and the visibility was good.
The Maenggol Channel has strong currents, which necessitate extreme caution when steering a ship through it. At the time of the incident, conditions were calm and Sewol was following a route that was frequently used. While the wider areas of the channel contain rock hazards and shallow waters, they were not in the immediate vicinity of the ship's usual path. While prosecutors and some news organizations labeled Park as being inexperienced based on her unfamiliarity with the channel, the Korean Maritime Safety Tribunal's investigation report noted that she had on multiple occasions passed through the channel on another ship.
As Sewol approached the fatal turn, breakfast was being served in the cafeteria. CCTV data taken at 8:40 a.m. showed students present and socializing on the deck. One surviving passenger, Choi Eun-seun, recalled having gone up to the deck to smoke right before the incident.
Multiple turns to the right (08:48)
Right before the incident, Park and Cho were standing side by side near the ship's wheel at the bridge. Captain Lee was absent from the bridge at the time. At 8:46 a.m., as Sewol was travelling at a speed of 18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph) at a course of around 136 degrees, Park ordered Cho to change the course from 135 degrees to 140 degrees, which Cho consequently undertook.
The accounts of what happened next are conflicting. According to Park's testimony, after she had used the radar to check that Sewol's course was changed and the new course was set to 140 degrees, she ordered Cho to change the course of the ship further to 145 degrees. The order was given at 8:48 a.m. After realizing that the ship was heavily listing to starboard, which led the bow to turn to the right, she gave an order to turn the wheel to port. Immediately after giving the order, she heard Cho exclaim, "The wheel isn't working" in a flustered voice, after which the ship started listing.
Cho's testimony did not notably differ from that of Park. He testified that the listing began with the order to turn to 140 degrees. According to Cho, he only received the order to change the course to 140 degrees, and not the order to change the course to 145 degrees. As Sewol kept turning towards the right even as he was holding onto the wheel, he made two turns to the left amounting to a five-degree turn. As the ship did not stop its rightward turning, it was eventually facing a 145-degree course. Cho testified that Park gave an order to turn "in the opposite direction" at this point, which he followed by turning the ship further to the left by ten degrees, so the total amount of the turn became fifteen degrees to the left.
The court came to the conclusion that Cho's steering led the ship to attempt a fifteen-degree turn for forty seconds. The court concluded that Cho, who was flustered by the ship turning faster than expected while he was following Park's order to turn to 145 degrees, was attempting to turn to the left when he took Park's order to mean a turn in the opposite direction. This led him to make a turn to the right, causing the front of the ship to rapidly turn right.
Effects of the turn
A Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries analysis of Sewol's track chart discovered that the ship's Automatic Identification System (AIS) did not collect data for a 36 second period from 8:48:37 to 8:49:13. The failure was initially attributed to a power outage. Huh Yong-bum, the head of the expert advisory panel on the police-prosecution joint investigation team, later testified that the AIS failure was due to system limitations and that it did not affect the steering.
According to the joint investigation team, Sewol's sharp turn was a combined result produced by the steering error and the lessened restoring force caused by overloading; however, investigations did not show any malfunctions with the generator or the battery. From 8:49:26, AIS data showed the ship's angular velocity accelerated from 0.29 degrees per second (dps) to 0.83, 1.00, and 2.00 until 8:49:39; these readings were consistent with previous testing data gained from earlier tests conducted on an empty Sewol. Consequently, the ship herself listed twenty degrees into the water at 8:49:40, causing cargo to fall to one side of the ship. The impact caused the ship's gyroscope to erroneously record angular velocities of 15 dps at 8:49:40, 14 dps the next second, and minus 11 dps the following second. Given that the shifted cargo effectively compounded the destabilizing effect, the ship tilted ten degrees further into the water. Passengers also reported hearing a loud "bang".
As Cho sharply turned the ship from 135 to 150 degrees, Sewol began to list to port and tilt towards the water. The overall effect was that the ship turned about 45 degrees to the right, then rotated an additional 22 degrees on the spot for a span of twenty seconds. The cargo falling to one side of the ship caused Sewol to lose all her restoring force and allowed water to flow into the ship through the side door of the cargo loading bay and the car entrance located at the stern. This scenario was confirmed by simulations separately run by the expert advisory panel on the joint investigation team, the Korea Research Institute of Ships and Ocean Engineering, and the Advanced Marine Engineering Center of Seoul National University. Cho testified that the tilting lasted for about two to three minutes after the initial tilt. During this time, Oh Yong-seok, an off-duty helmsman who was sleeping in his cabin, was awoken when he was thrown against its port side. As of 8:50 a.m., Sewol was leaning thirty degrees to port.
Captain Lee, who was in his private cabin at the time of the incident, immediately rushed to the bridge. After a short period, all the ship's mates and helmsmen arrived there as well. Around this time, Cho stopped the engines, although it is unknown whether it was on his own volition or following an order from Lee. At 8:50, Cho ordered an evacuation of the engine room through a call to the assistant engineer. During this time, Park was crying, as she was startled by the sudden incident; this lasted until at least 9:06 a.m. With the engines off, Sewol became unable to change directions and began drifting sideways. A passenger later testified that lights went out after the ferry started listing.
Calls for rescue (8:52–9:30)
Important Announcement repeated during capsizing
Do not move. Just stay where you are. It's dangerous if you move, so just stay where you are.
— As reported by CNN on 16 April