The Battle of Mersa Matruh was fought from 26 to 29 June 1942, following the defeat of the Eighth Army (General Sir Claude Auchinleck) at the Battle of Gazala and was part of the Western Desert Campaign of the Second World War. The battle was fought with the German–Italian Panzer Army Afrika (Panzerarmee Afrika (Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel). The Eighth Army comprised X Corps and XIII Corps.
The battle was fought during the pursuit by the Panzerarmee of the Eighth Army as it retreated into Egypt. Rommel intended to defeat in detail (one after the other) the British infantry formations, before they had a chance to regroup. The fortress port of Mersa Matruh and 6,000 prisoners were captured, along with a great deal of supplies and equipment. The Axis cut off the line of retreat of X Corps and XIII Corps but was too weak to stop the British from breaking out.
Background
After the defeat of the Eighth Army at the Battle of Gazala, it was compelled to retreat eastwards. The British left a garrison in Tobruk that was expected to be strong enough to hold the port while the Eighth Army regrouped and replaced its losses. The British command had not prepared Tobruk for a lengthy siege and planned to return to relieve the Tobruk garrison within two months. The Axis capture of Tobruk in a day was a great psychological blow to the British and meant that Panzer Army Africa (Panzerarmee Afrika/Armata Corazzata Africa) had a port, ample supplies and did not need to leave a garrison to watch the port.
The Italians and Germans could invade Egypt for the second time. After the victory at Tobruk, Rommel pressed on the heels of the Eighth Army. Rommel intended to bring the Eighth Army to battle and defeat it before the British had the chance to bring up fresh units and reform behind a defensive line. Though his forces were badly weakened by the Battle of Gazala, he had speed, guile and surprise. The 21st Panzer Division was given one day to regroup and then was sent down the coast road to Egypt.
Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief Middle East Command, offered his resignation on 22 June, which was declined. To slow the Axis advance into Egypt, the British command intended to form a defensive position at the Cyrenaica–Egypt frontier, along the Frontier Wire ("the wire"). XIII Corps (Lieutenant-General William Gott), was to fight a delaying action; Axis forces reached the wire on 23 June, shortly after XIII Corps. There was no time to mount a defence and the Eighth Army lacked the armour to defend the open southern end of the position. Gott recommended falling back another 120 mi (190 km) to the Mersa Matruh position. British rearguards tried to destroy the fuel and ammunition dumped at the frontier and then Gott withdrew without engaging the Panzerarmee Afrika. The British command ordered the Eighth Army to stop the Panzerarmee Afrika at Mersa Matruh.
Rommel requested freedom of manoeuvre from Mussolini to pursue the Eighth Army into Egypt, which was granted. Fuel, equipment and munitions were salvaged from remaining British stores at the frontier. Rommel pushed on unopposed through the night and the next day, meeting no resistance from the Eighth Army but increasing attack from the air. The Desert Air Force was growing in strength and operating nearer to its bases, while the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica were receding from theirs.
After the reverses at Gazala and Tobruk, the Eighth Army was disorganised and shaken in its morale. Auchinleck realised a change in command was necessary and on 25 June he relieved Ritchie and took over the Eighth Army. He issued directives to change the Eighth Army into a force that stressed mobility and made it clear that his priority was to keep it intact. The last defensive position before Alexandria was El Alamein. Auchinleck was preparing defences there but a mobile defensive battle was to be fought from Mersa Matruh to the El Alamein gap. It had become apparent to Auchinleck that non-mobile formations were helpless against mobile forces and he could ill-afford to lose more formations. He shifted transport to enable the infantry formations in XIII Corps to be fully motorised and stressed that the Eighth Army forces fighting at Mersa Matruh must not allow themselves to be cut off.
Prelude
Mersa Matruh
In 1942, Mersa Matruh (Mersa, anchorage) was a small port 120 mi (190 km) east of the frontier wire, halfway between Cyrenica and El Alamein. A railhead connected the town to Alexandria. The harbour was 1.5 mi (2.4 km) long and enclosed a small, deep-water anchorage. The coastal town was like a small Tobruk. Mersa Matruh had been fortified in 1940 before the Italian invasion of Egypt in 1940, was further strengthened during the build-up for Operation Crusader and was the last coastal fortress in Allied possession.
The town is on a thin coastal plain that extends inland 10 mi (16 km) to an escarpment. Extending further south is a second narrow plain extending 12 mi (19 km) to the Sidi Hamaza escarpment. At the eastern end of this escarpment is the Minqar Qaim track. Beyond the upper escarpment lies the high desert, extending 80 mi (130 km) south to the Qattara Depression. The western approach to the town was mined and the minefields had been extended around the southern approach to the town but the eastern approach to the fortress was still open and an airfield was just inland. The coast road (Via Balbia) was the main avenue of retreat and ran through the town.
Axis plans
When Rommel arrived, he planned to defeat the Eighth Army in detail before the British had a chance to regroup behind a defensive line and rebuild their army with fresh formations. Having dealt the British armoured forces a severe blow at Gazala, he looked to destroy much of their infantry by trapping them in Mersa Matruh. Rommel believed that four infantry divisions were in the fortress and the remnants of the British armour was to the south. He planned to use German units to push the British armour aside as the 90th Light Division trapped the infantry at Matruh. The Desert Air Force had attacked a car of the XX Motorised Corps, killing General Guido Piacenza and mortally wounding Colonel Vittorio Raffaelli, the commander of engineers and the corps commander, General Ettore Baldassarre, on 25 June while they were with the lead columns of the attack on the 7th Armoured Division.
