Since 2014, the government of China has committed a series of ongoing human rights abuses against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim minorities in Xinjiang which has often been characterized as persecution or as genocide. There have been reports of mass arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, mass surveillance, cultural and religious persecution, family separation, forced labor, sexual violence, and violations of reproductive rights.
In 2014, the administration of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary Xi Jinping launched the Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism, which involved surveillance and restrictions in Xinjiang. Beginning in 2017, under Xinjiang Party secretary Chen Quanguo, the government incarcerated over an estimated one million Uyghurs without legal process in internment camps officially described as "vocational education and training centers", in the largest mass internment of an ethnic-religious minority group since World War II. China began to wind down the camps in 2019, and some detainees were transferred to the penal system, while others were transferred to forced labor and factory work programs.
In addition to mass detention, government policies have included suppression of Uyghur religious practices, political indoctrination, forced sterilization, forced contraception, and forced abortion. An estimated 16,000 mosques have been razed or damaged, and hundreds of thousands of children have been forcibly separated from their parents and sent to boarding schools. Since 2017, preferential family planning exemptions previously available to Uyghurs have reportedly been reduced or removed. Chinese government statistics reported that from 2015 to 2018, birth rates in the mostly Uyghur regions of Hotan and Kashgar fell by more than 60%. In the same period, the national birth rate decreased by 9.7%. According to CNN, Chinese authorities acknowledged that birth rates dropped by almost a third in 2018 in Xinjiang, but denied reports of forced sterilization. Birth rates in Xinjiang fell a further 24% in 2019, compared to a nationwide decrease of 4.2%. Chen Quanguo was succeeded by Ma Xingrui as Xinjiang Party Secretary in 2021; Ma's tenure led to the end to overt crackdowns and the campaign-style mobilization under Chen and shifted towards a "normalization" phase while continuing the previous policies facilitating ethnic assimilation.
The Chinese government denies having committed human rights abuses in Xinjiang. International reactions have varied, with its actions being described as the forced assimilation of Xinjiang, as ethnocide or cultural genocide, or as genocide. Those accusing China of genocide point to intentional acts they say violate Article II of the Genocide Convention, which prohibits "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part", a "racial or religious group" including "causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group" and "measures intended to prevent births within the group".
At the United Nations, several countries, predominantly North American or European, signed letters condemning China's policies. Whilst other countries, predominantly Asian or African, signed letters supporting the policies as an effort to combat terrorism in the region. In 2020, a case brought to the International Criminal Court was dismissed because China is not a party to the Rome Statute, meaning the ICC could not investigate them. In 2021, the United States Department of State declared China's actions as genocide, and legislatures in several countries have passed non-binding motions doing the same, while other parliaments, condemned the policies as "severe human rights abuses" or crimes against humanity. In a 2022 assessment, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stated that China's policies and actions in the Xinjiang region may constitute crimes against humanity, though it did not use the term genocide. In 2026, the OHCHR described China's policies toward the Uyghurs as potentially amounting to "forcible transfer and/or enslavement as a crime against humanity."
Since 2014, the government of China has committed a series of ongoing human rights abuses against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim minorities in Xinjiang which has often been characterized as persecution or as genocide. There have been reports of mass arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, mass surveillance, cultural and religious persecution, family separation, forced labor, sexual violence, and violations of reproductive rights.
In 2014, the administration of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary Xi Jinping launched the Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism, which involved surveillance and restrictions in Xinjiang. Beginning in 2017, under Xinjiang Party secretary Chen Quanguo, the government incarcerated over an estimated one million Uyghurs without legal process in internment camps officially described as "vocational education and training centers", in the largest mass internment of an ethnic-religious minority group since World War II. China began to wind down the camps in 2019, and some detainees were transferred to the penal system, while others were transferred to forced labor and factory work programs.
In addition to mass detention, government policies have included suppression of Uyghur religious practices, political indoctrination, forced sterilization, forced contraception, and forced abortion. An estimated 16,000 mosques have been razed or damaged, and hundreds of thousands of children have been forcibly separated from their parents and sent to boarding schools. Since 2017, preferential family planning exemptions previously available to Uyghurs have reportedly been reduced or removed. Chinese government statistics reported that from 2015 to 2018, birth rates in the mostly Uyghur regions of Hotan and Kashgar fell by more than 60%. In the same period, the national birth rate decreased by 9.7%. According to CNN, Chinese authorities acknowledged that birth rates dropped by almost a third in 2018 in Xinjiang, but denied reports of forced sterilization. Birth rates in Xinjiang fell a further 24% in 2019, compared to a nationwide decrease of 4.2%. Chen Quanguo was succeeded by Ma Xingrui as Xinjiang Party Secretary in 2021; Ma's tenure led to the end to overt crackdowns and the campaign-style mobilization under Chen and shifted towards a "normalization" phase while continuing the previous policies facilitating ethnic assimilation.
