Operation Anaconda or the Battle of Shah-i-Kot was a military operation that took place in early March 2002 as part of the war in Afghanistan. CIA paramilitary officers, working with their allies, attempted to destroy al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. The operation took place in the Shah-i-Kot Valley and Arma Mountains southeast of Zormat. This operation was the first large-scale battle in the post-2001 war in Afghanistan since the Battle of Tora Bora in December 2001. This was the first operation in the Afghanistan theater to involve a large number of U.S. forces participating in direct combat activities.
Between 2 and 18 March 2002, 1,700 airlifted U.S. troops and 1,000 pro-government Afghan militia battled between 300 and 1,000 al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters to obtain control of the valley. The Taliban and al-Qaeda forces fired mortars and heavy machine guns from entrenched positions in the caves and ridges of the mountainous terrain at U.S. forces attempting to secure the area. Afghan Taliban commander Maulavi Saif-ur-Rehman Mansoor later led Taliban reinforcements to join the battle. U.S. forces had estimated the strength of the rebels in the Shah-i-Kot Valley at 200 to 250, but later information suggested the actual strength was of 500 to 1,000 fighters.
The operation was delayed with two days due to bad weather forecasts.
Background
On 11 September 2001, a group of Islamic terrorists attacked the United States. They were led by Osama bin Laden, who was the leader of a group called Al-Qaeda. It was suspected that bin Laden was hiding in Afghanistan, under the protection of the Taliban.
To respond to this threat, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom on 7 October 2001. The goal was to remove the Taliban from power and eliminate al-Qaeda. To achieve this, the US worked together with a rebel group in Afghanistan known as the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance was made up of people from different ethnic backgrounds, such as Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, who opposed the Taliban, which was primarily led by ethnic Pashtuns.
The US used a combination of airstrikes and special ground forces to help the Northern Alliance in its fight against the Taliban. They were able to quickly capture Taliban strongholds, and on 13 November 2001, they successfully took control of the capital city, Kabul.
Around the same time, intelligence suggested that Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda leaders had taken refuge in a training camp located in the Tora Bora mountains near Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province in Eastern Afghanistan. Unlike previous battle areas in Northern Afghanistan, this region was mainly inhabited by Pashtuns.
The United States wanted the Northern Alliance to help them attack Al-Qaeda in Tora Bora, but the Tajik and Uzbek warlords of the Northern Alliance refused. They were not willing to enter the hostile Pashtun areas in the east or south. So, the United States had to find other allies for the assault.
They managed to bribe Pashtun militias in the areas to join forces with them, and called this group the "Eastern Alliance." Together, they launched an attack on the Al-Qaeda training camp in Tora Bora on 30 November 2001. However, these Eastern Alliance militias proved to be far less effective than the Northern Alliance had been. They did not have the same level of animosity towards Al-Qaeda and would leave the battlefield each night to break their Ramadan fast. Due to the lack of effective cooperation with the Eastern Alliance militias, Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda leaders escaped from the Battle of Tora Bora.
After the Tora Bora operation, there was a perception that the reason Osama bin Laden escaped was because there were no US forces in place to stop Al-Qaeda from fleeing into Pakistan. The commanders on the ground had asked for 800 United States Army Rangers to be sent to block these escape routes, but CENTCOM, the military authorities, declined their request. This perceived failure to deploy blocking forces would have a significant impact on the planning of Operation Anaconda.
Around mid-January 2002, US officials received intelligence reports indicating that enemy forces, including Al-Qaeda, were gathering in the Shah-i-kot valley in Paktia Province, which was located about 60 miles south of Gardez. The Lower Shah-i-kot region was close to the Pakistani tribal lands, where many Al-Qaeda fighters were thought to have fled after the Tora Bora operation. As January progressed, US military officials started considering a potential attack on the Shah-i-kot valley.
The Shah-i-kot Valley, meaning 'the Place of the King' in Pashto, is about 9 kilometers long and 5 kilometers wide at its widest point. It consists of two main areas, the Lower Shah-i-kot and the Upper Shah-i-kot, running roughly parallel to each other. In the lower Shah-i-kot, there are several imposing mountains, with Takur Ghar being the most prominent at the southeastern end, and Tsapare Ghar to the northeast, which controls the northern entrance to the valley.
The valley is quite defendable, as its high ridges offer natural caves, crevasses, and other protected spots where guerrilla fighters can position themselves to shoot at the valley floor and access routes. During the Soviet-Afghan War, this area was also a battleground, as the Soviets fought mujahideen guerillas. The mujahideen, who opposed the Red Army in southeast Afghanistan, strategically positioned their defenses in Paktia province, mainly along the central mountain range. One critical highway between Gardez and Khost was a major supply route for the Soviet forces stationed in Khost. However, in 1981, the Afghan fighters successfully blocked this road and laid siege to Khost, forcing the Soviets to rely on airlift for resupply. The siege continued for seven years, and eventually, the Soviets were forced to retreat from the area.
During the Soviet–Afghan War, Mujahideen leader Malawi Nasrullah Mansoor was in charge of the valley and invited foreign jihadists to base themselves in the Lower Shah-i-kot. Mansoor fortified the valley, digging trench systems, building bunkers and firing positions into the ridgelines, many of which would be put into effect during the operation. Malawi Nasrullah Mansoor later joined the Taliban, becoming governor of Paktia Province before being killed in a battle with a rival warlord. Using his family's connections in the region Nasrullah Mansoor's son, Saif-ur-Rehman Mansoor, became the leading Taliban commander of Zurmat District in Paktia Province by 2002. The mujahideen fighters had successfully defeated the Soviet Army twice in this valley, and the Taliban-Al-Qaeda coalition expected events here to pan out in a similar fashion.
