The First Battle of Mount Hermon was fought at the outset of the Yom Kippur War between the Syrian Army and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). On Yom Kippur, October 6, 1973, Syrian commandos attacked and captured the IDF outpost on Mount Hermon. Two days later, the Syrians repelled an Israeli counterattack in the Second Battle of Mount Hermon. It was eventually recaptured by Israel on October 21 in the Third Battle.
Background
At a height of about 6,600 feet (2,000 m), Mount Hermon has a commanding view of the Galilee. After Israel's capture of it in the Six-Day War, it was used as a radar outpost, housing some of the IDF's most sensitive and secret electronic equipment. Israel also constructed an approach road and a ski lift. The troops manning the Hermon outpost could view the entire Syrian plain bordering on the Purple Line, there were observation posts on the outpost itself and at the upper level of the ski lift. The outpost was constructed with much help from the Druze living in the Golan. In April 1970, Colonel Hikmat Shahabi, chief of Syrian Military Intelligence, sent a letter with Sergeant-Major Nozi tewfik Abu Saleh, a Syrian Druze, to Kemal Kanj, a Golan Heights Druze leader and former member of the Syrian parliament whose brother was a general in the Syrian Army. Saleh, who was also related to Kanj, crossed the border on foot and delivered the letter, which asked Kanj to provide details regarding Israeli positions. Kanj agreed and carried out his mission. He was caught by the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate (AMAN) in May 1971. He was pardoned in June 1973.
The Hermon outpost was considered strategically important for several reasons, such as: gathering early warning information, real-time intelligence collection, conducting electronic warfare (EW) against ground or air attack, artillery spotting on the Damascus plain, using the Hermon ridge and its western slopes for a strategic flanking move toward Syria, conducting operations in Syria and Lebanon and commanding Israel's main water sources.
The outpost was isolated in its sector with only a narrow access road connecting it to the Golan Heights and Shebaa Farms. It was made up of three levels: an underground section of bunkers for quarters, ammunition, food and water, (which were connected by tunnels to the guard and observation posts) and two above-ground storeys which contained the work rooms, laboratories, infirmary, mess, generators and observation and guard posts. When the war broke out, the outpost was still under construction and fighting positions, communication trenches and a command position were not yet built.
The outpost was situated in the 13th Battalion's sector, but was commanded by Lieutenant Gadi Zidover from the 820th Regional Brigade, whose operational subordination was not properly classified. On Yom Kippur there were sixty soldiers in the outpost: thirteen of them were 13th Battalion infantrymen, the rest were men from support units, artillerymen, non-commissioned officers from the Israeli Northern Command (NC) and regional brigade intelligence and maintenance soldiers from the 820th Brigade. Some of the officers and soldiers had only arrived between October 4 and October 6 with just their personal weapons, others were unarmed. Most of them were not familiar with the layout of the outpost or with the sector in general.
In the days before the war, the artillery forward observation officer reported a growth in the number of Syrian artillery batteries and other forces. A section of troops were assigned to defend it. On Yom Kippur, October 6, 1973, fifty-five men were in the outpost, including the defense section from the Golani Brigade, men from the Israeli Air Force (IAF) and intelligence personnel manning the electronic equipment. NC estimated that the Hermon was not a major axis of advance, and would therefore not be subject to a major attack, only routine raids. The fortifications were built to withstand artillery fire and air bombardments, but the trench system was incomplete. A week before the war, an antiaircraft battery was moved down to the Golan.
Prelude
On Friday, October 5, the outpost reported a vast concentration of Syrian forces on the plain below. The Israeli soldiers were ordered to be on the alert, they shut themselves in the main bunker. The next morning, the observation posts were manned as usual and routine reconnaissance along the approach routes took place. An alert was ordered, but for some reason the Hermon outpost was not reinforced by the required fourteen-man infantry section. The security routine was maintained and included a foot patrol to secure the access road from the outpost to the lower level of the ski lift. It was conducted by the Golani troops and commanded by the platoon commander, Second-Lieutenant Hagai Funk. Only two infantrymen were left to guard the outpost.
After the patrol, the infantrymen returned to the outpost, except for three men who took up positions in an under-construction observation post on a hill north of the upper ski lift. One observation point and two guard positions were manned in the outpost itself. Three watches were deployed at dawn between Shebaa Farms and the lower ski lift, manned by members of the same company, but were subordinated throughout the day to the 902nd Nahal Battalion in Shebaa Farms. Shortly before 14:00, an EW blocking company from the 374th Communications unit, under the command of Lieutenant Moshe Sapir, arrived at the "tank curve" and located its equipment according to NC orders. Due to coordination problems, its arrival was unknown to the outpost commander and the Hermon company commander at the employment camp in Masada.