The Chinese government denies having committed human rights abuses in Xinjiang. International reactions have varied, with its actions being described as the forced assimilation of Xinjiang, as ethnocide or cultural genocide, or as genocide. Those accusing China of genocide point to intentional acts they say violate Article II of the Genocide Convention, which prohibits "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part", a "racial or religious group" including "causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group" and "measures intended to prevent births within the group".
At the United Nations, several countries, predominantly North American or European, signed letters condemning China's policies. Whilst other countries, predominantly Asian or African, signed letters supporting the policies as an effort to combat terrorism in the region. In 2020, a case brought to the International Criminal Court was dismissed because China is not a party to the Rome Statute, meaning the ICC could not investigate them. In 2021, the United States Department of State declared China's actions as genocide, and legislatures in several countries have passed non-binding motions doing the same, while other parliaments, condemned the policies as "severe human rights abuses" or crimes against humanity. In a 2022 assessment, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stated that China's policies and actions in the Xinjiang region may constitute crimes against humanity, though it did not use the term genocide. In 2026, the OHCHR described China's policies toward the Uyghurs as potentially amounting to "forcible transfer and/or enslavement as a crime against humanity."
Background
Uyghur identity
Uyghurs are a Turkic ethnic group native to Xinjiang. They are distinct from the Han Chinese, the predominant ethnic group in China. Uyghurs are the second-largest predominantly Muslim ethnicity in China, after the Hui, and Sunni Islam is an important aspect of Uyghur identity. The Uyghur language has around 10 million speakers and is shared with other minority groups in the region.
Xinjiang conflict
Both Uyghur and the predominantly Han government lay claim to Xinjiang. This prompted an ethnic conflict featuring resistance and sporadic violence as Uyghurs sought greater autonomy. Sinologists Anna Hayes and Michael Clarke have described Xinjiang as undergoing a process of transition as the Chinese government attempts to transform it from a frontier region to an "integral" province of a unitary Chinese state.
From the 1950s to the 1970s, the Chinese government sponsored a mass migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang and introduced policies designed to suppress cultural identity and religion in the region. During this period, Uyghur independence organizations emerged with some support from the Soviet Union, with the East Turkestan People's Party being the largest in 1968. During the 1970s, the Soviets supported the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan (URFET) against the Han Chinese.
During the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping, China pursued a new policy of cultural liberalization in Xinjiang and adopted a flexible language policy nationally. Despite a positive response among party officials and minority groups, the Chinese government viewed this policy as unsuccessful and from the mid-1980s its official pluralistic language policy became increasingly subordinate to a covert policy of minority assimilation motivated by geopolitical concerns. Consequently, and in Xinjiang particularly, multilingualism and cultural pluralism were restricted to favor a "monolingual, monocultural model", which in turn helped to embed and strengthen an oppositional Uyghur identity. Attempts by the Chinese state to encourage economic development in the region by exploiting natural resources led to ethnic tension and discontent within Xinjiang over the region's lack of autonomy. In April 1990, the Barin uprising, near Kashgar, was suppressed by the People's Liberation Army (PLA), involving a large number of deaths. Writing in 1998, political scientist Barry Sautman considered policies designed to reduce inequality between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities in Xinjiang unsuccessful at eliminating conflicts because they were shaped by the "paternalistic and hierarchical approach to ethnic relations adopted by the Chinese government".
In February 1997, a police roundup and execution of suspected "separatists" during Ramadan led to large demonstrations, which led to a PLA crackdown on protesters resulting in at least nine deaths in what became known as the Ghulja incident. The Ürümqi bus bombings later that month killed nine people and injured 68, with Uyghur exile groups claiming responsibility. In March 1997, a bus bomb killed two people, with responsibility claimed by Uyghur separatists and the Turkey-based "Organisation for East Turkistan Freedom".
Initial "Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism"
During the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the Chinese state began to emphasize weiwen (stability maintenance) which led to an intensification of repression across the country. Some within the Party warned that increased action to combat instability which might not even exist could lead to a spiral of repression and unrest.
In April 2010, after the July 2009 Ürümqi riots, Zhang Chunxian replaced the former CCP secretaryWang Lequan, who had been behind religious policies in Xinjiang for 14 years. New policies were implemented by Zhang Chunxian. Following the 2014 Kunming attack that killed 31 people, Xi Jinping told the Politburo "We should unite the people to build a copper and iron wall against terrorism", and "Make terrorists like rats scurrying across the street, with everybody shouting, 'Beat them!'" In April 2014, Xi traveled to Xinjiang and told police in Kashgar that "We must be as harsh as them, and show absolutely no mercy." A suicide bombing occurred in Ürümqi on the last day of his visit.