Increasing signals and human intelligence indicated a strong presence of Taliban, IMU and al-Qaeda fighters in the Shah-i-Kot Valley; approximately 200 to 250 fighters were believed to be wintering and possibly preparing for a spring offensive in the valley. The signal intelligence also raised the possibility that high-value targets (HVTs) were present in the valley among which were not only Saif Rehman, but also Tohir Yuldeshev, co-founder of the terrorist organization Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Jalaluddin Haqqani, whose tribal network controlled the area.
Jalaluddin Haqqani had a history of fighting against the Soviets with support from the CIA and Pakistan's intelligence agency, ISI. He was once seen as a potential alternative leader among the Pashtuns, apart from the Taliban. The CIA linked the Haqqani family to Osama bin Laden's escape from Tora Bora, an allegation that the family strongly denied. As a result, the Haqqani family became a target for American airstrikes, leading most of its members to flee across the border into Pakistan. However, despite their departure, Al-Qaeda fighters who had sought shelter in the family's tribal lands remained in the Shah-i-kot Valley.
In late January and February, a plan was developed to attack the Shah-i-kot Valley. The operation involved Afghan military forces (AMF) supported and guided by US special operators. Major General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, Commander of the 10th Mountain Division, was assigned to lead the Combined Joint Task Force Mountain responsible for the operation. The strategy was to have Afghan Pashtun militias launch an attack on the valley, similar to what had happened at Tora Bora. But this time, US special forces would be positioned in the eastern mountains to block any potential escape routes into Pakistan. The expectation was that Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters would retreat in the face of the Afghan militias' assault, and the US forces would be able to capture them as they fled.
The US decided to place its trust in a Pashtun warlord named Zia Lodin to lead the Afghan tribal forces. The operation officer of Task Force Dagger, Mark Rosengard, explained why they chose to rely on the Afghan militias that had previously disappointed them during the Battle of Tora Bora. First, there were reports suggesting that the Al-Qaeda forces in Shah-i-kot Valley were mixed among 1000 Afghan civilians. In such a situation, it was crucial to have troops who could distinguish between local civilians and jihadist foreign fighters. There was concern about accidentally killing civilians and repeating the Soviet forces' mistakes, which led to the Afghans viewing them as occupiers. Another reason was to foster a sense of "ownership" among the Afghans over the victory. Rosengard wanted the local people to feel like they were the ones who had driven out the foreign Al-Qaeda fighters from their country. When asked whether such a concept could be embraced on a national level in a country as ethnically diverse as Afghanistan, Mark Rosengard responded that at least Zia Lodin seemed to grasp the idea.
An important element in the operation was a group called Advanced Force Operations (AFO), reporting to Task Force 11 (TF 11). Their role was to carry out risky reconnaissance missions deep within enemy territory. AFO was not a fixed organization; it was a concept coordinated by a special operations headquarters cell that could draw personnel from various special operations units based on the mission's needs. Pete Blaber was chosen to lead AFO's efforts in Afghanistan. It was decided to use U.S. conventional infantry. The forces used, consisting of the 187th Infantry Regiment ("Rakkasans") of the 101st Airborne Division, led by Colonel Frank Wiercinski, and soldiers of 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul LaCamera, were to be inserted by CH-47D Chinooks, supported by six AH-64A Apache helicopters and secure these blocking positions. In keeping with established strategy in Afghanistan, fire support was to be provided by United States Air Force units, rather than artillery. Further air support was provided by U.S. Navy units and French Air Force Mirage 2000Ds. The amount of conventional assets allowed in Afghanistan was limited by United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and civilian defense leadership. The final plan foresaw two major forces: TF Hammer and TF Anvil. TF Hammer consisted of Afghan militias and a small number of US special operators as the primary effort to assault the Shah-i-Kot Valley; their objective was to enter the valley from the north, assaulting through the villages of Serkhankheyl and Marzak, where intelligence indicated that the enemy was concentrated, and channel fleeing enemy into the TF Anvil, the Rakkasan blocking positions. TF Anvil consisted of TF Rakkasan and the 1–87 to set up blocking positions and prevent enemy forces from escaping.
Units involved
The operation was composed of:
- Task Force Dagger: ODAs from the 5th SFG, B company, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR and USAF Combat Controllers.
- Task Force Rakkasan: 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 1st and 2nd battalion 187th Infantry Regiment, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division.
- Task Force Commando: 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.
- Task Force 64: 1 Squadron, Australian Special Air Service Regiment.
- Task Force K-Bar: ODAs from the 3rd SFG.
- Task Force Bowie: AFO (made up of a 45-man reconnaissance unit Delta Force and augmented by selected DEVGRU operators recce specialists, combat controllers and supported by ISA's technical experts, AFO conducted covert reconnaissance usually sending small 2 or 3 man teams on foot or on ATVs, deploying observation posts to watch and report enemy movements and numbers as well as environmental reconnaissance).
- Task Force Sword/11: Mako 30, 31 and 21, Task Force Blue/DEVGRU.
SOF teams from Task Force K-Bar and Task Force 64 included:
These teams inserted into the outer edges of the valley to cut off any escape.