LAPA Flight 3142 was a scheduled Buenos Aires–Córdoba flight operated by the Argentine airline Líneas Aéreas Privadas Argentinas. On 31 August 1999, the Boeing 737-200 operating the flight crashed while attempting to take off from Aeroparque Jorge Newbery International Airport in Buenos Aires.
The crash resulted in 65 fatalities – 63 occupants of the aircraft (3 crew members and 60 passengers) and 2 people on the ground – as well as injuries, some serious, to at least 34 people. As of 2026, it remains the second deadliest aviation accident to occur in Argentina, behind Aerolíneas Argentinas Flight 644, 38 years prior.
Background
Aircraft
The aircraft was Boeing 737-204C, registered as LV-WRZ with serial number 20389 and line number 251. It was also powered by two JT8D-9A engines. It first flew on 14 April 1970, and was delivered to Britannia Airways on 17 April of that year as G-AXNB.
Almost 20 years later, on 1 February 1990, the aircraft was sold to the French airline TAT European Airlines, and registered as F-GGPB.
Finally, the aircraft was delivered to LAPA on 21 December 1996. At the time it crashed, it had accumulated 64,564 hours of flight time and 38,680 take-off/landing cycles. The aircraft was 29 years and 139 days old.
Crew
In command was Captain Gustavo Weigel, aged 45, who had logged 6,500 hours of flying experience, 1700 of which were logged on the Boeing 737. His co-pilot was Luis Etcheverry, aged 31, who had logged about 4,000 hours of flying experience, including 600 on the Boeing 737. Both pilots died in the accident.
With regard to the two pilots, the JIAAC report said that "the records of their flight and simulator training showed repeated negative flying characteristics, and if they had been able to move away from these characteristics in the face of difficulties, their poor attitude manifested itself once again in relaxed attitudes such as that seen in the cockpit of flight 3142".
Even though the report stated that "the pilots had fulfilled technical and psychological requirements", and that "their experience, both in general flight, and with this kind of aircraft was suitable for the job they were performing", a lawsuit later determined that Weigel was not fit to fly, since his license had expired.
Even though these personal issues surrounding the pilots had a very significant influence on the accident, the legal investigation performed in the following years centered on proving that the pilots were not entirely to blame, but that the lack of controls by the Air Force and LAPA's organizational culture also played a role in the events leading to the crash.
Accident
As the aircraft started its takeoff run, the take-off warning system (TOWS) sounded an alarm indicating that the aircraft was not correctly configured for takeoff. The crew ignored the warning and continued, not realising that the flaps were not at the required takeoff position and were instead fully retracted. The jet overshot the runway, breaking through the airport's perimeter fence, crossed a road, hitting an automobile in the process, and finally collided with road construction machinery and a highway median. Fuel spilling over the hot engines and gas leaking from a damaged gas regulation station resulted in a fire that destroyed the aircraft.
The Junta de Investigaciones de Accidentes de Aviación Civil (JIAAC) determined that the pilots failed to configure the aircraft correctly for takeoff. The penal prosecution focused on proving that the company's policies and organization, under negligent supervision of the Argentine Air Force, were the main factors that led to the accident. For instance, it was mentioned that a pilot was allowed to fly without a license by the company. Because of these perceived flaws, some of LAPA's directors and the Air Force staff responsible for monitoring the airline were taken to jury trial.
Analysis
The JIAAC review of the flight reads:
The evening of the accident, the captain arrived at the Aeroparque Jorge Newbery one hour before take-off, as usual, in order to perform a regular commercial flight (LAPA 3142), on which 95 passengers and five crew members were to be transported to the destination airport Ingeniero Ambrosio Taravella in the city of Córdoba.
He arrived before the first officer and had an informal conversation with the flight dispatcher on duty. The aforementioned briefing started with the rest of the flight's crew, and when the first officer arrived, they went back over the weather conditions –which were good– and the NOTAMs for the destination airport as well as for alternative ones. Both pilots controlled the flight plan. Having seen the good weather conditions, the captain selected Aeroparque Jorge Newbery as the alternative airport and decided on the fuel requirements for the flight. The first officer went to the aircraft and the captain followed him shortly after.
The whole briefing lasted approximately ten minutes.
There were no unusual incidents during the briefing. There were no comments or attitudes outside the norm from either of the two pilots during the briefing.
According to the dispatcher, the captain looked very well and as energetic as usual and the first officer looked well. The first officer, the flight commissioner and cabin crew arrived at the aircraft first.
The first officer notified one of the mechanics assisting the aircraft that the total fuel requirement was 8,500 kilograms (18,700 lb), all to be stored in tanks on the wings. The mechanic corroborated loading fuel into the main tank. In this case, as required by the technical documentation of the time, the fuel was to be moved to the wing tanks. The mechanic started that job when the captain arrived at the aircraft.