German reconnaissance units reached the outskirts of Mersa Matruh on the evening of 25 June. Rommel planned to attack the next day but on the morning of 26 June an Axis supply column was destroyed, causing a fuel shortage and delaying the attack until the afternoon. Rommel's information on British dispositions at Matruh was incomplete, partly due to a lack of air reconnaissance and partly to the loss of his wireless interception unit, the 621st Signals Battalion, which the British had become aware of and made a point of over-running and destroying at the Battle of Gazala.
British plans
Auchinleck had been preparing defences at Mersa Matruh to be garrisoned by XXX Corps but then moved it back to the Alamein position; the positions at Matruh were taken up by X Corps (Lieutenant-General William Holmes), with two infantry divisions. The 10th Indian Infantry Division was sent to Mersa Matruh proper, while the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division was east of the town protecting the rear. To the south, XIII Corps took up positions on the high ground above the second escarpment. Auchinleck directed the corps commanders to offer the strongest possible resistance; if either corps was attacked the other was to take the opportunity to attack the Axis flank.
XIII Corps comprised the 5th Indian Infantry Division, 2nd New Zealand Division and 1st Armoured Division but the 5th Indian Infantry Division had only the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade. It was south of the town on the Sidi Hamaza escarpment. The 2nd New Zealand Division had recently arrived from Syria and took post at the eastern end of the escarpment, at the Minqar Qaim (Minqar, promontory or cliff) track. The 22nd Armoured Brigade (1st Armoured Division) was in the desert 5 mi (8.0 km) to the south-west. The division had been reinforced by the 7th Motorised Brigade and 4th Armoured Brigade (7th Armoured Division) that protected the Eighth Army against a southern flanking manoeuvre. The armoured units had lost nearly all of their tanks at Gazala but had received replacements, bringing the number up to 159 tanks, including 60 American Grant tanks with 75 mm guns.
Between the corps was a plain bounded by the escarpments, where a thin minefield had been laid, screened by Gleecol and Leathercol from the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade. The columns each had two platoons of infantry and an artillery detachment. Orders and counter-orders resulted in confusion in the minds of the British commanders. The British forces had to engage the Axis and inflict as much attrition as possible but could not risk being enveloped and destroyed. At Matruh the Eighth Army units were far stronger than the German and Italians but their effectiveness was reduced by conflicting objectives. There was little co-ordination between the British forces and communication was poor from the corps level on down.
Battle
Delays in getting units in position and refuelled meant the Axis attack of 26 June did not begin until mid-afternoon. The 21st Panzer Division moved across the short plain between the two escarpments above Matruh, with the 90th Light Division on its left flank, while the 15th Panzer Division moved across the plain above the second escarpment with the XX Motorized Corps following. The 90th Light and 21st Panzer divisions made a path through the minefield and brushed aside Gleecol and Leathercol. On the high desert plain the 15th Panzer Division ran into the 22nd Armoured Brigade and its drive forward was checked.
At dawn on 27 June, the 90th Light Division resumed its advance and destroyed the 9th Battalion, Durham Light Infantry (9th DLI), 17 mi (27 km) south of Matruh. As it moved east, the 90th Light Division came under the fire of the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division artillery and was forced to take cover. To the south Rommel advanced with the 21st Panzer Division and under the cover of an artillery duel the 21st Panzer Division made a flanking movement across the front of the 2nd New Zealand Division to the eastern approach at Minqar Qaim. The division ran into the 2nd New Zealand divisional transport at Minquar Qaim, scattering it. Though the New Zealanders were easily holding against the 21st Panzer Division, their path of retreat had been cut off. At midday on 27 June, Auchinleck sent a message to his two corps commanders indicating that they were to retire rather than risk encirclement and destruction. Rommel moved north and joined the 90th Light Division and got them to resume their advance to cut the coast road. After dark, the 90th Light Division reached the coast road, blocking the retreat of X Corps.
With the line of retreat of the 2nd New Zealand Division cut, Gott decided to withdraw that night and notified the Eighth Army. It was the Panzerarmee that was in a perilous position. The 90th Light Division occupied a narrow salient, isolated on the coast road. The 21st Panzer Division was 15 mi (24 km) away, hard pressed by the New Zealanders and the 15th Panzer Division and XX Motorised Corps were blocked by the 1st Armoured Division. Gott did not see the opportunity as he was preoccupied with getting his forces out intact. Gott relayed his intention to the Eighth Army, planning to take up a second delaying position at Fuka, about 30 mi (48 km) east of Matruh.
At 21:20 hours on 27 June, Auchinleck ordered the Eighth Army to fall back to Fuka. By this point, the 2nd New Zealand Division commander, General Bernard Freyberg, had been wounded in the neck from shrapnel. He passed command to Brigadier Lindsay Inglis the commander of the 4th NZ Brigade. Inglis chose to use his brigade to fight its way through to the east, to be followed by the divisional headquarters and the 5th NZ Brigade. There was to be no preliminary bombardment to surprise the Germans. The start of the attack was delayed until 02:00 by the late arrival of the Maori battalion. Once formed up the three battalions set off down the escarpment. With fixed bayonets, the 4th NZ Brigade drove down the Minqar Qaim track directly upon the positions of a Panzergrenadier battalion of the 21st Panzer Division. The German defenders were unaware of the New Zealand advance until they were nearly upon them and the New Zealanders drove their way through their positions.