Operation Cedar Falls was a military operation of the Vietnam War conducted primarily by US forces that took place from 8 to 26 January 1967. The aim of the massive search-and-destroy operation was to eradicate the Iron Triangle, an area northwest of Saigon that had become a major stronghold of the Viet Cong (VC).
It was the largest American ground operation of the Vietnam war: two Army divisions, one infantry and one paratrooper brigade, and one armored cavalry regiment participated in the operation. Altogether, it involved 30,000 US and South Vietnamese troops. The VC, however, chose to evade the massive military force by fleeing across the border to Cambodia or by hiding in a complex system of tunnels. Still, the Allied forces uncovered and destroyed some of the tunnel complexes as well as large stockpiles of VC supplies. In the course of the operation, so-called tunnel rats were introduced to infiltrate the Viet Cong's tunnel systems.
In an attempt at the permanent destruction of the Iron Triangle as a VC stronghold, Operation Cedar Falls also entailed the complete deportation of the region's civilian population to so-called New Life Villages, the destruction of their homes, and the defoliation of whole areas. Following this, the area was declared a free-fire zone and adults who were found in the zone following deportations were considered "enemy combatants" afterwards.
Most senior officers involved in planning and executing the operation later evaluated it as a success. Most journalists and military historians, however, paint a bleaker picture. They argue that Cedar Falls failed to achieve its main goal since the VC's setback in the Iron Triangle proved to be only temporary. Moreover, critics argue that the harsh treatment of the civilian population was both morally questionable and detrimental to the US effort to win Vietnamese hearts and minds and drove many into the ranks of the VC instead. Therefore, some authors cite Operation Cedar Falls as a major example of the misconceptions and inadequate perceptions of US strategy in Vietnam and for its morally troublesome consequences.
Background
The Iron Triangle
The planning for Operation Cedar Falls evolved out of the broader strategic aims which MACV, the United States' unified command structure for its military forces in South Vietnam, had formulated for 1967. Following the war's earlier stages, in which the dispatch of a large number of US ground troops had averted the collapse of the South Vietnamese regime and during which the Americans had built up their forces, COMUSMACV General William C. Westmoreland planned to go on the offensive during 1967. He planned to clear big People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) or VC strongholds and to push communist forces into South Vietnam's lightly populated border regions where US forces would be able to make more lavish use of their firepower.
The town of Bến Súc was in a central area of the Iron Triangle and politically controlled by the VC. Prior to 1964, the town was ostensibly neutral, with both ARVN and VC presence. In 1964 the ARVN outpost was overrun and the area was declared a liberated zone, with the VC establishing its own governing apparatus. Bến Súc was described by Jonathan Schell as an important market town for the region with a population of 3,500, and a refuge point for people fleeing from combat operations and US/ARVN aerial and artillery nearby. The area was located in proximity to several free-fire zone, and the village was surrounded by the daily presence of bombardment in nearby hills and forests and occasional bombardment from US forces.
On Westmoreland's order, Lieutenant General Jonathan O. Seaman, Commanding General, II Field Force, Vietnam, began planning for an operation code named Operation Junction City aimed at disrupting VC control of War Zone C. When the strength of Seaman's troops built up he suggested an attack on another major VC stronghold as well, the so-called Iron Triangle. This was the nickname for an area of approximately 155 km2 (60 sq mi) about 20 km (12 mi) north of Saigon which, being bounded by the Saigon River to the southwest, Than Dien Forest to the north, and the Thi Tinh River to the east, had a roughly triangular shape. Virtually since the beginning of the Second Indochinese War, this area had become a big VC staging ground and rear area which, by 1966, South Vietnamese government officials or military forces had not dared to enter in years. Due to the Iron Triangle's location, shape, and the scope of VC activity there, it had been called a "dagger pointed at the heart of Saigon". Westmoreland agreed and so it was decided that Operation Junction City was to be preceded by Operation Cedar Falls.
Since earlier efforts to clear the VC from the Iron Triangle had failed, Operation Cedar Falls was intended to achieve nothing less than its eradication as an enemy sanctuary and base of operations. Therefore, Operation Cedar Falls was to involve not only an assault on regular VC forces and their infrastructure, but also the deportation of the area's entire civilian population, the destruction of their homes, the area's defoliation, and its categorization as a free-fire zone.
Opposing forces and terrain
American intelligence indicated that the VC's Military Region IV headquarters were located in the Iron Triangle; their destruction thus was a principal aim of the operation. Moreover, the 272nd Regiment, the 1st and 7th Battalions of Military Region IV under the VC 165th Regiment, the Phu Loi Local Force Battalion, plus three local force companies, as well as the 2nd, 3rd, and 8th Battalions of the 165th Regiment were suspected to operate in the Iron Triangle.
To strike against this enemy force, II Field Force organized the single largest ground operation of the American war in Vietnam involving the equivalent of three US divisions, some 30,000 US and South Vietnamese troops. The US units involved were the 1st and 25th Infantry Division, the 196th Infantry Brigade, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, as well as the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Throughout the operation these units were supposed to bear the brunt of the fighting; South Vietnamese troops were planned to search villages in the region, perform logistical tasks, as well as organizing the deportation of the civilian population.
As often during the Vietnam War, the terrain of the area of operations constituted a major problem for military planners. Indeed, the reason why the VC were able to establish the Iron Triangle as a major sanctuary was that its terrain made it difficult for larger military forces to access this region. Therefore, another major aim of the operation was to destroy large parts of the vegetation through defoliants and bulldozers in order to make the Iron Triangle more easily accessible for future operations.
