Operation Moshtarak (Dari for Together or Joint), also known as the Battle of Marjah, was an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) pacification offensive in the town of Marjah, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. It involved a combined total of 15,000 Afghan, American, British, Canadian, Danish, and Estonian troops, constituting the largest joint operation of the War in Afghanistan up to that point. The purpose of the operation was to remove the Taliban from Marja, thus eliminating the last Taliban stronghold in central Helmand Province. The main target of the offensive was the town of Marjah, which had been controlled for years by the Taliban as well as drug traffickers.
Although Moshtarak was described as the largest operation in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, it was originally supposed to be the prelude to a much larger offensive in Kandahar that would follow Moshtarak by several months. ISAF chose to heavily publicize the operation before it was launched, comparing its scope and size to the 2004 Second Battle of Fallujah, in the hopes that Taliban fighters in the town would flee.
The operation was also designed to showcase improvements in both the Afghan government and Afghan security forces. ISAF claimed that the operation was "Afghan-led" and would use five Afghan brigades. General Stanley A. McChrystal, the commander of ISAF, also promised that following the offensive ISAF would install a "government in a box" in Marja.
While initially successful, ISAF and the Afghan government failed to set up a working government in the town, leading to a successful resurgence by the Taliban; 90 days into the offensive General McChrystal famously referred to it as a "bleeding ulcer". In October the town was still described as "troubling", but by early December the fighting there was declared "essentially over".
Shortly after the withdrawal of NATO soldiers from Marja, it was reported the Taliban had regained control of the town and district with US army analysts describing the goals of the operation as a failure. It has later been cited as a critical turning point in the war, as its failure led the Obama administration to shift in strategy, away from increasing the number of American combatants for a decisive victory and toward deescalation of the war.
Strategic meaning
The operation was called "a key test" of the coalition strategy against the Taliban insurgency. Brigadier James Cowan, the commander of British forces in Helmand, believed it would mark "the start of the end of this insurgency". At the very least it would become a test of whether the Afghan forces would be able to make their country peaceful and safe.
The announcement of the operation was also a part of this strategy: "shaping the information battlefield strategic communications", and to ensure it would not repeat the destruction of Fallujah in Iraq in 2004. Hours before the offensive began, Afghan and coalition forces dropped leaflets with the message, "Do not allow the Taliban to enter your home".
After this operation in Helmand province, the neighbouring province and the city of Kandahar became a target of American operations. In March 2010, U.S. and NATO commanders released details of plans for the biggest offensive of the war against the Taliban insurgency.
New war model
When launched, the operation was called a "new war model". Afghan and NATO officials had assembled a large team of Afghan administrators and an Afghan governor that would move into Marja after the fighting, with more than 1,900 police standing by. "We've got a government in a box, ready to roll in", said American commander Stanley McChrystal. The capture of Marja was intended to serve as a prototype for a new type of military operation. The Afghan government had pledged to hold any territory seized in the Taliban heartland during the assault. Utilities engineers were on hand to ensure power and water supplies were maintained.
Timeline of battle
Background
As early as September 2009, Canadian soldiers from 3 Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry began training about 400 Afghan National Army recruits for the operation. Since January 2010, coalition forces had launched smaller "shaping operations" to prepare for the main assault on February 13. One of these operations was a series of "find, fix, strike" raids by four-man SAS teams and U.S. Army Special Forces team ODA 1231. These resulted in the deaths of 50 Taliban leaders in the area according to NATO, but didn't seem to have any real adverse effect on the Taliban's operations. In another operation, the Scots Guards and Grenadier Guards captured a bomb factory and defused 20 IEDs.
The Afghan public was warned of the upcoming operation, in line with new rules of engagement for British forces, called "courageous restraint." The tactic, conceived by U.S. General Stanley McChrystal and British Major General Nick Carter, required soldiers to "use brain-power rather than fire-power" and hoped to reduce damage to the Afghan population (in terms of collateral and life cost) by using fewer munitions and support measures. 11 Light Brigade, the main British formation in Helmand for use in the counter-insurgency role tested the doctrine in some of the more heavily populated areas in Helmand.
The publicity and the new tactics intended to prevent the loss of civilians, and to persuade insurgents to lay down their arms. The operation was the first in Helmand since the surge of 30,000 U.S. troops and additional British reinforcements in late 2009/early 2010.
The main force was the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Task Force Leatherneck) as well as British Soldiers from 1 Coldstream Guards Battle Group, 1 Grenadier Guards Battle Group, 1 Royal Welsh Battle Group all supported by Close Support Combat Engineers from 28 Engineer Regiment; elements of the United States Army; and Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police forces.
British Forces focused on the Lashkar Gah district and Nad Ali district, and U.S. forces on the town of Marja. U.S. assault forces included the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines and 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines, 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion, and elements of 2nd Assault Amphibian Battalion and 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion The operation also intended to cut the opium trade. Its main aim was to ensure that captured ground can be held by British and American troops, enabling the Afghan government and civilian aid agencies and military contractors to work more effectively in the province.
A majority of the US forces were inserted by CH-53 and MV-22 helicopters, while the rest conducted a ground assault. The Canadian Forces focused on the air assault with seven helicopters, including three CH-47 Chinook escorted by four CH-146 Griffon. The Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-Afg) ferried about 1,100 coalition troops to Nad Ali District in the largest air assault ever conducted with Canadian helicopters. 33 other coalition helicopters, supported by fighter jets and uncrewed aerial vehicles, also participated in the operation with a total of 11 waves of troop drops.
