The Saur Revolution, also known as the April Revolution or the April Coup, was a violent coup d'état and uprising staged on 27 and 28 April 1978 by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which overthrew Afghan president Mohammad Daoud Khan, who had himself taken power in the 1973 Afghan coup d'état and established an autocratic one-party system in the country. Daoud and most of his family were executed at the Arg presidential palace in the capital city of Kabul by Khalqist (a PDPA faction) military officers, after which his supporters were also purged and killed. The successful PDPA uprising resulted in the creation of a socialist Afghan government that was closely aligned with the Soviet Union, with Nur Muhammad Taraki serving as the PDPA's General Secretary of the Revolutionary Council. Saur (also rendered Sowr) is the Dari-language name for the second month of the Solar Hijri calendar, during which the events took place.
The uprising was ordered by PDPA member Hafizullah Amin, who would become a significant figure in the revolutionary Afghan government. At a press conference in New York City in June 1978, Amin claimed that the event was not a coup d'état, but rather a "popular revolution" carried out by the "will of the people" against Daoud's government. The Saur Revolution involved heavy fighting throughout Afghanistan and resulted in the deaths of as many as 2,000 military personnel and civilians combined. It remains a significant event in Afghanistan's history as it marked the beginning of decades of continuous conflict in the country.
Background
With the support and assistance of minority political party the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Mohammad Daoud Khan took power in the 1973 Afghan coup d'état by overthrowing the monarchy ruled by his first cousin, King Mohammad Zahir Shah, and established the first Republic of Afghanistan. Since then, several coup attempts against Daoud's government had occurred such as those in September 1973, August 1974, and December 1976. According to some of the PDPA's leaders, the party had begun plotting a possible coup attempt as early as 1976.
President Daoud was convinced that closer ties and military support from the Soviet Union would allow Afghanistan to take control of Pashtun lands in northwestern Pakistan. However, Daoud, who was ostensibly committed to a policy of non-alignment, became uneasy over Soviet attempts to dictate Afghanistan's foreign policy, and relations between the two countries deteriorated.
Under the secular government of Daoud, factionalism and rivalry developed in the PDPA, with two main factions being the Parcham and Khalq factions. On 17 April 1978, a prominent member of the Parcham, Mir Akbar Khyber, was assassinated. Although the government issued a statement deploring the assassination and claiming Gulbuddin Hekmatyar responsible, Nur Muhammad Taraki of the PDPA charged that the government was responsible, a belief that was shared by much of the Kabul intelligentsia. PDPA leaders apparently feared that Daoud was planning to eliminate them. On April 19, massive protests broke out in Kabul as a result of Khyber's death. Alarmed at the size and strength of the demonstrations, Daoud Khan ordered security officials to suppress the protestors and the leadership of the PDPA.
The Khalqists were highly successful at recruiting supporters within the army due to widespread disillusionment with Daud appointing officers based on nepotistic or tribal connections, in addition to Parcham being associated with government collaboration.
During the funeral ceremonies for Khyber, a protest against the government occurred, and shortly thereafter, most of the leaders of PDPA, including Babrak Karmal, were arrested. Hafizullah Amin was put under house arrest, which gave him a chance to order an uprising, one that had been slowly coalescing for more than two years. Amin, without having the authority, instructed the Afghan army officers in the PDPA's Khalqist faction to overthrow the government. The KGB, having been informed of the coup two days earlier by Mohammed Rafie and Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoy, accused the Iranian SAVAK of tricking PDPA supporters into starting a rebellion.
Uprising
Preliminary steps for the coup came in April, when a tank commander under Daoud warned of intelligence suggesting an attack on Kabul in the near future, specifically 27 April. On the commander's recommendation, tanks (mostly Soviet-made T-55 and T-62 tanks) were positioned around the Arg, the presidential palace. On the 27th, the tanks turned their guns on the palace. The tank commander who made the request had, in secret, defected to the PDPA's Khalq faction beforehand.
In order to distract the government of the Republic of Afghanistan, PDPA sympathizers within the Afghan Armed Forces planted weapons and undetonated explosives in certain areas and tipped security forces to their locations, blaming Islamist groups. This was done in order to distract the government from the PDPA's activities and to shift the government's attention towards the leftist's ideological enemies, leading to the weakening of any Islamist organizations in Afghanistan.
On the early morning of the day of the coup, Daoud had just gotten ready when one of his office members informed him of a "riot" that was taking place in one of the military garrisons in Kabul. Daoud hurried to his office and asked his secretary to get hold of the phone number of the Chief of Staff, which could not be done after ten minutes of effort and additional attempts of finding the numbers of other military chiefs. A minute later, the telephone stopped working, as the 4th and 15th Tank Brigades began firing at the Arg. 50 armored vehicles belonging to the 4th Tank Brigade entered the city under the orders of then-Senior Captain Aslam Watanjar, and at the same time, Abdul Qadir took control of the MiG-21-equipped 322nd Air Regiment. A BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle, used by the PDPA in their coup, was destroyed by the Republican Guard Brigade using an RPG-7, in front of the Arg.
