The Battle of the Vistula River, also known as the Battle of Warsaw and Ivangorod, was a major Russian victory against Germany and Austria-Hungary on the Eastern Front during the First World War.
The battle is one of the largest and most important battles in the First World War, one of the most striking victories of the Russian army, which showed that the Russian troops were strong and could resist the Germans. Both sides suffered heavy losses. The battle also became a kind of psychological turning point. The Russians, believing in their own strength, recovered from the defeat at the Battle of Tannenberg, and became confident that they were superior to the Germans. This confidence helped them to win the Battle of Lodz a few days later.
Background
By mid-September 1914 the Imperial Russian Army were driving the Austro-Hungarian Army deep into Galicia, threatening Kraków, and the Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia was floundering. The armies that the Russian commander Grand Duke Nicholas was assembling in Congress Poland were still enlarging, including the arrival of crack troops from Siberia, freed by the Japanese declaration of war against Germany on 23 August. Stavka (Russian supreme headquarters) intended for the forces assembled south of Warsaw—500,000 men and 2,400 guns—to march west to invade the German industrial area of Upper Silesia, which was almost undefended. On their Eastern Front the Germans had only the 8th Army, which was in East Prussia. It already had mauled two Russian armies at Tannenberg and at the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes. To support the reeling Austro-Hungarian Armies, OHL (Oberste Heeresleitung, German supreme headquarters) formed a new German 9th Army in Silesia, to be commanded by General Richard von Schubert, with Erich Ludendorff, transferred from 8th Army, as chief of staff. Ludendorff quickly evaluated the situation in Silesia and convinced the new commander at OHL, Erich von Falkenhayn, to strengthen the 9th Army and also to make Paul von Hindenburg commander of both German armies in the east.
By the end of September, 9th Army, with headquarters in Breslau, consisted of the XVII, XX, XI, Guard Reserve Corps, Graf von Bredow's Landwehr Division, 8th Cavalry Division, and the 35th Reserve Division, with Woyrsch's Landwehr Corps linking the German Army with the Austro-Hungarian forces on the right. According to Prit Buttar, "Several Siberian divisions were now gathered around Warsaw, and it seemed likely that these would march southwest to support a westerly drive by the forces of Southwest Front. In order to oppose this, Conrad and Ludendorff agreed, the k.u.k. Army would extend its northern flank north of the Vistula, and the German 9th Army would then take up positions alongside." On 28 September, the Germans started their advance, while Dankl's 1st Army crossed the Vistula, reaching Bogoria on 1 October. On 30 September, the Germans reached Przedbórz, and Radom five days later. The Russian response was for Ruzsky to advance towards Kalisz, while Ivanov's 2nd, 4th, 9th, and 5th Armies concentrated along the Vistula. The Russian 3rd and 8th Armies would remain in Galicia.
Engagement of Opatów-Klimontów
To face the threat from Silesia, the Russians withdrew men from East Prussia and from the front facing the Austro-Hungarians The geographical barrier that separated the bulk of the opposing armies was the Vistula River. The Russian corps marching north to fill the gap moved along the east bank of the Vistula, which protected their left flanks. The troop movements involved both the Southwest Front commanded by Nikolai Ivanov and the Northwest Front under Nikolai Ruzsky. Their movements were poorly coordinated.
To guard the crossings for their 4th and 9th Armies, on the west bank of the Vistula the Russians deployed the 75th Reserve Division (4th Army) at Radom, as well as the group of General Delsalle, consisting of the Guard Rifle Brigade, 2nd Rifle Brigade and 80th Reserve Division, at Opatów-Klimontów. Both groups were screened by the Cavalry divisions of the Nowikow Corps.
On 28 September German 9th Army began a meticulously planned advance toward the Vistula River. German XI, Guard and Austro-Hungarian I Corps marched in heavy rain toward Delsalle's group. Because German Army wagons were too heavy for the woeful Polish roads, submerged in several feet of mud, they used light Polish carts hired along with their peasant drivers. As they advanced they improved the roads and bridges so they could support heavy artillery and adjusted the rails to the narrower European gauge. (The Vienna-Warsaw line was already European gauge.) Explosives were cached at road and railway bridges so they could be destroyed if necessary.
On 6 October, Dankl's 1st Army cavalry had reached Sandomierz, and though the Russians lost 7000 of General Delsalle's infantry killed or taken prisoner near Opatów, the remaining forces had withdrawn across the Vistula. On 7 October, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's 4th Army captured Rzeszów, while Svetozar Boroević's 3rd Army advanced towards Przemyśl. On 11 October, Austro-Hungarian troops captured Jarosław, and 5000 prisoners, but once, again, the Russians were able to withdraw across the San River.
Battle
The Germans reached the Vistula River on 9 October. The few Russian bridgeheads on the west bank were invested. Their left flank, August von Mackensen's XVII Corps, continued to march north until it was 19 km (12 mi) from Warsaw. Only small Russian pockets remained on the west bank; they were excellent targets for the German artillery. General Nikolai Ruzsky, commander of the Russian Northwest Front, sent troops from Warsaw to attack XVII Corps on the German left flank. Orders found on the body of a Russian officer revealed that 14 Russian divisions were concentrating against Mackensen's five divisions. The Germans were also privy to Russian movements from intercepted wireless messages. Unlike the messages sent in the clear during the first weeks of the war, now they were in the new Russian code, which by the end of September had been broken by a German reserve officer, Professor Deubner. Three Russian armies were concentrating against German 9th Army, relieving the pressure on the Austro-Hungarians in the south.