Ahead of the military operation, hundreds of civilian families fled Marja and its surroundings and were displaced from their homes due to the offensive by NATO and their Afghan partners. The town was suspected to be "one of the biggest, most dangerous minefields NATO forces have ever faced," and hundreds of the beleaguered insurgents could insist to fight until death.
Late December and Early January
By early January the surge forces which President Obama had announced on December 1, 2009, had arrived in country. The bulk of the Marine forces included the 1st and 3rd Battalion of the 6th Marine Regiment. They quickly setup command at Camp Dwyer, south of Marjah. They were joined with Afghan Army units and began training and preparing for their mission in Marjah. At the same time a small task force, A SQN The Household Cavalry Regiment would begin to secure the main road from Lashkargah around local police compounds at the main t-junction, which divides the main road North to Nad-e-Ali and South to Marjah. With 3 Troop tasked to move on a dirt track in a 12-man team in Scimitar's and 2 pick up's with a Tiger Team SF team, to prove a potential cross country route towards Marjah and probe the Taliban in the Bolan Desert in the weeks leading up to the Moshtarak.
Late January and Early February
As the assault drew near, US and coalition forces began to encircle the city in order to screen those entering and exiting, gather intelligence, and deceive the enemy as to the avenue of approach for the well publicized assault. 1st Battalion, 6th Marines moved command to Fire Base Fiddlers Green, home of 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines just southeast of Marjah, the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines built temporary Camp Belleau Wood just northwest of the city, and Bravo Company, 2nd Assault Amphibian Battalion and Alpha Company, 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion filled the desert to the west.
At the same time a small task force, A SQN The Household Cavalry Regiment (HCR) would begin to secure the main road from Lashkargah around local police compounds at the main t-junction, which divides the main road North to Nad-e-Ali and South to Marjah. With 3 Troop tasked to move in a 12-man team in 4 Scimitar's and 2 pick up's with a Tiger Team SF team, to prove a potential off-road route towards Marjah from the East and probe the Taliban in the Bolan Desert in the weeks leading up to the Moshtarak. In these weeks 3 Troop would encounter resistance each day and found dozens of IED's along the route. Sleeping next to the vehicles at night left allowed them to stay mobile but the Taliban were determined to no avail. At the same time 2 TP HCR (12 man team) would encounter a force of 35 Taliban moving South to Marjah, stopping them with help from Apache support.
February 9, 2010 (D-4)
In preparation for the major offensive, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines seized the "Five Points" junction east of Marja on the road to Lashkar Gah. Elements of Charlie Company were inserted by air under cover of darkness, while elements of Bravo Company, along with 1/3's Combat Engineer Platoon, traveled 9 kilometers on foot from their bases in the Nawa district, sweeping the road for explosive devices. Also Route Clearance Platoons clearing routes from their respective staging locations (In the Desert or Cop) into pre-specified locations and intersections from the East West North and South(a "Breach Point" at the Southern tip of the City in a specific instance(Breaching a canal with a bulldozer and a Fasseen type bridge gaining access to the much sought after city((RCP3 Attached/Embedded into ODA 3121)) While repelling Taliban assaults, the Marines built a combat outpost, completed on February 14, that they named COP Reilly. The 1/3 Marines held COP Reilly and the northeastern outer sector of Marjah until February 25, when Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines arrived to take control of the position.
February 11, 2010 (D-2)
On February 11, forces staged all around the city and at the major airbases ready for the next day's assault. Hours before midnight the Afghan President Hamid Karzai had given his personal approval for the operation, that had been delayed for 24 hours as Afghan officials entered last minute negotiations with insurgents.
February 12, 2010 (D-1)
February 12 was the original D-day, but after a 24-hour delay to for negotiations, forces were on a standout and had one extra day for preparation.
February 13, 2010 (D-Day)
Hours before dawn, US and Afghan special operations forces inserted into two key target sites in the southwest corner of Marjah. They would be isolated until Marines, Soldiers, and Afghani troops from Task Force 3/4/205 could link up. Just prior to dawn, the landing waves of helicopters across central Helmand marked the start of the major offensive. Third Battalion, 6th Marines were inserted into the northern part of the city and 1st Battalion, 6th Marines in the center of the city. In the southern edge, Task force 3/4/205 conducted a ground breach and companies of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines also conducted a ground breach from the southeast.
On February 13, two hours before dawn at 4 am local time the first of 90 Chinook and Huey helicopters disgorged a force of British, Afghan and French troops. The US Special Forces ODA's 1231 and ODA 3121 had been on the ground for hours prior to the main push seizing control of their objectives. The Special Forces then advanced north into the city meeting heavy resistance and capturing further objectives. The advance into Marja was slowed during the morning through poppy fields lined with home-made explosives and other land mines.
The first kills were reported to be made by uncrewed Predator aircraft and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, targeting insurgents seen laying roadside bombs and setting up anti-aircraft guns. At 2 am local time the troops from the U.S. Marine Corps seized a series of canal crossings south of Nad-e-Ali.
Within minutes, the U.S., British and Afghan special forces seized and secured dozens of helicopter landing sites. Most notably U.S. Army Special Forces ODA 1231 along with Afghan Commandos from 3rd Commando Kandak took control of the southern tip of the city, being the first boots on the ground. At 2:25 am Chinooks approached, flown by pilots with night vision equipment and guided by infrared flares, dropped from U.S. Marine KC-130's. At about 4 am, RAF Chinooks full of soldiers from the 1st battalion the Royal Welsh left Camp Bastion, the main British base in Helmand, for the Pegasus landing zone in the Taliban stronghold of Showal in the Chah-e-Anjir area.