Before entering the cockpit, he threw the flight technical record to the floor, showing annoyance, confirming that attitude by later shutting off the fuel transfer faucet between the main tank and the wing tanks, a job that was being performed at that precise moment by the assistant flight mechanic.
During their first four minutes on board, the captain, the co-pilot and the commissioner talked about trivial matters in good spirits, focusing on the commissioner's personal issues. When the commissioner left the cockpit, the conversation changed tone and matter as they discussed a controversial situation about their relationship. The captain said, after a reproach from the co-pilot, that he was "going through bad times," to which the copilot replied that he was also having a bad day.
Without interrupting the conversation and as part of it, the reading of the Procedures Control List (PCL) for the aircraft started, mixed with the personal issues that worried them and that led them to misread the procedure checklist.
This confusing situation, in which the PCL was interspersed with conversation irrelevant to the crew's task, persisted during "push back," engine start and taxiing, up to the moment of take-off, which was delayed by other aircraft waiting ahead of the LAPA flight and heavy arriving traffic.
During this final wait, the three men were smoking in the cockpit and their conversation could be of dubious interpretation.
Take-off started on Runway 13 of the Aeroparque at 20:53 hours, and in spite of overpassing rotation (Vr) and take-off security (V2) speeds, the aircraft did not succeed in taking off, continuing straight along its path uncontrollably, hitting several obstacles and finally impacting an embankment.
The report details:
In its final run after failing to take off, the aircraft hit a Chrysler Neon car that was travelling on the Rafael Obligado road that crosses the projection of Runway 13. The car's fuel in contact with sparks from the sliding fuselage against the tarmac and the dragged automobile possibly ignited a fire on the left front side of the aircraft, which grew from rupture of the wings which spilled jet fuel of type JP-1. Also, as a result of a gas regulator plant being hit, a gas leak developed. The fire moved to the back of the aircraft, covering it entirely.
After impact against the embankment, but before catching fire, a flight attendant attempted to operate a fire extinguisher, but did not succeed because the cabin had already reached high temperatures. She also unsuccessfully tried to open the rear right door that was jammed – probably due to deformation. Finally, another flight attendant succeeded in opening the rear left door allowing several passengers to be evacuated before the fire spread. The right side of the fuselage showed an opening, through which a few passengers escaped.
Regarding the doors, preliminary versions of the report added that "the front left slide L1, of grey colour, was found deployed but unpressurised", which means a much greater than normal effort was needed to open the door. The early reports also considered that the absence of a food or drinks trolley in the rear galley of the aircraft helped, since walking distance to the exit was notably reduced.
Fire units from the airport, as well as the Federal Police, and the Naval Prefecture fought the fire. The evacuation operation was directed by the city's Medical Emergency Attention Service (SAME), which used 15 ambulances of their own as well as some from private hospitals. Based on the severity of their injuries, the casualties were taken to different treatment centres.
JIAAC investigation
The Junta de Investigaciones de Accidentes de Aviación Civil investigation report was only one of the documents taken into account in the judicial investigation, though it was criticized for focusing solely on blaming the pilots directly.
During the three days after the accident, the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) sent a team to assist the JIAAC in their investigation. This team consisted of an NTSB representative and technicians from Boeing, Pratt & Whitney, and the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). While in Argentina, these investigators worked with JIAAC personnel, forming teams according to their areas of expertise.
The data from the flight data recorder (FDR) and the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was read at the NTSB headquarters in Washington. With this information, a computerized animation of the failed take-off attempt was constructed.
Another aspect that was studied and analyzed was the adherence to the maintenance plan in the available technical documentation. The analysis led investigators to believe that the aircraft, its components and its engines complied with the requirements set out in the maintenance plan and the approved operational specifications of the Dirección Nacional de Aeronavegabilidad (National Board of Airworthiness).
To complete the detailed investigation, the JIAAC technicians reassembled the main components of the aircraft in a hangar in the Aeroparque. They also cleaned, identified and analyzed the boards, actuators, electronic equipment, the cockpit pedestal, and other flight controls that were recovered from the accident site, and dismantled the engines of the plane as much as possible given the state of destruction they faced. The technicians inspected the hydraulic system on the thrust reversers of both engines and the braking system of the landing gear, all of which were found to be in sufficient working order.
Engines & thrust reversers
The investigation concluded that the engines almost certainly functioned until the final impact, though their behaviour at that particular moment could not be precisely determined. Nevertheless, from the reading of the FDR it was observed that both engines had equal thrust and were set to provide thrust for take-off before power was reduced and the thrust reversers were applied. In order to determine if there was a bird strike, the National Institute for the Investigation of Natural Sciences (Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones de las Ciencias Naturales) performed a study with negative results.
The thrust reversers – which are located behind the engine and direct the exhaust forward to slow the aircraft down quickly after landing (see image) – were found seriously damaged, but the hydraulic mechanism of the left engine was set for reverse thrust while the right one was set for forward thrust. The investigation was unable to determine if the thrust reversers were intentionally activated and later deactivated.