The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, fought during 25–27 October 1942, was the fourth aircraft carrier battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II. It was also the fourth major naval engagement fought between the United States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy during the lengthy and strategically important Guadalcanal campaign. As in the battles of the Coral Sea, Midway, and the Eastern Solomons, the ships of the two adversaries were rarely in sight or gun range of each other. Instead, almost all attacks by both sides were mounted by carrier- or land-based aircraft.
In an attempt to drive Allied forces from Guadalcanal and nearby islands and end the stalemate that had existed since September 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army planned a major ground offensive on Guadalcanal for 20–25 October 1942. In support of this offensive, and with the hope of engaging Allied naval forces, Japanese carriers and other large warships moved into a position near the southern Solomon Islands. From this location, the Japanese naval forces hoped to engage and decisively defeat any Allied (primarily US) naval forces, especially carrier forces, that responded to the ground offensive. Allied naval forces also hoped to meet the Japanese naval forces in battle, with the same objectives of breaking the stalemate and decisively defeating their adversary.
The Japanese ground offensive on Guadalcanal was underway with the Battle for Henderson Field while the naval warships and aircraft from the two adversaries confronted each other on the morning of 26 October 1942, just north of the Santa Cruz Islands. After an exchange of carrier air attacks, Allied surface ships retreated from the battle area with the fleet carrier Hornet sunk, and another fleet carrier, Enterprise, heavily damaged. The participating Japanese carrier forces also retired because of damage to two carriers, heavy aircraft losses, and the Japanese army's failure to capture Henderson Field.
Santa Cruz was a tactical victory for the Japanese in terms of both tonnage and control of the seas around Guadalcanal. However, Japan's loss of many irreplaceable veteran aircrews proved to be a long-term strategic advantage for the Allies, whose aircrew losses in the battle were relatively low and were quickly replaced. The Japanese had hoped for, and needed, a larger, decisive victory. The fact that the naval battle was won just after the land battle was lost meant that the opportunity to exploit their victory in the battle had already passed.
Background
On 8 August 1942, Allied forces, predominantly from the United States, landed on Japanese-occupied Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and the Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases for threatening the supply routes between the US and Australia, and to secure the islands as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of neutralizing the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.
After the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on 24–25 August, in which the fleet carrier USS Enterprise was heavily damaged and forced to sail to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, for a month of major repairs, three US carrier task forces remained in the South Pacific area. The task forces were based around the fleet carriers USS Wasp, Saratoga, and Hornet plus their respective air groups and supporting surface warships, including battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, and were primarily stationed between the Solomons and New Hebrides (Vanuatu) islands. In this area of operations, the carriers were charged with guarding the line of communication between the major Allied bases at New Caledonia and Espiritu Santo, supporting the Allied ground forces at Guadalcanal and Tulagi against any Japanese counteroffensives, covering the movement of supply ships to Guadalcanal, and engaging and destroying any Japanese warships, especially carriers, that came within range. The area of ocean in which the US carrier task forces operated was known as "Torpedo Junction" by US forces because of the high concentration of Japanese submarines in the area.
On 31 August, Saratoga was torpedoed by Japanese submarine I-26 and was out of action for three months for repairs.
On 15 September, Wasp was hit by three torpedoes fired by Japanese submarine I-19 while supporting a major reinforcement and resupply convoy to Guadalcanal and almost engaging the Japanese carriers Shōkaku and Zuikaku, which withdrew just before the two adversaries came into range of each other's aircraft. With power knocked out from torpedo damage, Wasp's damage-control teams were unable to contain the ensuing large fires, and she was abandoned and scuttled.
Although the US now had only one operational carrier, Hornet, in the South Pacific, the Allies still maintained air superiority over the southern Solomon Islands because of their aircraft based at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. However, at night, when aircraft were not able to operate effectively, the Japanese were able to operate their ships around Guadalcanal almost at will. Thus, a stalemate in the battle for Guadalcanal developed—the Allies delivered supplies and reinforcements to Guadalcanal during the day, and the Japanese did the same by warship, referred to as the "Tokyo Express" by the Allies, at night—with neither side able to deliver enough troops to the island to secure a decisive advantage. By mid-October, both sides had roughly an equal number of troops on the island. The stalemate was briefly interrupted by two large-ship naval actions. On the night of 11–12 October, a US naval force intercepted and defeated a Japanese naval force en route to bombard Henderson Field in the Battle of Cape Esperance. But just two nights later, a Japanese force that included the battleships Haruna and Kongō successfully bombarded Henderson Field, destroying most of the US aircraft there and inflicting severe damage on the field's facilities.
The US made two moves to try to break the stalemate in the battle for Guadalcanal. First, repairs to Enterprise were expedited so that she could return to the South Pacific as soon as possible. On 10 October, Enterprise received her new air group (Air Group 10) and on 16 October, she left Pearl Harbor; and on 23 October, she arrived back in the South Pacific and rendezvoused with Hornet and the rest of the Allied South Pacific naval forces on 24 October, 273 nmi (506 km; 314 mi) northeast of Espiritu Santo.
Second, on 18 October, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Allied Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Forces, replaced Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley with Vice Admiral William Halsey, Jr. as Commander, South Pacific Area: this position commanded Allied forces involved in the Solomon Islands campaign. Nimitz felt that Ghormley had become too myopic and pessimistic to lead Allied forces effectively in the struggle for Guadalcanal. Halsey was reportedly respected throughout the US naval fleet as a "fighter". Upon assuming command, Halsey immediately began making plans to draw the Japanese naval forces into a battle, writing to Nimitz, "I had to begin throwing punches almost immediately."