According to an eyewitness, the first signs of the impending coup in Kabul, at about noon on 27 April, were reports of a tank column headed toward the city, smoke of unknown origin near the Ministry of Defense, and armed men, some in military uniform, guarding Ariana Circle, a major intersection. The first shots heard were near the Ministry of Interior in the downtown Shahr-e Naw section of Kabul, where a company of policemen apparently confronted an advancing tank column. From there the fighting spread to other areas of the city. Later that afternoon, the first fighter planes, Sukhoi Su-7s, came in low and fired rockets at the Arg in the center of the city. In the early evening, an announcement was broadcast on government-owned Radio Afghanistan that the Khalq were overthrowing the Daoud government. The use of the word Khalq, and its traditional association with the communists in Afghanistan, made clear that the PDPA was leading the coup, and also that the rebels had captured the radio station. The Presidential Guard, present at the Arg, additionally thought that they were fighting against Islamists, not the PDPA.
At approximately 10:30am, an echelon of tanks moved towards the Afghan Air Force Headquarters, being directed there by Nazar Mohammad and Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoy from the Air Force Gendarmerie Base, firing at the headquarters. The Kabul International Airport Security Division Commander 2nd Lieutenant Khan Jan Maqbal, being caught off guard as they were performing Attan, hurriedly gathered the security unit to fire at the tanks, as the Khalqist tank crews fired shells towards the unit, killing Maqbal as surviving members of security unit were scattered. The tank crew eventually gained control of the headquarters, engaging in executions of officers. As Abdul Qadir landed in Bagram Airfield by helicopter, Daoud Taroon also engaged in the impartial killings of officers who just happened to be present at the airfield, accusing them of "opposing the coup". Anthony Hyman, a British writer, has recorded the deaths of 30 officers as a result of the killings. In truth, former Afghan Army officer Mohammad Nabi Azimi states that these killings were not performed due to opposition to the coup, but rather due to personal disputes or bloodlust. Additionally, Azimi claimed that Western estimates on casualties during the coup were exacerbated, claiming only 40 people might've died all together.
As resistance waned, the leadership of the Afghan Army—consisting of Defence Minister Ghulam Haidar Rasuli, Brigadier General Abdul Ali Wardak and Lieutenant General Abdul Aziz—left Tajbeg Palace, the headquarters of the 1st Central Corps, and hid in the house of a gardener who reported their location to the PDPA rebels. In the morning, they were arrested and summarily executed in Pul-e-Charkhi prison.
Lastly, at 11:30pm, armored units were dispatched to Jalalabad to fight loyalist officers of the Afghan Army's 11th Division who refused to accept the coup, with the death toll nearing 1000 people. The commander of the 11th Division was eventually shot dead.
Execution of Daoud and government purge
For the first time in the history of Afghanistan, the last remnants of monarchy, tyranny, despotism and power of the dynasty of the tyrant Nader Khan has ended and all powers of the state are in the hands of the people of Afghanistan.
— Announcement on Radio Afghanistan at 7pm
The aerial attacks on the palace intensified about midnight as six Su-7s made repeated rocket attacks, lighting up the city. The next morning, 28 April, Kabul was mostly quiet, although the sound of gunfire could still be heard on the southern side of the city. As the people of Kabul ventured out of their homes they realized that the rebels were in complete control of the city and learned that President Daoud and his brother Naim had been killed early that morning. After a day of fighting, an army lieutenant of the 444th Commando Brigade named Imamuddin entered the palace with a unit of soldiers to arrest Daoud. The president refused to go with them and fired a pistol at the soldiers. The soldiers responded by killing both Daoud and Naim. In addition, the Defense Minister of Daoud's cabinet Ghulam Haidar Rasuli, Interior Minister Abdul Qadir Nuristani, and Vice President Sayyid Abdulillah were also killed.
Other family members and close relatives of Daoud, including included women and children, were also killed at the presidential palace. Daoud had earlier ordered them to be brought to the palace from their homes in the city for their safety as soon as he was informed of the emergence of a crisis situation in Kabul earlier that day.
The coup marked the end of power of the Barakzai dynasty after 152 years.
Speculated Soviet involvement
There was speculation that the Soviet Union was behind the coup, but no convincing evidence to support this ever appeared. Soviet military advisors in Kabul had been informed about the coup several hours before it began. However, (based on the current state of knowledge as of 2024) they were not involved in the planning and the Soviet leadership was surprised by the events. According to Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Korniyenko, the Soviet leadership was informed about the coup through a statement by the Reuters news agency. The Soviet news agency TASS used the term "military coup" in its report, which would most likely have been called a "popular revolution" if the Soviets stood behind the coup. Political scientist William Maley has noted that while the Soviets were not directly involved, rising tensions with Daoud may have prompted them to refrain from taking steps to prevent an Afghan communist coup.
State Department analysts told U.S. President Jimmy Carter that direct Soviet involvement in the coup was unlikely: "Although they had probably become somewhat disillusioned with President Daoud, we do not think they would have tried to take over this important non-aligned country."
One year before Lieutenant General Shahnawaz Tanai's death, in 2021, he admitted that the coup was done without Soviet assistance in the documentary "Afghanistan: The Wounded Land". In 1997, during his residency in Tashkent, General Nabi Azimi additionally admitted the same thing and attempted to debunk claims of Soviet involvement in the coup, notably from Ahmad Shah Massoud's brother and various Afghan writers.