Event
1944 United States naval operation during World War II
Operation Hailstone was a large-scale United States Navy air and surface attack on Truk Lagoon on 17–18 February 1944, conducted as part of the American offensive drive against the Imperial Japanese Navy in the Pacific Ocean theatre of World War II.
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Text from the Wikipedia article “Operation Hailstone”, available under CC BY-SA 4.0.
Operation Hailstone was a large-scale United States Navy air and surface attack on Truk Lagoon on 17–18 February 1944, conducted as part of the American offensive drive against the Imperial Japanese Navy in the Pacific Ocean theatre of World War II.
Japanese troops occupied Micronesia, including the Caroline Islands, in 1914 and established Truk as a base as early as 1939. The lagoon was first built up as an anchorage for the Imperial Japanese Navy's 4th Fleet, its "South Seas Force". After the outbreak of war with the United States, the 4th Fleet was put under the command of the Combined Fleet, which continued to use Truk as a forward operating base into 1944. In addition to anchorages for warships and port facilities for shipping between the home islands and the Southern Resources Area, five airfields and a seaplane base were constructed at Truk, making it the only major Japanese airfield within flying range of the Marshall Islands. As Imperial Japan's main base in the South Pacific theatre of World War II, it was often described as the "Japanese Pearl Harbor".
There was a myth that Truk was heavily fortified, and it was given nicknames like "the Gibraltar of the Pacific." Despite the impressions of U.S. Navy leaders and the American public concerning Truk's projected strength as the "Japanese Pearl Harbor", Truk was never significantly reinforced or protected against land attack. In fact,
[T]he reality was somewhat different. (...) The lack of fortifications was less due to Japan's regard for international law than to Japan's economic limitations. It could not afford both a large navy and extensive naval fortifications. It opted to build up its naval forces, neglecting fixed defenses.
Japanese development of Truk's fortifications instead began in earnest in late 1943, with defensive measures being taken against a potential U.S. invasion. Airfields were extended and shore batteries were erected. Nonetheless, Japanese preparations were inadequate with few anti-aircraft guns and inadequate radar warning. The continued separate command arrangements made it hard for Navy fighter planes and Army troops to coordinate defensive efforts.
Because aircraft stationed at Truk could potentially interfere with the upcoming invasion of Eniwetok, and because Truk had recently served as a ferry point for the resupply of aircraft to Rabaul, Admiral Raymond Spruance ordered Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force, designated TF 58, to carry out air raids against Truk. Three of TF 58's four carrier task groups were committed to the operation. Their total strength consisted of five fleet carriers (Enterprise, Yorktown, Essex, Intrepid, and Bunker Hill) and four light carriers (Belleau Wood, Cabot, Monterey, and Cowpens), carrying more than 500 warplanes. Supporting these aircraft carriers was a task force of seven battleships and numerous heavy cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.
The Japanese, meanwhile, understood the weakness of their position at Truk. The IJN had begun withdrawing major units (battleships, heavy cruisers, carriers) from the anchorage as early as October 1943. The effective abandonment of Truk as a forward operating base accelerated during the first week of February 1944, following Japanese sightings of U.S. Marine Corps PB4Y-1 Liberator reconnaissance planes sent to reconnoiter the area.
The three carrier task groups committed to Hailstone moved into position and began launching their first fighter sweep 90 minutes before daybreak on 17 February 1944. No Japanese air patrol was active at the time, as the IJN's 22nd and 26th Air Flotillas were enjoying shore leave after weeks on high alert following the Liberator sightings. Similarly problematic for the Japanese, radar on Truk was not capable of detecting low-flying planes—a weakness probably known and exploited by Allied intelligence organizations. Furthermore, radar stations were not adequately manned and telephone communications were poor. Because of these factors, U.S. carrier aircraft achieved total surprise.
Japanese pilots scrambled just minutes before TF 58 planes arrived over Eten, Param, Moen, and Dublon Islands. Though more than 300 Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service (IJNAS) and Imperial Japanese Army Air Service (IJAAS) planes were present at Truk on the first day of the attacks, only about half of them were operational, compared to over 500 operational aircraft among the carriers of TF 58. U.S. Navy fighter pilots in their Grumman F6F Hellcats, with the advantages of speed, altitude, armor, and surprise, achieved a one-sided victory against IJNAS pilots flying Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters. As many as 30 of the 80 Zeros sent up in response to the fighter sweep were shot down during the battle. Only token aerial resistance was encountered for the rest of the morning; almost no Japanese aircraft were present by the afternoon.
Due to the lack of air cover or warning, many merchant ships were caught at anchor, with only the islands' anti-aircraft guns for defense against American carrier planes. Some vessels outside the lagoon already steaming towards Japan were attacked by American submarines and sunk before they could make their escape. Other Japanese ships attempting to flee via the atoll's North Pass were bottled up by aerial attack and by Admiral Spruance's surface force, Task Group 50.9, which circumnavigated Truk, bombarding shore positions and engaging enemy ships.