The Japanese Combined Fleet was also seeking to draw Allied naval forces into what was hoped to be a decisive battle. Two fleet carriers—Hiyō and Jun'yō, as well as the light carrier Zuihō—arrived at the main Japanese naval base at Truk Atoll from Japan in early October and joined Shōkaku and Zuikaku. With five carriers fully equipped with air groups, plus their numerous battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, the Japanese Combined Fleet, directed by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, was confident that it could make up for the defeat at the Battle of Midway. Apart from a couple of air raids on Henderson Field in October, the Japanese carriers and their supporting warships stayed in the northwestern area of the Solomon Islands, out of the battle for Guadalcanal and waiting for a chance to approach and engage the US carriers. With the Japanese Army's next planned major ground attack on Allied forces on Guadalcanal set for 20 October, Yamamoto's warships began to move towards the southern Solomons to support the offensive and to be ready to engage any enemy ships, especially carriers, that approached to support the Allied defenses on Guadalcanal.
Prelude
On or around 11 October a large force consisting of aircraft carriers, battleships, and their escorts departed Truk for an extended sortie in support of an October Guadalcanal offensive. On the same day a major reinforcement convoy reached Guadalcanal, but a force of supporting heavy cruisers was prevented from bombarding Henderson Field and turned back in what became known as the Battle of Cape Esperance. What followed were three bombardments conducted by battleships and heavy cruisers between 13 October and 16 October (the heaviest naval attack on the airfield in the campaign), the first and third of those conducted by vessels detached from Vice admiral Nobutake Kondō's Advance Force. Starting midnight on 14 October, another convoy consisting of four transports unloaded the bulk of their cargo, including tanks and heavy artillery. On 15 October, the destroyer Meredith, while escorting the tug Vireo pulling a resupply barge, was spotted and sunk by aircraft from Zuikaku and Shokaku. On 17 October, Hiyō and Jun'yō launched a strike force to attack transports off Lunga Point, but caused no damage. The large body of warships would remain in the waters around Guadalcanal until after fighting in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands had ceased and returned to Truk at the end of October. The recently commissioned carrier Hiyō was originally part of the fleet, but a fire in her engineering room on 21 October forced her to retire to Truk for repairs. On 25 October, 6 bombers and 12 fighters from Jun'yo attacked Henderson Field, but did little damage.
From 20 to 25 October, Japanese land forces on Guadalcanal tried to capture Henderson Field in the Battle for Henderson Field with a big attack against the US defenders. The attack was defeated with heavy casualties for the Japanese. Incorrectly believing that the Japanese army troops had captured Henderson Field, the Japanese sent warships from the Shortland Islands toward Guadalcanal on the morning of 25 October to support their ground forces on the island. Aircraft from Henderson Field attacked the convoy throughout the day, sinking the light cruiser Yura (with some help from B-17s from Espiritu Santo) and damaging the destroyer Akizuki.
Despite the failure of the Japanese ground offensive and the loss of Yura, the rest of the Combined Fleet continued to maneuver near the southern Solomon Islands on 25 October in the hope of engaging Allied naval forces in a battle. The Japanese naval forces now comprised four carriers (two large, one medium, one light), Hiyō having departed due to an accidental engine fire, with a combined aircraft complement of approximately three Shokaku-class fleet carriers.
The Japanese naval forces were divided into three groups: the "Advanced" force of Jun'yō, four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and seven destroyers commanded by Kondō in heavy cruiser Atago with a support group consisting of two battleships and two destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Takeo Kurita; the "Main Body" of Shōkaku, Zuikaku, and Zuihō plus one heavy cruiser and eight destroyers, commanded by Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo aboard Shōkaku; and the "Vanguard" force of two battleships, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and seven destroyers, commanded by Rear Admiral Hiroaki Abe in the battleship Hiei. In addition to commanding the Advanced force, Kondo acted as the commander of the three forces.
On the US side, the Hornet and Enterprise task groups (Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid) swept around to the north of the Santa Cruz Islands on 25 October, searching for the Japanese naval forces. The US warships were deployed as two carrier groups, separated from each other by about 10 nmi (19 km; 12 mi). A US PBY Catalina reconnaissance seaplane based in the Santa Cruz Islands located the Japanese Main Body carriers at 11:03. However, the Japanese carriers were about 355 nmi (657 km; 409 mi) from the US force, just beyond carrier aircraft range. Kinkaid, hoping to close the range to attack that day, steamed towards the Japanese carriers at top speed and, at 14:25, launched a strike force of 23 aircraft. The Japanese, knowing that they had been spotted by US aircraft and not knowing where the US carriers were, turned to the north to stay out of range of the US carrier aircraft. The US strike force returned to its carriers without finding the Japanese warships.
Battle
Carrier action on 26 October: first strikes
At 02:50 on 26 October, the Japanese naval forces reversed direction and the naval forces of the two adversaries closed the distance until they were only 200 nmi (370 km; 230 mi) away from each other by 05:00. Both sides launched search aircraft and prepared their remaining aircraft to attack as soon as the other side's ships were located. Although a radar-equipped Catalina sighted the Japanese carriers at 03:10, the report did not reach Kinkaid until 05:12. Therefore, believing that the Japanese ships had probably changed position during the intervening two hours, he decided to withhold launching a strike force until he received more current information on the location of the Japanese ships.