The time period from 1985 through 1991 marked the final years of the Cold War, which were characterized by systemic reform within the Soviet Union, the easing of geopolitical tensions between the Soviet-led bloc and the United States-led bloc, the collapse of the Soviet Union's influence in Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
The beginning of this period is marked by the ascent of Mikhail Gorbachev to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Seeking to bring an end to the economic stagnation associated with the Brezhnev Era, Gorbachev initiated economic reforms (perestroika), and political liberalization (glasnost). His rise coincided with a gradual thaw in relations with President Ronald Reagan's administration. Over four summit meetings between 1985 and 1988, the two leaders negotiated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons for the first time in the Cold War's history.
Popular revolutions swept Eastern Europe in 1989, toppling Communist governments in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. The sentiment culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November, which, in turn, reopened the long-dormant question of German unity. Within a year—following negotiations—the once politically distinctive countries of West Germany and East Germany were reunified into a single nation state that became a member of NATO.
The Soviet Union itself did not survive the changes it had unleashed. Independence movements in the Baltic states and elsewhere gathered pace through 1990 and 1991, and a coup attempt by hardliners against Gorbachev in August 1991 accelerated rather than halted the union's disintegration that December. While the exact end date of the Cold War is debated among historians, it is generally agreed upon that the implementation of nuclear and conventional arms control agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, and the resultant collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War. Scholars remain divided over the underlying causes, with materialist accounts emphasizing Soviet economic decline and ideational accounts stressing the personal worldviews of Gorbachev and Reagan coupled with the broader appeal of the Western European model.
Thaw in relations
After the deaths of three successive elderly Soviet leaders since 1982, the Soviet Politburo elected Gorbachev Communist Party General Secretary in March 1985, marking the rise of a new generation of leadership. Under Gorbachev, relatively young reform-oriented technocrats, who had begun their careers in the heyday of "de-Stalinization" under reformist leader Nikita Khrushchev, rapidly consolidated power, providing new momentum for political and economic liberalization, and the impetus for cultivating warmer relations via glasnost and trade with the West. Historian Sheila Fitzpatrick wrote that Gorbachev looked on these reforms "through the prism of the Thaw, as a revitalization of socialism rather than an abandonment of it."
On the Western front, President Reagan's administration had taken a hard line against the Soviet Union. Under the Reagan Doctrine, the Reagan administration began providing military support to anti-communist armed movements in Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua and elsewhere. Reagan had also ordered the implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983—a space-based interceptor
program against nuclear missiles more commonly dubbed "Star Wars" by the media—an initiative that alarmed and "horrified the Soviets," who while doubting its feasibility, were in no position to compete technologically. By November 1985, the Soviets perceived SDI as both a military threat and as a potential means by which the United States might weaken NATO cohesion and alter the strategic balance in nuclear weapon technology. At the same time, officials in the Kremlin expressed concern that the deployment of space-based missile defenses would destabilize strategic parity and could make nuclear war more likely rather than less.
A major breakthrough came in 1985–87, with the successful negotiation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). This breakthrough became possible only after the Politburo agreed, on 28 February 1987, to decouple the treaty from Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative—the very dispute that had derailed the Reykjavík talks the year before—clearing the way for an agreement in which the Soviet Union eliminated substantially more missiles than the United States, including the SS-23 "Oka," whose range Gorbachev conceded fell within treaty limits over his own military's objections. Historian Sergey Radchenko traces the decoupling decision to a memorandum Aleksandr Yakovlev sent Gorbachev on 25 February 1987, three days ahead of the Politburo's vote, arguing for separate INF negotiations independent of the broader Reykjavík framework. Radchenko situates the move within Gorbachev's wider preoccupation with projecting Soviet leadership through sustained peace diplomacy, reinforced by a growing conviction within his circle that SDI posed less a genuine military threat than a public-relations exercise. The INF Treaty of December 1987, signed by Reagan and Gorbachev, eliminated all nuclear and conventional missiles, as well as their launchers, with ranges of 500–1,000 kilometres (310–620 mi) (short-range) and 1,000–5,500 kilometres (620–3,420 mi) (intermediate-range). Among the missile systems the INF Treaty intended to eliminate or scale-down were U.S. Pershing missiles and an array of American ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), while Soviet intermediate range systems included SS-4s, SS-12s, and SS-20s. The treaty did not cover sea-launched missiles, but it did include mutual on-site inspections by both nations to ensure compliance within a three-year period. By May 1991, after on-site investigations by both sides, 2,700 missiles had been destroyed.
The Reagan administration also persuaded the Saudi Arabian oil companies to increase oil production. This led to a drop in the price of oil, at a time when oil was the main source of Soviet export revenues. Following the USSR's previous large military buildup, President Reagan ordered an enormous peacetime defense buildup of the United States Armed Forces; the Soviets did not respond to this by building up their military because the military expenses, in combination with collectivized agriculture in the nation, and inefficient planned manufacturing, would cause a heavy burden for the Soviet economy. It was already stagnant and in a poor state prior to the tenure of Mikhail Gorbachev who, despite significant attempts at reform, was unable to revitalise the economy. Recognizing the unsustainable burden of military spending on the Soviet GDP, the growing costs of sustaining allied and satellite regimes, systemic barriers to technological innovation, and declining domestic living standards, Gorbachev pursued a program of radical economic modernization. The implications of these combined factors were vast, leading Gorbachev to begin changing the regime's political tone.