On 10 October, the Russians were ordered to attack from their positions along the Vistula. The Russian 4th Army was deployed with its 14th, 17th and Guards Army Corps along the lower San and Vistula. North of them was the 9th Army with the 16th, Grenadier, and 3rd Caucasian Army Corps. 5th Army was still be deployed north of them, while closest to Warsaw was the 2nd Army, consisting of 1st, 27th and 2nd Siberian Army Corps. On 13 October, Grand Duke Nikolai placed command of the 2nd and 5th Russian armies under the command of the Northwest Front, responsible for the major thrust into Poland, while the Southwest Front tied down the German and Austro-Hungarian armies along the Vistula. However, on 11 October, the German 9th Army XVII Corps, under the command of Mackensen, was to attack Warsaw, securing the 9th Army's northern flank.
Mackensen was within 6 miles (9.7 km) of Warsaw, when a set of orders was found on a Russian staff officer corpse. According to Buttar, "For the first time, the Germans became aware that they were facing no fewer than four Russian armies, which intended to roll up the German line from the north. It now became the intention of Hindenburg and Ludendorff to try to tie down as much of the Russian strength as possible, thus allowing the k.u.k. Army to achieve a victory against weaker forces in the south." On 10 October, Conrad ordered the Austro-Hungarian 3rd and 4th Armies to cross the San, but by 12 October they had not made any headway, even the 1st Army failed to establish a bridgehead. Though the Austro-Hungarians had 36 divisions in Galicia compared to 26 for the Russians, but the Russians had more guns, and were fighting from defensive positions. On 11 October, Conrad sent the 1st Army's V Corps to Ożarów to reinforce the Germans along the left bank of the Vistula. On 12 October, the Russians succeeded in establishing a bridgehead at Ivangorod. The Russians attacked Mackensen on 16 October after two days of bombardment. Ludendorff requested Conrad send his 1st Army in response, but Conrad only agreed to send his 7th Cavalry Division. Macksen's eastern flank was threatened as Phleve's Russian 5th Army crossed the Vistula. Asked if he could hold his position until 18 October, allowing Hindenburg to withdraw to the southwest, Mackensen responded, "I will hold until 19 October." By then Russian cavalry had bypassed his western flank and threatened to cut him off to the south. Mackensen was then forced to withdraw, while Grand Duke Nikolai ordered a general offensive for 20 October.
By 20 October, Radko Dimitriev's Russian 3rd Army had established 5 bridgeheads across the San, which Ferdinand's Austro-Hungarian 4th Army was unable to dislodge. On 22 October, Aleksei Brusilov's Russian 8th Army recaptured Stryj. As the German and Austro-Hungarian forces withdrew to the west, Conrad planned an ambush of the Russians crossing at Ivangorod. As Sergei Sheydeman's Russian 2nd Army advanced, Dankl's 1st Army was to strike north against the southern flank of the Russian bridgehead on 22 October. Dankl's attack faltered, while the next day his eastern flank was threatened by Russian troops crossing the Vistula at Puławy. According to Buttar, "Conrad's plan to crush the Russians in the process of crossing the river, always a risky venture, would now face the combined strength of the Russian 4th and 9th Armies." As the German Guards Reserve Corps advanced towards Kozienice, at the western end of the Ivangorod bridgehead, another Russian bridgehead opened at Kazimierz Dolny, to the rear of Dankl's eastern front. On 25 October, the Russians advanced. On 26 October, the German Guards Reserve Corps retreated towards the southwest, along with the German 9th Army to avoid its western flank from being turned, forcing Dankl's 1st Army to also retreat.
The Austro-Hungarian 1st Army, which was taking over the German right flank, was unable to defend the crossings over the Vistula. The Germans claimed that they deliberately allowed the Russians to cross, then intending to engulf them. According to the Austro-Hungarians they arrived too late to prevent the crossings. In any event, the Russians were able to bring enough men quickly over the river to force the Austro-Hungarians to retreat to a line 60 km (37 mi), to the west. According to Max Hoffmann, the third ranking member of 9th Army Staff, they pulled back without alerting the nearby German units—they escaped only because they were warned by a German telephone operator. In fact the Austro-Hungarians did properly inform their allies
Aftermath
According to Buttar, "Both the German and the Austro-Hungarian commanders attempted to emphasise that they had been forced to retreat because their allies had not delivered what was required. Despite taking an estimated 12,000 Russian prisoners, 1st Army had lost over 40,000 men, and had failed to eliminate any of the Russian bridgeheads across the Vistula." On 30 October, the Russians reached Łódź. The Russians took 19,000 prisoners and a lot of material trophies at the same time.
The Germans calculated that until extensive repairs were finished the furthest the Russians could advance over the devastated countryside was 120 km (75 mi), so they would have some weeks respite before the Russians could invade Silesia, but they had been forced back. They portrayed the withdrawal as a strategic maneuver, and had succeeded in blocking an enemy advance into Germany for weeks, while their army was trying to win on the Western Front. The retreat "... filled the Russian army with confidence in its strength to deal with Germany". Now Russian troops had beaten both Germans and the Austro-Hungarians. But they dissipated their advantage by indecision about their next move and confusion in their administrative arrangements
On 1 November, Hindenburg was given command of all of the German forces on the Eastern Front. Mackensen was promoted as commander of the 9th Army, the majority of which was deployed by rail to Thorn, so as to threaten the Russian northern flank. Yet, for the Austro-Hungarian forces, in the words of Buttar, "All the gains of the October campaign were to be abandoned, and a new line would be held through the winter, running along the Carpathians and then to Krakow."