In 2014, a secret meeting of CCP leadership was held in Beijing to find a solution to the problem, which would become known as the Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism. In May 2014, China publicly launched the campaign in Xinjiang in response to growing tensions between the Han Chinese and the Uyghur populations of Xinjiang. Following the announcement of the campaign, CCP general secretary Xi Jinping held the Central Symposium on Work in Xinjiang, where he outlined new CCP policies toward Xinjiang and stated that "practice has proved that our party's ruling strategy in Xinjiang is correct and must be maintained in the long run".
Following guidance from Beijing, CCP leadership in Xinjiang commenced a "People's War" against the "Three Evils" of separatism, terrorism, and extremism. They deployed two hundred thousand party cadres to Xinjiang and launched the Civil Servant-Family Pair Up program. Xi was dissatisfied with the initial results of the People's War and replaced Zhang Chunxian with Chen Quanguo in 2016. Following his appointment Chen oversaw the recruitment of tens of thousands of additional police officers and the division of society into three categories: trusted, average, and untrustworthy. He instructed his subordinates to "Take this crackdown as the top project", and "to preempt the enemy, to strike at the outset".
Regulations since 2017
Following a meeting with Xi in Beijing, Chen Quanguo held a rally in Ürümqi with ten thousand troops, helicopters, and armored vehicles. As they paraded, he announced a "smashing, obliterating offensive", and declared that they would "bury the corpses of terrorists and terror gangs in the vast sea of the People's War." He ordered them to "round up everyone who should be rounded up", and by April 2017 mass arrests had begun. New bans and regulations were implemented on 1 April 2017. Abnormally long beards and the wearing of veils in public were both banned. Not watching state-run television or listening to radio broadcasts, refusing to abide by family planning policies, or refusing to allow one's children to attend state-run schools were all prohibited.
In 2017, China's Ministry of Public Security began to procure race-based monitoring systems which could reportedly identify whether or not an individual was Uyghur. Despite its questionable accuracy, this allowed a "Uyghur alarm" to be added to surveillance systems. Enhanced border controls were also implemented with guilt being presumed in the absence of evidence. Zhu Hailun, Communist Party secretary of Kashgar, signed off on a bulletin in 2017 that presumed guilt in persons from Xinjing who had travelled abroad. According to Zhu, "If suspected terrorism cannot be ruled out, then a border control should be implemented to insure the person's arrest".
In 2017, 73% of foreign journalists in China reported being restricted or prohibited from reporting in Xinjiang, up from 42% in 2016.
Alleged "re-education" efforts began in 2014 and were expanded in 2017. Internment camps were built for the housing of students of the "re-education" programs, most of whom were Uyghurs. Chen ordered that the camps "be managed like the military and defended like a prison". The Chinese government did not acknowledge the camps' existence until 2018 and called them "vocational education and training centers". From 2019, the government began referring to them as "vocational training centers". The camps tripled in size from 2018 to 2019 despite the Chinese government stating that most of the detainees had been released.
The use of these centers appears to have ended in 2019 following international pressure. Academic Kerry Brown attributes their closures beginning in late 2019 to the expense required to operate them. Although no comprehensive independent surveys of such centers have been performed as of October 2022, spot checks by journalists have found such sites converted or abandoned. In 2022, a Washington Post reporter checked a dozen sites previously identified as re-education centers and found "[m]ost of them appeared to be empty or converted, with several sites labeled as coronavirus quarantine facilities, teachers' schools and vocational schools."
In December 2021, Chen Quanguo was succeeded as Xinjiang Party Secretary by Ma Xingrui, the governor of Guangdong. Since his accession to the post, Xinjiang has seen relative normalization in some aspects, such as turnstiles between residential areas being removed and two-day breaks in weekends for public officials being restored. Chen's departure led to the end of overt crackdowns and the campaign-style mobilization in Xinjiang, with Ma bringing what Zenz describes as normalizing a "coercive environment".
Propaganda campaign
The Chinese government has engaged in a propaganda campaign to defend its actions in Xinjiang. China initially denied the existence of the Xinjiang internment camps and attempted to cover up their existence. In 2018, after widespread reporting forced it to admit that the Xinjiang internment camps exist, the Chinese government initiated a campaign to portray the camps as humane and to deny that human rights abuses occurred in Xinjiang. In 2020 and 2021, the propaganda campaign expanded due to rising international backlash against government policies, with the Chinese government worrying that it no longer had control of the narrative.