Economic failings in the Communist system were becoming more obvious across eastern Europe during the 1980s, as for instance, the yearly per capita GDP of East Germans was barely half that of those in West Germany. Infrastructure investments were also deficient in countries like Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, while at the same time, eastern bloc countries were losing their share of world trade. Meanwhile, countries throughout western Europe continued to prosper. By the mid-1980s, historian John W. Young observes, this contrast had become stark and rather than an integrated economic community at the technological frontier, Eastern Europe remained heavily indebted, inefficient, and unable to compete in world markets—a burden the Soviet economy itself had to help sustain through subsidized oil and raw materials.
In 1985, Reagan and Gorbachev held their first of four "summit" meetings, beginning in Geneva, Switzerland. After discussing policy, facts, etc., Reagan invited Gorbachev to go with him to a small house near the beach. The two leaders spoke in that house well over their time limit, but came out with the news that they had planned two more (soon three more) summits. The second summit took place the following year, in 1986 on October 11, in Reykjavík, Iceland. The meeting was held to pursue discussions about scaling back their intermediate-range ballistic missile arsenals in Europe. The talks came close to achieving an overall breakthrough on nuclear arms control, but ended in failure due to Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative and Gorbachev's proposed cancellation of it.
Like Reagan, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher also got along well with Gorbachev despite her pronounced anticommunism; she was subsequently encouraged by both his optimistic domestic reform agenda and his arms-control efforts through the mid-1980s.
Fundamental to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Gorbachev policy initiatives of "restructuring" (perestroika) and "openness" (glasnost) had broad ramifications. To this end, historian Sheila Fitzpatrick wrote of glasnost:
Everything the intelligentsia had ever hoped for in terms of freedom of expression and publication was suddenly available. Thanks to glasnost, the Soviet press was full of informed, detailed criticisms of historical ‘mistakes’ such as collectivization, the Great Purges, bad decisions in World War II, wartime ethnic deportations and postwar anti-Semitism. Newspapers and thick journals competed with each other for exposés, publishing all the manuscripts in drawers that had hitherto been forbidden and pushing for rehabilitation of fallen revolutionary heroes. It was a wonderful time to be a Soviet writer of a certain age and type—a Khrushchevian truth-teller whose realist novels and plays unmasked social ills, historical cover-ups and political scandals. It was an equally exciting time to be a Soviet reader, except that there was too much to read, and what one read was likely to shake one's faith in the Soviet system. Gorbachev's assumption, like that of the old reform-minded thick journals, was that 'telling the truth' could not but be good, ultimately strengthening the Soviet system by purifying it. Unfortunately, the opposite proved to be the case. The effect of the crash course on the flaws of Soviet socialism was to undermine the public’s confidence rather than rally it for reform.
Additionally, the internal political reforms associated with perestroika altered both the political consciousness of Soviet society and the strategic outlook of Soviet foreign policy. As the human-rights norms associated with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) increasingly entered Soviet public discourse, elements within the Soviet leadership began to reassess the diplomatic significance of the CSCE process. This reassessment became visible during the negotiations of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting (1986–1989), where by 1988, the Soviet delegation demonstrated an increased willingness to compromise and relinquish several long-standing positions. The resulting agreements, which received unusually broad attention within Soviet society, illustrated how perestroika contributed to a transformation in Soviet perceptions of multilateral diplomacy and international human-rights norms.
Consequently, perestroika and glasnost had ripple effects throughout the orbit of the Soviet world, including eventually making it impossible to reassert central control over Warsaw Pact member states without resorting to military force. These ideological initiatives were accompanied by a significant reduction in military spending—which had once constituted 25 percent of the Soviet Union's GDP—as Gorbachev moved resources to improve the Soviet economy and help deal with domestic social challenges.
By 1986–1987, the Reagan administration increasingly employed public rhetorical challenges that emphasized human rights and political choice as tests of Soviet reform, during which the American president used a symbolic address to gauge the credibility of Gorbachev's agenda. The most overt example occurred when Reagan challenged Gorbachev on June 12, 1987 to go further with his reforms and democratization by tearing down the Berlin Wall. In a speech at the Brandenburg Gate next to the wall, Reagan stated:
General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union, Central and South-East Europe, if you seek liberalization, come here to this gate; Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!
While aging Eastern European communist elites clung to "normalization," Mikhail Gorbachev exposed the stagnation at the heart of the Soviet Union's Communist Party. Assuming the post of General Secretary, he sought to reorder Soviet priorities in response to deepening structural decay: an economy largely unreformed since Stalin, paralyzed by central planning, and incapable of integrating the technological transformations reshaping the West. The result was a widening gap in living standards, particularly when contrasted against Western Europe and the United States. Facing declining revenues due to falling oil prices and rising expenditures related to the arms race and the command economy, the Soviet Union was forced during the 1980s to take on significant amounts of debt from the Western banking sector.