Torpedo bomber and dive bomber squadrons from the American carrier air groups (CAGs) were responsible for the bulk of the damage inflicted on Japanese ground facilities. Early on the first day of Hailstone, Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bomber squadrons from Enterprise's Carrier Air Group 10 (CAG-10) and Intrepid's CAG-6 dropped fragmentation and incendiary bombs on runways at Eten Island and the seaplane base on Moen Island. Dozens of aircraft were damaged or destroyed on the ground, further blunting any possible response by the Japanese to the strikes. Subsequent joint attacks by dive bombers and Avenger torpedo bombers cratered runways and destroyed hangar facilities.
Morning strikes were also launched against shipping in the lagoon. Lieutenant Commander James D. Ramage, commanding officer of Dive Bombing Squadron 10 (VB-10), is credited with sinking the previously damaged merchant tanker Hoyo Maru. Lieutenant James E. Bridges and his crew in one of Intrepid's Torpedo Squadron 6 (VT-6) Avengers scored a direct hit on the ammunition ship Aikoku Maru. The torpedo detonation set off the ammunition carried near the bow, resulting in a tremendous explosion which immediately sank the ship taking down 945 crew and passengers, and also engulfed Bridge's plane.
By the second and third strikes of the day, CAG action reports listed the apparent enemy mission as "escape". Japanese ships that were able to make for open sea steamed for the North Pass exit from the lagoon while weathering repeated aerial attacks. One particular group of warships – the cruiser Katori, auxiliary cruiser Akagi Maru, destroyers Maikaze and Nowaki, and minesweeper Shonan Maru – was given special attention by carrier bombers. Multiple air groups attacked these ships, inflicting serious damage. Yorktown's dive- and torpedo-bombing squadrons claimed two hits on the violently maneuvering Katori and hits on another cruiser and multiple destroyers; Essex bombers claimed five hits on a Katori-class cruiser, stating that the ship was stopped dead in the water after the attack. Akagi Maru was sunk by air attacks.
At this point, reports reached Admiral Spruance concerning the group of warships fleeing through North Pass. Spruance was so adamant on engaging in ship-to-ship combat that his carrier commander, Admiral Mitscher, ordered his CAGs to stop attacking Katori and her companions. Spruance put himself in tactical command of Task Group 50.9, made up of four destroyers, heavy cruisers Minneapolis and New Orleans, and the new battleships Iowa and New Jersey, which he personally led in a surface engagement against the previously damaged Japanese ships. The battered Japanese ships did not stand much of a chance against Task Group 50.9, though members of his staff saw Spruance's decision to engage in surface action when aircraft likely could have achieved similar results as needlessly reckless. Indeed, the Japanese destroyer Maikaze managed to fire torpedoes at the battleship New Jersey during the engagement. Fortunately for Spruance, the torpedoes missed, and the "battle" ended with predictably one-sided results. The U.S. Navy surface combatants received virtually no damage, and it was the only time that Iowa and New Jersey fired their main guns at enemy ships.
Meanwhile, New Jersey's 5-inch (127 mm) guns combined fire with U.S. cruisers to sink Maikaze and Shonan Maru, while Iowa targeted and sank Katori, which was already dead in the water, with numerous hits from her main battery. Nowaki was the only Japanese ship from this group to escape, sailing through a gauntlet of fire from Iowa and New Jersey, suffering only very minor damage at the hand of a straddle from a high capacity, 16-inch (406 mm) round from New Jersey at the extremely long range of 35,700 yards (20.3 statute miles or 32.6 kilometers).
Retaliation for the day's strikes arrived late at night in the form of small groups of Japanese bombers flying out of Truk and Formosa probing the task groups' defenses. From roughly 21:00 on 17 February to just minutes past midnight on 18 February, at least five groups of between one and three enemy planes attempted to sneak past screening ships to strike at the fleet carriers. One lone Rikko-type twin engine bomber from the 755th Kōkūtai (Genzan Air Group) made its attack on Task Group 58.2 and torpedoed the starboard quarter of the Intrepid, damaging steering control and killing 11 sailors. Intrepid was forced to retire to the U.S. for repairs and did not return to combat until August 1944.
The attacks on Truk have often been described as the Americans' payback for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor several years earlier, although American carrier aircrews were disappointed that major Japanese surface warships were absent, as they had been withdrawn prior to the raid (in parallel to the absence of U.S. carriers from Pearl Harbor). The only warships that were left to the Americans to attack were relatively insignificant, consisting of two light cruisers and four destroyers plus some auxiliaries.
Nonetheless, Japanese losses at Truk were severe as these affected the navy's logistical capabilities. Truk had been a key center for aircraft distribution and repair in supporting Japanese naval aviation. Some 17,000 tons of stored fuel were destroyed by American airstrikes. Shipping losses totaled almost 200,000 tons, including several precious fleet oilers, of which the Japanese navy had a dwindling number by early 1944. Vessels sunk at Truk represented almost one-tenth of total Japanese shipping losses between 1 November 1943 and 30 June 1944. At this point in the war, Japan's industrial capability was unable to replenish such losses in ships and aircraft, in contrast to the American rearmament after the Pearl Harbor raid. In contrast to Truk, Pearl Harbor's oil storage tanks and repair yards had remained untouched during the attacks on 7 December 1941.
After the Truk attacks, the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff blamed Masami Kobayashi and relieved him of his command two days later. On 30 May 1944, Kobayashi was forced from active service and on 31 May 1944, he went into the reserves.
Text from the Wikipedia article “Operation Hailstone”, available under CC BY-SA 4.0.