The Syrians had put the Hermon at the top of their target list. The 82nd Paratroop Battalion, the elite combat unit of the Syrian Army, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Rifai al-Joju, was given its final briefing on the morning of the attack. Al-Joju's company was to be landed by helicopter 0.5 miles (0.80 km) from the outpost and was to take up positions covering the outpost and the road leading toward it from the Golan. The rest of the battalion, about 200 men, were to set out on foot from the Syrian controlled Hermon. This force was to attack the outpost while al-Joju's troops would provide them with covering fire. The plan used data collected through Kanj.
Battle
Syrian attack
At around 13:00, four Soviet-built MI-8 helicopters lifted off near Damascus and flew west into Lebanon, where they circled until forty-five minutes into the Syrian shelling of the Golan. They then headed southeast toward the Israeli outpost. The Israelis detected the helicopters at about 15:00, when the team at the upper ski lift reported them and fired at them until they flew out of sight. At 13:45, the artillery officer, along with other officers, noticed that the Syrian artillery units in the plain below were taking the camouflage nets from their guns.
The Syrians began shelling the outpost at 14:00. All the Israeli soldiers in the outpost concentrated in the central hall of the bunker. The platoon officer and the mortar sergeant climbed up to the observation point but had to come back down due to the heavy shelling. An observation officer, a technical assistant and a driver from the 334th Artillery Battalion left the outpost in a half-track for their planned position in the "tank curve" to help pinpoint the artillery in the northern Golan. Six Syrian Air Force MiG-17 aircraft attacked the outpost. Three of the helicopters arrived from the west. Two of them landed about thirty paratroopers on Hill 2072, south of the lower ski lift. Most of the Syrian force deployed above the curve south of the upper ski lift to block access to the outpost. A few of them advanced toward the outpost to provide cover. A third helicopter with sixteen paratroopers, who were supposed to block the "tank curve", crashed (a rotor-blade hit the slope). Only three paratroopers survived and joined their comrades at the upper ski lift. They opened fire on the Israeli half-track, which kept driving. The company commander of the EW unit and his driver, who were riding in a jeep on their way to the outpost, saw the Syrians landing and turned back to their unit at the "tank curve", under fire. Three Golani soldiers at the upper ski lift observation post saw the Syrian landing but failed to fire at them due to a machine gun malfunction. After a few minutes, they abandoned their post, which was equipped with a radio, and went down to the lower ski lift to join a platoon positioned there without informing the outpost of the Syrian landing.
While Joju's troops were taking-up positions, the rest of the 82nd Battalion, two companies under the command of Captains Jassam al Salah and Mahmoud Ma'aleh, advanced on foot from the Syrian controlled Hermon position to the Israeli outpost. They were organized in eight platoon-sized forces. At around 15:15, when the first two forces arrived near the outpost, Syrian artillery opened fire and the covering force directed small-arms fire at the outpost. Meanwhile, the fourth helicopter approached and landed sixteen more commandos. Some of them joined the charge at the outpost while the rest formed a second covering force.
When the shelling subsided small-arms fire could be heard from the central hall. Zidover, Funk, and four other Golani soldiers came out to the fighting platform through the upper western opening. They saw dozens of Syrian soldiers advancing on the road toward the outpost gate and a covering force lying on the embankment outside the outpost fence. Of their three machine guns, two were out of action after the shelling. Though lacking fighting positions, the outpost commander and the infantrymen opened fire with a machine gun and their personal weapons. The Syrians were surprised by the fire and halted. The machine gunner was killed and the outpost sergeant took over the weapon. The outpost commander realized that ammunition was low and went down to the central hall to contact the 820th Brigade commander, Colonel Zvi Barazani. He explained the situation and asked him to "fire on our outposts". Barazani approved and the 334th Battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Aryeh Schwartz, accepted the mission. The Golani soldiers kept firing at the Syrians and prevented them from entering the outpost until approximately 15:45, when the Israeli shelling began. At this point Barazani ordered the outpost commander to shut his men in the outpost until the shelling was over and break out only on his command. Due to a misunderstanding, the soldiers did not leave the outpost and continued defending its openings from within.
The Syrians charged into the outpost courtyard and some managed to penetrate the upper western opening into the top storey, throwing fragmentation and stun grenades and firing into the work rooms. Their entrance was hesitant and slow, and included calls in Hebrew and Arabic to the Israeli soldiers to surrender. Some went down the staircase leading to the central hall and threw grenades into it. They reached the hall but did not enter the rooms or the connecting tunnels. They may have used a smoke generator operated by a small engine. The hall filled with smoke dust and the sounds of explosions, which induced panic among the Israeli non-combatant soldiers. Many of them were choking and believed the Syrians were using gas. The room was full of dust, they had to cover their noses with flannelette soaked in urine to breathe. Some tried to take cover in the tunnels, but some were in a state of shock and remained frozen in the rooms near the central hall. Between 16:00 and 17:00, some of the soldiers returned fire from various corners of the central hall in the direction of the staircase and prevented the Syrians from coming down. The outpost commander tried to concentrate the men from the different tunnels and rooms into a single tunnel. At this point, the outpost lost its connection with the outside world.