Battle plan
Operation Cedar Falls was planned as a "hammer and anvil" operation. Under the cloak of deceptive deployments on seemingly routine operations, the 25th Infantry Division with the 196th Infantry Brigade attached to it was to assume blocking positions west of the Iron Triangle, along the Saigon River, while one brigade of the 1st Infantry Division was assigned the same task along the Thi Tinh River east of the area of operations. The remaining units were then supposed to "hammer" the VC against this "anvil" by rapidly moving through the Iron Triangle, scouring it for enemy troops and installations, and clearing it of civilians. A tight encirclement of the area was to prevent communist units from retreating.
Operation Cedar Falls was scheduled to begin on 5 January 1967, when weather conditions were most favorable. It was divided into two distinct phases. During preparatory phase I, 5-9 January, the "anvil" was set up by positioning the relevant units along the Iron Triangle's flank, and an air assault on Bến Súc, a key fortified VC village, was to take place on 8 January (D-day). These operations were to be succeeded by the completion of the area's encirclement as well as a concerted drive of American forces through the Iron Triangle (the "hammer") from both the south and the west in phase II.
Battle
Phase I
Positioning forces and the assault on Bến Súc
Starting on 5 January, blocking forces assumed their positions to south of the Iron Triangle along the Saigon River (the 25th Infantry Division and the 196th Infantry Brigade) and east of it (1st Infantry Division) to set up the anvil. On D-day, finally, elements of the 1st Infantry Division's 2d Brigade commenced the planned air assault on the village of Bến Súc.
Bến Súc was the main pillar of the VC's dominance over the Iron Triangle. This fortified village was supply and political center with its population organized as rear service companies. Achieving tactical surprise, American forces were able to encircle and seal off the village against light resistance. A South Vietnamese battalion was then flown in to search the village and interrogate its inhabitants. A complex tunnel and storage system was uncovered and large quantities of supplies were obtained and later destroyed. The allied forces were able to arrest only lower ranking VC military or political personnel.
Following the village's screening, 106 villagers were detained; the remaining inhabitants of Bến Súc and of surrounding villages, some 6,000 individuals, two-thirds of them children, were deported, along with their belongings and livestock, in trucks, river boats and helicopters to relocation camps. After the deportation of the village's population, Bến Súc was erased by USAECV engineers who burned the village to the ground and then leveled their remnants as well as the surrounding vegetation using bulldozers. To collapse tunnels too deep for the demolition teams to find and crush, the village was then subjected to heavy air bombardment.
General Bernard Rogers, who served as assistant division commander of the 1st Infantry Division during Operation Cedar Falls, notes that, during the forced evacuation of Bến Súc, inhabitants were "moved as humanely as possible", were allowed to take their possessions and livestock with them, and were even given medical treatment. He concedes that "It was to be expected that uprooting the natives of these villages would evoke resentment, and it did"; he goes on to describe the "sight of the natives of Bến Súc with their carts, chickens, hogs, rice" as "pathetic and pitiful." He reports grave difficulties occurring during the inhabitants' resettlement to the village of Phu Loi. He quotes Westmoreland as having said "Unfortunately, the resettlement phase was not as well planned or executed as the actual evacuation. For the first few days the families suffered unnecessary hardships." When interviewed more than 15 years later, one resident of the village recalled how they were not allowed to take anything from their homes, and how, from the very start of the operation, the army killed villagers. Journalist Jonathan Schell, who wrote an extensive article on the operation for The New Yorker, confirms the government's assessments. Those South Vietnamese officials, who were charged with the relocation of the villagers, were not informed of their task to organize a refugee camp until 24 hours before the forced evacuation began. As a result, the surprised inhabitants of Phu Loi were forced to house the deportees from Bến Súc in their overcrowded dwellings.
Phase II
With phase I largely completed, US forces initiated phase II. Following saturation bombing and artillery fire, elements of the 1st Infantry Division along with the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment began their massive thrust into the Iron Triangle, first cutting the area into half and then conducting a thorough search which covered the entire area of responsibility as Seaman had demanded. The blocking forces of the 25th Infantry Division and of the attached 196th Infantry Brigade conducted search and destroy operations west of the Saigon River and sealed the river by patrolling it on open boats.
This massive military punch largely encountered air. Perhaps forewarned or anticipating the attack, the VC had chosen to evade allied forces by fleeing across the border into Cambodia or hiding in complex underground systems. One of the largest military ground operations since the Korean War and the single largest ground operation of the War in Vietnam was characterized by skirmishes and other small unit actions rather than large-scale combat. Allied troops were overwhelmingly engaged in extensive searches and patrolling during daytime and ambushing during the night; casualties were suffered primarily from sniper fire, land mines, and booby traps.
While allied forces thus failed to search and destroy significant contingents of enemy forces, they did manage to uncover parts of the VC's complex tunnel system where large amounts of VC supplies and documents were found. In order to infiltrate these vast underground complexes, the US military used specifically trained teams (so-called "tunnel rats") for the first time in the war. After having been searched, tunnel complexes were destroyed using a combination of acetylene gas and conventional demolition charges.
A significant part of the operation was also characterized by large-scale combat engineering and chemical operations. Tankdozers, bulldozers, and Rome plows were used by USAECV in jungle-clearing operations in which enemy held terrain was cleared of its vegetation in order to conduct search-and-destroy operations and to destroy enemy installments. Chemicals were used to defoliate parts of the area and to contaminate enemy rice supplies that American forces were unable to remove.